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Abstract 
 The ability of nations to grow and to provide their citizens with a better 
standard of living depends on the competitiveness of their firms. During the 
transition from a centrally-planned to a market economy firms had to face the 
challenging task of restructuring in order to become more competitive. It was 
expected that through changes in their behaviour they would be able to replace 
once dominant price-driven competitive profiles with quality-based profiles which 
can generate higher value added and can lead to higher rates of growth. The aim of 
this thesis is to investigate competitiveness of firms and industries in Central and 
East European Countries (CEECs) in general and Croatia in particular. We argue that 
the competitiveness of firms and industries is a dynamic process closely related to 
their restructuring activities, characteristics and environment. With that in mind we 
apply dynamic panel methodology and dynamic shift-and-share analysis to two 
large firm and industry level datasets for the period 2000-2007, the most recent 
year for which data was available to us.  We compare the behaviour of Croatian 
firms with that of their rivals from several advanced CEECs, assess the competitive 
profile of Croatian exporters and examine the competitiveness of Croatian 
industries on the EU15 market. Our findings indicate that in an advanced stage of 
transition the behaviour of firms in CEECs and Croatia was typical of price 
competitive firms with improvements in labour productivity and cost efficiency 
being their most important forms of restructuring. Furthermore, we identified 
several agglomeration externalities and government policy measures such as free 
trade zones as factors which can facilitate the ability of Croatian firms to compete 
on international markets. We have also demonstrated that Croatian trade with 
EU15 is mainly of the vertical intra-industry type. Finally, stronger capital and 
innovation intensity in combination with higher pressure of imports have positive 
effects on the relative quality of exports from Croatian industries to the EU15 
market.  Based on these findings we have developed a set of recommendations for 
Croatian policy makers and managers which we hope can stimulate the 
innovativeness of firms and industries and increase their ability to compete through 
quality. 
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Preface 
 The past two decades have witnessed the transition of former socialist 
countries from centrally-planned into market-style economies. This process was 
motivated by political, social and economic factors. Notwithstanding the relative 
importance of the developments in the first two spheres, the emphasis of this 
research is on the economic outcomes of transition. Owing to a number of reasons 
such as the low efficiency and innovativeness of firms, a lack of entrepreneurial 
activity and specialisation of industries in low value added products, the economic 
performance of former centrally-planned economies was inferior to their market 
oriented counterparts and one of main expectations from transition was to initiate 
the process of restructuring which would transform former socialist enterprises into 
competitive firms and change the competitive profiles of their industries, away from 
the low value added and low technology products towards sophisticated products 
with higher technological intensity. In such a context, this thesis will investigate the 
evolution of competitiveness during the transition period paying particular 
attention to its relationship with the process of restructuring.  
 Competitiveness is an issue of growing interest amongst academics, 
businessmen and policy makers who are concerned about the ability of firms, 
industries and nations to compete on the global market. The process of transition 
has provided a rare and valuable opportunity to observe how this ability has 
evolved along all the above mentioned dimensions. Following the demise of central 
planning, the transition to a market system was accompanied by a strong 
reorientation of trade from former socialist countries towards new, largely West 
European, market economies. The key dimension of this reorientation was at the 
level of firms which had to face the challenging task of restructuring in order to 
survive in the new environment. However, once these economies established the 
institutions of a market system and passed the initial phase of market based 
reforms, the main question of interest to observers and policy makers became how 
these economies could compete. It was expected that through a shift from price to 
quality-driven competitiveness these economies could enhance their ability to grow 
and to provide their citizens with better standard of living. The attention was, 
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therefore, focused on the structure of their trade and the identification of channels 
through which their firms and industries can improve the sophistication of their 
products and climb on the technological ladder. 
 Owing to the differences in initial conditions and the scope and speed of 
reforms, the competitiveness of transition economies developed at an uneven pace. 
The group that went furthest in this process was the Central and East European 
countries (CEECs) whose producers today compete in the high quality segments of 
markets. At the opposite end, many of South East European countries (SEECs) and 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are still struggling to replace one 
type of (falling) competitiveness based on price-competitive standardised products 
with another type based on sophisticated, differentiable products which can lead to 
higher rates of growth for the economy. Croatia, as a country between these two 
groups, is particularly interesting. As a semi-market economy in the late 1980s, with 
the bulk of its trade going to West European markets, Croatia was expected to be 
among the forerunners of transition but much of this initial advantage vanished due 
to the war and political upheavals and its late integration into the regional, 
European and global economic associations. There is, however, little research on 
whether, by the second decade of transition, Croatian firms and industries have 
been able to catch up with advanced CEECs. 
 This research project aims to fill this gap by examining competitiveness and 
its determinants in an advanced stage of transition by developing several empirical 
models at both firm and industry levels and estimating them using rich datasets of 
firms and industries from the manufacturing industries in Croatia and several CEECs. 
The variables used in these models aim to capture different types of restructuring 
such as improvements in efficiency, innovations, investment in new technology or 
in human capital and to examine how they affect the ability of firms and industries 
to compete in both the short and long run. In addition, our investigation will 
address the role of several related issues such as agglomeration externalities, 
experience, size, or competitiveness-aimed government policies which are relatively 
unexplored in the literature on competitiveness in transition and, to the best of our 
knowledge, have not been addressed in context of Croatian transition.  The 
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originality of the approach lies also in the modelling strategy used. We emphasise 
the dynamic nature of competitiveness and take into account the mutually 
reinforcing nature of its relationship with the process of restructuring.  
 Bearing in mind the context outlined above, several research questions are 
raised that will motivate us throughout the thesis. First, what is competitiveness, 
how is it conceptualised and what is the proper way of measuring it in transition 
economies? Second, what is the role of restructuring in shaping the ability of firms, 
industries and nations to compete? Third, what are distinguishing features of 
Croatian transition in comparison to advanced CEECs? Fourth, are the competitive 
profiles of Croatian firms and industries different from those of their counterparts 
in advanced CEECs? Fifth, what determines the competitiveness of Croatian exports 
and how can their sophistication be improved? Finally, what recommendations can 
be made to policy makers in order to devise policies to improve the competitiveness 
of Croatian firms and industries?  
 These questions will be answered through quantitative analysis. To this end, 
the originality of our approach lies in the use of dynamic panel data methods which 
allow us to control for the dynamics of competitiveness while distinguishing 
between defensive and strategic forms of restructuring. For this purpose two 
comprehensive datasets, one at firm level for Croatia and several transition 
countries and one at industry level for Croatia, will be utilised. The data sets cover 
the 2000-2007 period, the most recent years for which data was available at the 
time of writing this thesis.  
 The structure of the thesis and its relevance in answering the above stated 
questions are as follows. Chapter One provides a general overview of the concept of 
competitiveness. As the critics of this concept commonly refer to its different 
meanings and the lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework, we focus our 
attention on exploring different meanings of, and approaches to, competitiveness 
and argue that despite being a relatively new economic concept, its underlying 
principles can be traced to theories of competition, international trade and 
economic growth. In addition, three main approaches to the analysis of 
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competitiveness (macroeconomic, trade and microeconomic) are critically 
examined and their suitability for the purpose of this research is discussed. In the 
second part of this chapter, we critically review the current state of the knowledge 
on the role and importance of competitiveness in the process of transition. We 
investigate: the ability of these economies to create the environment which would 
facilitate the development of business activity; examine the major changes in their 
trade structure; and identify factors and forces behind the competitiveness of their 
enterprises. We discuss the major weaknesses of previous studies and identify the 
gaps in the existing body of knowledge which is related to much of the literature 
concentrating on the competitiveness of CEECs in the early period of transition.  
 Chapter Two examines the concept of enterprise restructuring. The concept 
of restructuring, its main types, its relationship with the processes of industrial and 
economy-wide restructuring, and the reasons for enterprise restructuring in 
transition economies are examined. We contend that, for a variety of reasons, the 
behaviour of socialist enterprises had little in common with behaviour of firms in 
market economies and argue that systemic changes in their environment have 
required these enterprises to change their behaviour in order to survive in new 
environment.  In this context, we examine the progress of transition economies in 
pursuit of reforms and demonstrate the notable differences between CEECs on one 
hand and SEECs and CIS economies on the other. The last part of chapter will 
critically review the current literature on the enterprise restructuring in transition 
and highlight its shortcomings. Together with Chapter One, this will form the core 
conceptual framework for the remainder of thesis.  
 Chapter Three investigates major features of the transition process in 
Croatia. In the first part we argue that before transition the Croatian economy had 
some of the major characteristics that may have led to the expectation of its being 
among the forerunners of transition. We show that Croatia’s institutional 
framework was more liberal than that in other centrally-planned economies, 
allowing enterprises significantly greater freedom of decision-making. Also, we 
demonstrate that Croatia’s main trading partners were West European market 
economies (not the Soviet block countries) and that the structure of Croatian 
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economy was closer to EU15 economies than any other socialist country. The 
second part of this chapter will outline the main features of Croatian transition. 
Here we establish that the first decade of transition was marked by several adverse 
developments including the war, the failure of the privatisation programme and the 
delayed integration into the regional, European and global economic institutions 
which impeded the restructuring of Croatian enterprises and eroded their 
competitiveness. However, we also show that in the second decade of transition 
many of these negative trends were reversed and Croatia was integrated into the 
regional, European and global economic associations with greater intensity.  
 The following three chapters provide the empirical analysis of 
competitiveness in transition. In Chapter Four, we develop a model examining 
factors and forces influencing the competitiveness of firms (measured by their 
market share) and apply it to a rich dataset of firms from Croatia, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Poland. Here, the process of restructuring is modelled 
through several variables reflecting improvements in the efficiency of firms. A 
dynamic panel method is used for estimation given the dynamic nature of 
competitiveness. In addition, the role of location, experience and actions of other 
rivals in shaping the ability of firms to compete is examined. This part of 
investigation is of particular importance as it enables us to identify differences 
between the behaviour of firms in Croatia and those in other CEECs.  
In Chapter Five, we focus on the competitiveness of Croatian exporters 
(measured by export intensity). The goal here is to establish whether, on 
international markets, these firms compete in terms of price or in terms of quality. 
While sharing the estimation method and many of the variables in the model with 
the previous chapter, the richness of dataset allows us to introduce several new 
variables measuring the impact of innovations, investment in human capital as well 
as the impact of entrepreneurial and free trade zones on the competitiveness of 
Croatian exporters.  
 In Chapter Six, we move the analysis to the level of industry and analyse the 
competitiveness of Croatian export to the EU15 market, paying special attention to 
xvii  
the structure of its traded products. In first part of this investigation, a dynamic 
shift-and-share analysis is employed to identify the main factors influencing changes 
in Croatia’s market share. In continuation, the structure of trade with EU15 is 
examined in detail to distinguish between inter-industry and within-industry trade. 
The objective is to investigate whether Croatian exports to the EU15 market has 
shifted towards products of higher technological intensity, and whether the intra-
industry trade between the two entities is of vertical or horizontal type. In the last 
part of this chapter, a model will be developed to relate the relative quality of 
Croatian exports to the EU15 market with variables such as restructuring, access to 
finance, competitive pressure and technology transfer which have been recognised 
as important in the relevant theoretical and empirical literature.  
 Finally, in Chapter Seven we will summarise our findings and formulate the 
conclusions of the thesis. We identify the contributions of this research to 
knowledge as well as its limitations, and develop policy recommendations aimed at 
improving the competitiveness of Croatian firms and industries. We distinguish 
between activities that can be undertaken to further improve the competitiveness 
of Croatian producers within their existing competitive profiles and actions which 
should be undertaken to increase their ability to compete in high quality segments 
of the market. We argue that policies targeting competitiveness should be designed 
with the aim of facilitating innovativeness, technological upgrading and investment 
in human capital as well as easier access to finance. We hope that our 
recommendations will help to increase the competitiveness of Croatian firms and 
industries on single European market once they enter the European Union.  
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2 
1.1 Introduction  
 Competitiveness is a matter of interest for academics, businessmen and 
policy makers who are concerned about the success of firms, industries and nations 
in a globalised world. In simplest terms, it refers to the ability of an economic unit 
to compete. At different levels of analysis this ability takes a range of meanings - 
from the relative position of firms on a market to the competitive profiles of their 
industries and the ability of nations to grow and to provide their citizens with better 
standard of living. In a world marked by diminishing trade barriers and intensified 
competitive pressure, different meanings of the concept complement each other as 
the ability of firms and industries to compete has an important role in explaining 
the well-being of their nations. For this reason, competitiveness is being studied by 
a growing number of scholars with different theoretical backgrounds who hope to 
find out why some economic units perform better than others. This multifaceted 
and multidimensional nature of the concept has been a constant source of debate - 
for some commentators like Krugman (1994), it has even served as a motive to 
question its theoretical foundations.  
 The ongoing transition process in Eastern Europe provides a rare and 
valuable opportunity to observe how several dimensions of competitiveness have 
been developing simultaneously. The demise of central planning in these economies 
was followed by the creation of a market environment, the reorientation of their 
trade and eventually a shift in their competitive profiles towards the high quality 
segments of the market. Yet, the key component of this process has taken place at 
the level of firms which, in order to survive, have had to learn how to compete. 
While some countries have largely completed this process others are still struggling 
to replace one type of competitiveness based on the abundance of skilled but 
inexpensive labour with another type based on skill, knowledge and technology 
intensive production methods, which are expected to contain higher value added 
and to lead to higher rates of growth for the economy. Hence, the central questions 
for the competitiveness of transition economies today are related to their trade 
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structure and the factors which can enable them to improve the quality of their 
products and climb on the technological ladder.  
 The aim of this chapter is to introduce the concept of competitiveness and 
to critically assess the existing state of knowledge on the competitiveness of 
transition economies. In Section 1.2 we bring together some of the numerous 
definitions of the concept in order to clarify its meaning. The discussion of the 
theoretical foundations of competitiveness will take place in Section 1.3 where we 
will attempt to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for this research 
project. The main approaches to competitiveness will be discussed in Section 1.4 
followed by a critical review of existing body of knowledge on the competitiveness 
of transition countries in Section 1.5. Finally, we summarise our discussion and 
provide guidance for the theoretical and empirical work in later chapters in Section 
1.6.  
1.2. What is competitiveness? 
 Competitiveness refers to the ability of an economic unit (a firm, an industry, 
a region or a country) to compete with rivals. It is associated with rivalry between 
economic units over markets or access to human and material resources and 
technology. Different economic units reveal their competitiveness in different ways 
and, therefore, there is no unique and commonly accepted definition of the 
concept. For some authors (Krugman, 1994, p. 41) this implies that competitiveness 
is not a very useful concept (more on this later). Others consider the lack of a 
comprehensive definition as the evidence of its complexity and multidimensionality 
(Lall, 2001). An important characteristic of competitiveness is its dynamic nature. 
Sources of competitiveness are not perpetual; sooner or later, rivals come up with 
better ways of doing things. Thus economic agents can sustain their 
competitiveness only by making continuous improvements in their behaviour.  
 Competitiveness is most commonly defined at the firm-level. In the 
terminology of Buckley et al. (1988), a firm is competitive if it can produce products 
of better quality and lower costs than its rivals. At this level, competitiveness is 
Chapter One: The Concept of Competitiveness 
 
4 
synonymous with a firm’s long run profit performance and its ability to compensate 
its employees while providing superior returns to its owners. Hence, at the firm 
level competitiveness encompasses three dimensions: the cost efficiency, quality 
and relative performance. Numerous variations of this definition exist in the 
literature. For Porter (1985), the competitiveness of the firm is the ability to employ 
all available resources, that is, internal characteristics, socio-cultural, institutional, 
economic and technological factors in its environment, in a way that is superior to 
its rivals. In a similar vein, Ernst (2004) defines firm’s competitiveness in terms of its 
productivity. A firm is said to be competitive if it can convert its resources into value 
more efficiently than its rivals. Finally, in the context of international trade, Buckley 
et al. (1988) define the competitiveness of a firm as its ability to deliver goods which 
will stand the test of international markets. 
 The definitions of industrial competitiveness are analogous to those of firm’s 
competitiveness. However, industrial competitiveness inevitably involves territorial 
dimension. When the industry is defined as the group of firms with similar activity 
from a particular region or country, its competitiveness is evaluated against groups 
of producers with similar activity from other regions or countries. In this case, the 
competitiveness of an industry is evaluated on both domestic and foreign markets 
and an industry is said to be competitive if it is more profitable or serves a larger 
share of international market than its rivals in other countries (Reiljan et al., 2000). 
Critiques of such understanding of competitiveness postulate that the profitability 
or market position of a group of producers from one country in relation to their 
foreign rivals may be result of numerous other factors whose effects would be 
difficult to distinguish from competitiveness if the emphasis is solely on the relative 
performance of industry (Yap, 2004). This line of thinking proposes that the 
competitiveness of industry should be evaluated primarily in terms of factors 
underlying the ability of its firms to compete such as productivity, cost efficiency or 
technological intensity.  
 At the level of the economy, competitiveness is defined as the ability to 
compete with other countries. In the terminology of US Commission on 
International Competitiveness (1985) a nation’s competitiveness is the degree to 
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which it can, under free and fair market conditions, produce goods and services that 
meet the tests of international markets while simultaneously expanding the real 
incomes of its citizens. The European Commission (2001) considers competitiveness 
of a nation to be synonymous with its ability to provide citizens with high and rising 
standards of living and high rates of employment on a sustainable basis. A 
somewhat different approach is taken by Hawkins (2006) who defines national 
competitiveness as the ability of the economy to move towards and/or shift out of 
the production possibility frontier.  
 There is also another group of definitions which are more focused on the 
ability of nations to create the right environment for their firms. For one group of 
authors the national competitiveness is issue of macroeconomic performance 
reflected in relative costs, exchange rates and productivity (Fagerberg, 1996; Porter, 
1998; Yap, 2004; Thompson, 2004). Sometimes national competitiveness is defined 
as the ability to create the institutional, technological and socio-cultural 
environment for attracting foreign investors and enabling own firms to compete 
abroad (Garelli, 1996; IMD, 1998; Reiljan et al., 2000; Thompson, 2004; Fougner, 
2006; Siggel, 2006). Some authors approach national competitiveness through the 
structure of international trade and as the ability of a nation to compete in 
industries with higher potential for value added generation (Reinert, 1994; 
Fagerberg, 1996; Lall, 2000; 2001). Different definitions of national competitiveness 
are best integrated by Scott and Lodge (1985) who consider the above-mentioned 
factors as pieces of national competitive potential and argue that the primary 
subject of national competitiveness are firms who bear the burden of competition 
with foreign rivals.  
 Putting all pieces of the above discussion together, we can see that at the 
heart of all definitions of competitiveness is the ability of firms to compete but they 
diverge on the understanding of the factors and forces from which this ability may 
arise. In the next section we attempt to develop a comprehensive theoretical 
framework which would bring together these divergent views on the concept of 
competitiveness. To do this, we will first critically review notions put forward by 
Chapter One: The Concept of Competitiveness 
 
6 
several schools of thought on the elements which make some economic agents 
superior to others and then attempt to establish a link between them.  
1.3. Theoretical foundations of competitiveness 
 For many scholars competitiveness is a relatively new economic concept 
coming from the business and management literature (Lall, 2001). The use of term 
in economics dates back to early 1980s when the first reports on competitiveness 
were published in the USA and Europe.1 For this reason it is sometimes thought that 
the concept lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework and its definitions are 
portrayed as derivatives of its measures (Krugman, 1994; Wziatek-Kubiak, 2003). 
However, competitiveness refers to ideas which are well founded in competition, 
trade and growth literature. Theoretical foundations of the concept should, 
therefore, be looked for within this body of knowledge. Here, we will first explain 
the relationship between competitiveness and competition and then combine this 
discussion with the predictions of the trade and growth literature as we develop a 
comprehensive theoretical framework of investigation. 
 As the etymological meaning of the word implies, competitiveness is closely 
related to competition. The relationship between the two can be explained in the 
frameworks of both mainstream and heterodox economic literature. The former 
body of knowledge predicts that the rivalry among firms takes place through the 
continuous search by individual firms for new, more efficient modes of production. 
This search is expected to lead to the state of competitive equilibrium or perfect 
competition in which all firms within industry are identical in size, prices and 
products while optimal functioning of the market mechanism and the rational 
behaviour of all agents preclude any possibility of rivalry and supremacy of some 
firms over others (Knight, 1921; Stigler, 1957; Vickers, 1995). In this context, 
competitiveness refers to a transitory feature of firm behaviour with the relative 
position of firms within their industries being determined by differences in their 
                                                 
1 According to Group of Lisbon (1993) the term was first mentioned in the ”Report of the President 
on U.S. Competitiveness”, published by the U.S. Department of Labour’s Office of Foreign Economic 
Research in Washington D.C. in September 1980. It was followed by the “Report of Industrial 
Competition” by the European Management Forum in Geneva 1981. 
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efficiency and where the more efficient firms have an opportunity to seize the 
market share of their less efficient rivals and to eventually drive them out of the 
market.  
 Two major weaknesses are usually associated with the above reasoning. 
First, it is postulated that in emphasising the objective of firm’s behaviour, the 
neoclassical doctrine omits to explain the methods used by firms to achieve these 
objectives (Simon, 1955). Second, assumptions such as rational behaviour of agents 
or optimal functioning of markets are major departures from the reality as limited 
cognitive capabilities prevent human beings from processing all the relevant 
information in a complex world (Fagerberg, 2003). Taking these shortcomings into 
account, alternative (heterodox) schools of thought such as the Austrian or the 
evolutionary schools suggest that models of imperfect competition, which 
introduce into the analysis bounded rationality of agents and market imperfections 
such as economies of scale, information asymmetries or preferences for varieties, 
are much closer to real world rivalry (Schumpeter, 1934; Winter, 1971; Fagerberg, 
2003). 
 In the framework of the Austrian school it is postulated that new profit 
opportunities motivate individuals to continuously search for previously unthought-
of knowledge (Mises, 1949). This line of thinking defines the ability to compete in 
terms of discoveries which can be used by firms to outperform their rivals by 
offering products of either better quality or lower prices (Kirzner, 1997). Although 
the rivalry reduces the overall level of ignorance and uncertainty in the market and 
brings it closer to the notion of competitive equilibrium the system never reaches 
this desired state. The main reason for that is the constant change in consumers’ 
tastes, technology of production and availability of resources (Vaughn, 1994). The 
Austrian school assumes that individuals respond to challenges of competition on 
the basis of trial and error. Learning about own and others’ errors increases the 
probability that subsequent actions of individuals will be rewarded with appropriate 
returns.  
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 For evolutionary economists the behaviour of firms consists of routines or 
learned principles of behaviour while their relative position is determined through 
the compatibility of these routines with the current requirements of the system, 
analogous to the biological process of natural selection (Alchian, 1950). According 
to this view, the changing nature of the environment is the reason why the survival 
of firms depends on their ability to innovate (Schumpeter, 1934; Winter, 1971). It is 
argued that “the true type of competition is the competition from the new 
commodity, new technology, new source of supply, the new type of organisation. 
This competition commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and strikes not at 
the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their 
foundations and their very lives” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 84).2 However, it is also 
emphasised that higher potential rewards from innovations come at the price of 
more uncertainty about the outcome of individual’s actions which is the reason why 
risk-averse individuals will be more inclined to imitate the routines which have 
proven to be successful for other agents (Nelson and Winter, 1982). As over time, 
the mass of imitators will reach a critical level, it follows that the superiority of the 
first innovator has diminishing character. The conclusion is that a firm wishing to 
continuously remain superior needs to continuously innovate; and this is also the 
reason why a dynamic approach to competition is needed.  
  The Austrian and evolutionary logic has served as a basis for several more 
recent theories of firm behaviour. One of these, the endogenous growth theory 
provides a quality ladder model of firm behaviour in which the R&D investment and 
stochastic innovations are the main engines of firm’s growth (Romer, 1990; Aghion 
and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Klette and Griliches, 2000). 
Although not explicitly addressing the concept of competitiveness, the rivalry with 
                                                 
2 As Fagerberg (2003) notes, the credit for the first mentioning of the relationship between evolution 
and innovation go to Marxian economists. According to their view, the evolution of capitalist 
economies is being driven by technological innovations which determine the relative efficiency of 
firms. Improvements in efficiency lead to better competitive position and higher profits at the 
expense of less efficient rivals who are eventually driven out of the market. The weakness of the 
Marxian view is that it defines innovation only as introduction of new machinery. However, it served 
as the starting point for the work of one of most influential evolutionary economists, Joseph 
Schumpeter.  
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other firms is introduced among the assumptions of the theory. The model predicts 
that the demand for a firm’s products depends on the quality of own and rivals’ 
products which in turn are determined by the ability of firms to undertake 
foresighted investment decisions (such as R&D investments). These investments, 
however, depend on the existing and expected profits. Thus, the model suggests 
that the relative performance of firms (competitiveness) and their behaviour may 
be in a simultaneous and mutually reinforcing relationship.   
 Other theories have combined the views of evolutionary economists on firm 
behaviour with those of industrial organisation and strategic management (Barney, 
1991; Conner, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1992). This literature is more explicit on the 
issue of competitiveness than any previously mentioned. One strand of literature, 
the resource-based view (RBV), argues that the ability of a firm to obtain above 
normal returns depends on its ability to either maintain distinctiveness of its 
products or to offer products identical to that of competitors at lower prices 
(Conner, 1991). According to Barney (1991), this distinctiveness is directly related to 
the ability of the firm to exploit physical capital, human capital and organisational 
capital resources at its disposal.3 When these resources are rare, imperfectly 
imitable and without any substitute, they are said to constitute the firm’s 
competitive advantage which is said to be sustained if it continues to exist after 
efforts to duplicate it have ceased (Barney, 1991). 
 Similar to the resource-based view, Porter (1985) develops a model in which 
firms combine resources and capabilities into one of two types of competitive 
advantages: cost leadership or product differentiation. The former relates to all 
situations where firms compete by offering similar products to their rivals but at 
lower prices, while the latter applies to situations where firms, by offering products 
which are superior in quality to rivals’ products, are able to set price in excess of 
costs. Besides cost leadership and differentiation which form the firm’s competitive 
advantage within an industry, the industry-specific factors determine the level of 
                                                 
3 Daft (1983) defines firm's resources as “all assets, capabilities, organisational processes, firm 
attributes, information, the knowledge controlled by a firm that enables it to conceive of and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness”  
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competitiveness of the firm and its industry. These include five forces: the threat of 
substitute products, the threat of established rivals, the threat of new entrants, the 
bargaining power of suppliers and the bargaining power of customers. The strength 
of each of these five forces determines the profitability of industry in which the firm 
operates (Porter, 1985, p. 3).  
 By postulating that the potential for profit generation differs among 
industries Porter (1985) continues the long line of thinking started by Smith (1776) 
that some industries have higher potential for technological innovations and 
improvements in productivity of labour than others which is the reason why nations 
specialising in manufacturing are wealthier than those specialising in agriculture. 
Later scholars have explained asymmetric distribution of profits across industries 
with differences in their requirement for special skills, or the need for a particularly 
large amount of investment in capital (Robinson, 1934) or with their innovation 
intensity (Schumpeter, 1934). It is postulated that the introduction of innovations 
causes inflow of imitators which has a beneficial effect on the growth of industry, its 
related sectors and the whole economy. In this context, Fagerberg (2003) highlights 
the importance of sectors with strong potential for economies of scale and learning. 
Extending these arguments to the level of national competitiveness, Reinert (1994) 
concludes that for a nation to be competitive it is not sufficient to be most efficient 
producer in any of activities but in those activities that provide highest potential for 
rising of income.  
 The concept of competitiveness is also tied to the models explaining 
international trade and its connection with economic growth. Traditional models of 
comparative advantage and factor endowment explain competitiveness of nations 
with differences in their resource abundance or in technologies which are treated 
as exogenous factors (Reinert, 1995; Yap, 2004; Fougner, 2006). Critics of these 
models are grouped around few arguments. First, it is postulated that scarce 
inherited factors may be substituted or created (Porter, 1998). Second, the 
assumption about exogenous and constant technology is said to be a major 
departure from real world conditions (Barney, 1991). Finally, the empirical evidence 
does not support predictions of these models (Fagerberg, 2003). 
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 In the new generation of trade models the focus of attention is on 
technological capabilities as the main determinant of national competitiveness. One 
stream of this literature predicts that in the presence of market imperfections 
international trade flows will be determined by technological asymmetries (Posner, 
1961). Hence, the competitiveness of a country in particular products is determined 
by the relation between the complexity of the good’s production process and its 
own level of technological development (Elmslie and Vieira, 1999). It is further 
assumed that market imperfections are responsible for the fact that there is a time 
lag between the point when the good is introduced in one country and the point 
when rivals from other countries begin to imitate it. In the meantime, it is argued, a 
country can enjoy a monopolistic position in the production of that good. 
 Along similar lines, Vernon (1966) develops a theory of dynamic comparative 
advantages (product-life cycle theory) which provides an explanation for 
international trade between high and low wage countries based on their patterns of 
technological development. The theory is considered as an explanation of one of 
the most important critics addressed to the traditional explanations of trade – the 
Leontief paradox.4 It predicts that from the moment they are introduced until the 
moment they disappear from the market products exhibit four stages of life-cycle 
during which their competitive advantage moves from innovativeness to cost-based 
advantage while their production shifts from advanced to developing countries. An 
important contribution of the model is that it points out to the cyclical nature of 
technological development. The model has two important implications for 
competitiveness. Firstly, it points out that by improving cost-efficiency 
competitiveness can be improved only until a certain point. When the possibilities 
for further improvements in cost-efficiency have been exhausted, an economic 
entity that wishes to stay dominant must introduce radical change in the 
technology.   
                                                 
4 Under standard assumptions of neoclassical theory of trade capital-intensive countries would 
specialise in capital intensive products while labour intensive countries would specialise in labour 
intensive products. This assumption was disputed by Leontief (1953) who had shown that US exports 
were mainly based on labour intensive products. This finding is referred to as the Leontief's paradox. 
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  Another line of thinking introduces demand for varieties and economies of 
scale as main determinants of international trade (Krugman, 1980; Krugman and 
Obstfeld, 2003). Under the traditional view, the trade among nations could only be 
of inter-industry type. New trade theory argues that demand for variety leads to 
international trade within same industry. This ultimately leads to the exploitation of 
economies of scale which otherwise could not exist. In a parallel development, the 
endogenous growth theory has argued that agents undertake innovations 
motivated by the desire to capture above average returns from the introduction of 
new products to the market (Grossman and Helpman, 1994). When all these 
theories are merged, the conclusion is that growth potential of economies increases 
as international competitive profiles of their industries shift towards products of 
higher technological and innovative intensity. 
 In the previous section we also mentioned that competitiveness of nations 
may depend on the quality of their socio-economic environment. This literature has 
mainly developed along two strands. One group of authors, with roots in 
institutional economics consider that formal institutions, social and behavioural 
processes and cultural values have a key role in shaping the behaviour of firms and 
the outcome of competition (Freeman, 1987; North, 1990; Nelson, 1993; Fagerberg, 
2003). The other strand of literature has a narrower view and emphasises the role 
of regional and local dimensions (Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991). It is suggested 
that the ability of agents to compete is determined by the interaction between 
firms, government, universities and other organisations whose primary output is 
knowledge. Porter (1998) develops the diamond model of national competitiveness 
in which competitive advantage of a nation depends on four groups of variables: 
factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industries and firms, 
and the strategy, structure and rivalry where factor conditions refer to the factors 
of production, demand conditions refer to domestic demand, and supporting 
industries include internationally competitive supplier and related industries while 
the firm, strategy, structure and rivalry refer to the conditions for the creation, 
organisation, and management of companies as well as the nature of domestic 
rivalry.   
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 While praised in work of many authors, Porter’s view is also criticised for 
several reasons. Lall (2001) points to several weaknesses of the Porter’s model. 
First, it is argued that this model does not provide a theory of competitive 
advantage in economic terms. Second, the connections between the firm level and 
the national level are weak and unsubstantiated in the model. Third, Porter’s 
assertion that factor endowments are not systematically related to innovation is 
considered as unjustified. It is argued instead that some activities, particularly those 
that are technology and skill intensive, have higher propensity to create and sustain 
innovative advantages, and also involve close links to research institutions and 
universities. Davies and Ellis (2000) address three major disadvantages of the 
model. First, Porter’s thesis that the ability to compete depends on the strength of 
the diamond in home country may not hold if domestic firms have considerable 
part of their operations abroad. Second, they suggest that model can be amended 
in various ways. Third, they argue that firms can draw on diamonds not only at 
home country but also in other places which brings the validity of the model into 
question.   
 To sum up, several stylised facts about competitiveness emerge from the 
discussions of this section. The first and the most important fact is that there is a 
long history of efforts to understand factors related to competitiveness. Second, 
that competitiveness is a meaningful concept only when the market is imperfect 
and there is rivalry among economic entities. Third, although references to 
competitiveness can be found in both mainstream and heterodox literature, it is our 
belief that the assumptions of the heterodox literature provide a more solid 
framework for the investigation of competitiveness. However, it is evident that 
different strands of the literature could be helpful for our investigation of 
competitiveness which calls for an eclectic approach to the issue. Fourth, that the 
dynamics of competitiveness can best be portrayed by dynamic imperfect 
competition which will be used as a principal theoretical framework in the 
remainder of the thesis.  
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1.4. Approaches to measurement of competitiveness 
 We can now move on to the discussion of measurement of competitiveness. 
As with its definition, there is no commonly accepted measure of the concept but 
variety of indicators are being used depending on the specific unit of analysis. 
Broadly speaking, there are three main approaches to the measurement of 
competitiveness: macroeconomic, trade and microeconomic approach. We discuss 
each of them in more detail in this section.  
1.4.1. The macroeconomic approach to competitiveness         
 The macroeconomic approach refers to the ability of national economies to 
compete with each other. This ability is evaluated with three groups of measures 
indicating: competitive performance, competitive potential and the ability to create 
a competitive environment.5 The terminology of macroeconomic approach is being 
increasingly used by governments and different commissions all over the world 
(Lall, 2001). Such terminology is also well accepted by those for whom it is intended 
– the voters and the public in general. This is the reason why the macroeconomic 
approach to competitiveness is at the same time the most controversial and the 
most popular approach. 
 The competitive performance of nations is measured by indicators from the 
trade and growth literature such as the balance of payments and trade and export 
market share (Barcenilla-Visus and Lopez-Pueyo, 2000; Siggel, 2006) or output or 
output per capita in both levels and growth form (Fagerberg, 1988; Yap, 2004; 
Siggel, 2006). Sometimes, both trade and growth are viewed as the means of 
reaching a higher goal, the maximisation of social welfare (Aiginger, 2006). Critics of 
these measures suggest that trade performance may have little to do with 
competitiveness in situations of changing comparative advantages, when 
economies are inward oriented or when an increase in exports is based on resource 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that there are other types of measures in the macroeconomic approach. 
Aiginger (2006), e.g., defines measures of international trade and growth as measures of ”outcome 
competitiveness“ and measures related to ability of nation to create favourable environment for its 
firms as ”drivers of competitiveness“.  
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endowments or other favourable initial conditions (Krugman, 1994; Lall, 2001; Yap, 
2004). Similarly, it has been noted that measures of economic growth cannot 
distinguish between competitiveness and non-competitiveness related sources of 
growth (Garelli, 1996; Yap, 2004) and that they may be sensitive to problem of 
commensurability in cross-country comparisons (Reiljan et al., 2000).6  
 The competitive potential of nations refers to all those factors which are 
supposed to form their ability to grow and to provide their citizens with better 
standard of living. In a narrower sense this group includes indices such as the real 
effective exchange rate (REER), relative unit labour costs (RULC) and measures of 
productivity.7 In broader sense, the quality of a nation’s socio-economic 
environment can also be included in this group (Thompson, 2004). When the 
underlying structural factors in an economy are constant REER is supposed to 
reflect improvements in competitiveness through reductions in relative prices of 
goods and services (Reiljan et al., 2000; Lall, 2001). Similarly, a lower value of the 
RULC is expected to reflect the improvements in labour efficiency of one country in 
relation to other which is interpreted as improvement in its competitiveness, while 
a deterioration of efficiency and a rise in worker’s compensation have the opposite 
effect. Finally, productivity is, according to Porter (1998, p. 7), the only meaningful 
concept of competitiveness at the national level. It is expected to underlie higher 
quality of products, new technology and production efficiency, all of which have 
important roles in explaining the nation’s position on the international market.  
 Measures of competitive potential have been criticised on both theoretical 
and empirical grounds. First it has been suggested that international 
competitiveness of country may be subsidised through devaluation policies only for 
a limited period of time and that there may be reverse causality between the 
                                                 
6 Reiljan et al. (2000) point out that the conversion of these figures on the basis of exchange rates 
does not properly reflect ratios of price levels in different countries as these rates depend on supply 
and demand on the foreign exchange market or on the intervention of governmental institutions. 
7 The REER is commonly defined as the average value of a country’s currency in relation to basket of 
other currencies, adjusted for effects of inflation and weighted by the relative trade balances for 
each pair of countries included (Yap, 2004; Siggel, 2006). The RULC is defined as ratio of average 
employee compensation and output between two countries (Fagerberg, 1988; Yap, 2004) while 
productivity is defined as the value of output produced by a unit of labour or capital (Fagerberg, 
1988). 
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international price position of economy and its macroeconomic performance 
(Reiljan et al., 2000; Yap, 2004). 8 Second, Aiginger (2006) identifies unemployment, 
low participation rate and social inequality as factors that may underlie rise in 
productivity of nation. Similarly, Yap (2004) postulates that the inclusion of 
productivity in the analysis at the national level leads to the ambiguous 
interpretation of various strategies for the promotion of growth. Finally, empirical 
evidences on the relationship between some of these measures and indices of 
trade, growth or foreign market share have been ambiguous and do not provide any 
conclusion on the direction of effect (Kaldor, 1978; Fagerberg, 1988; Yap, 2004).   
  
 Indices related to the quality of institutional, cultural, and technological 
framework in which economic activity takes place generate a new dimension of the 
concept by shifting the focus of analysis from the ability of national firms and 
industries to compete internationally to the ability of nations to create a 
competitive environment and attract foreign capital9. The most popular indices 
within this group are World Competitiveness Index (WCI) calculated annually by 
International Institute for Management Development (IMD) and Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) published by World Economic Forum (WEF). The 
former index consists of four groups of sub-indices: business efficiency, economic 
performance, government efficiency and the infrastructure of an economy. In the 
Global Competitiveness Index10 nine separate sub-indices are grouped into the 
three groups: the basic requirements, efficiency enhancers and the innovation 
factors (WEF, 2007).11 The rankings of economies, on the basis of these indicators, 
                                                 
8 One such example is the Balassa-Samuelson effect which postulates that in poorer countries the 
price index will be lower due to lower prices of non-tradable goods (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003). 
9 Fougner (2006) defines this shift as a change from competitiveness in the sense of aggressiveness 
to competitiveness in the sense of attractiveness. A similar view is also employed by Porter (1998). 
10 In recent years several changes have been introduced in this methodology. Up to 2000 the 
Competitiveness Index (CI) was used as a measure of potential for economic growth. Between 2000 
and 2007 the measure of macroeconomic competitiveness used by IMD was the Growth 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) which is said to comprise the CI and level of per capita income (IMD, 
2001; Wziatek-Kubiak, 2003). This index consists of three subindexes namely, the index for level of 
technology, the quality of public institutions and for the macroeconomic conditions related to 
growth.  
11 The group of basic requirements includes institutions, macroeconomy, infrastructure, health and 
primary education. Efficiency enhancers are defined as higher education and training, market 
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are quite similar and high rates of correlation among them have been reported in 
the literature (Thompson, 2004; Hawkins, 2006). 
 Both WCI and GCI evaluate competitiveness as the country’s growth 
potential. For countries at different stages of development this potential is 
determined by different factors (Lall, 2001; Yap, 2004). In this context it is suggested 
that at lower levels of development countries will place more emphasis on the 
creation of a framework for the free and smooth functioning of factor markets 
while as they progress factors such as market regulations, infrastructure and 
development of innovation and networking oriented policies will be more 
important. It has been noted that in construction of WCI it is assumed that the 
drivers of growth do not differ across countries (Stanovnik and Kovacic, 2000; Lall, 
2001). However, the specific context of economies at different stages of 
development is taken into account in the construction of the GCI. At the low levels 
of development a larger weight is placed on the first group of factors (basic 
requirements). Similar action is undertaken with efficiency enhancers in the second 
group of factors while the role of innovation factors is emphasised for the highly 
developed economies. 
 The criticisms of this group of competitiveness measures have been directed 
at both their construction and theoretical foundations. On the practical side it has 
been postulated that many variables used to construct these indices are correlated 
with the measures of output without being its cause (WEF, 2000). Moreover, the 
high degree of inter-correlation found between many of sub-indices prevents the 
use of multiple-regression analysis. Finally, it has been noted that the explanations 
for the inclusion of particular data sources in the construction of indices or for the 
preference for qualitative against quantitative data are lacking (Lall, 2001). On the 
theoretical side, the ability of nations to shape their competitiveness through 
changes in socio-economic environment in the age of globalization has been 
questioned. On one hand, the removal of trade barriers weakens the importance of 
traditional tools of economic policy (Krugman, 1994). On the other hand, the 
                                                                                                                                          
efficiency and technological readiness. Finally, the innovation factors group comprises business 
sophistication and innovation.  
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governments can actively shape economic activity in the age of globalisation 
through the provision of basic infrastructure and education, specific industrial 
policies and by creating institutional framework for the absorption, diffusion and 
dissemination of technology and knowledge (Yap, 2004; Bienkowski, 2009).  
 Summing up this part of our discussion we can draw two important 
conclusions. First, it is evident that several measures used in the macroeconomic 
approach are in fact aggregates of measures whose origins can be found at the firm-
level. Second, it is evident that the macroeconomic approach refers to factors which 
are intended to facilitate the ability of firms to compete. This suggests that national 
competitiveness is based on the competitiveness of firms as they are the ones who 
have to bear the burden of competition.   
1.4.2. The trade approach to competitiveness 
 In the trade approach to competitiveness the ability to compete is evaluated 
by means of measures indicating the structure of products traded among 
economies, and constructed from the data on exports, imports or net trade. One 
group of measures is theoretically rooted in traditional theories of comparative 
advantage and relative factor endowments. In this context, the observed trade 
patterns are supposed to reveal the specialisation of countries in particular 
products (De Benedictis and Tamberi, 2002; Utkulu and Seymen, 2004). Another 
group of measures, rooted in new trade theories, evaluate competitiveness through 
the degree of intra-industry trade. This type of measures is often used in analyses 
concerned with the catching up process between developing and developed 
economies. Both groups are criticised for two major weaknesses: their emphasis on 
the traded sector of the economy and the ambiguous interpretations of the indices. 
 Within the first group of measures, Balassa index (BI) of Revealed 
Comparative Advantage (RCA) has been in most widespread use (Balassa, 1965). In 
its original form, this index is defined as below and takes values between zero and 
infinity: 
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BIcs|w= XcsXwsXcXw ,BI∈(0,∞)                    (1.1)                                                                 
where X stands for export, c for a specific country, s for industry and w for the 
group of countries under consideration (or the world). By providing a quantitative 
overview of the comparative advantage enjoyed by one country against other 
countries under consideration, the index distinguishes between countries that 
reveal comparative advantage in a particular sector and those that do not. Also, it 
allows for ranking of countries in the order of their competitiveness in a given 
sector (De Benedictis and Tamberi, 2002).12 
 Despite its popularity, the ability of BI to measure competitiveness is being 
criticised from both theoretical and empirical grounds (Bowden, 1983; Peterson, 
1988; Laursen, 1998; De Benedictis and Tamberi, 2002; Wziatek-Kubiak, 2003; 
Utkulu and Seymen, 2004). On the theoretical front it is argued that the index 
reflects competitiveness only when several restrictive assumptions such as constant 
domestic and foreign demand, the absence of subsidies, import restrictions and any 
other tools of government intervention capable of influencing the trade patterns 
are met (Bowden, 1983; Wziatek-Kubiak, 2003). If this is not the case it is hard to 
tell what the index measures and the results can be biased. Some authors 
emphasise the sensitivity of index to the size of economy as another potential 
source of bias in cross-country comparisons (Peterson, 1988; De Benedictis and 
Tamberi, 2002). Moreover, taking values between zero and infinity with 1 as 
threshold the index is asymmetrical distributed which can lead to problems with 
non-normality if it is employed in the regression analysis (Laursen, 1998; De 
Benedictis and Tamberi, 2002; Wziatek-Kubiak, 2003). Finally, it has been 
acknowledged that different conclusions can be obtained from the index when the 
level of aggregation is changed (De Benedictis and Tamberi, 2002; Wziatek-Kubiak, 
2003).  
                                                 
12 There are also other definitions of BI. Peterson (1988) defines it in terms of non-neutrality. The 
index is defined as neutral when it takes value of unity. Below this threshold, it is said to reflect 
comparative disadvantage while values above unity signal comparative advantages in a given sector. 
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 Several other indices have been developed in an attempt to overcome above 
mentioned shortcomings of BI. One of these, the Michaely index (Laursen, 1998) 
takes form of:  
MIij= Xij∑ Xijni=1 - Mij∑ Mijni=1 ,Mij∈(-1,1)         (1.2)                             
with MI representing the index for industry i from country j, and X and M standing 
for exports and imports of same industry and country respectively. The positive 
values of the index reflect specialisation in the sector and negative ones reflect 
under–specialisation. While this index solves the problem of re-export as the source 
of distortion, it also tends to underestimate the results for sectors which make 
purchase via re-export (Laursen, 1998). There were also attempts to minimise the 
problems coming from asymmetric distribution of BI. Vollrath (1991) proposes to 
take the logarithm of the BI. However, Laursen (1998) notes that such practice 
leaves the index undefined for sectors in which export of the country is zero and 
introduces the index of Revealed Symmetric Comparative Advantage (RSCA) defined 
as:  
RSCAij= RCAij-1RCAij+1 , RSCAij∈(-1,1)         (1.3)  
where i and j are same as previously and which is supposed to be normally 
distributed.13  
 In another group of measures, trade competitiveness of nations and 
industries is measured through the degree of their intra-industry trade. The 
common starting point for this line of thinking is the thesis that a higher degree of 
intra-industry trade is to be found among countries at similar levels of development 
(Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003). From there it can be concluded that for developing 
                                                 
13 There have been also other attempts to deal with these issues. Bender (2001) introduces Trade 
Specialisation Index (TSI) which is defined as: TSIij=∑ ��Xi-Mi� ∑ (Xi+Mi)i� �, TSIij∈(0,1)ni=1  where a value 
of one means full specialisation and i,j,X and M being same as before. Volrath (1991) proposes the 
Relative Trade Advantage Index (RTA) in form: 
 RTAij= Xij ∑ Xiji⁄ ∑ Xijj ∑ ∑ Xijji⁄� - Mij ∑ Miji⁄ ∑ Mijj ∑ ∑ Mijji⁄� , RTAij∈(-∞,+∞)  
for an industry i from country j where values below zero reflect comparative disadvantage, those 
between zero and one neutrality and those above one the comparative advantage.  
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economies an increased value of indices of intra-industry trade signals catching up 
with their developed counterparts. The most popular measure of intra-industry 
trade is the Gruber-Lloyd index which for industry i from country j can be defined as  
GLij=1- �Xi-Mi�Xi+Mi , GLij∈(0,1)         (1.4) 
where higher values of the index imply higher degree of intra-industry trade and 
henceforth higher competitiveness. It should be noted that all measures within 
trade approach suffer from the same problem as that present in the original 
Balassa’s index, i.e. they focus only on traded sector of an economy. Moreover, 
problems inherent in BI, i.e. sensitivity to level of aggregation and interventions 
remain weaknesses in all of them. These shortcomings limit the usefulness of 
findings on competitiveness based on the trade approach.  
1.4.3. The microeconomic approach to competitiveness 
 In the microeconomic approach measures of competitiveness can be divided 
into measures of competitive performance and the competitive potential. Within 
the former group the most widely used are market share and profitability. In the 
latter group, competitiveness is evaluated through forms of competition, i.e. 
competition in prices or quality and characteristics of firms such as the unit cost of 
production or productivity. A broader dimension of competitive potential of firms 
also includes many elements which belonged to the previous two approaches to 
competitiveness such as the quality of institutional environment, industrial 
networks, government policies, etc. When this is the case, competitiveness 
becomes a multidimensional concept which depends on factors and forces from 
different levels of analysis. 
 The most widely used measures of competitive performance are profitability 
and market share. When expressed in relative terms, the former reflects the ability 
of a firm to make returns which are superior to the returns of its rivals. However, it 
is incapable of distinguishing between firms which are sacrificing their profits for 
the sake of higher returns in the future and their rivals who are truly uncompetitive 
(Buckley et al., 1988). The evaluation of competitiveness through market share of 
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firms rests on the thesis that their ability to seize market of rivals is a consequence 
of improvements in their competitiveness (Wziatek-Kubiak, 2003). However, it has 
been noted that changes in market share can be interpreted as indicators of 
competitiveness only when changes in domestic and foreign demand follow similar 
trends. Moreover, changes in the market share of a firm may come as consequence 
of dumping practices which have little to do with competitiveness (Buckley et al., 
1988). For these reasons it is commonly considered that measures of competitive 
performance, when treated alone, have ambiguous interpretations and that the 
analysis of competitiveness has to take into consideration factors which lead to 
improved ability to compete. This group of measures is known as measures of 
competitive potential.  
 Measures of competitive potential are usually derived from definitions of 
competitiveness. In one group of studies this potential is defined in terms of ability 
to undersell rivals (Warren, 1999). However, as price indices may have ambiguous 
interpretation, i.e. higher prices may be an indicator of better quality and also of 
deteriorating price-competitiveness, this ability is measured indirectly through 
factors such as costs, productivity and unit export values (Wziatek-Kubiak, 2003). 
The most frequently employed measure of costs are the unit labour costs (ULC) 
which has been defined earlier in this chapter as the ratio of labour compensations 
per employee and labour productivity. Such definition implies that firms can be 
competitive either by reducing costs of employees or by increasing their 
productivity (Buckley et al., 1988). However, it has been acknowledged that unit 
labour costs may be affected with unit intermediate costs, productivity of capital 
and the costs of learning (Wziatek-Kubiak, 2007). 
 Price competitiveness is also being evaluated in terms of export unit values 
which are defined as the ratio of the value of exports to its quantity (Aiginger, 1998; 
Fischer, 2007). This measure is primarily used as a measure of industrial 
competitiveness on international markets. The lower value of this indicator is 
considered as sign of improved price competitiveness. Yet, Fischer (2007) notes that 
changes in the composition of export rather than deteriorating price 
competitiveness can underlie observed changes in export unit values which is the 
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reason why they are much more frequently treated as an indicator of quality 
competitiveness. In this context, it is supposed that the better quality of products 
enables firms to expand its market share and achieve higher margins at the same 
time. To avoid ambiguous interpretation of the index, Aiginger (1998) proposes that 
conclusions should not be drawn about the meaning of index without considering 
the balance of trade between trading partners for a given product. Hence, if unit 
values reflect costs the countries with lower costs should be net exporters and 
countries with higher costs should be net importers of a given product. Yet, if a 
producer is net the exporter and has higher unit export values this should be 
interpreted as its competitiveness in terms of quality (Aiginger, 1998). Fischer 
(2007) concludes that the unit export value is much closer to meaning as a measure 
of price competitiveness at the highly disaggregated levels while at high levels of 
aggregation it is possible to determine whether it reflects price reductions or quality 
upgrading.14 
 In the context of competitive potential it is also stressed that an important 
role is played by technology and research & development. Innovation leads to 
greater flexibility of firms, enables them to differentiate and to seize market share 
of their rivals while achieving above-average returns at the same time. The most 
frequently employed measure of innovation is innovation expenditure (Kemp et al., 
2003; Loof and Heshmati, 2006).15 Yet, it is often criticised on the basis that lower 
amount of own expenditures on innovations may simply reflect the fact that 
innovation is being developed in cooperation with universities or other firms. For 
this reason it has been suggested that much better measures of innovation are 
those focusing on its output such as the turnover generated from sales of new 
products (Klomp and Van Leeuwen, 2001; Loof and Heshmati, 2002) or the number 
of registered patents and product announcements (Acs and Audretsch, 1987). It 
has, of course, been noted that the number of patents presents only an 
                                                 
14 This is explained with the fact that at high levels of disaggregation there may not be two-way trade 
in particular groups of products among countries. 
15 Here, a distinction is usually made between R&D expenditure as narrower category and innovation 
expenditure which goes beyond it and includes also investment in human capital, purchase of new 
software, machinery and equipment etc.  
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intermediate (and possibly incomplete) measure of innovation output (Kemp et al., 
2003). The problem with new product announcements as a measure of output in 
cross-country comparisons is the selection of relevant sources in which the new 
products are announced. Kemp et al. (2003) conclude that the sales from new 
products are the most robust measure of innovation output which includes the 
entire innovation process. 
 The review of the literature so far suggests that the microeconomic 
approach most comprehensively represents the characteristics of competitiveness 
which makes it a logical candidate for measurement approach in this dissertation. 
Several arguments can be provided in favour of such decision. First, in several 
places throughout this chapter it was emphasised that in the end competitiveness 
comes down to the ability of firms to compete. This fact is most explicitly stressed in 
the microeconomic approach. Second, in the microeconomic approach a link is 
established between competitive performance and competitive potential. 
Individually, these two dimensions of competitiveness are not very revealing. 
However, together they are much closer to the notion of competitiveness as the 
outcome of rivalry than that suggested by other two approaches. Third, since one of 
objectives in the macroeconomic approach is to create favourable environment for 
competition among firms it follows that elements of macroeconomic approach are 
in fact constituent elements of the competitive potential in the microeconomic 
approach. On the basis of these arguments we propose a somewhat broader 
microeconomic approach which also encompasses elements from the other two 
approaches as the core approach that will be used in remainder of this thesis. 
Together with dynamic imperfect competition which we identified in Section 1.3 as 
our core theoretical framework this forms the skeleton on which our research will 
be based.  
1.5. Competitiveness in transition countries: review of the literature 
 Having specified the theoretical framework and the approach for research 
on competitiveness, our next task is to review the existing state of knowledge of 
competitiveness in transition countries. The process of transition in Central and East 
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European Economies (CEECs) provides a rare and valuable opportunity to observe 
and investigate the development of competitiveness in virtually all of the previously 
mentioned dimensions. For decades, the economic activity in these economies was 
conducted under an institutional framework that was completely different from 
that of a market economy. The structure of system dictated the firms’ involvement 
in international trade which, to a large extent, involved the export of low quality 
goods with low added value. With the onset of transition, and the change in 
institutional framework, ownership structure and macroeconomic conditions, firms 
had to change their behaviour in order to survive. They also had to compete with 
foreign firms on both domestic and foreign markets. The development of 
competitiveness in the period of transition has been an important multidimensional 
challenge – firms had to fight for their survival and governments had to try to create 
and consolidate a favourable institutional framework to help firms learn new 
principles of behaviour and reorient their trade patterns.  
 For some transition countries, particularly those that joined the EU in the 
first round of enlargement, this process is widely documented and there is now an 
extensive body of literature involving all three approaches to competitiveness. For 
other countries, however, there are still many aspects of competitiveness which 
have not been investigated. By reviewing the existing literature on the 
competitiveness of transition economies in the remainder of this chapter we will 
identify the previously unaddressed issues and define potential areas to which this 
thesis can contribute. In the interest of consistency, previous studies are grouped 
according to their main approach to competitiveness as discussed in Section 1.4.     
1.5.1. The macroeconomic approach to the competitiveness of transition countries 
 Perhaps, the best known sources of information about national 
competitiveness of transition economies are the WEF’s Global Competitiveness 
Report and IMD’s World Competitiveness Yearbook. Nowadays, these reports 
provide rankings for the majority of transition economies and, as we argued before, 
there are significant similarities between rankings of economies in these reports. As 
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an example, we present the ranking of several transition countries according to the 
Global Competitiveness Report (WEF, 2009) in Table 1.1 below. 
Table 1.1: Ranking of transition 
economies by Global 
Competitiveness Index 2008/09 
Country 
Ranking 
2009 2008 
Czech Republic 31 33 
Estonia 35 32 
Slovenia 37 42 
Poland 46 53 
Slovakia 47 46 
Lithuania 53 44 
Hungary 58 62 
Romania 64 68 
Latvia 68 54 
Croatia 72 61 
Bulgaria 76 76 
    Source: WEF, 2009 
 Table 1.1 demonstrates that using WEF’s Global Competitiveness Index the 
most competitive among the listed transition economies in 2009 were the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Poland. Croatia and Bulgaria were the least 
competitive countries in the group. In comparison with the previous year the 
highest improvement in competitiveness had occurred in Poland while Latvia and 
Croatia had experienced the sharpest decline in their competitiveness. It is 
important to note that nearly two decades after the start of transition, the EU15 
countries (with exception of Spain, Portugal and Greece) all ranked above the 
transition economies (see Table A1.1 in Appendix I). The WEF methodology 
combines the level of GDP per capita and the structure of exports to determine 
each economy’s development stage.16  Most transition economies are moving from 
the efficiency driven development stage to the innovation driven stage. The 
exceptions to this rule are Bulgaria which still resembles characteristics of efficiency 
driven economies and the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia who have 
                                                 
16 As noted in Section 1.4.1, the WEF methodology divides all economies into three development 
stages. 
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already reached the level of innovation-driven competitiveness where the ability to 
compete is based on differentiation and sophisticated production processes (WEF, 
2009).  
 Sub-indices used in construction of the GCI, as represented in Table 1.2 show 
that transition economies have low rankings in the group of ‘basic requirements’ 
which encompasses public institutions, infrastructure and macroeconomic 
framework (WEF, 2009). Here again, the best performance is recorded by the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Slovenia while the problems with the functioning of 
institutional framework are most pronounced in Bulgaria and Romania. All countries 
have somewhat higher rankings in the second group of factors, i.e. ‘efficiency 
enhancers’. WEF (2009, p. 8) identifies this group of factors as a key to 
competitiveness for efficiency-driven economies. Finally, the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia have been ranked relatively high in the third group of factors, ‘innovation 
and sophistication’ which are said to be determinant of competitiveness for 
innovation-driven economies.  
Table 1.2: Sub-indices of Global Competitiveness index for 2009 
Country Basic Requirements 
Efficiency 
Enhancers 
Innovation 
Factors 
Czech 
Republic 45 24 26 
Estonia 34 27 42 
Slovenia 29 37 30 
Poland 71 31 46 
Slovakia 54 34 57 
Lithuania 47 47 53 
Hungary 58 45 61 
Romania 86 49 75 
Latvia 60 51 86 
Croatia 52 67 72 
Bulgaria 80 62 89 
   Source: WEF, 2009 
 In addition to the previously mentioned competitiveness reports, the 
macroeconomic approach to competitiveness of transition economies has been 
employed in several empirical studies. According to Fagerberg et al. (2004) between 
Chapter One: The Concept of Competitiveness 
 
28 
1993 and 2001 the CEE candidate countries17 and Croatia experienced the highest 
rates of growth amongst all transition economies. Investigating the drivers of this 
growth, they conclude that the competitiveness of transition economies is largely 
based on cost advantages while they in general suffer from problems in the 
development of the institutional framework, macroeconomic stability and 
infrastructure. The major weaknesses of transition economies accounting for their 
low ranking in GCI include: low levels of savings, disproportionate growth across 
sectors, large share of the grey economy, high growth of public consumption, higher 
costs of insolvency than OECD countries, enforceability of contracts, corruption and 
the inflexibility of state administration whose activities were found to block 
entrepreneurial freedom and limit creativity (Stanovnik and Kovacic, 2000; Zidek, 
2004). However, in this respect there appears to be substantial differences between 
eight countries which were in line to join the EU in 2004 and Croatia, on the one 
hand and rest of transition countries on the other (Zinnes et al., 2001).   
 According to Krajnyak and Zettelmeyer (1998) in the period of 1990-1995, 
CEECs have exhibited growth in actual and equilibrium dollar wages while the 
opposite trend was found in countries of former Soviet Union. This was explained 
by the differences in the speed of reforms and the creation of institutional 
framework, as well as proximity to EU borders. However, the level of wages in these 
countries still remained below levels in mature market economies. In a similar way, 
Havlik (2005) identifies the rise in labour productivity as the main source of price 
competitiveness in Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary in the 1993-2001 period. 
For the 1996-2001 period, Torok (2008) shows that Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia improved their competitiveness on markets of Italy, Germany and 
Austria in capital, material, technology and R&D intensive products while, at the 
same time, their competitiveness in the labour intensive products deteriorated. As 
suggested by Welfens (2007) the exporters were incentivised by the appreciation in 
REER to upgrade the quality and technological sophistication of their products in 
order to offset the upward price pressure. 
                                                 
17 The term candidate countries refers to the group of countries in line to join the EU (here, it refers 
to 8 transition economies which joined the EU in 2004).  
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 Studies undertaken within the macroeconomic approach suffer from two 
major shortcomings. The first shortcoming is the fact that much of the analysis is at 
the level of descriptive statistics which questions the validity or robustness of 
conclusions about causal relationships between various observed phenomena. The 
second shortcoming of this literature is of conceptual nature. As noted by Wziatek-
Kubiak (2003), many of issues investigated within this approach can be understood 
as factors of competitiveness only in the very broad sense of the word. It is 
therefore doubtful whether these studies are investigating determinants of 
competitiveness or determinants of growth.  
1.5.2. The trade approach to the competitiveness of transition countries 
 It is widely documented that in pre-transition period producers from 
transition economies were technologically inferior and less efficient than their 
counterparts in mature market economies. Moreover, their exports were based on 
labour and resource intensive products. But with the progress of transition, and the 
changing behaviour of firms, this pattern had to change. It was expected that 
transition would incentivise firms to change their pattern of specialisation towards 
the more skill and technology intensive products. Together with the availability of 
trade data this motivated a large number of scholars to investigate competitiveness 
of transition economies using the trade approach. Most of the studies analyse trade 
patterns of some or the entire first group of transition economies that joined the EU 
in 2004 (Havlik, 2000; Fidrmuc, 2000; Weresa, 2001; Benacek and Visek, 2002; 
Wziatek-Kubiak, 2003; Ferragina and Pastore, 2005; Yilmaz, 2005; Zaghini, 2005; 
Borbely, 2007). Recently, studies focusing on other transition economies are also 
emerging (Mikic and Lukinic, 2004; Kandogan, 2006; Kaminski and Ng, 2006; 
Teodorovic and Buturac, 2006). The analyses were mostly undertaken using the 
indices of specialisation discussed in Section 1.4.2, primarily the Balassa’s Index.  
 During the 1990s, the export from CEECs to EU15 had been concentrated in 
few manufacturing industries such as textiles and textile products, basic metals and 
fabricated metal products, transport equipment and in some instances wood and 
wood products while they had comparative disadvantages in industries such as pulp 
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and paper, machinery and equipment and electrical and optical equipment (Havlik 
et al., 2001; Zaghini, 2005). They mainly competed on EU market with rivals which 
enjoyed identical comparative advantages in labour and resource intensive 
products with low value added using the low level of labour costs as the main 
competitive advantage (Benacek and Visek, 2002; Yilmaz, 2005; Borbely, 2007). By 
the end of the first decade of transition in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia, these patterns started to change towards the skill, R&D and capital 
intensive industries while in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania the trade 
patterns continued to be dominated by labour intensive industries. Benacek et al. 
(2006) point out that between 1993 and 2001 the structure of Czech exports had 
shifted from price to quality competitive goods. Using regression analysis the 
authors conclude that this was the result of changes in the trade partners’ 
aggregate demand, the real exchange rate trends and the removal of tariffs in trade 
with EU. Similar trends in competitiveness have been reported for Hungary, but 
there the capital intensity was identified as the key factor between these changes 
(Havlik, 2000; Weresa, 2001).  
 Among the very few studies on the pattern of trade in Croatia, Mikic and 
Lukinic (2004) argue that between 1997 and 2001 Croatia had the strongest 
comparative advantages in labour and resource – intensive activities and non – fuel 
primary commodities. During the same period, Croatia was increasing its 
specialisation in low skill, technology, capital and scale intensive activities. The 
overall conclusion is that Croatian trade pattern in analysed period was not 
concentrated in one group of products but rather dispersed which was interpreted 
as an indicator of the structural movement towards more sophisticated goods.   
 Analysing the trade patterns of 8 CEECs between 1993 and 2003 Borbely 
(2007) finds a dynamic relationship between current and past specialisation 
patterns measured by RCA. These results remain robust even when the industries 
are grouped according to their factor intensity. The study identifies unit export 
values and wage differentials as other determinants of the specialisation. In labour 
intensive industries it was found that the increase in relative wages of CEECs had a 
negative impact on their competitiveness while other factors were insignificant. Yet, 
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in science-based and differentiated goods the results point to the strong role of 
quality as a determinant of RCA. Finally, the results suggest that foreign direct 
investment and R&D expenditure have a positive impact on RCA in CEECs which 
further supports the thesis about the relationship between changing specialisation 
and the ability to attract foreign capital. 
 An important characteristic of the trade between CEECs and the EU during 
transition has been the increase in intra-industry trade. Between 1991 and 1996 all 
CEECs experienced a significant growth of intra-industry trade which was most 
pronounced in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary (Fidrmuc, 2000). These 
countries were followed by Slovakia Poland, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Bulgaria and Estonia respectively (Mikic and Lukinic, 2004; Havlik, 2005). The scope 
of the intra-industry trade in more advanced CEECs was particularly emphasised in 
textiles and electrical, optical and transport equipment while in the Croatian case, 
the increasing intra-industry trade was observed in tobacco, clothing, wood, non-
metal and fabricated products, machinery and equipment, and furniture industries 
(Havlik, 2005; Teodorovic and Buturac, 2006). Nevertheless, it remains unclear 
whether this intra-industry trade was of vertical or horizontal nature.  
 As with studies reviewed in macroeconomic approach, much of the work 
undertaken in the trade approach is based on descriptive statistics. This is the 
reason why explanations for causes of the observed trade patterns should be 
interpreted with caution. Studies using more sophisticated methods of analysis are 
mainly undertaken with cross-section data and thus omit the dynamic nature of 
competitiveness. The evidence from few studies which have accounted for the 
dynamics of competitiveness suggest that past realisations may have important role 
in explaining the current ability to compete of transition economies. Finally, the 
shortcomings of trade indices discussed in Section 1.4.2 receive a particular weight 
when applied to transition countries. In a turbulent environment such as transition, 
the conclusions about trade patterns cannot be assessed unless one controls for 
many characteristics of environment such as subsidies, tariffs or exchange rate 
movements. The evidence from the few studies reviewed here demonstrates this. 
These shortcomings cast doubt on the results obtained in the trade approach. 
Chapter One: The Concept of Competitiveness 
 
32 
1.5.3. The microeconomic approach to the competitiveness of transition countries 
 Investigating the competitive performance of firms and industries from 
transition economies some authors have employed domestic or EU market shares 
(Wziatek-Kubiak and Winek, 2004; Havlik et al., 2001; Hashi and Hajdukovic, 2006; 
Toming, 2006; Wziatek-Kubiak, 2007) while others have used profitability or 
measures of competitive potential (Elteto, 2001; Havlik, 2000; Havlik et al., 2001; 
Toming, 2006; Woodward and Wojcik, 2007). The studies using competitive 
potential are themselves based on unit labour and unit material costs, productivity 
and the relative unit export values.18  To these some authors have added variables 
reflecting the extent of firm and industry level restructuring as well as variables 
measuring the impact of government policy and networking (Elteto, 2001; Hashi et 
al., 2007; Woodward and Wojcik, 2007). Most of the studies using the 
microeconomic approach to competitiveness are focused on the transition 
economies which joined the EU in 2004.  
 Between 1993 and 2001, candidate countries increased their share of the 
EU15 market and the biggest gainers in this process were the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland and the bulk of the increase was caused by improvements in 
the competitiveness of industries from these economies (as opposed to other 
reasons such as an increase in demand in EU countries) (Elteto, 2001; Havlik et al., 
2001; Wziatek-Kubiak and Winek, 2004; Wziatek-Kubiak, 2007). Initially, the 
structure of exports from CEECs to EU was dominated by labour intensive industries 
which, in later stages of transition, were replaced by the more sophisticated 
technology intensive industries. In Hungary and Poland the increase of EU15’s 
market share was, in majority of cases, accompanied by a declining share of 
domestic market (Elteto, 2001; Wziatek-Kubiak and Winek, 2004; Wziatek-Kubiak, 
2007). When the industry or firm exhibits a rise in one and a decline in another 
market, it is hard to tell whether this is the consequence of improved 
competitiveness or merely a reflection of its response to a change in demand.  
                                                 
18 The relative unit export value is defined as ratio of unit export values between one industry 
(economy) and its counterpart (industry from other economy or some entity such as EU etc.) 
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 The main driver of microeconomic competitiveness in transition was the 
high growth of labour productivity which, for some countries, was higher than 
growth of productivity observed in countries of EU15 (Havlik et al., 2001). The 
growth of productivity, together with stagnating or declining wages was the main 
reason why CEECs have enjoyed the advantage of a much lower unit labour cost 
than firms in EU15 (Havlik et al., 2001; Marin, 2006). Moreover, this growth had 
favourable effects on the ability of transition economies to maintain their cost 
advantage throughout most of the transition period. In terms of unit labour costs, 
the most competitive economy of CEE419 in 1996 was the Czech Republic, followed 
by Poland, Hungary and Slovenia respectively (Havlik, 2000). Across industries, in all 
four countries, ULC was lowest in the leather and textile industry. Moreover, it was 
found that in Hungary sectors which were characterised by very high foreign 
ownership penetration, i.e. rubber and plastic products, basic metals, fabricated 
metal products, machinery and transport equipment, were much more competitive 
than same sectors in other countries. As Wziatek-Kubiak and Winek (2004) suggest, 
the major reason for differences in ULC across transition countries were 
disproportionate rates of growth in productivity and wages. Where the latter has 
been higher than the former, as was the case in Poland, the authors conclude that 
this led to a decline of competitiveness on the EU15 market.  
 The evidence on the ability of transition economies to compete in quality 
have come from international comparisons of relative unit export values between 
these economies and other exporters to the EU15 market. Using 4-digit SITC data 
Kandogan (2006) writes that CEECs started to improve the quality of their products 
already in 1993 and, by the end of 1999, almost 40% of their products competed in 
terms of quality. However, Havlik et al. (2001), using 2-digit NACE data, have found 
that between 1995 and 1999 all CEECs sold their products at lower prices than EU 
members with the exception of Greece, Spain and Portugal which was interpreted 
as the evidence of their competitiveness in low quality segments of the EU15 
market. With the respect to individual industries, the evidence suggests that, in the 
                                                 
19 This refers to the group of four advanced transition economies: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovenia. 
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period of analysis, CEECs had lowest unit export values in machinery, rubber and 
plastic, wood and wood products and manufacturing n.e.c while the industries with 
highest unit export values were food, textiles, leather and basic metals and metal 
products. Findings from other studies conducted at 3 or 2-digit level of aggregation 
appear to be closer to those of Havlik et al. (2001). Wziatek-Kubiak (2007) contends 
that the Polish export to EU15 between 1996 and 2001 mainly served the demand 
of the low and medium income consumers while Tomnig (2006) reports the same 
findings for the Estonian food industry. Overall, these findings appear to be 
sensitive to the source of data and the level of aggregation - an issue which we will 
address in chapter six.    
 In the work of some authors, there is a noticeable tendency to establish a 
relationship between different elements of competitive potential and competitive 
performance. In the terminology of Elteto (2001), competitive performance is 
defined in terms of export share, export intensity or profitability and is modelled as 
a function of firm’s activities (development of sales, productivity and investment), 
characteristics (technology level, strategies and organisation of management) and 
external conditions (macroeconomic performance, institutions and infrastructure). 
Their study concludes that restructuring activities such as investment in human 
capital, purchasing of new machinery and equipment and innovations are the key 
reasons why in Hungary foreign owned firms have been superior in terms of 
profitability and shares of foreign and domestic markets. In addition, foreign owned 
companies benefited from the establishment of customs-free zones which provided 
them with sizeable cost advantages over their domestic counterparts.   
 Another source of competitiveness identified in the transition literature is 
the technology and knowledge spill-over which flows mainly from foreign to 
domestic owned companies (Elteto, 2001). Investigating the effect of various types 
of cooperation and the internal characteristics of firms on their export intensity and 
profitability in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, Woodward and Wojcik 
(2007) find that, in 2004, firms with highest export intensity were foreign-owned 
and imported the majority of their inputs from EU15 countries. As Marin (2006) 
points out the bulk of exports from CEECs to EU15 were, in fact, outsourced 
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segments of the production process, mainly standardised, labour intensive 
activities. Their studies also find that the share of technical staff and the in-house 
R&D activity are negatively related to exports while the share of sales accounted by 
innovative products is insignificant, probably reflecting the inability of these firms to 
compete through innovations and quality of products.   
 With the respect to networking, Woodward and Wojcik (2007) include 
indicators for eight types of cooperation. The export intensity is found to be 
positively related to the number of relationships with foreign and domestic 
customers and foreign suppliers, as well as with the subcontracting to foreign firms 
which can be seen as further evidence of outsourcing thesis. When the export 
intensity is replaced with profitability it is found that older firms tend to have lower 
profitability, possibly the evidence of the surviving legacy of socialism, while the 
results with respect to technological variables remain the same as in export 
intensity model. 
 As we noted in Sub-section 1.4.1, one of the most controversial issues about 
competitiveness in the transition period is the question of the government’s ability 
to influence business climate. The evidence suggests that, at least in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, these policies were counterproductive. Using 3-digit 
industry data from the manufacturing sector for period 1996-2003, Hashi et al. 
(2007) have found that the position of industries from these countries on the EU15 
market was negatively influenced by the presence of subsidies, higher taxes, 
preferential VAT treatment and higher share of state owned companies in an 
industry. At the same time, lower relative unit labour costs, higher investment 
intensity and higher unit material costs have a positive effect on the industry’s 
share of the EU15 market. The domestic market share analysis was undertaken for 
Poland and Czech Republic. It was noted that the presence of subsidies in the Czech 
Republic and preferential VAT treatment in Poland resulted in higher domestic 
market share, while in both countries a reduction in unit labour and unit material 
costs, and an increase in the share of employment in industry, have positive effect 
on the domestic market share of each industry. It should be noted, that this study, 
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although based on a panel dataset, does not account for the dynamics of 
competitiveness. This questions the validity of the derived results.  
 In sum, we can see that within the microeconomic approach, authors have 
investigated many dimensions of the competitiveness. However, most of reviewed 
work is focused on the period up to 2003 and undertaken for advanced transition 
economies. Another shortcoming of this strand of literature is the failure of many 
authors to recognise the dynamic nature of competitiveness and to control for the 
endogeneity of the relationship between competitiveness and some of its 
determinants. As we will see in next chapter, many aspects of firm behaviour, vital 
for their competitiveness, have been influenced by firm and industry specific 
characteristics and by elements from the broader socio-economic framework during 
the transition period.   
1.6. Conclusion 
 Our analysis in this chapter showed that despite being a relatively new 
economic concept, competitiveness rests on ideas which are well established in 
both mainstream and heterodox models of competition, international trade and 
economic growth. In the first part of this chapter we clarified the meaning of 
competitiveness and reviewed the main theories underlying it. We decided to 
follow models which are theoretically rooted in concept of imperfect competition as 
this concept provides the soundest basis for competitiveness. Along these lines it 
was demonstrated that the ability of nations to grow and to provide their citizens 
with better standard of living depends on the competitiveness of their firms which 
in turn is determined by a combination of their activities and characteristics and 
features of their environment. Finally, we examined critically the three main 
approaches to competitiveness. Taking into account that the burden of national 
competitiveness rests on the back of firms the microeconomic approach was 
selected as the one that best suits the needs of our research. 
 One of reasons for the transition of former centrally-planned economies was 
the low competitiveness of their firms and industries. In the second part of the 
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chapter we identified three main directions in which competitiveness of these 
economies developed once transition was initiated. First, we showed that by the 
advanced stage of transition most of them successfully created a favourable 
business environment. Second, it was shown that following the demise of central 
planning and the break-up of traditional trade linkages, industries from these 
economies penetrated markets of EU15 where they have been competing in terms 
of prices with products of low value added. This pattern, however, started to 
change in some countries towards the more sophisticated products of higher 
technological intensity. Finally, we established that the ability of firms to compete 
during transition was directly related to changes in the behaviour (such as 
improvements in efficiency, investment in new products, technology and 
innovations or improvements in cost competitiveness) which they introduced.  
 However, the most important contribution of this chapter is the fact that it 
provides the rationale for our decision to study competitiveness of firms in 
transition in general and in Croatia in particular. The need for such study arises from 
the fact that the existing body of knowledge mainly deals with developments that 
occurred in the period before 2004 (when the first group of transition economies 
joined the EU). Moreover, our analysis shows that there is a gap in the literature on 
the competitiveness of transition countries which were not included in 2004 and 
2006 waves of EU enlargement. As Croatia faces the prospects of becoming the next 
EU member, the identification of factors influencing its competitiveness becomes a 
key issue. It is also worth mentioning that the bulk of the existing work on 
competitiveness in transition economies is based on descriptive statistics, and 
studies using more sophisticated statistical and econometric techniques do not 
control for the dynamic nature of competitiveness. Finally, little quantitative 
empirical work has been undertaken on the relationship between competitiveness 
and enterprise restructuring in transition environment.  
 To tackle these issues the thesis will develop and test several models which 
will be applied to firm and industry level data from several transition economies, 
including Croatia in the advanced period of transition (2001-2007). In this context, 
the emphasis will be on enterprise restructuring as the key process for explaining 
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the ability of firms in transition to compete. However, the research will also take 
into account the impact of industry and country specific factors which are likely to 
influence the relative position of firms. While providing the cross-country evidence 
on firm behaviour in transition economies, the results of investigation will also help 
us to determine whether the competitive profile of enterprises in these economies 
has changed over the years and have they succeeded to shift towards the high 
quality segments of market. The first steps in this investigation will be to develop a 
deeper understanding of the process of enterprise restructuring and to investigate 
the main features of the Croatian economy in transition. These two tasks will be the 
subject of the following two chapters. 
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2.1. Introduction 
 In the previous chapter we discussed the concept of competitiveness and its 
many dimensions. We argued that the position of enterprises, industries and 
economies on the market depends on their response to a wide range of incentives, 
market trends, technological changes, government policies and institutional 
reforms. In general, we argued that by making adjustments to their behaviour, 
economic units (agents) can secure their survival and seize their rivals’ market. 
These adjustments, which are commonly referred to as restructuring, can take 
various forms ranging from changes in relative size of different sectors within an 
economy to the creation of new industrial networks, changes in the input mix, 
output basket and the technology of production, and financial and operational 
changes in the behaviour of enterprises. Hence, by taking a closer look into nature 
of restructuring in this chapter we develop the second building block of our 
investigation. Particularly, we are interested in forms and determinants of 
restructuring at enterprise level since, as we argued in the previous chapter, the key 
to overall national competitiveness lies in the ability of enterprises to compete and 
this, in turn, is closely linked to their restructuring efforts. Together with findings 
from Chapter One our discussion here will form the conceptual framework for the 
remainder of the thesis.  
 Enterprise restructuring was one of most important mechanisms of the 
successful transformation of former socialist countries into market-oriented 
economies. The changing environment characterised by institutional reforms, the 
rise of new and the decline of old sectors, the release of previously suppressed 
demand partially met by the large scale entry of foreign firms, the break-up of 
traditional enterprise networks (particularly including those in other socialist 
countries), and increasing competition required enterprises to make adjustments in 
their behaviour in order to survive under the new conditions. For this reason, there 
is a large body of literature on the determinants, forms and outcomes of enterprise 
restructuring in the period of transition. By critically reviewing this body of 
knowledge the current chapter poses several questions relevant for our research. 
What is enterprise restructuring? What are its objectives and forms? What are the 
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major reasons for enterprise restructuring in transition? What are the major 
patterns of enterprise restructuring in transition conditions and what factors and 
forces have motivated enterprises to choose particular patterns of restructuring? 
 The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we explain the basic 
concepts of restructuring at economy, industry and enterprise levels. We then 
present main features of firm behaviour in former centrally planned economies and 
review major changes in socio-economic framework of these economies in Section 
2.3. In this section we also identify factors and forces that created the need for 
enterprise restructuring in transition. Section 2.4 analyses the literature on 
enterprise restructuring in transition to identify the major patterns of enterprise 
restructuring, their determinants, outcomes and the methodologies used in existing 
studies. In this process, the shortcomings and gaps in the present state of 
knowledge will be highlighted. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.  
2.2. What is enterprise restructuring? 
2.2.1. Basic concepts 
 Enterprise restructuring is the process through which an enterprise adjusts 
its behaviour to changes in its circumstances arising from actions of rivals, changes 
in market conditions, technological changes, institutional reforms or economic 
policies. These changes provide the enterprises with an opportunity to change their 
operations in order to expand their market share (often at the expense of their 
rivals). Enterprises which do not react to changes in their circumstances will 
ultimately suffer the consequence and may be driven out of the market. However, 
as we mentioned in Section 1.6, the competitiveness of nations and industries rests 
on the back of their enterprises - whose ability to compete in turn depends on their 
behaviour. From here it follows that enterprise restructuring holds the key to 
competitiveness of enterprises, industries and national economies (Lieberman, 
1990; Mathieu, 1996; Hare, 2003).  
 Enterprise restructuring is part of the wider concept of economic 
restructuring which also includes changes in the relative size of different sectors of 
the national economy, development of new forms of inter-enterprise networks and 
Chapter Two: Enterprise Restructuring in Transition 
 
 
42 
changes in the structure of production at the level of industry (Kuznets, 1957; 
Chenery, 1960; Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Hare, 2003). In this context, enterprise 
restructuring is a response to incentives created by the economy-wide or industry-
side restructuring. Systemic changes, institutional reforms, changes in demand, 
technology or the availability of new resources pave the way for changes in relative 
size of sectors within an economy which in turn motivates enterprises to adjust 
their behaviour and take advantage of the new circumstances – or ignore the new 
conditions and face the consequences. This adjustment is facilitated through the 
creation of industrial networks, acquisitions or foreign direct investment as well as 
through cooperation with research centres and training institutes (Mathieu, 1996; 
Radosevic and Sadowski, 2004). 
 Irrespective of the reason for changed circumstances, restructuring takes 
place within individual enterprises through adjustments in both financial and 
operational dimensions. Financial restructuring encompasses activities such as 
rescheduling, write-off or swapping of debt for equity and its objective is to restore 
and improve solvency and financial stability of the enterprise (Claessens, 2005). In 
this context, financial forms of enterprise restructuring are complemented by 
operational restructuring which takes place through improvements in the efficiency 
of production, adjustments of managerial incentives, organisational changes as well 
as improvements in the quality of existing products and changes in product mix 
(Carlin et al., 1994; Grosfeld and Roland, 1996; Djankov and Murrell, 2002). As we 
argued in the previous chapter, by developing new and better ways of combining 
knowledge and resources, enterprises can defend themselves against the threat of 
bankruptcy and expand their market share. Hence, enterprise restructuring can be 
understood as a process whose objective is to secure the survival of an enterprise in 
a changing environment and to increase its cash value, profitability and market 
share (Pohl et al., 1997).  
2.2.2. Patterns of enterprise restructuring 
 Enterprise restructuring is commonly divided into either defensive or 
strategic restructuring (Carlin et al., 1994; Grosfeld and Roland, 1996). In the 
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terminology of Grosfeld and Roland (1996), defensive restructuring takes place 
within existing capacities of enterprise through scaling down of activities such as 
closing, selling or leasing of unprofitable units or shedding excessive labour. 
However, it does not include activities such as the development of new products or 
product lines or the improvements in technology of production which we identified 
in previous chapter (Section 1.3) as factors and forces that enable an enterprise to 
outperform its rivals in dynamic imperfect competition. As scaling down of 
enterprise activities cannot last indefinitely and enterprise will eventually face 
closure, defensive restructuring may be labelled as a pattern of restructuring that 
secures the survival of an enterprise in the short run.  
 Strategic restructuring, on the other hand, is a pattern of enterprise 
behaviour which creates foundations for sustainable development of enterprises in 
the long run. It involves active and radical reorganisation of enterprise’s activities, 
improvements in the efficiency of production through investment in new 
equipment, introduction of innovations in production process and creation of 
incentives which will increase the productivity of labour. It also implies changes in 
the structure of products through improvements in quality of existing products and 
development of new ones. It is embarked upon by enterprises which recognise the 
irreversibility of the systemic change and undertake adjustments in their operations 
in order to outperform their rivals in the long run (Grosfeld and Roland, 1996).  
 It should be emphasised that strategic and defensive restructuring are not 
independent or mutually exclusive concepts. Some enterprises embark on defensive 
restructuring first, because of insufficient resources or incentives, and engage in 
strategic restructuring later when, for example, new and insightful owners take over 
the company and obtain sufficient resources for investment. As the behaviour of 
enterprise in any period can be understood in terms of the outcome of its past 
decision and their consequences, any mistakes made during defensive restructuring 
will act as impediment to strategic restructuring (Brada, 1998). Enterprises which 
fail to react proactively to changed circumstances will lose some of their market to 
rivals with severe consequences for their financial performance and their value. This 
would in turn, reduce their attractiveness to new owners of capital, skilled 
Chapter Two: Enterprise Restructuring in Transition 
 
 
44 
managers and qualified workers, thus making the pursuit of strategic restructuring 
more difficult for themselves (Grosfeld and Roland, 1996).   
 Summing up the findings from this section, we can better understand the 
nature of enterprise restructuring and its relevance for competitiveness of 
enterprises, industries and economies. Enterprise restructuring describes the 
process of adjustment of enterprises to various changes in their environment. It has 
two main objectives: to enable enterprises to defend themselves against 
developments that threaten their survival, and to help them outperform their rivals. 
As national competitiveness is ultimately linked to the ability of enterprises to 
compete, enterprise restructuring can be identified as a process that holds the key 
to competitiveness of enterprises, industries and economies. With these findings 
we move on to investigate factors and forces that created the need for enterprise 
restructuring in transition.  
2.3. Reasons for enterprise restructuring in transition 
 The behaviour of enterprises in centrally-planned economies had little in 
common with the behaviour of their counterparts in market economies. The two 
groups responded to different kind of incentives, had different scope of activities 
and pursued different objectives. Their differences were embedded in features of 
their economic systems. When these features changed in former socialist countries, 
enterprises had to adopt new principles of behaviour and reorganise their activities 
in a way which would make them capable of surviving in a market environment. It 
therefore follows that two sets of factors influenced enterprise restructuring in 
transition: the behaviour of enterprises in centrally-planned economies and the 
systemic change in these countries (Lavigne, 1999; Djankov and Murrell, 2002). In 
this section we address these in more detail.  
2.3.1 Enterprise behaviour in centrally-planned economies  
 In western industrialised economies, economic activity is coordinated 
through market mechanism. The key role in the functioning of this mechanism 
belongs to prices which convey to owners of means of production information 
about opportunities for employment of their resources and about preferences of 
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buyers. Based on this information, enterprises autonomously make decisions about 
various aspects of their behaviour from the choice of suppliers to production 
methods and the product mix. In former centrally-planned economies, the 
coordinating role was delegated to the administration (or a central planning office) 
which substituted the price system and covered all aspects of economic life through 
a network of bureaucratic plans.1 This also included the behaviour of enterprises 
from their objectives to their internal organisation and their contacts with both 
domestic and foreign suppliers and customers. Hence, the running of socialist 
enterprises required more technical skills than just managerial competencies. In 
practice the functioning of socialist enterprises was flawed and consequently beset 
with difficulties amongst which low efficiency, lack of incentives for innovation and 
of financial discipline were the most obvious.  
 The growth strategy of nearly all centrally-planned economies was based on 
the concept of rapid industrialisation2. The main tools for pursuit of this strategy 
were the central control of prices and international trade. In general, the system 
used the combination of subsidies and taxes to keep prices of strategically 
important goods, primarily inputs in basic industries low while many other goods, 
primarily consumer goods, were overpriced (Kornai, 1992). Through the same 
mechanism exchange rates were fixed (and subsidised) to facilitate the import of 
strategically important goods such as raw material and intermediate goods and to 
increase the export of goods for final use abroad (Lavigne, 1999). The consequences 
of such practice were shortages which created sellers’ markets in these economies 
and lowered the efficiency of their enterprises. 
 On the one hand, shortages in supply of inputs generated disruptions in 
production. To ensure continuity of production managers had to build up stocks of 
inputs and to hire more workers than needed (Knell and Rider, 1992). On the other 
                                                 
1 The features of centrally-planned economies have been exhaustively analysed in the literature and 
their detailed discussion would go beyond this thesis. Instead, here we present only few stylised 
facts. For detailed discussion interested reader should consult Kornai (1992), Gros and Steinherr 
(1995) or Lavigne (1999). 
2 This concept implies development of economy in concentric circles where initially all resources are 
concentrated in development of basic industries so that they can later serve as the basis for the 
development of more sophisticated industries. 
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hand, the seller’s market enabled enterprises to exhaust (and even go beyond) 
economies of scale without the need to introduce new technologies or to 
economize on inputs. In addition, the lack of demand-induced incentives in 
combination with the absence of private ownership meant that enterprises did not 
need to innovate. In market economies, the rights to use assets, to appropriate 
returns on them and to bear the consequences of the changes in the value of those 
assets, motivate individuals to introduce new products, new modes of production 
or to develop new channels of communication with their buyers and suppliers. Such 
incentives were absent in centrally-planned economies as the means of production 
were the property of the state and state ownership was not a clearly defined 
concept. Hence, it was not clear who should be responsible for maintaining capital 
(Gros and Steinherr, 2004). For these reasons, compared to their counterparts in 
market economies, the intensity of energy and intermediate goods use per unit of 
output was several times higher among enterprises in centrally-planned economies 
(Knell and Rider, 1992; Gros and Steinherr, 1995).   
 The low efficiency of socialist enterprises was further entrenched by their 
involvement in economic and social activities and by the presence of soft-budget 
constraints. In market economies the activities of enterprises are confined in 
majority of cases to their core activity. However, in centrally-planned economies 
enterprises were required to handle many non-core activities such as political, 
administrative and social services (Lavigne, 1999). Such practices presented 
additional burden for their cost structure but it also distracted managers from their 
core activities. Another source of inefficiency was the existence of soft-budget 
constraints. In principle, the formal obligation for the repayment of loans existed 
but in hierarchy of enterprise’s objectives, it was less important than the 
quantitative plan targets and fulfilment of social welfare activities. Liquidity 
problems were solved through administrative refinancing by banks. When 
enterprises were unable to meet their loan repayment requirement, banks would 
roll over and prolong the defaulted loans. Such soft budgetary constraints resulted 
in poor financial discipline, contributing to further inefficiency and loss-making 
operation of enterprises.  
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 Bringing all these features together, it can be seen that enterprises in 
centrally-planned economies had different objectives than their counterparts in 
market economies and running them required more technical and political rather 
than entrepreneurial skills. They lacked the knowledge of activities and skills which 
are needed for survival in a market environment. The inherent characteristics of 
centrally-planned economies had negative effects on the efficiency of enterprises 
and left them without the need for, and the incentive to innovate.  
2.3.2 Institutional reforms in transition 
 In the course of transition many institutions of centrally-planned economies 
were modified or replaced with those more typical for market economies. In 
economic terms, the most important reforms took place in fields of prices, foreign 
trade, property rights and the financial sector (Lavigne, 1999). They were 
undertaken with the expectation that the new environment will motivate 
enterprises to restructure and eliminate the problems inherited from the socialist 
period. The removal of subsidies, the pressure of previously unsatisfied demand, 
intensified foreign competition and easier access to new technology were expected 
to induce adjustments in the input and product mix and improve the efficiency of 
enterprises while the new private property rights were expected to create 
competition, facilitate innovativeness and signal the irreversibility of changes 
(Aghion et al., 1994; De Melo et al., 1996; Megginson and Netter, 2001; Mickiewicz, 
2005). On the financial side, the banking sector reform was expected to increase 
financial discipline of enterprises through the introduction of hard budget 
constraint (Borish et al., 1996). In addition, non-banking financial institutions such 
as stock-exchanges or investment funds were recognised as important mechanisms 
facilitating the transfer of property rights from the state to the private sector 
(Druzic, 2006). 
 The speed, content and timing of the introduction of above mentioned 
reforms varied among transition economies due to their specific political and social 
circumstances.  The progress of transition economies in pursuit of the above 
reforms has been traced by the EBRD in Transition Reports (EBRD, various years) 
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using a progress in transition index ranging from 1 to 4 with the higher values 
indicating the adoption of standards typical of market economies.3 Following the 
EBRD, and for the sake of simplicity, the European transition countries are grouped 
into the three main groups of Central and East European Countries, including the 
Baltics (CEECs), South East European Countries (SEECs) and East European and 
Caucasus countries4 and their progress in different areas of reform are discussed 
below. 
Figure 2.1: Progress in price liberalisation, 1989-2007 
 
Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2008 
 As Figure 2.1 shows, all transition countries abandoned administrative prices 
in early stage of transition. In some countries such as the Czech Republic and Poland 
prices were liberalized at the very start of transition in almost all sectors, except the 
energy sector, while in others prices were liberalised gradually by retaining price 
controls in sectors considered as socially important (Marangos, 2003).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 The explanation of these indices is provided in Table A2.1 in Appendix II.   
4 The first group includes transition economies that joined EU in 2004 and Croatia; the second group 
includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania and 
Serbia; and the third group includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
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Figure 2.2: Progress in external trade liberalization, 1989-2007 
 
Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2008 
 In most of transition countries external trade liberalisation took place more 
slowly than price liberalisation as tariffs were recognised by governments as a 
valuable source of revenues for financing of reforms. There was also fear that 
without some protection, domestic producers would be eliminated from market by 
their foreign rivals even before they had a chance to engage in restructuring. As we 
can see from Figure 2.2, the process of trade liberalisation was fastest in CEECs. Due 
to the obligations undertaken in the process of EU accession, all quantitative and 
administrative restrictions on trade were moved and full current account 
convertibility introduced in the early stage of transition in these countries (Gros and 
Steinherr, 2004). But even by 2000, only few transition economies had introduced 
capital account convertibility (EU candidates being these few countries). 
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Figure 2.3: Progress in small privatisation, 1989-2007 
 
Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2008 
 Property rights reforms in transition countries took place through two main 
channels: development of de novo private sector and privatisation of former state-
owned enterprises. It was recognised from the beginning that the development of 
new private sector would be a lengthy process and, therefore, the emphasis had to 
be placed on the privatization of state-owned enterprises. Most studies distinguish 
between small privatisation and large-scale privatisation. The former expression 
describes development of small entrepreneurship through either sales or renting of 
assets to small private persons in previously underdeveloped or undeveloped 
sectors such as services, trade or construction. As Figure 2.3 shows, small 
privatisation took place in the three groups of countries with different intensity. 
CEECs went furthest in this process but by 2007 neither group had reached levels of 
small entrepreneurship in the economy close to that of advanced market 
economies.  
 The privatization of large state-owned enterprises took place over a longer 
time and through several methods ranging from sale to foreign or domestic buyers 
to mass privatization schemes which consisted of often free transfer of shares to 
citizens through vouchers, either with or without the involvement of investment 
funds (Lavigne, 1999). These reforms went furthest and fastest in CEECs although, 
as Figure 2.4 shows, none of three groups have succeeded in reaching the level of 
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advanced market economies.5 The level of private property rights reached in 
countries of Eastern Europe and Caucasus is particularly low and they, even in 
advanced stage of transition, remain dominated by state ownership. 
Figure 2.4: Progress in large-scale privatisation, 1989-2007 
 
Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2008 
 The financial sector in transition economies was reformed through the 
creation of a two-tier banking sector and through the development of non-banking 
financial institutions. As Figure 2.5 shows, the banking sector reform started earliest 
in CEECs -  indeed, in some countries such as Hungary and Poland some reforms had 
been implemented even before the beginning of transition (Lavigne, 1999). By the 
advanced stage of transition these countries made significant progress towards the 
standards of banking laws and regulations typical for advanced industrialised 
economies.6 In the other two groups the reform of banking sector took place at a 
much slower pace and although  by 2007 these countries had achieved substantial 
progress in solvency of banking sector, opened market to private banks and 
liberalised interest rates , they had made little or no progress in other areas of the 
banking sector reforms (EBRD, 2010). 
 
                                                 
5 EBRD (2010) defines these standards as structure with more than 75% of privately owned 
enterprises and effective corporate governance.  
6 EBRD (2010) defines these standards as existence of well-functioning banking competition under 
effective supervision, development of term lending to private enterprises and financial deepening. 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
CEEC & 
Baltics
SEEC
East 
Europe & 
Caucasus
Chapter Two: Enterprise Restructuring in Transition 
 
 
52 
Figure 2.5: Progress in banking sector reform, 1989-2007 
 
Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2008 
 In the non-banking segment of financial sector, reforms took place through 
the establishment of stock-exchanges, investment funds, insurance markets and 
pension funds. In nearly all transition countries the establishment of stock-
exchanges was among the first measures introduced. They served primarily as a 
way of familiarizing citizens of transition economies with the principles of capital 
market and they were also expected to facilitate large-scale privatisation (Lavigne, 
1999). The ability of investment funds to restructure state-owned companies in the 
early stages of privatisation was limited as they did not have the necessary skills and 
expertise and were not well prepared for efficient monitoring of the companies in 
their portfolio. They also did not have access to finance which was needed for 
effective restructuring and in some countries they were not allowed to participate 
in the mass privatisation programme (Albania) or were allowed to participate only 
in last round of privatization which included mostly loss-making companies with 
poor prospects for survival (Hashi and Xhillari, 1999; Mickiewicz, 2005; Druzic, 
2006).  
 The development of other non-banking financial institutions was slower. 
State owned insurance companies retained their privileged position for most of the 
transition period while pension funds did not emerge until the second part of 1990s 
(Lavigne, 1999). Figure 2.6 reflects these developments. As in other fields of reform, 
the most notable progress was recorded in CEECs where the regulatory framework 
for the functioning of capital market was established early on, facilitating the 
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emergence of non-bank financial institutions. However, in the other two groups of 
countries, the development of capital market and other non-bank institutions is still 
in rudimentary form. 
Figure 2.6: Progress in securities markets and non-bank 
financial institutions reforms, 1989-2007 
 
Source: EBRD Structural indicators database 2008 
 Bringing all of these findings together we can see that the main reforms, 
which were necessary to transform the former centrally-planned economies into 
market economies, were initiated relatively early in transition and by the advanced 
stage of transition they were completed in majority of cases. This is particularly true 
for group of advanced transition economies (CEECs). As a result of these reforms, 
enterprises were forced to change their behaviour, redefine their objectives in line 
with the new market economy conditions, respond to the pressure of competition,  
and actively embark on measures which would improve their efficiency and enable 
them to increase their market share (in other words, restructuring measures).  
2.3.3. Changes in economic structure of transition economies 
 Institutional reforms are not the only channel through which enterprise 
restructuring can be motivated. Incentives may also come from changes in 
technological capabilities and in the structure of demand which may also induce a 
faster growth of particular sectors at the expense of others, and create the 
incentive for inter-sectoral reallocation of resources and adjustments in their 
product mix and production efficiency. The centrally-planned economies were 
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characterised by their low responsiveness to the above changes (Mickiewicz, 2005). 
This was particularly evident in the last two decades of their existence when they 
retained their reliance on heavy industries and concentrated on improving existing 
technologies while most market economies shifted from the heavy and resource 
intensive to more sophisticated and less resource intensive industries such as power 
engineering, computers and synthetic materials which required changes in the 
technological framework (Druzic, 2006). As we showed in the previous section, price 
and trade liberalisation have released previously suppressed and unsatisfied 
demand and provided better access to the new technologies. In this context, it 
would be expected that, over time, the economic structure of transition countries 
will converge to the economic structure of mature market economies. Figure 2.7 
shows the process of structural convergence between three groups of transition 
economies and EU15 countries in the period 1990-2007. 
Figure 2.7: The convergence of economic structure 
between transition countries and EU15, 1990-2007 
 
Source: Own calculations from World Bank data 2008 
 The vertical axis on the diagram shows the index of structural similarity, 
developed in Thiessen and Gregory (2007), which is calculated as:  
Dk=∑ (STEi-SEU15i)2i          (2.1) 
Where STEi stands for share of sector i in transition economy and SEU15i for the 
average share of sector i in EU15. Lower values of the index indicate structural 
convergence between two economic entities. Our findings indicate that at the 
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beginning of transition, in terms of their economic structure, CEECs were much 
closer to EU15 countries than the other two groups. It is also evident that the 
process of structural convergence took place with different intensities in the three 
groups of transition economies. The largest change took place in CEECs whose 
economic structures became similar to the EU15 economies already by 2000. The 
process of convergence in SEECs was slower and their structures did not become 
similar to those of EU15 until the late stage of transition. Finally, least structural 
convergence has taken place in the group of East European and Caucasus countries 
which is particularly true for the period after 1998 when, as Figure 2.7 indicates, 
there was little variation in value of structural convergence index.    
 All in all, our previous discussion shows that the institutional and systemic 
characteristics of centrally-planned economies had generated distinctive patterns of 
enterprise behaviour which had little in common with the behaviour of enterprises 
in market economies. Furthermore, the incentive system affecting these enterprises 
had generated numerous problems for them of which particular emphasis should 
be placed on the problem of efficiency. The replacement of socialist economic 
system and institutions with those of market economies required enterprises to 
rethink their objectives and to make adjustments in their organisational, financial 
and operational practices which would ensure their viability under the pressure of 
competition. The need for restructuring was further emphasised by changes in the 
structure of demand which required them to adjust their product mix. Hence, 
institutional reforms and economy-wide restructuring created an environment in 
which enterprises could not survive without changing their behaviour. Having 
established this, we proceed in the next section with the review of main findings of 
the literature on enterprise restructuring in transition.   
2.4. Enterprise restructuring in transition: review of the literature 
 During the transition period, enterprises have adjusted numerous aspects of 
their behaviour from organisational structure to the input and output mix, 
technology and their relationships with suppliers and customers. The main 
determinants, forms and outcomes of these changes have been extensively 
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documented in the literature. The general message from this literature is that 
enterprises in transition have responded to changes in their environment with both 
defensive and strategic forms of restructuring. In most studies the authors have 
identified change of ownership, competition, ease of access to finance and the role 
of managers as factors that can facilitate the adjustment of enterprises to the new 
environment. The outcomes of restructuring have been manifested in performance 
of enterprises and in their competitiveness (Grosfeld and Roland, 1996; Djankov 
and Murrell, 2002). In this section, we will focus our attention on four aspects: i) 
measurement of enterprise restructuring, ii) determinants of this process, iii) 
methodological approaches to enterprise restructuring and iv) the shortcomings 
and gaps in the previous research.  
2.4.1. Measurement of enterprise restructuring 
 The measurement of restructuring in transition literature takes two main 
forms. In some studies, the authors have focused on activities undertaken by 
enterprises to survive in new environment and investigated what factors influence 
these activities or how these activities affect the performance or competitiveness of 
enterprises in the short and long run. In other studies the authors have investigated 
the outcomes of restructuring in context of its determinants (Grosfeld and Roland, 
1996; Commander et al., 1999; Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Domadenik et al., 2008). 
There are also studies that attempt to establish a relationship between forms of 
enterprise restructuring and its outcomes (Benacek et al., 1997; Halpern and Korosi, 
2001; Carlin et al., 2004). In the rest of this section we will review the two 
approaches to measuring restructuring and then review the findings on the 
relationship between forms and outcomes of enterprise restructuring.  
 Studies focusing on forms of restructuring usually distinguish between 
defensive and strategic restructuring. The most commonly investigated forms of 
defensive restructuring include downsizing of employment and output which are 
perceived as attempts by enterprises to minimise losses caused by declining 
demand for their products (Estrin and Richet, 1993; Aghion et al., 1994; Grosfeld 
and Roland, 1996; Coricelli and Djankov, 2001; Domadenik et al., 2008). Following 
Chapter Two: Enterprise Restructuring in Transition 
 
 
57 
the same reasoning, several studies have investigated defensive restructuring 
through the ability of firms to reduce their costs (Pinto et al., 1993; Vehovec, 2003). 
The most commonly used measure of costs is the labour costs, although in some 
studies authors have also investigated the ability of enterprises to reduce the costs 
of material, energy and other inputs (Pinto et al., 1993). Finally, several studies have 
considered the sale of unprofitable units, inventories and other enterprise assets as 
the indicators of attempts by enterprises to reduce their costs and survive in the 
new environment (Estrin and Richet, 1993; Djankov, 1999).  
 On the strategic side of restructuring, studies have focused on adjustments 
undertaken by enterprises such as the replacement of obsolete capital, changes in 
their organisational and management structures, changes in methods of 
production, engagement in innovation activities aimed at improving their efficiency. 
In this context, investment in machinery and equipment has been one of the most 
commonly employed indicators of strategic restructuring (Charap and 
Zemplinerova, 1993; Grosfeld and Roland, 1996; Lizal, 1999; Coricelli and Djankov, 
2001; Domadenik et al., 2008). Most authors have approached efficiency of 
enterprises through labour productivity (Djankov, 1999; Linz, 2000; Djankov and 
Murrell, 2002; Dimova, 2003) although some studies have used changes in total 
factor productivity as the indicator of strategic restructuring (Hoekman and 
Djankov, 1997; Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 2006). A different approach was taken by 
Benacek et al. (1997) who distinguish between allocative efficiency (the ability of 
enterprises to produce with the optimal mix of inputs) and their technological 
efficiency. Finally, innovation activities have also been used as indicators of strategic 
restructuring by some authors using expenditure on R&D or the percentage of sales 
originating from new products as measures of innovation activity (Carlin et al., 
2004; Masso and Vahter, 2007; Domadenik et al., 2008).  
 Recognising the long history of loss-making in former socialist enterprises 
most of authors have taken profitability as an indicator of restructuring efforts 
(Benacek et al., 1997; Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002; Bakanova et al., 2006). Some 
authors have, however, argued that restructuring efforts of enterprises are better 
reflected in their ability to generate revenues particularly considering the poor 
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accounting system in the early phase of transition and the ability of enterprises to 
show profit in their financial statements. As Frydman et al. (1997) put it, in the short 
run, measures of profitability can be affected by accounting methods and as such 
bear limited information on the actual performance of enterprise. Furthermore, the 
ability of enterprises to create revenues reflects their orientation towards the new 
entrepreneurial environment. For this reason, several studies have also evaluated 
enterprise restructuring by using revenues or the growth of revenues as the 
indicator of successful restructuring (Frydman et al., 1997; Kocenda and Svejnar, 
2002; Carlin et al., 2004; Commander and Svejnar, 2007).  
 The link between forms of restructuring and enterprise performance or 
competitiveness has been confirmed in several studies. Improvements in allocative 
or technical efficiency have a positive effect on profitability of enterprises (Benacek 
et al., 1997). Furthermore, growth of sales was higher in those enterprises that 
engaged in the development of new products or opened a new plant (Carlin et al., 
2004). Similarly, Dimova (2003) finds that an increase in employment contributes to 
labour productivity of enterprises while Halpern and Korosi (2001) have found a 
positive relationship between improvements in efficiency of enterprise and its 
market share. Finally, Masso and Vahter (2007) have found that productivity tends 
to be higher in enterprises which have undertaken some process innovations. When 
taken together, these studies provide strong evidence that strategic restructuring 
enables enterprises to perform better, even outperform their rivals and expand 
their market shares. 
2.4.2. Determinants of enterprise restructuring 
 
 The transition literature has identified the main factors which facilitate the 
restructuring of enterprises: the institutional framework, the type of ownership and 
dominant owners, the ease of access to capital, competition, networking and role of 
managers and employees (Djankov and Murrell, 2002). Starting with institutional 
reforms, the early transition literature hypothesised that institutional changes 
would be sufficient incentive for enterprises to engage in restructuring (Carlin et al., 
1994). However, several case studies from this and later periods have challenged 
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this view suggesting that additional incentives and pressures may be needed to 
motivate enterprises to restructure (Pinto et al., 1993; Lizal, 1999; Commander and 
Svejnar, 2007).  
 Another argument originating in the early transition literature revolved 
around the role of managers and the power of workers in the decision making 
process as determinants of enterprise restructuring. Several theoretical models 
postulated that managers may be motivated to engage in restructuring with a 
combination of positive and negative incentives such as the desire to signal their 
skills to the managerial labour market (career concerns), the opportunity to gain a 
stake in the ownership of company after restructuring, as well as government-
driven incentives such as hardening of budget constraint, the introduction of 
bankruptcy laws and clear definition of property rights (Estrin and Richet, 1993; 
Aghion et al., 1994; Grosfeld and Roland, 1996). Similarly, it has been argued that 
the main opposition to restructuring can come from biggest losers in the process, 
i.e. workers who fear job losses which may arise during restructuring (Aghion et al., 
1993). However, the evidence with respect to the role of managers and the power 
of workers are ambiguous as in some studies both workers and managers were 
found to be opposed to restructuring while in others they were proven to be 
important positive factors in pursuit of reforms within enterprises (Pinto et al., 
1993; Brada, 1998). 
 The relationship between ownership and enterprise restructuring has been 
investigated in the context of differences between state and private owners and 
between different types of private owners. While both state and privately owned 
enterprises engaged in defensive restructuring, the evidence of strategic 
restructuring were more often associated with private ownership (Frydman et al., 
1997; Carlin et al., 2004; Domadenik et al., 2008). In general, private enterprises 
were found to be more productive and cost efficient, investing more in fixed assets, 
marketing and R&D, taking into account the fact that the two groups’s access to 
finance is very different (Charap and Zemplinerova, 1993; Dimova, 2003; Robinson, 
2004; Domadenik et al., 2008). With respect to different types of ownership, the 
most comprehensive restructuring took place in enterprises bought by managers or 
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outside owners, particularly foreign owners (Frydman et al., 1997; Djankov, 1999; 
Robinson, 2004). Foreign owners were able to inject new capital in the enterprise 
and in the majority of cases they brought know-how and foreign expertise. They 
also tended to increase the revenues of enterprise, increase its cost efficiency and 
labour productivity.   
 In models of enterprise restructuring hard budget constraint is defined as an 
incentive for enterprises to improve their cost efficiency (Aghion et al., 1993; 
Grosfeld and Roland, 1996). However, a substantial body of evidence indicates that 
hard budget constraints have acted as impediment to strategic restructuring of 
enterprises by blocking their access to financial funds (Carlin et al., 1994; Brada, 
1998; Claessens, 2005). Studies undertaken on enterprises in various transition 
countries have reported a positive relationship between the ability of enterprise to 
access finance and the extent of its strategic restructuring measured by various 
indicators such as investment in fixed assets, R&D, training or marketing (Djankov, 
1999; Coricelli and Djankov, 2001; Domadenik et al., 2008). However, the findings 
for defensive restructuring have not been so unambiguous. Carlin et al. (2004) 
found on a sample of enterprise from 25 transition countries that the existence of 
soft budget constraint has a positive impact on defensive restructuring while 
Coricelli and Djankov (2001) argue that the existence of soft budget constraint 
impeded defensive restructuring of enterprises in Romania.  
 With respect to product market competition, most studies have focused on 
the interactions between domestic and foreign enterprises. The starting position in 
most of these studies is that intensified competition motivates enterprises to 
change their product mix, search for new markets and improve the design and 
quality of their products (Carlin et al., 1994). But it has also been argued that the 
presence of foreign competitors can have negative effect on domestic enterprises if 
the absorptive capacity of the latter, i.e. their ability to gain benefits through rivalry 
with foreign counterparts, is low (Sabirianova Peter et al., 2004). The empirical 
evidence on the impact of competition on enterprise restructuring has been 
ambiguous. On the one hand, there is evidence of positive impact of intensified 
competition on productivity of enterprises and their motivation to introduce new 
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products (Dimova, 2003; Carlin et al., 2004). On the other hand, in some studies 
competition from foreign rivals was found to negatively influence restructuring of 
enterprises (Djankov, 1999; Angelucci et al., 2002). These findings have been backed 
up by several studies on the spillover effects of FDI on domestic enterprises. The 
explanation for this relationship is that domestic enterprises benefit from FDI 
mainly through vertical linkages (ownership over domestic enterprises) while the 
horizontal effects of FDI (competition) have mainly been associated with the exit of 
domestic enterprises from the market (Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; Damijan and 
Majcen, 2000; Sabirianova Peter et al., 2004; Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 2006). 
 Finally, in addition to these main determinants of enterprise restructuring, 
some studies have included additional variables such as size or market orientation. 
Larger firms were found to create more revenues and have higher productivity 
while smaller ones were found to invest more (Coricelli and Djankov, 2001; Dimova, 
2003; Carlin et al., 2004). Coricelli and Djankov (2001) also argue that firms oriented 
to export market tend to engage more in strategic restructuring. However, their 
finding is contradicted by Domadenik et al. (2007, 2008) who have found no 
statistically significant difference between the behaviour of enterprises which 
compete domestically and those that participate in international markets. The 
effect of market orientation is therefore ambiguous. 
2.4.3. Methodological issues  
 The modelling approach to enterprise restructuring in the early transition 
literature was based on the assumption that external environment motivates 
enterprises to change their behaviour in order to perform better or become more 
competitive (they were exogenous). However, in several studies authors have 
recognised that outcomes of restructuring may act also as its determinants 
suggesting that there is the problem of endogeneity (Carlin et al., 2004; Domadenik 
et al., 2008). In addition to this, several studies have also pointed to biases that may 
arise from the relationship between forms of restructuring and unobserved firm, 
industry and country specific characteristics (Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 2006; 
Commander and Svejnar, 2007). In the empirical literature, these problems have 
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been treated with different techniques though the degree of attention paid to them 
has varied in different studies. 
 The problem of endogeneity has been recognised in the context of the 
relationship between outcomes of restructuring such as productivity, revenues, etc. 
and the  independent variables such as innovation activities or employment 
adjustment, access to finance, type of ownership, the quality of business 
environment, the extent of competition or other industry and country specific 
characteristics (Coricelli and Djankov, 2001; Dimova, 2003; Carlin et al., 2004; Zajc-
Kejzar and Kumar, 2006; Commander and Svejnar, 2007; Masso and Vahter, 2007). 
These problems have been dealt with in two ways. On the one hand, authors of 
some studies have investigated the impact of potentially endogenous variables in 
lagged forms on the dependent variable which were measured in current period 
(Coricelli and Djankov, 2001; Dimova, 2003). On the other hand, there were studies 
that attempted to find suitable instruments for potentially endogenous variables on 
the basis of theoretical predictions and within limits of their datasets (Carlin et al., 
2004; Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 2006; Commander and Svejnar, 2007).  
 The impact of business environment on restructuring of enterprises has 
been isolated in a straightforward manner through variables which control for 
industry, region and country specific effects (Frydman et al., 1997; Linz, 2000; 
Vehovec, 2003; Bakanova et al., 2006; Domadenik et al., 2008). However, this was 
not the case with unobserved firm-specific characteristics. When these effects were 
taken as time-invariant authors have either assumed that this individual 
heterogeneity is uncorrelated with other explanatory variables (Hoekman and 
Djankov, 2000) or they attempted to eliminate unobserved firm-specific effects by 
estimating models in differenced form (Vehovec, 2003). Studies that assumed the 
sources of bias to be time-variant have specified models of enterprise restructuring 
mainly in two stages where the dependent variable in the first stage was specified 
in the form of a choice variable and the residuals from this stage were incorporated 
in the second stage equation to control for potential selection bias (Hoekman and 
Djankov, 1997; Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 2006).  
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 A distinct approach to above problems has been developed in studies using a 
dynamic framework (Christev and Fitzroy, 2002; Vehovec, 2003; Domadenik et al., 
2008; Kolesnikova, 2010). In general, these studies allow for individual unobserved 
heterogeneity of enterprises and, in that context, for the potential endogeneity 
between some of the explanatory variables and unobserved firm, industry and 
country specific characteristics. Furthermore, this approach allows authors to 
control for path dependency of enterprise restructuring as well as to distinguish 
between the short-run and long-run impacts of actions which enterprises take in 
terms of employment adjustment, investment in machinery, equipment and in 
R&D.  
2.4.4. Shortcomings of the studies on enterprise restructuring in transition 
 The review of the literature on enterprise restructuring in transition shows 
that there are several shortcomings in these studies and a number of gaps in the 
state of knowledge on the subject. Starting with the geographical coverage of 
current studies, most of the reviewed work is focused on the group of advanced 
transition economies labelled as CEECs (Benacek et al., 1997; Frydman et al., 1997; 
Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; Lizal, 1999; Halpern and Korosi, 2001; Christev and 
Fitzroy, 2002; Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002; Zajc-Kejzar and Kumar, 2006; Masso and 
Vahter, 2007; Domadenik et al., 2008). Of other countries, only a few studies have 
paid some attention to Bulgaria and Romania (Coricelli and Djankov, 2001; Dimova, 
2003) and to CIS countries (Djankov, 1999; Linz, 2000; Bakanova et al., 2006; 
Kolesnikova, 2010) while Vehovec (2003) investigated restructuring of enterprises in 
Croatia and Slovenia. Finally, Carlin et al. (2004) and Commander and Svejnar (2007) 
have brought together the data from several transition countries.  
 The studies reviewed above have largely concentrated on the early period of 
transition, prior to 1997 (Benacek et al., 1997; Frydman et al., 1997; Hoekman and 
Djankov, 1997; Lizal, 1999; Linz, 2000; Coricelli and Djankov, 2001; Halpern and 
Korosi, 2001; Christev and Fitzroy, 2002) when the most important issue was 
whether enterprises will be able to survive in the new market oriented 
environment. Other studies mainly cover the period up to 2003 (Djankov, 1999; 
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Kocenda and Svejnar, 2002; Dimova, 2003; Vehovec, 2003; Carlin et al., 2004; 
Masso and Vahter, 2007; Domadenik et al., 2008). The behaviour of enterprises in 
later years of transition when market institutions were developed and some of 
these countries joined the EU is largely unknown. In this context, another gap in 
reviewed literature relates to its time coverage.  As we can see, the research on 
enterprise restructuring in the less advanced transition economies is rather scarce 
and limited to shorter periods of time. We aim to fill this gap by using the data for a 
longer period of time and for a wider range of countries.  
 There is also an evident lack of research which would relate forms of 
restructuring with its outcomes in terms of performance and particularly 
competitiveness. Models of enterprise behaviour in most studies analyse individual 
forms of restructuring against some of its determinants or evaluate enterprise 
performance on the basis of some of the same determinants. In both cases, the 
relationship between forms of restructuring and its outcome is implicitly assumed. 
Little is known about effects of restructuring on market share, export performance 
or other indicators of competitiveness of enterprises. Also, in these studies, the 
authors focus on either defensive or strategic forms of restructuring and to the best 
of our knowledge there is no study that brings together the two forms of defensive 
and strategic restructuring with their outcomes - whether in terms of performance 
or competitiveness.    
 From the methodological standpoint, the existing literature suffers from an 
important limitation in that most studies fail to treat problems of either selection 
bias or simultaneity. As we have argued in the previous chapter, there is a 
simultaneous and mutually reinforcing relationship between forms of restructuring 
and the outcomes of restructuring (improved competitiveness of firms, for 
example). These problems have been recognised at the theoretical level but, in the 
majority of empirical studies, have not been treated appropriately. In practice, most 
studies have used techniques which allowed them to control for either unobserved 
effects or the endogeneity. In relation to that, much of the existing work is 
undertaken within a static framework and only few studies have acknowledged the 
path dependency of restructuring and placed this process in a dynamic context.  
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2.5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter we have developed our understanding of the process of 
enterprise restructuring in the transition period. We have seen that restructuring is 
a multidimensional process which takes place at macroeconomic, industry and 
microeconomic levels. Although notions of restructuring differ among these levels, 
together they form pieces of larger mechanism which can lead to improvements in 
the competitiveness of national economies in the long run. We have located 
enterprise restructuring at the heart of this mechanism and the restructuring 
processes at industry and economy-wide levels as supporting processes which 
create the environment facilitating the restructuring of enterprises.  
 It was shown that because of the problems inherited from the socialist 
period, the survival of enterprises in transition economies was not possible without 
restructuring. By the advanced stage of transition, in the majority of countries, the 
core institutions needed for the functioning of a market economy were established 
and their economic structures have become similar to those in advanced market 
economies. In analysing enterprise responses to these changes we have identified 
two main patterns of firm behaviour and concluded that only those firms who 
engage in deep or strategic restructuring have been able to survive in the long run.  
 The review of the current literature on enterprise restructuring identified 
many gaps in the present state of knowledge. It is evident that studies which relate 
competitiveness with restructuring while taking into account the dynamic nature of 
the two concepts, are generally scarce. Moreover, most of the existing studies 
estimate the effect of individual restructuring measures on firm performance and 
draw conclusions about the impact of restructuring through the relationship 
between its determinants and outcomes. Another potential problem has been 
noted is the inability of existing studies to control for problems of selectivity and 
simultaneity in models of restructuring. Finally, the majority of studies deal with 
behaviour of enterprises in early stages of transition and not the later and more 
mature phases of transition when the gap between many of these economies and 
mature market economies has been reduced. Furthermore, the present studies 
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almost entirely focus on advanced transition economies, leaving out the less 
advanced countries – a shortcoming that will also be dealt with in this thesis. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 As we stated in the Preface, the principal objective of this thesis is to 
investigate competitiveness of Croatian firms in transition. For this reason, we start 
the empirical part of the research by reviewing the development of the major 
features of the Croatian economy in the past few decades. In comparison with 
other socialist countries, Croatia has always had several distinctive features. Its 
economic activity was organised through a system which combined planning with 
market instruments and its enterprises enjoyed greater freedom of decision-
making. There were also differences in the structure of the economy, where the 
manufacturing sector was accompanied by a relatively large service sector. Finally, 
Croatia traded with both centrally-planned and market economies, the latter 
accounting for more than half of its overall international trade. These favourable 
initial conditions indicate that Croatia had the potential to be amongst the 
forerunners of transition.  
 In practice, Croatia embarked on transition in an environment characterised 
by political and social turbulences. With the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it 
was the only country that had to deal with transformational recession and to 
pursue institutional reforms in a war environment. In the post-war period, a set of 
specific political factors impeded its integration into the EU and other European and 
international trade organisations. Together with the shortcomings of its 
privatisation process, these developments delayed the restructuring of Croatian 
enterprises and eroded their competitiveness on both domestic and foreign 
markets. In the advanced stage of transition, negative trends were partially 
reversed as Croatia approached regional, European and global economic 
associations with higher intensity. 
 The chapter is organised in two main parts. In Section 3.2 we will present a 
review of the main features of the Croatian economy before transition in order to 
understand why Croatia was expected to be amongst the forerunners of transition. 
In that context, we will consider four main areas of investigation: the institutional 
setting, macroeconomic performance, economic structure and international trade. 
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Section 3.3 will then investigate the major changes that took place in these four 
dimensions during the transition period and compare Croatian experience with that 
of other transition economies. Finally, the summary of findings will be presented in 
Section 3.4.  
3.2. Croatian economy before transition 
 Before 1991, Croatia was a constituent part of former Yugoslavia –a socialist 
country with a number of distinctive characteristics compared to other centrally-
planned economies. The country followed a ‘liberal’ model of central-planning, 
known as self-managed socialism, which combined instruments of both the plan 
and the market. It had adopted the notion of ‘social ownership’ as opposed to ‘state 
ownership’, leaving enterprises, in trust, in the hands of its employees. Prices and 
foreign trade were, for the most part, liberalised. In general, and by many criteria, 
the country was closer to the standards of industrialised market economies than 
any other socialist country. In this context, it is possible to track the main features 
of the Croatian economy before transition along four main areas: characteristics of 
its institutional framework, macroeconomic performance, structure of economy 
and international trade. 
3.2.1. Institutional setting 
 Centrally-planned economies were known by their specific institutional 
setting which included state ownership of the means of production, the dominance 
of politics in all economic decisions and the coordination of economic activity 
through plans, including the strict control of prices, production, allocation of inputs 
and foreign and domestic trade. However, Yugoslavia practised a more liberal 
model of socialism known as ‘socialist self-management’. Formally, economic 
activity was coordinated through plans but these plans were more of an indicative 
than of binding nature and enterprises had to rely, by and large, on market forces 
when making decisions about their activities such as organisation of production, 
product mix, prices, borrowing or allocation of their revenues (Gros and Steinherr, 
1995). The ownership rights over means of production were vested in all citizens 
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but the management over such social property and responsibility for the 
performance of enterprises were delegated to workers who were expected to use 
and maintain these assets. In practice, the employees could use the assets to 
maximise their incomes. In such setting, managers of enterprises had the 
opportunity and incentive to show initiative and to respond to market stimulus. In 
some periods (particularly the 1960s and early 1970s), they enjoyed freedom of 
decision-making comparable to those of their counterparts in market economies. 
 Through much of its existence, Yugoslav policy makers were searching for 
the optimal balance between elements of the market system and elements of 
planning. As a consequence, in some periods the country was closer to centrally-
planned economies while in others it had more features of a market economy. The 
first departure from central planning took place between 1952 and 1964 following 
the dispute between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (and other countries of the 
Warsaw Pact) when decision-making was decentralised and market forces were 
introduced at the microeconomic level (Lydall, 1984). The gradual liberalisation of 
economy continued until 1972 mainly through price and trade liberalisation which 
enhanced managerial initiatives by providing them easier access to new 
technologies and new markets (Druzic, 2006). In that respect, it can be argued that 
Croatia’s transition to a market economy has been underway since the 1950s. 
However, some of the consequences of the liberalisation policies of the 1960s led to 
a partial retreat from market principles which limited the autonomy of managers 
and introduced the concept of voluntary social planning intended to bring market 
mechanisms under the central political control. Nevertheless, market forces were 
present to a much higher extent than in any other centrally-planned economy until 
the fall of the system.  
3.2.2. Macroeconomic performance 
 Table 3.1 summarises the movement of the main macroeconomic indicators 
of Croatia. The first available post-WW2 statistical data on Croatian macroeconomic 
performance originates from 1952. From that year until 1989, when the socialist 
period came to an end and the transition period started, the Croatian economy was 
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growing at average annual rate of 5.2%. For comparison, the average rate of growth 
in OECD countries between 1960 and 1989 was 3.93%. The productivity of labour in 
that period was growing at rate of 1.7% per year while the export/import ratio 
averaged around 75%. The only exception to this positive picture was inflation with 
average annual rate of 60%. However, averaging over such a long period may hide 
the actual variations in macroeconomic aggregates in particular sub-periods. To this 
end, the post-war period may be divided into three distinguishable periods; the 
liberalisation (1952-1971), the retreat from the market (1972-1979) and finally the 
period of economic decline (1980-1989) (Druzic, 2006). 
Table 3.1: Main macroeconomic aggregates: Croatia 1952-1989 
Period GDP growt
h (%) 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
(%) 
GDP/ 
Employm
ent 
growth 
Inflation 
(%) 
Export/ 
Import 
ratio 
1952-
1989 5.19 4.67 1.74 59.72 0.75 
1952-
1971 7.63 6.93 3.47 9.73 0.81 
1972-
1979 5.41 5.00 1.52 19.70 0.61 
1980-
1989 -0.75 -1.12 -1.80 244.32 0.77 
 Source: Own calculations based on data from Croatian 
Statistical Office (DZS) and Druzic (2006). 
 The Croatian economy recorded its highest rates of growth in years of 
liberalisation (1952-1971) when the average annual rates of growth of GDP and GDP 
per capita were 7.63% and 6.93% respectively and they were accompanied by rising 
labour productivity (Table 3.1). Inflation was lower than in any other sub-period 
(9.73%) although prices started to rise after 1960 mainly due to the fact that price 
and trade liberalisation increased prices of raw materials and agricultural products. 
Furthermore, institutional reforms improved the international competitiveness of 
Croatian producers and exports covered 83% of imports. The favourable 
macroeconomic trends partially continued in next period (1972-1979) despite 
political and social instabilities of the time and partial retreat from the market 
principles. The GDP and GDP per capita were growing at slower rates (5.41% and 5% 
respectively) as well as the output/employment ratio (1.52%).  
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 The prices in this period were growing at average annual rate of 19.7% 
although the rates of inflation in years of oil shocks (1973-74 and 1979) were higher 
suggesting that Croatia, as other centrally-planned economies, was sensitive to 
changes in the prices of energy and raw material. The export/import ratio in this 
period was substantially lower than in previous years with exports covering only 
about 60% of imports. Finally, the slowdown of economy from the 1970s turned 
into economic decline in the 1980s which was also accompanied by the declining 
productivity of labour. By this time, inflation had become an acute problem for the 
Croatian economy.1 This was caused by a combination of factors of which the most 
important were structural disproportions, the high share of foreign debt and oil 
shocks (Gros and Steinherr, 1995). The only positive developments in this period 
took place in international trade where the combination of increased export and 
administrative controls over imports resulted in export/import ratio increasing to 
0.77%. 
3.2.3. Economic structure 
 In the first years of central planning, Croatia was a predominantly industrial 
and agricultural economy as these sectors accounted for 47% and 29% of overall 
output respectively (Table 3.2). The industrialisation of economy continued in years 
of economic liberalisation and by 1964 at peak of reforms, industry accounted for 
56% of overall output. However, by this time, the share of agriculture in economy 
had decreased to 20.1% and services had become the second largest sector (24%). 
In years that followed, the share of industry and agriculture in the economy 
decreased further, and in 1988 industry accounted for 44% of the overall output, 
followed by services whose share had increased to 42% (Table 3.2).    
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The highest rates of inflation were recorded in last years of the socialist era. The average rate of 
inflation for first five years of this period (between 1980 and 1984) was 38.9% while over next five 
years (between 1985 and 1989) it increased to 336.8% reaching its peak in 1989 (1198.6%). 
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Table 3.2: The structure of the Croatian economy, 1952-1988 
Year Industrya Agriculture Services 
1952 0.47 0.29 0.26 
1964 0.56 0.20 0.24 
1985 0.45 0.13 0.41 
1986 0.45 0.14 0.41 
1987 0.45 0.14 0.41 
1988 0.44 0.13 0.42 
Source: Federal Statistics Bureau of Yugoslavia, (SZS) 
1989 and DZS, 1990 
 a Includes mining and construction 
 The comparison of the economic structure of Croatia and several other 
centrally-planned economies (for which data were available) with that of the EU15 
in 1988, using the index of structural convergence discussed in Section 2.3.3, shows 
that in structural terms Croatia was closer to EU15 countries than any other 
centrally planned economy (Figure 3.1). We can conclude that favourable economic 
policies and institutional circumstances had facilitated the gradual emergence of an 
economic structure typical of market economies.   
Figure 3.1: Structural similarity of selected centrally-planned economies and EU15 in 1988 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from DZS (1990) 
and WDI World Bank (2010)  
3.2.4. International trade 
 The distinctive feature of Croatian trade pattern in comparison to other 
centrally-planned economies was its much stronger orientation to West European 
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markets. In 1989, more than half of both Croatian export and import were 
accounted for by trade with market economies, mainly West European (Table 3.3). 
For comparison, today’s advanced transition economies (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania) and USSR imported from Western Europe only 39% 
of their overall imports while they exported 38% of their export to Western Europe 
(Lavigne, 1999). Croatia’s main trading partners at the time were Italy, Germany 
(Federal Republic) and Soviet Union (DZS, 1990). Together, these three countries 
accounted for one third of Croatian import and absorbed nearly half of its export. 
Table 3.3: Distribution of Croatian international trade in 1989 
Flow 
Export Import 
Destination 
Market Economies (MEs) 0.54 0.53 
Western Europe 0.46 0.43 
Other ME 0.08 0.10 
Centrally-Planned Economies (CPEs) 0.29 0.25 
East European CPE 0.29 0.25 
Other CPE 0.01 0.01 
Developing Countries 0.16 0.22 
   Source: DZS, 1990   
 Table 3.4 shows the sectoral distribution of international trade of Croatia 
and EU15 countries with the rest of the world in 1988.2 At that time, over 53% of 
Croatia’s exports were concentrated in two sectors (6 and 7 – ‘manufactured goods’ 
and machinery and equipment’). These two sectors also accounted for the largest 
share of EU15’s exports (almost 53%). Two sectors (3 and 7 = ‘energy and raw 
materials’ and ‘machinery and equipment’) accounted for the bulk of Croatia’s 
imports (nearly 47%). Given that 70-75% of Croatia’s trade was conducted with 
Western Europe and non-socialist countries (Table 3.3), the sectoral distribution of 
its exports and its similarity with the market economies of EU15 indicates that 
Croatian industries were influenced by, and responded to, the international market 
trends. 
 
                                                 
2 The data are classified by SITC rev 3 classification 
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Table 3.4: Sectoral distribution of exports and 
imports of Croatia and EU15 in 1988 (%) 
Sector Croatia Export 
Croatia 
Import 
EU15 
Export 
EU15 
Import 
0 11.4 9.1 10.3 9.3 
1 0.6 0.1 1.8 1.0 
2 5.8 9.3 5.5 5.9 
3 3.6 26.3 3.2 7.4 
4 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.4 
5 10.4 18.8 10.4 10.8 
6 21.5 11.6 22.6 18.1 
7 31.9  20.3 30.2 33.5 
8 14.6 4.3 14.3 11.9 
9 0.1 0.0 1.4 1.6 
               Source: Own calculations based on UN Comext database and  
               SZS (1989)  
 
 Bringing all findings from this section together we can identify several 
reasons why Croatia was expected to be among forerunners of transition. First, 
even before transition Croatia was a semi-market economy with many functioning 
market instruments which had yet to be introduced in other centrally-planned 
economies. Second, in structural terms, Croatia was closer to European market 
economies than most of other centrally planned economies. Third, Croatian 
producers have been predominantly oriented towards international trade on West 
European markets and their export was in line with import demand of that market. 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that Croatian economy suffered from several 
weaknesses common to centrally-planned economies such as the hyperinflation and 
declining efficiency.   
3.3. Croatian economy in transition  
 The transition in Croatia formally started in 1989 with the introduction of 
several laws that permitted the creation of new private businesses and the full 
transfer of ownership over socially owned means of production to employees and 
outside owners.3  As the EBRD indices of institutional reforms (Table 3.5) show, 
some degree of price and trade liberalisation and small entrepreneurship existed 
                                                 
3 These laws are also known as the Markovic laws, named after the last Prime Minister of Yugoslavia 
Ante Markovic. 
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even in 1989 before the break-up of Yugoslavia. However, these favourable initial 
conditions were offset by the political and social turmoil, including the war that 
followed Croatia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia and the 
subsequent dissolution of this country. The initial transformation policies aimed at 
facilitating Croatia’s transition to a market economy were undertaken under 
conditions of war, inflow of refugees and consequent economic, social and political 
problems (Bartlett, 2003). In addition to war, specific political circumstances during 
the second half of 1990s impeded Croatia’s EU accession as well as integration into 
international economic and political associations such as Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA), World Trade Organisation (WTO), etc. These factors did 
not facilitate restructuring of enterprises whose competitiveness declined in this 
period (Nikic, 2003). Some aspects of Croatia’s transition such as the institutional 
framework, macroeconomic performance, structural changes and international 
trade need to be discussed further.    
3.3.1. Institutional framework 
 As a semi-market economy Croatia had the advantage that the extent of 
institutional reforms that needed to be undertaken was less than in other transition 
countries. The institutional reforms in the transition period were the continuation 
of the reform processes which started in 1965 and continued in second half of 
1980s. The most important reforms were undertaken in the first half of 1990s. By 
1992, price controls were restricted to natural monopolies, highly concentrated 
industries and some sectors such as agriculture and shipbuilding where subsidies 
were justified as temporary assistance in the course of restructuring. Full current 
account convertibility and internal convertibility were established in 1993 thus 
enabling the free purchase of foreign currencies by legal and private subjects. Trade 
liberalisation was gradual and, by 1996, import quotas and non-tariff instruments 
were replaced by a set of tariffs typical of market economies (Skreb, 1995; Bartlett, 
2003). The capital account was liberalized only in 2007 and in that respect, Croatia 
was more conservative than other CEECs (Babic, 2002). Croatia experimented with 
several exchange rate mechanisms from the real exchange rate regime (REER) 
inherited from Yugoslavia to fixed exchange rate regime in 1991 to floating regime 
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in 1992 and to a crawling peg exchange rate regime introduced in 1993 pegging the 
domestic currency first to Deutschmark (DEM) and then to Euro (Payne, 2000). 
Table 3.5 shows the progress of institutional reforms in the post-transition period. 
Table 3. 5: Indices of the progress in institutional reforms in Croatia, 1989-2007 
 
Price 
liberalization 
External 
trade 
liberalization 
Large scale 
privatization 
Small 
privatization 
Banking 
reform 
Non-
banking 
financial 
sector 
reform 
1989 2.67 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 
1990 3.67 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 
1991 3.67 3.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 
1992 4.00 3.00 2.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 
1993 4.00 3.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 1.00 
1994 4.00 4.00 2.00 4.00 2.67 2.00 
1995 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 2.67 2.00 
1996 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.33 2.67 2.00 
1997 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.33 2.67 2.33 
1998 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.33 2.67 2.33 
1999 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.33 3.00 2.33 
2000 4.00 4.33 3.00 4.33 3.33 2.33 
2001 4.00 4.33 3.00 4.33 3.33 2.33 
2002 4.00 4.33 3.00 4.33 3.67 2.67 
2003 4.00 4.33 3.33 4.33 3.67 2.67 
2004 4.00 4.33 3.33 4.33 4.00 2.67 
2005 4.00 4.33 3.33 4.33 4.00 2.67 
2006 4.00 4.33 3.33 4.33 4.00 3.00 
2007 4.00 4.33 3.33 4.33 4.00 3.00 
    Source: EBRD Transition report (various years) 
       a The explanation of indices is provided in Table A2.1 in Appendix II  
In the first years of transition Croatia benefited from preferential trade 
agreements signed between EU and Yugoslavia in the 1980s. However, due to 
various political obstacles, the integration in international trade flows in later years 
was slower than in other CEECs. The membership in World Trade Organization 
(WTO) was achieved in 2000 while the Association Agreement with EU which 
enabled CEECs to export their products to the EU market under preferential terms 
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was signed in 20014. Finally, Given that Croatia was not part of Central European 
Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) until 2003, her access to markets of other CEECs was 
impeded. From 2000, the preferential trade agreements were signed with almost all 
SEECs and according to Skuflic (2005), 95% of Croatia’s trade in 2005 was covered 
with bilateral trade agreements. 
 In addition to previously mentioned laws from 1989 that allowed the 
creation of private and the privatisation of socially owned enterprises, the law on 
Transformation of Socially Owned Assets was passed in 1991 that further facilitated 
the replacement of social ownership by private ownership. In the next two years 
the bulk of companies were privatised through direct sales to employees, Croatian 
citizens and Croatian and foreign legal entities.5 The remaining shares from this 
round were sold from 1994 to 1997 on the basis of contractual sales or they were 
distributed to selected institutions and groups such as health and pension funds, 
war veterans, etc. By 1998, 96% of total capital earmarked for privatisation was 
privatized in this manner (Druzic, 2006). Between 1998 and 2000 half of remaining 
shares were then distributed through voucher privatization to selected social 
categories. Finally, in the fourth stage, after 2000, the shares in remaining non-
privatized companies and some strategic companies, mainly public utilities which 
were left out of the earlier stages of privatization, were offered either through the 
stock-exchange or directly to strategic partners.  
 Although ownership was transferred formally to the private sector, the state 
continued to remain in control of the economy through several indirect channels 
such as state companies or state-owned banks (Bartlett, 2003). Furthermore, the 
privatization often lacked transparency and the ownership of some of the most 
                                                 
4 This agreement granted Croatia unrestricted access to EU market in all goods except fish, wine, 
sugar and baby-beef. In return, Croatia was expected to open its market for EU producers by 1st of 
January 2008.  
5 Buyers in this stage were divided into privileged and non-privileged ones. Privileged buyers were 
mainly existing and former employees of enterprises who were given priority right to purchase up to 
half of the estimated value of company at privileged price with maximum total value of the shares to 
be bought at discount limited to 20,000 DM per individual and the second half at regular market 
price. According to Bartlett (2003) this measure was intended to prevent the creation of employee-
controlled enterprises. The non-privileged buyers included Croatian citizens and Croatian and foreign 
legal-entities. They were allowed to purchase stakes in companies sold on the market. 
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profitable enterprises was transferred to individuals who had close ties to the 
governing party in contravention of the law (Bartlett, 2003). Also, 100 most 
important large companies were left to be privatized in later periods. The new 
owners of privatised companies often lacked the vision, knowledge and capital to 
transform enterprises into efficient companies capable of competing in a market 
economy. As a consequence, many profitable and potentially profitable enterprises 
were eventually returned to the Croatian Privatization Fund (CPF) as loss-making 
companies ready for liquidation. An audit of the privatization programme by the 
State Audit Office in 2004 found that the 64% of privatized companies have failed to 
achieve goals stated before privatization (State Audit Office, 2004). In addition, the 
discounted sale of shares to employees proved to be unsuccessful as in many cases 
employees were not able to pay for their shares. According to Gregurek (2001), by 
1999 only 26% of shares purchased by employees were paid for and about 60% of 
contracts between CPF and employees had to be terminated. 
 The reforms in banking sector started in 1991 with measures aimed at 
freeing banks from the accumulated bad loans. From 1993, Croatian National Bank 
(HNB) was given autonomy and it was vested with the duty to maintain the stability 
and liquidity of the financial system. Its supervisory powers were further increased 
with the new banking law in 1999. Furthermore, the ceilings were introduced on 
credit activities of business banks and the borrowing of the government from the 
central bank. The reforms of the banking sector continued in two waves, in 1995 
when four major loss-making banks were rehabilitated and in 1999 when the new 
banking law initiating the bankruptcy of some banks and the privatization of others 
was passed (Bartlett, 2003).  
 During the transition period, changes have also taken place in the number of 
banks and in the ownership structure of the banking sector. In 1993, the Croatian 
banking sector consisted of 25 state-owned banks and 18 banks in private domestic 
ownership (HNB, 2010). The number of banks was rising until 1998 when the total 
reached 60 banks of which 42 were in domestic private ownership, 10 were in 
foreign ownership and 8 were owned by the state. Since then, the number of banks 
has been falling and by 2007, the total had reduced to 33 banks, 2 owned by the 
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state, 16 by foreign owners and 15 by domestic private owner. After 2000, the 
share of the state in the assets of banking sector was reduced to 5%, and it has 
been varying between 4% and 5% ever since. Among private banks, the share of 
foreign owners in the assets of banking sector has been rising and, since 2002, over 
90% of Croatian banking sector was in foreign ownership (HNB, 2010). 
 The stock-exchange was established as early as 1991, but the stock market 
started to gain importance from 1998 after voucher privatization when newly 
established Privatization Investment Funds (PIFs) entered the market, trading with 
shares of privatized enterprises. The number of funds and their diversity increased 
over the years and at the end of 2007 there were 100 open-end and 9 closed-end 
investment funds. In addition, the net assets owned by investment funds increased 
twelve times between 2001 and 2007, mostly due to the increase in the net assets 
of open-end funds (Croatian Financial Services Supervisory Agency (HANFA), 2010). 
After 2000, the insurance sector was also liberalized and in 2007 there were 27 
insurance companies in Croatia. Finally, the reform of pension funds was 
undertaken between 1999 and 2002 when the former retirement fund was 
substituted by the three pillar pension model consisting of mandatory personal 
retirement account, mandatory private retirement schemes, and optional private 
saving for the purpose of retirement. In 2007, 22 retirement funds were in 
operation with over 1.5 million members and net assets worth of about 3 billion 
Euro.  
 To sum up, we can analyse Croatia’s institutional developments by 
distinguishing between two sub-periods. Between 1991 and 1999 Croatia 
introduced all major mechanisms required for the establishment of a functioning 
market economy. However, due to the specific nature of Croatian transition the 
success of these reforms was only partial and in many aspects Croatia fell behind 
other CEECs. In the second period, after 2000, Croatia made significant progress to 
regain its position in the group of advanced CEECs. This primarily relates to the 
process of integration in international and regional trade arrangements and 
developments in the financial sector. In this context we can state that the 
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institutional framework of a market economy was fully created in the advanced 
stage of transition. 
3.3.2. Macroeconomic performance 
 At the beginning of transition, the Croatian economy demonstrated 
behaviour typical of transition economies. The decline in output was accompanied 
by the decline in employment and rising inflation. However, the transformational 
recession was amplified with the war and the break-up of linkages with markets of 
former Yugoslavia. Between 1989 and 1993 the GDP was falling at average annual 
rate of 10% and in 1993 it was on 60% of its pre-transition level (see Table 3.6). 
Such output decline is comparable only to that of some CIS and Baltic countries 
(Fischer et al., 1996). Due to transformational recession and the destruction of 
many industrial capacities in first years of the war, the number of employed persons 
reduced from 1.6 million to 1.23 million, i.e. a decline of almost 25% (Druzic, 2006). 
The slower fall in employment than in output resulted in declining productivity of 
labour which was falling at average annual rate of 5.43% (Table 3.6). The only 
aspect of macroeconomic performance that developed in a favourable direction in 
this period was export/import ratio which was sustained at the level of nearly 90%. 
However, these developments should be interpreted with caution as at the time 
Croatia was under unofficial sanctions which artificially decreased imports. 
Moreover, imports in this period included a considerable amount of military 
equipment which was not registered in the official import statistics (Druzic, 2006). 
Table 3. 6: Croatia’s main macroeconomic aggregates: Annual averages, 1989-2007 
Period 
GDP 
growth 
(%) 
GDP per 
capita 
growth 
(%) 
Employment 
growth rate 
(%) 
GDP/ 
Employment 
growth 
Inflation 
(%) 
Export/ 
Import 
ratio 
Change in 
Export/ 
Import 
ratio(p.p.) 
1989-1993 -10.21 -10.58 -5.18 -5.43 807.46 0.87 1.54 
1994-1999 4.5 5.38 -1.06 5.19 43.16 0.59 -6.78 
2000-2007 4.48 4.48 3.18 15.45 2.93 0.49 -0.21 
 Source: DZS and HNB 
 Inflation, inherited from 1980s, reached its peak between 1989 and 1993 
when average annual rate of inflation was over 800% (Table 3.6), substantially 
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above the inflation rates in CEECs and in line with CIS, Macedonia and some Baltic 
countries. The first attempts to curb inflation were made by the government of 
Ante Markovic in 1989 when annual rate of inflation was running at 1200% but 
these measures yielded only temporary success and inflation again started to rise 
after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the onslaught of the war. By this time, 
inflation was further fuelled by the attempts of monetary authorities to build 
foreign currency reserves (Bartlett, 2003). As after the declaration of independence 
Croatia had no reserves of its own, the Central bank started to buy foreign currency 
from enterprises and private persons in exchange for domestic currency. As a 
consequence, inflation reached its peak in October 1993 when at the annual level it 
amounted to over 1400%.  
 The recovery of the economy started in the second half of 1993 when the 
government introduced a stabilisation plan which had four main objectives: to curb 
inflation, to initiate restructuring of the real sector and to rehabilitate the financial 
sector, and to create foundations for sustainable growth of economy in the long 
run. In 1994 the rate of inflation fell to 107%, a change of 92 percentage points, and 
in the following five years it was brought down to an average of 4.46% per annum. 
On a wave of post-war recovery and stabilization, the Croatian economy started to 
grow and the average annual rate of growth of GDP and GDP per capita reached 
4.5% and 5.38% respectively, which was in line with other CEECs. As employment 
continued to fall at about 1% annually, the overall labour productivity increased at a 
rate of 5% per year (Table 3.6). The success of macroeconomic stabilization, 
however, was not followed by another element of the stabilization package, the 
enterprise restructuring. The failures of privatization, the weak discipline in the 
banking sector and the specific political environment of the 1990s impeded the 
restructuring process which eventually eroded the competitiveness of domestic 
enterprises (Nikic, 2003). This was particularly visible in international trade where 
the ratio of export to import fell to 60% (Table 3.6). The expansion of the economy 
and the post-war recovery were accompanied by a rise in imports for both 
consumption and investment purposes. As domestic export stagnated, Croatia was 
eventually transformed into an import led economy (Bartlett, 2003).   
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 Between 2000 and 2007, all main macroeconomic aggregates recorded 
positive trends. Growth of GDP and GDP per capita (4.48%) was somewhat lower 
than in other CEECs (5.5%) but Croatia reached its pre-transition level of output in 
2003 (EBRD, 2007). The growth of output was accompanied by growth in 
employment (3.38%) which was higher than in CEECs (0.76%) and by a high growth 
of labour productivity (15.5%). What is more important, in comparison to EU27 
average, the level of labour productivity in Croatian economy (68% of EU27 
average) was higher than in other CEECs (58%) (EBRD, 2007). Also, through the 
entire period, inflation remained at around 3%, below the rate of inflation in other 
CEECs (4.8%) (EBRD, 2007). However, the export/import ratio fell to an average of 
about 50% (Table 3.6).   
 To sum up, the transformational recession in Croatia was particularly strong 
with the decline in output and the high inflation which were more comparable with 
experiences of CIS countries than with those of CEECs. In years after the 
introduction of stabilization programme, Croatia managed to restore 
macroeconomic stability and achieve rates of growth typical for CEECs. The biggest 
improvement in macroeconomic performance took place in the advanced stage of 
transition when growth of output and employment were accompanied by high 
increases in labour productivity. However, the stabilization and expansion of the 
economy were not accompanied by the restructuring of enterprises which eroded 
the competitiveness of Croatian export and eventually transformed Croatia into an 
import-led economy.  
3.3.3. Structural changes 
 Before transition, economic activity in Croatia was concentrated in 
manufacturing and service sectors. During the period of transformational recession, 
the service sector suffered from a particularly large contraction, mainly due to the 
decline in tourism. In 1991, the fall in the number of tourist arrivals was estimated 
at 85% (Bartlett, 2003). However, as transformational recession and the war had 
affected the entire economy, the contraction of services did not produce major 
changes in its structure. In 1993, the year when output fall reached its bottom, the 
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service sector accounted for nearly 50% of entire value added in Croatian economy, 
compared with 54% in 1990. It was followed by industry (36%) whose share slightly 
increased from 35% in 1990 and agriculture whose share increased from 10% in 
1990 to 14% in 1993. Figure 3.2 shows the change in the structure of the economy 
throughout the transition period. 
Figure 3.2: The structure of the Croatian economy ( % of GDP), 1990-2007 
 
             Source: WDI, World Bank, 2010 
 In years after the introduction of the stabilization programme and during the 
post-war recovery (1994-1995), the share of service sector in economy increased to 
62% in 1999 and by another 3% by 2007 (Figure 3.2). The share of industry was 
reduced to 28% while the share of agriculture fell to 6% by 2007. The structure of 
Croatian economy in this period was shaped by the ending of the war and regional 
conflict which boosted domestic tourism and increased the share of services to 
levels higher than pre-transition levels. However, it is also likely that the 
combination of privatization failures, difficulties of access to markets of EU and 
CEECs, and the penetration of imports eroded the competitiveness of Croatian 
manufacturing sector and reduced its share in the overall economy. A comparison 
of the structural similarity between transition economies and Croatia on one hand 
and EU15 economies on the other indicates that Croatia soon assumed a pattern 
which was much closer to that of market economies than to centrally-planned 
counterparts (Figure 3.3). In that respect Croatia was closer to EU15 countries than 
the group of advanced CEECs. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Services
Industry
Agriculture
Chapter Three: The Croatian Economy in Transition 
 
85 
 
Figure 3.3: Structural convergence of transition economies, 1990-2007 
 
             Source: Own calculations based on WDI World Bank (2010) 
 A closer look at the components of the manufacturing sector, presented in 
Table 3.7, indicates that between 1995 and 2005 food industry, the manufacture of 
coke, petroleum and nuclear fuels and chemical industry accounted for more than 
40% of value added in this sector. The industries that have enjoyed the highest rate 
of growth in this period were manufacture of transport equipment (83 p.p.), 
manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (61 p.p.) and recycling (43.32 
p.p.). However, together these three industries accounted for only 13% of total 
value added in manufacturing. On the other hand, the fastest declining industries in 
the period of transition were manufacture of leather and leather products (-40.35 
p.p.), manufacture of textiles (-40 p.p.), manufacture of wearing apparel, dressing 
and dyeing of fur (-32 p.p.) and chemical industry (-32 p.p.). In 1995 these four 
industries together accounted for 22% of total value added in manufacturing 
whereas by 2005 their share had fallen to 14%.   
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Table 3.7: Industry value added as % of manufacturing in Croatia, 1995-2005 
Industry 
Code Industry Name 1995 2005 
2005/1995 
(p.p.) 
15 Food products and beverages 19.3% 20.2% 5.1 
16 Tobacco products 2.4% 2.5% 3.0 
17 Textiles 2.8% 1.7% -39.7 
18 Wearing apparel; Dressing and dyeing of fur 5.6% 3.8% -32.3 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather; luggage, handbags, saddler, harness, footwear 2.2% 1.3% -40.4 
20 Products of wood and cork, except furniture; articles of straw and plaiting 2.8% 2.9% 3.1 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 2.7% 2.0% -23.6 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 6.6% 5.8% -12.4 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 10.3% 10.9% 5.8 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 11.8% 8.1% -32.0 
25 Rubber and plastic products 2.4% 2.4% 1.2 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 4.4% 7.2% 61.8 
27 Basic metals 1.9% 1.7% -15.4 
28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 5.9% 7.5% 27.2 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 3.4% 3.4% 0.9 
30 Office machinery and computers 0.9% 1.0% 23.2 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 3.9% 4.2% 7.4 
32 Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 2.2% 2.3% 3.8 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 0.9% 0.8% -15.2 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 0.8% 1.1% 30.7 
35 Other transport equipment 2.9% 5.4% 83.1 
36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 3.2% 2.9% -6.4 
37 Recycling 0.6% 0.8% 43.3 
Source: DZS, 1997 and 2008 
 The division of industries from Table 3.7 by their technological intensity into 
low, medium-low, medium-high and high technology intensive industries (OECD, 
2007) reveals   that industries with largest share in Croatian manufacturing come 
from the groups of low (food industry), medium-low (coke-petroleum and nuclear 
fuels) and medium-high (chemical industry) technology intensive industries.6 Such 
dispersed pattern may imply either lack of specialization or it may also signal that, 
even in advanced stage of transition, the manufacturing sector was still undergoing 
structural changes. The latter explanation seems more plausible if we note that the 
three largest losers (in terms of their shares in value added of the manufacturing 
sector) were low-technology intensive industries while of five biggest gainers in 
transition four were from the medium-low and medium-high technology intensive 
                                                 
6 The classification of 2-digit industries by their technological intensity is presented in Table A3.2 in 
Appendix III. 
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industries. The competitive profile of Croatian firms will be examined in detail in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
 Summing all these findings we can conclude that during the transition period 
Croatia has gradually approached the structure of a market-style economy. After 
the war and the initial transformational recession, the share of the service sector 
increased to above its pre-transition level and Croatia became closer to the 
structural pattern of EU15 countries than any of the three major groups of 
transition countries. However, it needs to be underlined that within the 
manufacturing sector, the low-technology intensive industries retained the largest 
share. Moreover, the restructuring of Croatian enterprises in the early transition 
period took place in more hostile institutional environment than in other CEECs. 
3.3.4. International trade 
 As we already explained in Section 3.3.2, in first years of transition Croatia 
benefited from Trade and Cooperation Agreement signed between EU and 
Yugoslavia in the 1980s. In later years the lack of Association Agreement deprived 
Croatia of preferential access to EU markets which was offered to many other 
transition countries. The exporters from transition economies which had 
Association Agreement with EU were discouraged to source their inputs in Croatia 
as these agreements required that their exports to EU market must contain 
minimum levels of input originating either in the EU, or in Association Agreement 
countries. Similarly the late signing of CEFTA agreement impeded the access of 
Croatian producers to CEECs’ markets (Bartlett, 2003). In addition, since the almost 
fixed level of exchange rate set by the stabilization plan in 1993 (which effectively 
implied currency appreciation), eroded the international competitiveness of 
Croatian producers and facilitated large increases in imports (Nikic, 2003).  
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Figure 3.4: % of Croatian trade by main trading partners, 1995-2007 
Export Import Legend 
1995  
  
2000  
  
2007  
  
Source: IMF DOTS Database 
ExYu group includes Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Montenegro and Macedonia 
CEECs group includes Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
Other East European group includes CIS countries, Moldova, Albania and 
Georgia 
 Figure 3.4 shows the share of main trading partners in Croatia’s international 
trade during the transition period. It is evident that despite previously mentioned 
impediments, the EU15 countries remained the most important trading partners of 
Croatia during entire transition period. The share of EU15 in Croatian import and 
export was highest in first years of transition when Croatia was confronted with loss 
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of markets in other parts of former Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe. Within EU15, 
the major trading partners were Germany and Italy, the same countries as before 
transition (see Table A3.1 in Appendix III). In addition, countries of former 
Yugoslavia accounted for about 25% of Croatian export and about 10% of its 
imports. The bulk of this trade took place with Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
who absorbed over 80% of Croatian trade with the region (Table A3.1 in Appendix 
III). Other transition countries did not have a significant share in Croatian 
international trade. The low share of CEECs in Figure 3.4 probably reflects the 
impediments to trade with these countries which were mentioned earlier. Trade 
with other economies from Eastern Europe was also modest and these countries 
accounted for less than 5% of Croatian export and less than 10% of its imports in 
the entire period. To some extent these developments can be interpreted as an 
indicator of Croatia’s strong orientation towards EU but also they may indicate that 
Croatia did not succeed in regaining its position on these markets. Finally, the trade 
with rest of world formed about one fifth of Croatian export and import.  
 During transition, exports from Croatia and CEECs to the rest of the world 
were mainly concentrated in three sectors, machinery and transport equipment, 
manufacturing products classified by material and miscellaneous manufactured 
articles (Table 3.8). These sectors accounted for 75% of CEECs export to the rest of 
the world. On the import side, three most important import sectors in both CEECs 
and Croatia were manufacturing of machinery and transport equipment, 
manufacturing of products classified by material and chemical industry.  
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Table 3. 8: Sectoral distribution of international trade of Croatia and CEECs 
with rest of world, 1993-2007 (%) 
 
 Export Import 
SITC 
Rev 3  
Code 
Description Croatia CEECs Croatia CEECs  
0 Food and live animals 8.2 6.4 7.8 5.5 
1 Beverages and Tobacco 2.3 0.7 0.8 0.8 
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 5.7 3.9 2.5 3.6 
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 10.2 4.9 12.0 10.5 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.c. 11.8 7.7 11.3 11.9 
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 14.3 22.2 19.0 19.6 
7 Machinery and transport equipment 25.4 36.5 31.9 36.8 
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 21.8 16.4 12.8 9.7 
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 0.04 1.0 1.5 1.3 
      Source: Own calculations based on UN Comext database 
 During transition EU15 countries have mainly imported from the rest of the 
world products from three industries which we identified as most important in the 
overall export of Croatia and CEECs (Table 3.9). About third of Croatian export to 
EU15 was coming from miscellaneous manufactured articles. On the other hand, 
most important exporting sector of the CEECs was machinery and transport 
equipment (40%) Finally, the import of these countries from EU15 did not 
significantly differ from their import from rest of the world. It was concentrated in 
few sectors the most important being machinery and transport equipment. On the 
one hand, these figures can be interpreted in light of findings about outsourcing of 
activities from EU15 to transition economies. However, they may also signal that 
intra-industry trade has an important role in the exchanges of CEECs and Croatia 
with the rest of the world, an issue to which we will return in Chapter Six.   
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Table 3.9: International trade of Croatia and CEECs with EU15, 1993-2007 (%) 
SITC 
Rev3 
Code 
Description 
Export to EU15 Import from EU15 
Croatia CEECs Croatia CEECs 
0 Food and live animals 4.1 4.6 6.7 4.5 
1 Beverages and Tobacco 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.6 
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 7.9 4.3 1.7 2.1 
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 5.5 3.6 2.8 2.2 
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 
5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.c. 9.9 4.8 12.6 13.9 
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 14.6 21.2 19.2 22.9 
7 Machinery and transport equipment 23.7 40.1 39.3 41.9 
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 33.8 20.0 14.8 10.5 
9 Commodities and transactions n.e.c. 0.04 0.6 2.1 0.6 
Source: Own calculations based on UN Comext database 
 Summarizing our findings it is evident that over the past two decades Croatia 
lost most of its initial advantage over other transition economies. Broadly speaking, 
it is possible to distinguish between two periods of Croatian transition: first, 
characterised with eroding competitiveness of its firms and industries (during 
1990s) and second (after 2000) when many negative trends from the previous 
period came to an end and competitiveness of Croatian firms, industries and the 
economy as a whole started to improve. However, while it is well established and 
taken as stylised fact that the key role in explaining the first part of Croatian 
transition belonged to specific nature of Croatian transition, which at that time was 
characterised by war, privatisation failures and unfavourable institutional 
developments, it remains unknown whether improvements in competitiveness of 
Croatian firms and industries have come as a consequence of favourable 
developments in their environment or they have been the results of changes in the 
behaviour of firms themselves. These issues will be dealt with in more detail in the 
next three chapters where we will first compare the behaviour of Croatian firms 
with behaviour of their counterparts in advanced transition economies in Chapter 
Four, then move on to examine the competitive profiles of Croatian exporters in 
Chapter Five and end with the analysis of trade relationships between Croatia and 
EU15 countries in Chapter Six.    
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3.4. Conclusion 
 In this chapter we reviewed the development of some important features of 
the Croatian economy in the course of transition to a market economy.  Our 
investigation showed that before transition Croatia had some distinctive features in 
relation to other centrally-planned economies. The Croatian economic system was 
organized as a semi-market economy and its enterprises enjoyed higher freedom of 
decision-making than their counterparts in other socialist economies. In addition, 
the Croatian international trade was equally balanced between East European 
centrally-planned economies and West European market-style economies, implying 
that Croatian enterprises had the experience of competing in a market oriented 
environment and the structure of the economy was more similar to EU15 countries 
than to socialist world. However, it was also shown that in the last years of the 
socialist regime, Croatia struggled with hyperinflation which suggests that Croatia 
was not free from the common weaknesses of centrally-planned economies despite 
the more liberal institutional framework and openness in trade with West European 
market economies. On the whole, it can be concluded that at the beginning of 
transition Croatia had the potential to be amongst the forerunners of transition.  
The transformation of Croatia into a market-style economy started in an 
environment characterized by political turbulences and war which pushed 
transformational recession to levels below those in most of other transition 
economies, destroying a large part of domestic economic capacities and 
infrastructure. Although all major reforms were pushed through at same time as in 
advanced transition economies and macroeconomic stability was achieved 
relatively early, Croatia developed its relationships with the EU and other major 
international trade organisations slower than other CEECs. This, and the poor 
political environment, put Croatian enterprises in an unfavourable position on their 
traditional markets of EU15 and CEECs. As a consequence, Croatian producers 
turned to markets of less developed transition economies and other countries of 
the world. However, as we have shown in this chapter, the institutional framework 
in Croatia underwent major changes in the advanced stage of transition 
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characterized by faster approach to EU and accession and membership in regional 
and global trade associations. In this context, it remains to be seen how Croatian 
enterprises have responded to these changes in environment, something which will 
be discussed in the following three chapters.  
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4.1. Introduction 
 In previous chapters we explained the motives for this research and 
established the conceptual framework of the thesis. The process of restructuring 
was identified as an important precondition for the survival of firms in transition 
economies. If the competitiveness of firms in these economies is constrained by the 
lack of knowledge, skills and expertise, and the inefficient production and outdated 
technology which they inherited from the pre-transition period, we would expect 
that improvements in productivity and cost efficiency, investment in machinery and 
equipment, innovations and other mechanisms of restructuring will improve their 
market position. We consider that the emergence of market environment in 
transition economies was characterised by numerous imperfections which provided 
an opportunity for an asymmetric distribution of output. In such a setting, by 
changing their behaviour and using factors and forces from their environment, firms 
have the opportunity to seize the market share of their rivals.  
 To examine the validity of the above relationship empirically we will develop 
a model relating the firm’s market share to several indicators of different types of 
restructuring and apply it to a large dataset of firms from the manufacturing sectors 
of several transition economies. The research will respond to several questions 
which have been relatively unexplored in the transition context such as the impact 
of experience, competition from other firms, location and the technological 
intensity of different industries on the market share of firms. The results of the 
investigation will also improve our  understanding of the extent to which the 
behaviour of firms in Croatia is different from that of firms in other CEECs. Given the 
developments in the Croatian socio-economic framework during the advanced 
stage of transition, we would expect that the business climate of this period would 
facilitate and speed up the restructuring of Croatian firms and bring their behaviour 
closer to that of firms from advanced transition economies. Hence, the chapter will 
contribute to the understanding of competitiveness of firms in transition in general 
and to the understanding of competitiveness of firms in Croatia in particular. In 
Section 4.2 we develop the conceptual framework of our research while the 
features of the dataset and the research methodology of the chapter will be 
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discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4. The empirical results will be elaborated in the 
Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 will summarize the findings and conclude. 
4.2. Conceptual framework 
 The ability of firms to compete can be expressed in a number of ways. The 
two most widely used measures, as we discussed in the Section 1.4.3 are 
profitability and market share. The competitiveness literature particularly favours 
the latter as by its construction it reflects the position of one firm in relation to its 
rivals in its industry. However, the theoretical and empirical literature do not 
provide clear guidance on the elements which constitute and influence the ability of 
a firm to increase its market share. Different theoretical propositions have been 
only partially validated by empirical research; thus the choice of model components 
is a challenging task. This task is even more challenging in the transition context as 
the analyses of market share  have been mainly based on a descriptive approach. 
Hence, to overcome this problem we first review the theoretical and empirical 
literature on factors and forces that can explain the market share of firms and use 
the insights gained from this review to develop a model that will be used in our 
empirical investigation.  
4.2.1. Theoretical basis 
 The most common assumption in models of firm behaviour is that the 
asymmetric distribution of output within industry emanates from inter-firm 
differences in efficiency, product quality or technological intensity. In one set of 
models these factors and forces are treated as exogenous and the relative ranking 
of firms within an industry, in terms of their market shares, is  determined through 
a random distribution of firm attributes from some predetermined set of attributes 
(Caves and Porter, 1978; Clarke et al., 1984; Schmalensee, 1987). Such models, 
however, do not take into account the efforts which could be undertaken by firms 
to improve their position or to defend themselves from actions of rivals.  
Another set of models relax these restrictive assumptions and consider the 
actions of firms as a key factor in explaining  their position on the market  
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(Jovanovic, 1982; Nakao, 1993; Jovanovic and Macdonald, 1994; Vickers, 1995; Hay 
and Liu, 1997; Williams, 2007). The behaviour of firms in these models is considered 
as a response to actions of their rivals and other features of their environment.  
They postulate that the imperfect functioning of the market mechanism provides 
the opportunity for some firms to outperform their rivals by investing their efforts 
in development of distinctive competitive advantages.  Such understanding seems 
to be closer to the concept of competitiveness as adopted in this thesis.  
 Among the latter group of models (especially those by Jovanovic, Jovanovic 
and MacDonald and Vickers) the competitive advantages of firms have been 
modelled in various ways. One strand of the literature shows, in a Cournot-like 
fashion, that through improvements in cost efficiency, firms can drive their high-
cost rivals out of the market and seize their market share. Other authors are closer 
to the Austrian and evolutionary understanding of firm behaviour and argue that 
asymmetric distribution of output among firms emanates from inter-firm variations 
in innovations and technology (Nakao, 1993; Hay and Liu, 1997; Williams, 2007). 
There are also models that highlight the role of firm-specific characteristics. Hay and 
Liu (1997) e.g. consider that the quality of management, location and  technological 
capabilities are likely to affect efficiency of firms and their market share while 
Ferrier et al. (1999) emphasise the role of accumulated organisational knowledge. 
The ability of a firm to maintain and improve its market share will be higher for 
those firms that have a history of knowledge about the prospects for success or 
failure of individual actions. Finally, Mitchell and Skrzypacz, (2005) argue that firms 
which had high market share in the past are also likely to grow in the present period 
due to the consumer network externalities such as complementary products, 
services or the number of users as well as their ability to benefit from economies of 
scale more easily. 
 The impact of external environment on the market position of firms is 
included in these models in two ways. First, the environment can impact market 
share of firms indirectly through various elements of firm behaviour. Vickers (1995) 
and Nickell (1996) demonstrate how the intensity of competition may exert 
downward pressure on the costs of firms and motivate them to innovate in order to 
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acquire the market share of less efficient rivals. Aghion and Schankermann (1999) 
develop a model in which investment in physical and institutional infrastructure 
during transition facilitates product-market competition which in turn motivates the 
exit of high-cost firms and acts as incentive for low-cost firms to engage in 
restructuring. The second effect is exercised through direct impact of exogenous 
factors such as institutional changes, market trends or technological conditions 
which affect the entire industry. Caves and Porter (1978) argue that these factors 
may not have symmetrical impact on all firms thus leading to changes in their 
relative ranking within the industry. 
 Overall, the theoretical models consider how the market share of firms  is 
based on their activities and characteristics and features of their environment. 
Furthermore, these models emphasise the role of imperfect competition as a 
process that enables some firms to outperform others. While enterprise 
restructuring is not explicitly addressed, it is evident that these models focus on 
those activities of  firms which have impact on their market share - and which we 
have identified in as important mechanisms of enterprise restructuring in Section 
2.2. Finally, the position of firms on the market is likely to be influenced by their 
relative performance in the past which is in line with the  dynamic nature of 
competitiveness put forward in Sections 1.2 and 1.3.  
4.2.2. Literature review 
 The firm-level studies of market share in the transition literature, which 
were reviewed in Section 1.5.3, have been based mainly on qualitative analyses. 
However, outside the transition context, a sizeable body of literature has examined 
the market position of firms using quantitative analsysis. As it is case with 
theoretical models, these studies do not specifically address restructuring as 
determinant of market share but they include as explanatory variables many factors 
which were identified as mechanisms of enterprise restructuring in Section 2.2. In 
addition several studies have also investigated the impact of various features of a 
firm’s external environment such as industry-specific characteristics, trade policies 
or the actions of rivals  on the relative position of firms within their industries.  
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 The relationship between market share and the efficiency of firms has been 
analysed using two-stage models where in the first stage the efficiency of firm is 
determined by its production function in relation to some frontier while the second 
stage would investigate the impact of efficiency on market share (Hay and Liu, 
1997; Halpern and Korosi, 2001). The findings from these studies indicate that the 
relative position of firms on the market improves as their efficiency increases. 
Although both studies include a lagged dependent variable in their estimation, the 
model used by Halpern and Korosi (2001) does not distinguish between short- and 
long-run impacts of efficiency on the market share of firms. However, the model 
used by Hay and Liu (1997) indicates that the impact of changes in efficiency on the 
relative position of firms will be of higher magnitude in the long run. Such findings 
are consistent with the views introduced in our discussion of strategic restructuring 
in Section 2.2 where we stated that the full impact of this type of restructuring will 
be visible only in the long run.   
 Another aspect of firm behaviour commonly investigated in the context of 
market shares is the innovation activities of the firm. The findings from different 
studies exhibit a great deal of variation, making it difficult to reach a general 
conclusion about the impact of innovations on the position of firms within their 
industry. On the one hand, using R&D expenditure as the measure of innovation 
activity, Nakao (1993) and Davies and Geroski (1997) do not find any evidence of a 
relationship between innovation activities and the market share of firms. On the 
other hand, Robinson (1990) and Banburry and Mitchell (1995), who use  measures 
of innovation output such as the introduction of new products, find a positive 
relation between the two variables. These findings are in line with the views of 
evolutionary economics about the need for continuous innovation amongst firms 
that wish to remain superior to their rivals. Firms which introduce product 
innovations two to three times per year are found to have higher market share than 
firms which innovate once.  
 As discussed in the previous section, theoretical models postulate that the 
ability of a firm to outperform its rivals in the past will have positive impact on its 
present market share. Studies by Hay and Liu (1997) and Halpern and Korosi (2001) 
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have found positive coefficients for the lagged dependent variable implying that 
advantages such as customer network externalities, economies of scale or similar 
factors may be important in explaining the market position of firms over time. 
However, the findings of Davies and Geroski (1997) indicate that better relative 
performance of firm in the past has a negative effect on its present position. Davies 
and Geroski do not offer any explanation for this negative effect but their finding 
can be related to the so-called ‘quiet life’ hypothesis whereby firms which had 
outperformed their rivals in the past would be less willing to undertake difficult and 
costly actions and instead would enjoy fruits of their past activities.   
 In terms of the firm’s  environment, previous studies have focused on the 
behaviour of other firms, industry concentration and import penetration. Davies 
and Geroski (1997) and Hay and Liu (1997) illustrate the effect on a firm of two 
different types of actions of rivals.  The former study finds that a higher advertising 
intensity of rivals negatively influences market share of the firm. The latter study 
finds that improvements in efficiency of rivals motivate the firm to improve its 
efficiency which in turn leads to higher market share. Such a finding is consistent 
with the view, explained in the previous section, that competition puts pressure on 
firms to innovate and reduce their costs, and therefore increase their market share.  
 When industry concentration and import penetration have been included 
the findings have been contradictory between studies. Baldwin and Goreski (1985) 
find a negative effect for concentration and a positive effect for import penetration. 
The explanation offered for latter finding is that imports mainly consist of 
outsourced semi-finished products which are being re-exported after finalisation, 
thus adding to the market share of domestic firms.  Halpern and Korosi (2001) 
report the opposite finding, that concentration has a positive while import 
penetration has a negative impact on the market share of firms. They explain this 
with the argument that in concentrated industries improvements in market share 
may be more easily achieved because of higher market imperfections, while the 
negative sign of import penetration is interpreted as evidence that the entry of 
foreign firms intensifies competition and reduces the market share of domestic 
rivals. In addition to these studies, Davies and Geroski (1997) investigated how 
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changes in the market share of firms are influenced by the minimum efficient scale, 
R&D and advertising intensities of their industries. They found that the firms in 
industries with a higher advertising intensity and minimum efficient scale had a 
higher market share, while the relationship between market share of the firm and 
the R&D intensity of its industry was statistically insignificant.  
 A number of problems and shortcomings are apparent in the present 
literature. First, the results presented above are based on cross-sectional studies. In 
some cases this was because of the nature of the datasets; in others, the authors 
did not analyse the longitudinal dimension of their datasets, running separate 
regressions for each year, or pooling the data (Caves and Porter, 1978; Amable and 
Verspagen, 1995; Halpern and Korosi, 2001). As a consequence the dynamic 
dimension of market share has frequently been omitted from the analysis. Second, 
existing studies in general have failed to control for the correlation between 
unobserved firm and industry specific effects such as managerial quality or 
technological capacities and the explanatory variables. Results of Hay and Liu (1997) 
who modelled firm specific time invariant effects with categorical variables for each 
firm and found that they are significant as group suggest that these effects might be 
important and question the validity of results obtained without taking them into 
consideration. Furthermore, while theoretical models of firm behaviour have 
devoted a great deal of attention to the issue of efficiency, this issue has received 
little treatment in empirical studies. We were unable to find studies which deal with 
individual aspects of firm efficiency such as costs, labour or capital efficiency or 
studies addressing the location or experience of firms. Finally, there is an evident 
lack of firm-level studies which address the determinants of market share in the 
transition context. As it will be shown in the next section, our research attempts to 
cover some of these gaps.  
4.2.3. Model specification 
 The model we develop in this chapter draws on the arguments presented in 
the previous two-subsections, linked with the insights gained from the discussion of 
Section 1.3. The common thread connecting these is the assumption that the 
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imperfect functioning of market mechanism provides some firms with an 
opportunity to outperform their rivals. In line with this assumption, models of firm 
behaviour  reviewed in Section 4.2.1 indicated that the ability of firms to seize the 
market share of their rivals may be influenced by four groups of factors and forces: 
i) their own actions (restructuring); ii) their characteristics iii) features of their 
environment and iv) their past levels of competitiveness. This can be expressed as: 
CIit=f(CIit-1,Ait, Cit, Eit)                                                     (4.1) 
where CI reflects firm i’s competitive performance, measured as its market share in 
period t, A, C and E are its activities, characteristics and features of its environment 
respectively.  Following our discussion in Sections 1.3 and 4.2.1, we expect that 
previously accumulated knowledge, customer network externalities or established 
distribution channels may be used by firms to improve their current market share 
which is the reason for inclusion of lagged dependent variable. Furthermore, as we 
showed in Section 2.3, the emergence of markets in transition economies was a 
lengthy and gradual process characterised by numerous imperfections, such as the 
impeded access of firms to finance, asymmetrical distribution of knowledge about 
irreversibility of systemic changes and about the steps which need to be undertaken 
by firms in order to survive in the new environment.  
 
 In modelling firm behaviour it has already been established in Section 2.3.1 
that the efficiency of firms in former centrally-planned economies was low and 
therefore it is expected that, in line with the views of Vickers (1995) and Hay and Liu 
(1997) discussed earlier, improvements in efficiency would provide firms with an 
opportunity to seize the market share of their rivals. These improvements may, in 
the short run, come from managerial efforts to change the behaviour of firm within 
its existing capacities but also they may be the result of foresighted long-run 
oriented activities such as investment in new technology, expansion of capacities or 
innovation. Such reasoning draws its theoretical support from the discussion of 
evolutionary and product-life cycle theories (Section 1.3) where it was argued that 
the economies (firms) can increase their competitiveness only to a certain level 
within their existing capacities after which they would have to innovate and invest 
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in new technology, skills and knowledge in order to improve their situation and the 
failure to do so would result in them being outperformed by their rivals. For that 
reason, our model makes a distinction between short- and long-run activities of 
firms with the former reflecting elements of defensive restructuring and the latter 
elements of strategic restructuring. This is in line with our discussion in Section 2.2. 
 The efficiency of firms in this model has three dimensions: cost efficiency, 
the productivity of labour and of investment. In this respect the present study 
differs from previous ones which have mainly focused on the aggregate efficiency of 
firms estimated from the production function. Cost efficiency is measured with unit 
labour and unit material costs, defined as the ratio of costs of employees and 
material costs to sales revenues respectively. Several studies reviewed in the 
Chapters One and Two have argued that the reduction of unit costs reflects the 
efforts of firms to improve their cost efficiency (Pinto et al., 1993; Havlik, 2000; 
Wziatek-Kubiak and Winek, 2004). Hence, we expect to find a negative sign on 
coefficients of these variables.  
 In addition to cost efficiency we control for the productivity of labour and of 
investment, which are defined as ratios of a firm’s turnover to the number of 
employees and the net investment in machinery, equipment and buildings, 
respectively. Labour productivity was shown to be one of the most important 
factors behind the competitiveness of firms in transition (Section 1.5.3). It will 
increase as a result of various activities of firms such as investment in human 
capital, new technology or process innovations. Hence, by including it we aim to 
control for this aspect of firm behaviour. Finally, the outdated and inefficient 
machinery and equipment was identified in Section 2.3.1 as one of reasons for low 
efficiency of firms in former centrally-planned economies. Therefore, the transition 
literature argued that investment was needed by these firms to raise the overall 
efficiency of their production (Grosfeld and Roland, 1996; Lizal, 1999; Wziatek-
Kubiak and Winek, 2004). However, the construction of our variable does not take 
into account only the investment behaviour of firms. By using the 
turnover/investment (or the productivity of investment), we also hope to control 
for the effectiveness of this investment, i.e., the correctness of managerial decisions 
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about choice of technology and putting of this technology into its optimal use. For 
both variables we expect positive sign.   
 We must also take into consideration the possibility that the behaviour of 
firms will be influenced by their characteristics and the features of their 
environment. While we control for some of these characteristics in our model, it is 
reasonable to assume that there are some unobserved characteristics such as the 
quality of the management, the impact of the ownership structure and exogenous 
demand shocks, which are likely to affect both restructuring of firms and their 
competitiveness. The failure to control for these factors may create the problem of 
endogeneity and cause our estimates to be biased. This is something that should be 
taken into account in the modelling strategy which will be discussed in more detail 
in Section 4.4.  
 The choice of firm-specific characteristics and features of the environment 
has been influenced by theoretical arguments as well as the limitations imposed by 
the nature of the dataset used. Hence, our model controls for the age of the firm, 
agglomeration effects and technological intensity of the firm’s industry. The 
variable age is constructed as the period of time between the year of observation 
and the year of firm’s incorporation. Age is expected to reflect the firm’s general 
business experience, familiarity with the market system and the familiarity of 
customers with the firm’s products. The resource-based view (Section 1.3) defines 
experience as one of the firm’s human capital resources which enables it to improve 
its efficiency and effectiveness (Barney, 1991). Furthermore, the Austrian school 
postulates that the experience of business activities may help firms to predict more 
accurately the future outcomes of their activities. It is therefore expected that older 
firms have some specific knowledge which enables them to outperform their rivals, 
thus the sign will be positive. The technological intensity of a firm’s industry is based 
on the OECD (2007) classification of industries. Accordingly, firms are divided into 
the four categories of low, medium-low, medium-high and high technology 
intensive industries.1 The inclusion of these variables is motivated by the desire to 
control for industry-specific effects such as minimum efficient scale and barriers to                                                              
1 The full list of industries and their classification is provided in Table A3.2 in Appendix III 
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entry. We expect that the market share of firms in high technology intensive 
industries would be higher as their ability to compete depends on investment in 
new production processes, products, technology, knowledge and skills all of which 
require a large customer base in order to justify the investment.  
 In the previous sub-section we concluded that the empirical studies have 
paid little attention to the location of firms and the economies associated with this. 
However, there are several channels through which the location may have an 
impact on the ability of firms to compete (Fujita, 1988; Krugman, 1980; Krugman, 
1991; Krugman, 1993; Venables, 1996; Hafner, 2008). First, by locating themselves 
in large cities firms can benefit from the higher level of demand and achieve 
internal economies of scale more easily and lower their costs through mass 
production (Marshall, 1920). Second, by locating in dense urban areas firms can 
benefit from between-industry economies such as better access to infrastructure 
(Krugman, 1980). Third, by locating themselves near other firms from the same 
industry, firms can enjoy benefits of within-industry economies such as the ease of 
access to specialised input services and skilled labour, and the R&D and knowledge 
spillovers from other firms. However, in addition to these centripetal forces which 
attract firms to large urban areas there are also centrifugal forces that motivate 
firms to move towards smaller cities. Generally, a higher concentration of firms 
increases the cost of inputs which can lower the competitiveness of firms  which 
compete on prices (Lall, 2000). As a consequence, these firms are likely to locate 
themselves in smaller urban areas than in large agglomerations. Therefore, by 
observing the sign of the variable for location of firm, which is defined as categorical 
variable that takes value of one if firm is located in cities with more than 100,000 
inhabitants, we may gain an insight into the competitive profile of firms in the 
sample. 
 In order to distinguish between several types of agglomeration externalities 
we introduce two additional variables which aim to capture the ‘between’ and 
‘within-industry’ economies. These two types of effects may be particularly 
important for firms in transition economies as they may reduce the cost of 
obtaining information about market trends or may receive technology and know-
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how which can be used to improve their production processes and products 
through horizontal spillovers from firms located in their proximity (Woodward and 
Yoruk, 2005). In order to capture spillovers from intersectoral diversity of 
agglomeration such as sharing of basic assets, information, resources and 
institutions (urbanisation economies) we introduce a variable constructed as the 
ratio of the number of all firms in an administrative region to the number of all 
firms in the country (Malmberg et al., 2000; Becchetti and Rossi, 2000; Holl, 2004). 
Furthermore, to control for spillovers such as industry-specific learning and 
innovation, introduction to new technology through contact with early adapters or 
benefits of information flows about market conditions which are known as within 
industry or localisation economies (Malmberg et al., 2000), we introduce another 
variable defined as the ratio of the number of other firms in the firm’s 4-digit NACE 
industry in a region to the total number of firms in that region. Accordingly if such 
agglomeration effects exist we would find positive signs on these variables while 
the negative sign would be an indicator that firms in transition perceive their rivals 
only as competition. The definitions of all variables are provided in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1: Description of variables 
Dependent variable  
MShare Market share - Turnover of firm i divided by total turnover of its 4-digit industry  
Independent variables  
Labprod Labour productivity – ratio of turnover to number of employees (1000 EUR per 
employee) 
Invprod Investment productivity  – ratio of turnover to the change in fixed assets between 
two periods  
Ulc Unit labour costs – costs of employees as a share of turnover  
Umc Unit material costs – costs of material as a share of turnover  
Lgcit Dummy for location in large cities (those with more than 100 000 inhabitants) 
Age Number of years since foundation  
Low Dummy for low technology industries (base group) 
Mlow Dummy for medium-low technology industries 
Mhigh Dummy for medium-high technology industries 
High Dummy for high technology industries 
Urbef Urbanization economies – ratio of total number of firms in the administrative region 
to total number of firms in the country 
Locef Localization economies – ratio of number of firms from the firm’s 4-digit industry in 
administrative region to total number of firms in the region 
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4.3. Dataset 
 The empirical work in this chapter is based on the large panel of firms from 
manufacturing industries from the firm-level database Amadeus collected and 
compiled by Bureau van Dyke. This database covers more than the 1 million 
companies in 41 European countries and it provides information from financial 
reports such as balance sheet and profit and loss accounts, financial ratios and also 
some general information about companies such as location, age and type of 
industry. For the purpose of this chapter, we have been able to access data for firms 
from four advanced transition economies, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and 
Bulgaria as well as those from Croatia collected over the period 2000-2007.2 Table 
4.2 presents the number of firms included in the database which vary over the years 
and over countries (and which also means that we have an unbalanced panel). 
Table 4.2: Number of firms in the database 
Country/
Year CRO CZ SK PL BG 
2000 2258 296 - 992 966 
2001 2392 1116 68 1364 1057 
2002 2484 1970 247 1938 946 
2003 2652 2732 447 2257 979 
2004 2756 3855 664 2902 1050 
2005 2774 4041 743 3172 1108 
2006 2763 3863 662 4268 1099 
2007 2706 671 - - 207 
Total 20785 18544 2831 16893 7412 
 A common problem in microeconomic datasets is that of missing 
observations or missing information on particular categories of data. The missing 
observations can be random or non-random. In the former case a distinction can be 
made between observations which are missing at random (MAR) where missingness 
does not depend on the variable’s own value, but may depend on the values of 
other variables, and those missing completely at random (MCAR) where 
missingness does not depend on its own or any other variable’s values in the                                                              
2 We also had access to the data for Hungary and Slovenia but they were unusable due to an 
extremely high rate of missingness (over 90%) on several key variables such as costs of material, age, 
location and investment. 
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dataset (Rubin, 1976). Both processes belong in the group of ignorable missingness 
mechanisms in which the parameters for the missing data-generating process are 
unrelated to the parameters which have to be estimated in the complete model 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Under assumptions of MCAR the estimates are 
consistent and the inference can be carried on using method of listwise deletion 
which deletes observations with missing values on one or more variables in the 
dataset. The listwise deletion can also be applied under MAR assumptions if the 
probability of missing data on any regressor does not depend on the values of 
dependent variable. However, the listwise deletion can significantly reduce the 
amount of available information and thus the efficiency of estimation in small 
samples when missingness occurs for a non-trivial proportion of regressors 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p. 928).  
 The problem of missing observations demonstrates itself in our dataset in 
two ways. First, as we can see from Table 4.2, the number of observations exhibits 
high degree of variations across countries being lowest in Slovakia and highest in 
Croatia. Second, the data on one or more variables are missing for some 
observations (Table 4.3). While the provider of database, Bureau-van-Dyke (2010) 
does not provide any explanation for the former issue, the second is linked with two 
arguments. On one hand, it is said that prior to becoming available in database, the 
data must go through time-consuming administrative procedures which can take 
from a couple of weeks to several years. On the other hand, same source 
acknowledges that in some countries, particularly transition economies where 
penalties for such practice are low, firms do not meet their legal obligation of 
submitting reports to authorities. While it is possible that this occurs at random, 
there is a possibility that there is some unobserved process which underlies pattern 
of missingness in our sample, i.e. the data are not missing at random. However,  
other studies using the Amadeus (Haltiwanger et al., 2003; Warzynski, 2003; 
Stiebale, 2008) database have not recognised such a posiblity and we are unable to 
identify any missingnes mechanism and discern between these two possibilities 
thus we decide to treat the missing data in our sample as missing at random and 
apply listwise deletion to our sample. Given the size of the data set in this study, it is 
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our belief that such practice should not significantly reduce amount of available 
information and efficiency of estimation. Table 4.3 presents the descriptive 
statistics of the dataset over the 2000-2007 period. The detailed annual descriptive 
statistics of the dataset can be found in Tables A4.1-A4.4 in Appendix IV. 
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for quantitative variables 
 CROATIA CZECH REPUBLIC  BULGARIA 
 Mean Std Dev Missing Mean 
Std 
Dev Missing Mean 
Std 
Dev Missing 
MShare 0.1 0.1 0.9% 0.1 0.2 0.4% 0.1 0.2 0.3% 
Labprod 82.6 523 2.8% 87.4 675 5.6% 41.8 192 2.7% 
Invprod -10.4 354 7.8% -4.1 810 7.8% -10.0 372 14.2% 
Ulc 0.3 0.9 2.5% 0.4 24.9 1.0% 0.2 0.4 2.6% 
Umc 0.7 1.1 1.1% 0.9 70.3 39.3% 0.4 0.8 2.5% 
Urbef 0.2 0.2 0.0% 0.2 0.1 0.0% 0.5 0.3 0.0% 
Locef 0.0 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0% 
Age 16.0 20.1 3.8% 8.6 4.7 1.8% 18.3 22.3 46.0% 
 SLOVAKIA POLAND  
 Mean Std Dev Missing Mean 
Std 
Dev Missing 
   
Mshare 0.3 0.3 0.1% 0.1 0.2 0.1%    
Labprod 219 1988 2.6% 97.5 349 5.0%    
Invprod 14.5 534 4.6% -12.0 1349 6.4%    
Ulc 0.3 1.3 0.1% 0.2 2.2 2.0%    
Umc 0.6 8.6 17.7% 0.6 1.5 0.1%    
Urbef 0.1 0.03 0.0% 0.1 0.1 0.0%    
Locef 0.02 0.02 0.0% 0.0 0.0 0.0%    
Age 10.2 7.4 0.1% 17.0 23.1 5.3%    
Note: Missing values were identified in Stata using misschk[varname]  option. 
 The missing observations do not present a problem for categorical variables 
of the sample. As Table 4.4 demonstrates, none of the five categorical variables has 
any missing observations in all five countries.  
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for categorical variables 
 CROATIA CZECH REPUBLIC BULGARIA POLAND SLOVAKIA 
 1(%) Missing 1(%) Missing 1 Missing 1(%) Missing 1(%) Missing 
Lgcit 38.6 0% 23.1 0% 78.6 0% 38.8 0% 12.5 0% 
Low 45.2 0% 35.3 0% 53.1 0% 44.3 0% 40.0 0% 
Mlow 30.2 0% 33.3 0% 21.0 0% 30.0 0% 29.1 0% 
Mhigh 15.8 0% 24.8 0% 16.5 0% 20.9 0% 25.4 0% 
High 8.9 0% 6.7 0% 9.5 0% 5.3 0% 5.5 0% 
Note: Missing values were identified in Stata using misschk[varname]  option. 
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 In longitudinal datasets, such as ours, financial variables may be influenced 
by inflation. This primarily relates to  labour productivity, as other variables are  in 
ratio form. A common way of discounting the effect of price increases is to divide 
the nominal variables by a price index at the level of economy or sector. However, 
given that the providers of the dataset had already converted the variables into 
Euro and that we do not have information about exchange rate used, it is 
inappropriate to try to deflate the Euro figures using some form of price index. In 
most countries, inflation is also reflected in the exchange rate and the conversion to 
Euro will reduce the effect of inflation. Furthermore, as it will be explained in 
Section 4.5, the model developed for this chapter includes time dummies which are 
intended to control for sources of cross-sectional dependence and may also pick-up 
the effect of inflation. However, in the following chapters, where the data is 
presented in local currency, the problem will be dealt by deflating the nominal 
values by producer price index.  
 The descriptive statistics offer some insights into the profile of firms in our 
sample. As we can see from Tables 4.3 and 4.4, most firms in all countries come 
from low and medium low technology intensive industries. The level of unit labour 
costs is lowest in Bulgaria and Poland, while Slovak firms have highest level of 
labour productivity. Somewhat surprisingly, the mean value of investment 
productivity is negative in four of the five countries. As Table A4.3 in Appendix IV 
shows, the mean value of its underlying variables turnover and investment in fixed 
assets is positive in all countries. A likely explanation is that for some firms high 
level of turnover in combination with low level of disinvestment had resulted in 
high levels of negative investment productivity thus affecting the overall 
distribution of this variable in the sample. With the exception of Bulgaria, the 
majority of firms in all countries are located outside of large cities. The average age 
of firms ranges between 9 years in Czech Republic and Slovakia and 16 years in 
other three countries suggesting that the sample includes mainly firms which were 
founded during transition or emerged as part of spinoffs of former socialist 
enterprises.  
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4.4. Methodology 
 Having in mind that we are dealing with longitudinal dataset it seems natural 
to look for a suitable estimator in the family of panel techniques. Among several 
panel methods available we need to select one capable of dealing with the issues 
identified in Section 4.2 as important such as firm-specific heterogeneity, that 
market share is dependent on its past realisations and the potential endogeneity of 
covariates representing firm behaviour (restructuring). The problem of individual 
heterogeneity, arising from unobserved time-invariant factors can be controlled for 
in all panel data techniques using the effects models. However, these models 
require the error term to be uncorrelated with each of explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge, 2006, p. 486; p. 494). This assumption is violated when the lagged 
dependent variable is included on right-hand side of the model as this variable will 
be by construction correlated with the error term. At the same time the non-
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable and use of a static panel techniques will 
result in the estimators obtained  being biased and inconsistent if the process is 
actually dynamic. The assumptions of static effects models will be also violated if 
any other explanatory variable is correlated with error term. In this context, we 
need a model that can capture the possible individual heterogeneity but also the 
potential endogeneity of lagged dependent variable and of variables representing 
restructuring.   
 The general approach to the estimation of panel models with a lagged 
dependent variable and other potentially endogenous variables is to use GMM-type 
estimators in a dynamic panel model (Greene, 2002, p. 308). The GMM is a general 
method for estimation of population parameters which unlike other methods does 
not require assumptions such as normality or homoskedasticity. The only 
requirements of GMM are assumed population conditions, expressed in terms of 
expectations or moments (Pugh, 2008). A fundamental moment condition which 
needs to be satisfied in order to produce unbiased and consistent estimates of 
coefficients of interest is the restriction on the covariance between the error term 
and independent variable 𝐸(𝜀𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡) = 0. When this condition is not satisfied the 
estimates are likely to be biased and inconsistent. The problem can be overcome by 
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the use of instrumental variables which have to be uncorrelated with the error term 
but correlated with the endogenous variables. The number of these instruments is 
not limited and can be very large, by defining more than one moment condition per 
parameter to be estimated, which maximises the information available to the 
estimation process. This advantage of GMM is especially exploited in the dynamic 
panel estimation. 
 On the basis of GMM two types of dynamic estimators are developed – a 
difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and a system GMM estimator 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). With only one lagged 
dependent variable as an explanatory variable, such a  model takes the following 
form: 
yit=β1yit-1+ηi+vit,                                                               |β|<1                   (4.2) 
where  𝜂𝑖 stands for the individual time invariant effects and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 for the idiosyncratic 
errors. The time invariant nature of the former effects implies that they are 
correlated with dependent variable but also with its past realisations which appear 
on the right-hand side. In the difference estimator the problem of time invariant 
effects is solved by differencing the model. 
yit-yit-1=βyit-1-βyit-2+vit-vit-1,                           |β|<1                     (4.3) 
 Although the time invariant effects are removed the problem of endogeneity 
remains as the differenced lagged dependent variable and error term are correlated 
through the correlation between 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 (Greene, 2002; p.308). However, 
under the assumption of no serial correlation in idiosyncratic errors, Arellano and 
Bond (1991) have proposed the use of lagged difference 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−3 or lagged 
level 𝑦𝑖𝑡−2 as instruments (Greene, 2002; p. 308). Higher lags of levels and of 
differences of endogenous variables can also be used as instruments although the 
validity of these instruments would depend on their correlation with the 
explanatory variables. As Greene (2002; p.309) suggests, the instruments which are 
lagged too far are likely to bear less information.  
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 The difference estimator has been found to be biased and inefficient in 
situations when the lagged levels of series are close to a random walk (Blundell and 
Bond, 1998; Pugh, 2008; Roodman, 2009b). The “system” GMM estimator (Arellano 
and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) has an advantage in this situation. This 
builds a stacked dataset with twice the observations, one for the levels equation 
and one for the differenced equation. The introduction of levels equation in the 
model is explained by the argument that past changes may be more predictive of 
current levels than the levels can be of future changes when the series are close to 
random walk. Nevertheless, the system is treated as a single equation and the same 
linear relationship with the same coefficients is believed to apply to both the 
transformed (differenced) and untransformed (level) variables (Roodman, 2009b). 
Another advantage of system estimator over difference one is its ability to include 
time-invariant variables which are being differenced together with fixed effects in 
the latter case. Finally, supplementing instruments for differenced equation with 
those for the levels equation, the system estimator increases amount of 
information used in estimation thus leading to an increase in efficiency (Pugh, 
2008).  
 While being superior to the difference estimator in many aspects, the 
system estimator is also not without flaws. Its most commonly cited problems are 
the sensitivity to the number of instruments and on violation of the steady-state 
assumption. Roodman (2009a) notes that in finite samples large number of 
instruments may weaken the ability of relevant diagnostics (Hansen test) to reject 
the null hypothesis of instrument validity. There is no consensus over the question 
of optimal number of instruments but it is taken as rule of thumb that this number 
should not exceed number of groups (cross-sectional units) used in estimation. 
Another issue recognised in context of system estimator is requirement of steady-
state assumption. According to Pugh (2008), there are two requirements for this 
condition to hold. First, the coefficient on lagged dependent variable must have 
absolute value less than unity so that the process is convergent and second, this 
process of convergence should not be correlated with time-invariant effects. 
Chapter Four: Competitiveness, Restructuring and Firm Behaviour in Transition 
 
114  
 In our estimation we use the system dynamic panel estimator. There are 
four reasons which can justify our choice. First, the dynamic panel analysis enables 
us to control for potential endogeneity of other variables caused by their 
correlation with unobserved time-invariant characteristics in the same way as the 
relationship between these characteristics and lagged dependent variable is 
controlled for. Second, given that several variables of interest in our model such as 
the location of firm or technological intensity of its industry are modelled as dummy 
variables it is more reasonable to use the system estimator which allows inclusion 
of time-invariant variables. Third, as we mentioned earlier in the presence of 
random walk or near random walk processes system estimator is more efficient. 
Finally, as we will explain soon, the dynamic analysis provides us with an 
opportunity to discern the short-run from the long-run effects of explanatory 
variables which might help us to distinguish between defensive and strategic 
restructuring discussed in Section 2.2.  
 Dynamic estimators can be estimated in one-step and two-step procedures. 
In the one-step procedure the GMM estimator is developed by imposing some 
reasonable but arbitrary assumption (such as homoscedasticity) about the 
weighting matrix. However, this estimator is not robust to heteroskedasticity or 
cross-correlation. Therefore, the procedure for obtaining a robust estimator 
involves another step in which the residuals from the first step are used to 
construct the proxy for the optimal weighting matrix which is then embodied in the 
feasible GMM estimator, which is robust to the modelled patterns of 
heteroskedasticity and cross-correlation (Roodman, 2009b, p. 9). However, the 
standard errors obtained in the two-step procedure are known to be downward 
biased when the number of instruments is large. This problem can be greatly 
reduced with the use of Windmeijer’s (2005) corrections for the two-step standard 
errors. Given that Windmeijer’s corrected standard errors are found to be superior 
to the cluster-robust one-step standard errors (Roodman, 2009b, p. 12), we decide 
to apply this approach.   
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 Another benefit of dynamic analysis is that it allows us to discern between 
the short -and long-run effects. Supposing that equation (2) includes additional 
explanatory variable 𝑥 this can be written as  
 yit=β1yit-1+β2xit+ηi+vit,                                                               |β|<1                   (4.4) 
In equation (4.4), the coefficient 𝛽2 is the estimated coefficient and is known as the 
short-run multiplier which represents only a fraction of the desired change (Greene, 
2002, p. 568). The long-run effect can then be calculated algebraically as product of 
the coefficient 𝛽2 and the long-run multiplier 
1
1−𝛽1
 . The standard error and the 
corresponding t-statistic for coefficient obtained this way can be then calculated 
using delta-method (Pugh, 1998, p. 99; Greene, 2002, p. 569; Papke and 
Wooldridge, 2005, p. 413). However, we must bear in mind that the results 
obtained with the long-run coefficients are valid only under the assumption of the 
system’s stability, i.e. lack of structural breaks over course of time which is however 
major simplification. Having that in mind and applying the above mentioned 
methodology we next turn to the estimation and interpretation of results. 
4.5. Discussion of findings 
 Bearing in mind theoretical arguments from Section 4.2 and the discussion 
about methodology of our research from previous section we specify the model of 
the form: 
CIit=c+CIit-1+βX+vi+uit                                                                                            (4.5) 
where CI stands for the competitiveness index which we measure as firm’s market 
share, and X includes elements of firm behaviour, characteristics and features of its 
environment as defined in Section 4.2.3. while 𝑣𝑖 are time-invariant unobserved 
factors and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are usual idiosyncratic errors. After substitution of X with set of 
variables for restructuring, our model takes the following form 
CIit=c+ αCIit-1+β1LABPRODit+β2INVPRODit+β3UMCit +β4Lgcitit+β5Mlowit +β6Mhighit+β7Highit+β8Ageit+β9Urbefit+β10Locefit+vi+uit     (4.6) 
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 In addition to variables in equation (4.6) our discussion in Section 4.2.3 had 
identified unit labour costs as important factor in explaining ability of firms to 
compete. However, we need to take into account that this variable and labour 
productivity both reflect same theoretical variable, labour efficiency. Thus we have 
two proxies for labour efficiency and we estimate the model using each of these 
proxies for comparison. Finally, our models also include year dummy variables to 
control for cross-sectional dependence. Roodman (2009b) states that this 
dependence is likely to arise from the factors such as universal time-shocks which 
affect all of cross-sectional units. Therefore it is essential to model these possible 
sources of cross-sectional dependence.  
 The model was estimated using the statistical software Stata 11. The lagged 
dependent variable and variables representing restructuring of firms, i.e. 
productivity of investment and of labour, unit labour and unit material costs are 
treated as endogenous. In the instrumentation matrix they were instrumented with 
their own lags and lagged differences while the exogenous variables were imputed 
as their own instruments. The choice of instruments was done according to the 
principle that all relevant model diagnostics need to be satisfied. However, in 
situations where several alternative sets of instruments satisfied above condition 
we chose those outcomes which made more economic sense. We present here only 
results for the variables of interest, while the coefficients for year dummy variables 
are not presented. The latter are discusssed in section on the diagnostics of model 
and the results for them as well as the syntaxes used can be found in the printouts 
of estimations in Appendix IV (Tables A4.5-A4.14). We begin with the interpretation 
of results for Croatia. 
4.5.1. Results for Croatia 
 In this section we present and discuss main results from estimation 
undertaken on Croatian sample of firms (Table 4.5). The first step is the examination 
of model diagnostics. The most important issue for validity of results obtained with 
the dynamic panel technique is the proper choice of instruments. As we established 
in Section 4.4, in system GMM estimation the instruments used come from within 
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the system. In the levels equation they are found among the one and more periods 
lagged differences of endogenous variables or current differences of predetermined 
variables. In the difference equation the endogenous variables are instrumented 
with their own levels  lagged two or more periods and levels of predetermined 
variables lagged one or more periods. Also, a large number of instruments can 
overfit endogenous variables and weaken the tests of instrument validity 
(Roodman, 2009a). In our estimation this number is far below the N (number of 
cross-sectional observations) ranging between 53 and 89 instruments (Table 4.5).  
 The validity of instruments in dynamic panel estimations is tested with the 
Hansen test and the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation in differences of 
residuals. The null hypothesis in Hansen test is that the overidentifying restrictions 
are valid. It has been suggested that as well as low values, very high p-values with 
this test should be viewed with concern. Roodman (2009a, p. 10) advises that the 
reported p-values at the conventional significance levels of 0.05 or 0.10 should not 
be viewed with too much confidence. Very high values, close to unity should be 
viewed with caution as these may be caused with the high instrument count. The p 
values in Hansen tests of overidentifying restrictions in Table 4.5 are 0.37 and 0.56 
which may be interpreted as a sign of valid instruments.  
 A further important diagnostic is the m2/m1 test for autocorrelation in 
disturbances (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This test examines whether there is no 
second–order autocorrelation of the error term in the first-differenced equation, 
where the null hypothesis is of no autocorrelation. The test checks for 
autocorrelation of first and second order for which reason it is known as the m1/m2 
test. It is expected that differences of errors are correlated in terms of the MA(1) 
process, i.e. there is negative correlation of first order. However, it is also expected 
that there is no second-order autocorrelation in disturbances, i.e. no MA(2) 
processes which makes the second and higher lags of potentially endogenous 
variables valid instruments. As it can be seen from table 4.5 the null hypothesis of 
no autocorrelation in differences of errors is rejected for the autocorrelation of first 
order but there is no sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation of second order in differences of errors.  
Chapter Four: Competitiveness, Restructuring and Firm Behaviour in Transition 
 
118  
 We also check whether the steady-state assumption is satisfied and whether 
any pattern of cross-sectional dependence is identified. With respect to former 
objective, Tables A4.5 and A4.6 in Appendix IV provide difference-in-Sargan test for 
levels equation. There is not sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of valid 
instruments for levels which implies that the steady-state assumption can be 
accepted and system estimator can be preferred over the difference one. The same 
table also provides the dummy variables for individual years which are insignificant 
at conventional levels of significance implying that units in our sample are not 
subject to universal time shocks. In addition, as it has been recognised in the 
literature that problem of cross-sectional dependence may persist even after 
inclusion of time dummies (Sarafidis et al., 2009, p. 2) we examine the difference-in-
Sargan test statistic for the lagged dependent variable. The corresponding p-values 
suggest that there is not sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the 
instruments on lagged dependent variable are valid, implying that our model is 
unlikely to suffer from cross-sectional dependence (Tables A4.5 and A4.6 in 
Appendix IV).  
 Roodman (2009b) notes that the value of true dynamic estimator should lie 
between the values obtained by OLS and fixed effects methods. Accordingly, the 
OLS tends to inflate the coefficient on lagged dependent variable while the fixed 
effects estimation biases it downwards. As Tables A4.15 and A4.16 in Appendix IV 
demonstrate, in both specifications the obtained coefficient on lagged dependent 
variable is below the one obtained with OLS but higher than the one obtained with 
fixed effects.  Finally, the test for joint significance of explanatory variables in all 
three models indicates that our chosen variables have jointly explanatory power. 
These diagnostics suggest that our model is well specified and allow us to proceed 
with the interpretation of results from the Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5: Dynamic panel system GMM estimations for the competitiveness of firms in 
Croatia, 2000-2007 (Dep. variable MShare) 
 SPECIFICATION 1 SPECIFICATION 2 
 SR LR SR LR 
Lagged dependent variable 0.73(0.000)*** - 0.86(0.000)*** - 
Constant term(cons) 0.02(0.009)*** - 0.01(0.094)* - 
RESTRUCTURING     
Labprod 0.0001(0.091)* 0.0004(0.082)* - - 
Invprod 0.0002(0.003)*** 0.001(0.009)*** 0.0001(0.008)*** 0.001(0.070)* 
Ulc  - - -0.01(0.056)* -0.04(0.032)** 
Umc -0.003(0.616) -0.013(0.618) 0.002(0.192) 0.01(0.143) 
AGGLOMERATION EFFECTS     
Lgcit -0.004(0.097)* -0.01(0.070)* -0.002(0.332) -0.01(0.290) 
Urbef -0.02(0.029)** -0.06(0.006)*** -0.01(0.303) -0.04(0.211) 
Locef -0.39(0.000)*** -1.40(0.000)*** -0.17(0.060)* -1.22(0.000)*** 
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS     
Mlow -0.01(0.014)** -0.02(0.004)*** -0.003(0.146) -0.02(0.100) 
Mhigh 0.01(0.150) 0.02(0,150) 0.01(0.088)* 0.13(0.105) 
High -0.01(0.211) -0.02(0.155) -0.0002(0.897) -0.002(0.942) 
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS     
Age 0.001(0.002)*** 0.002(0.000)*** 0.0002(0.186) 0.001(0.008)*** 
MODEL DIAGNOSTICS     
Number of observations 20785 - 20883 - 
Number of groups 3375 - 3375 - 
Wald test 3017.55 - 4157.19 - 
Prob>chi2 0.000 - 0.000 - 
Sargan/Hansen J Statistic 36.03 - 67.67 - 
Prob> chi2 0.374 - 0.557 - 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first 
differences -3.14 - -4.32 - 
Prob>chi2 0.002 - 0.000 - 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 0.02 - -0.39 - 
Prob>chi2 0.987 - 0.695 - 
Instrument count 53 - 89 - 
Note:  p-values in brackets where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% 
level of significance    respectively. 
p-values are obtained from two-step dynamic panel procedure with Windmeeijer's corrected robust 
standard errors.  
All models include year dummies. 
 In both specifications in Table 4.5, the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable is highly significant and positive thus providing support to the hypothesis of 
the dynamic nature of competitiveness. The size of the estimated coefficient 
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increases a little when we replace labour productivity with unit labour costs. 
Holding everything else constant this implies that a one percentage point increase 
in market share in the last period explains 0.72 (0.86) percentage point  change in a 
firm’s market share in current period. Furthermore, we also find significant 
coefficients on all elements of restructuring except unit material costs.  The findings 
with respect to agglomeration effects  and industry-specific characteristics are 
ambiguous while age of firm appears to be positively related to firm’s 
competitiveness in both the short and the long run.  
 Turning to the greatest concern, the relationship between competitiveness 
nad restructuring of firms we find statistically significant and positive coefficients in 
both short and long run on productivity of investment in both specifications. An 
increase in investment productivity by one unit increases the market share of firm 
for 0.02 percentage points in the short run and 0.1 percentage points in the long 
run. Similarly, improvements in efficiency of labour have a positive impact on the 
market share of firm and this finding remains robust even when we replace labour 
productivity with unit labour costs in specification 2, as both variables have their 
expected signs. An  improvement in labour productivity by one unit (1000 EUR per 
employee) is estimated to lead to about 0.01 percentage points higher market 
share of firm in the short run and 0.04 percentage points higher market share in the 
long run. Among cost variables, only unit labour costs are significant and they have 
the expected sign. The estimates suggest that if a firm’s managers reduce their unit 
labour costs by one percentage point, this in the long run increases the market 
share of the firms for 0.04 percentage points. These findings can be taken as 
evidence that Croatian firms compete by making defensive short-run adjustments in 
their behaviour within existing capacities and technology constraints but also by 
investing into activities such as the new technology, knowledge and human capital 
whose impact should be visible in improved efficiency of their costs, labour and 
capital in the long run.  
 The location of firm is significant (and then only at the 10%  level) only in the 
specification with labour productivity and therefore we interpret findings from this 
specification only. The negative coefficient on having a location in large city 
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suggests that firms located outside of large urban areas would in the short run have 
0.4 percentage points higher market share than their rivals in large cities. This 
finding can be interpreted as evidence that Croatian firms consider as more 
important the externalities provided by smaller urban areas such as those discussed 
in Section 4.2.3 than those which are typical for large cities such as cooperation 
with research institutes or universities. Contrary to expectations, we did not find 
evidence of the effect of urbanization or localization economies. Both variables 
have negative signs and coefficient on urbanization economies is statistically 
insignificant when we replace labour productivity with unit labour costs. One likely 
explanation for such finding is that Croatian firms do not perceive other firms from 
their region as potential cooperatives but as strictly competitors. Thus our results 
are closer to findings of studies reviewed in Section 4.2.2 which stated that pressure 
of competition has negative effect on market share of firms. Accordingly, the larger 
number of rivals on firm’s regional market increases competition, as they all 
compete for same part of income. 
 The age variable is significant in the short run in specification with 
productivity of labour and in both specifications in the long run. Focusing on former 
specification it is estimated that an additional year since incorporation increases 
firm’s market share for about 0.1 percentage points in the short run while in the 
long run, firm increases its market share as it gets older for about 0.2 percentage 
points. This finding provides support for the hypothesis that accumulated 
knowledge about principles of behaviour on the market, established networks of 
suppliers and customers and other related factors helps firm to outperform its 
rivals. Finally, variables for technology intensity are insignificant in both 
specifications, except for medium-low technology intensive firms which suggest 
that firms from this group of industries have on average in the long run 2 
percentage points lower market share than their rivals from low technology 
intensive industries. However, with respect to other two groups, the medium-high 
and high technology intensive industries there appears to be no statistical 
difference between firms in these industries and firms in the low technology 
intensive group.   
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4.5.2. Results for other countries 
 In this section we discuss our findings for group of advanced transition 
economies. For expositional convenience, we bring in Table 4.6 only results from 
our baseline specification while the results of alternative specification can be found 
in Tables A4.7-A4.14 in Appendix IV. As in previous section, we start by addressing 
briefly the diagnostics of models for all four countries. All diagnostics which we 
identified in Section 4.5.1 as important in context of dynamic panel estimation are 
satisfying and provide support to our specification in all four countries. We do not 
have sufficient evidence to reject null hypothesis about validity of overidentifying 
restrictions and p-values of Hansen test in all four estimations are above the most 
conservative threshold of 0.25 (Table 4.6). The choice of instruments is further 
supported with the m1/m2 statistic. In all estimations the null hypothesis of no first 
order autocorrelation was rejected but we did not have sufficient evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis of no second order autocorrelation in differences of residuals. In 
addition, the number of instruments is relatively low in comparison to number of 
groups of cross-sectional observations.  
 The difference-in-Sargan test for levels supports the choice of the system 
estimator over difference one while same test for lagged dependent variable as well 
as the coefficients on time dummies do not reveal possible problems from cross-
sectional dependence. In all specifications, the coefficient on lagged dependent 
variable is lower than the one obtained with OLS but higher than the one from fixed 
effects estimation.3 Finally, the Wald test for joint explanatory power of coefficients 
does not reject the null that all coefficients jointly have explanatory power. The 
model diagnostics hold when we substitute labour productivity with unit labour 
costs (Tables A4.7-A4.14 in Appendix IV). Having said that we may proceed with the 
interpretation of results. 
 
 
                                                              
3 However, we do obtain somewhat lower coefficient with system GMM estimator than with FE in 
specifications for Czech Republic (Tables A4.7 and A4.8). Nevertheless, all other diagnostics remain 
robust. 
Chapter Four: Competitiveness, Restructuring and Firm Behaviour in Transition 
 
123  
Table 4.6: Dynamic panel system GMM estimations for the competitiveness of firms in 
advanced transition economies  (Dep. variable Mshare) 
 CZECH REPUBLIC SLOVAK REPUBLIC POLAND BULGARIA 
 SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.17** 
(0.028) - 
0.68*** 
(0.000) - 
0.72*** 
(0.000) - 
0.91*** 
(0.000)  
RESTRUCTURING 
Labprod 3e-05* (0.074) 
3e-05* 
(0.070) 
5.52e-
06*** 
(0.002) 
2e-05** 
(0.013) 
2e-05* 
(0.092) 
0.0001* 
(0.086) 
-7.69e-
06 
(0.705) 
0.0001 
(0.752) 
Invprod -1e-05 (0.381) 
-1e-05 
(0.374) 
1e-05 
(0.569) 
4e-05 
(0.548) 
3.90e-06* 
(0.063) 
1e-05* 
(0.070) 
1e-05** 
(0.036) 
0.0001 
(0.327) 
Umc 0.002 (0.490) 
0.002 
(0.493) 
-0.02 
(0.909) 
-0.05 
(0.910) 
0.002 
(0.926) 
0.01 
(0.926) 
-0.04 
(0.466) 
-0.44 
(0.488) 
AGGLOMERATION EFFECTS 
Lgcit 0.011** (0.042) 
0.02** 
(0.036) 
0.01 
(0.592) 
0.03 
(0.579) 
0.001 
(0.792) 
0.003 
(0.792) 
-0.001 
(0.899) 
-0.01 
(0.892) 
Urbef -0.06** (0.024) 
-0.07** 
(0.019) 
-0.20 
(0.140) 
-0.62 
(0.154) 
-0.04*** 
(0.009) 
-0.143*** 
(0.005) 
-0.02** 
(0.010) 
-0.26 
(0.161) 
Locef 
-
1.74*** 
(0.000) 
-
2.09*** 
(0.000) 
-1.92*** 
(0.000) 
-
5.95*** 
(0.000) 
-0.53*** 
(0.000) 
-1.92*** 
(0.000) 
-0.20 
(0.172) 
-2.29 
(0.290) 
INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Mlow -0.01 (0.341) 
-0.01 
(0.341) 
0.01 
(0.518) 
0.02 
(0.507) 
0.001 
(0.640) 
0.003 
(0.644) 
0.003 
(0.662) 
0.04 
(0.561) 
Mhigh 
-
0.03*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.04*** 
(0.000) 
-0.01 
(0.234) 
-0.04 
(0.211) 
-0.001 
(0.780) 
-0.002 
(0.778) 
0.003 
(0.475) 
0.03 
(0.448) 
High 
-
0.03*** 
(0.003) 
-
0.03*** 
(0.002) 
-0.01 
(0.741) 
-0.02 
(0.746) 
-0.003 
(0.517) 
-0.01 
(0.503) 
-0.0001 
(0.982) 
-0.002 
(0.982) 
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS 
Age 0.001* (0.074) 
0.002* 
(0.061) 
0.001 
(0.299) 
0.002 
(0.299) 
0.0001*** 
(0.005) 
0.0004*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0001 
(0.605) 
-0.001 
(0.718) 
         
Cons 0.13*** (0.000) - 
-0.20** 
(0.036) - 
0.04* 
(0.080) - 
0.04* 
(0.170) - 
         
MODEL DIAGNOSTICS 
Number of 
observations 18544 - 2830 - 16893 - 7412 - 
Number of groups 6344 - 826 - 4925 - 1575 - 
Wald 672.67 - 1087.93 
- 4909.50 - 
3793.32 - 
Prob>chi2 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 
Sargan/Hansen 13.40 - 22.11 - 35.58 - 36.45 - 
Prob>chi2 0.495 - 0.683 - 0.262 - 0.448 - 
AR(1) -3.85 - -4.60 - -6.81 - -6.38 - 
Prob>chi2 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000 - 
AR(2) 1.51 - 1.17 - 1.45 - 1.00 - 
Prob>chi2 0.131 - 0.240 - 0.148 - 0.317 - 
Instrument count 33 - 42 - 49 - 55 - 
Note:  p-values in brackets where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance    respectively. 
 p-values are obtained from two-step dynamic panel procedure with Windmeeijer's corrected robust standard errors 
All models include year dummies. 
 Findings for group of advanced transition economies are broadly similar to 
those which we reported for Croatia. In all countries there are evidences of the 
dynamic nature of competitiveness as coefficient on lagged dependent variable is 
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highly statistically significant and positive. We have also found in all countries some 
evidence of strategic restructuring. The most important aspect of firm behaviour in 
these countries is labour productivity while other forms of restructuring are 
insignificant (or in a few cases only significant at the 10% level). In most of cases we 
did not find any evidence of agglomeration externalities described earlier in this 
chapter. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the variable 
capturing the effect of localisation economies implies that firms in analysed 
countries, just as those in Croatia, in struggle for better position within their 
industries perceive other firms solely as competitors. With exception of results for 
Czech Republic, we were not able to confirm existence of relationship between 
industry-specific characteristics and competitiveness of firms. Finally, it appears that 
age has positive role in competitiveness of firms in Poland  and the Czech Republic, 
but  in other two countries this variable was insignificant. 
 Judging by our findings for restructuring variables, behaviour of firms from 
CEECs did not significantly change in relation to their behavioural patterns in earlier 
periods. As in the case of Croatia, in all the analysed countries we find that the 
estimated coefficient on labour productivity has a positive sign and is statistically 
significant, except for Bulgaria. The magnitude of coefficient varies somewhat 
across countries being lowest in Slovak Republic and highest in Czech Republic 
(Table 4.6). We also find significant coefficient with positive sign on productivity of 
investment in Poland, Slovakia and in Bulgaria (Table 4.6 and Tables A4.10, A4.12-
A4.14 in Appendix IV). Choice between location in large cities or in smaller urban 
areas appears to make difference in market share only for firms in Czech Republic 
as in all other countries the variable is not statistically significant. The positive sign 
on the coefficient suggests that location in large cities increases market share of 
Czech firms by about 1 percentage point in the short run and 2 percentage points in 
the long run. This finding can be interpreted as a sign that Czech firms in building 
their competitiveness rely on externalities such as access to skilled labour or 
collaboration with universities, research laboratories etc. Also, it can be sign that 
Czech firms by locating in large cities benefit from lower costs due to mass 
production, easier access to market and better infrastructure. Thus we may say that 
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ability of the former group of firms to compete rests on different types of 
agglomeration externalities than the ones which are important for their Croatian 
counterparts.  
  The findings for other two agglomeration variables, namely urbanization and 
localization economies are statistically significant and have a negative sign. 
Accordingly, we do not have sufficient evidence to conclude that firms in the Czech 
manufacturing sector benefit from general agglomeration effects such as sharing of 
basic assets, resources and institutions or from the industry-specific agglomeration 
effects such as knowledge spillovers or innovation. Instead, it appears that higher 
concentration of firms and particularly of firms from same industry in one region 
has a negative effect on market share of Czech firms. Our variables may thus be 
picking up the effect of competition rather than agglomeration effects. The findings 
about urbanization and localization economies in other countries do not differ from 
those for Czech republic. The only exception from this rule are Bulgaria and Slovakia 
where in the long run we obtain insignificant coefficients for both variables in the 
former and for urbanisation economies in the latter.   
 Age is significant only in estimations for Poland and the Czech Republic (only 
at the 10% level). In these countries the evidence supported the presence of 
positive relationship between firm’s age and its market share. Such finding can be 
an indicator that firms in these two countries are exploiting the benefits of the 
accumulated knowledge in order to increase their market share. However, this 
finding can also be interpreted as an indicator that some firms have maintained 
their market shares from pretransition period. Finally, technological intensity of 
firm’s industry is statistically insignificant, except for the Czech Republic where the 
estimates give statistically significant coefficients with a negative sign for medium-
high and high technology intensive industries. On overall, firms from these 
industries have about 3 percentage points lower market share than firms from low 
technology intensive industries. Such a finding may be interpreted as an evidence 
that these two groups of industries in Czech Republic are characterized by a higher 
degree of competition than their low technology intensive counterparts. Hence, in 
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this respect, the behaviour of firms from advanced transition economies seems to 
be similar to the behaviour of their Croatian counterparts. 
 The replacement of labour productivity with unit labour costs does not 
cause major changes in our findings (Tables A4.7-A4.14 in Appendix IV). The only 
exceptions are coefficients of investment productivity which looses its significance 
in Poland and becomes significant in Slovak Republic and that of localisation 
economies in Bulgaria which becomes significant but only at 10% level. However, 
the coefficient on unit labour costs is significant only in Poland where it has the 
expected negative sign. Ceteris paribus, Polish firms which reduce their unit costs of 
labour for 1 percentage point have 0.04 percentage points higher market share.  
 Bringing all these findings together we can identify several stylised facts 
about the behaviour of firms in CEECs in the advanced stage of transition. First, in 
all countries we find some evidence of strategic restructuring. Second, in building 
their relative position on the market, firms from these economies rely mainly on 
improvements in efficiency of labour as the coefficient on labour productivity has 
been significant in majority of cases. Third, it appears that firms in our sample do 
not utilise benefits of agglomerations in a way which would be typical for firms 
which compete in terms of quality of their products. Rather their behaviour in this 
respect implies price-based competitiveness. Fourth, comparing findings across 
different countries it appears that the most extensive restructuring has taken place 
among Croatian and Polish firms. In addition to improvements in labour 
productivity firms in these countries build their competitiveness also through 
investment in machinery and equipment and improvements in unit labour costs.  
4.6. Conclusion 
 In this chapter we investigated behaviour of firms from four advanced CEECs 
and Croatia. We were able to confirm the hypothesis about the dynamic nature of 
competitiveness and we also found some evidence of strategic restructuring, 
suggesting that competitive firms undertake their actions with long run survival in 
mind. However, our findings indicate that during the advanced stage of transition, 
firms from transition economies have mainly followed the patterns of behaviour 
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described in earlier literature. In this respect, we identified improvements in labour 
productivity and labour cost efficiency as forms of restructuring which contribute 
most to the ability of firms to increase their market share. It appears though, that in 
building their competitiveness firms in our sample have relied more on their own 
experience and less on cooperation and knowledge sharing with other firms. Such 
patterns of behaviour where labour costs and labour efficiency tend to be the major 
element of restructuring and where interactions between firms are less important 
for gaining market share, are typical for firms which compete in prices producing 
easily imitable products based on stable, well-diffused technologies and simple skill 
requirements. Therefore, we can conclude that the behaviour of firms in CEECs still 
bears resemblance to behavioural patterns demonstrated by these firms in earlier 
years of transition. 
 Our investigation did not find any significant differences in the behaviour of 
Croatian firms in relation to firms from other analysed CEECs. In the struggle to 
retain, or expand, their market share in the period under consideration, Croatian 
firms relied on same factors and strategies as firms in other countries. Moreover, 
we found more evidence of strategic restructuring in Croatia than in some of the 
other countries as, in Croatia, the market share of firms was also related to the 
productivity of investment in addition to labour productivity and unit labour costs. 
In that respect, the behaviour of Croatian firms was closest to the behaviour of 
firms from Poland as this was the only other country in the sample where firms 
demonstrated similar pattern of behaviour.  
 Summarizing the empirical results of this chapter we can identify three 
important findings. First, competitiveness is dynamic phenomenon which is closely 
related to strategic restructuring. Second, the behaviour of firms from CEECs is still 
based on same foundations as in earlier years of transition, they resemble many 
characteristics of price-competitive firms and in that respect our findings are in line 
with findings from studies reviewed in Chapters One and Two. Finally,  the 
behaviour of Croatian firms does not significantly differ from the behaviour of firms 
in other CEECs which suggests that Croatian firms were able to catch-up with 
former group in the advanced stage of transition.   
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5.1. Introduction 
 For small and open economies, such as Croatia, the ability to grow and provide 
their citizens with better standard of living is closely related to the success of their 
firms on international market. In financing their imports, these economies, among 
other things, rely on foreign exchange generated by exporters to other countries. Also, 
the knowledge and technology accumulated through international competition and 
transferred to home operations through horizontal and vertical spillovers are important 
factors in explaining competitiveness of their industries. As we discussed in Section 1.3, 
several international trade theories link the growth of economies with the structure of 
their exported products. In this context, the ability of firms to compete in the high 
technology intensive segments of international markets makes them capable of 
differentiating their products from their rivals’ and to achieve higher rates of growth 
for themselves and their economies. With this in mind, understanding the competitive 
profile of exporters becomes an important factor for assessment of competitiveness of 
their nations.  
 This chapter investigates the competitiveness of Croatian exporters paying 
special attention to the role of enterprise restructuring and its manifestations in 
efficiency, human capital, technology and innovativeness. The investigation also takes 
account of the characteristics of firms recognised as important by the relevant 
literature and addresses several issues which, to our knowledge, have received little or 
no attention in context of transition economies such as agglomeration effects or 
government policies. By observing how different elements of firm behaviour, their 
characteristics and features of their environment affect their ability to compete abroad 
we aim to assess competitive profile of Croatian exporters. Together with findings from 
previous and the following chapter, the results will be used in last part of thesis to 
formulate our conclusions about competitiveness of Croatian firms in transition and to 
develop policy recommendations.  
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 The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 will start with the discussion of 
theoretical arguments exploring factors which contribute to the ability of firms to 
compete on international markets and review the relevant empirical findings on 
competitiveness of exporters in order to develop a model for the empirical part of the 
chapter. The characteristics of our dataset and main descriptive statistics will be 
discussed in Section 5.3. Following the discussion of methodological issues in Section 
5.4, the analysis of the main findings of empirical investigation will be undertaken in 
Section 5.5. Finally, the summary of findings will be presented in Section 5.6.  
5.2. Conceptual framework 
 In last couple of decades the subject of competitiveness of exporters has 
aroused a great deal of interest amongst academics, businessmen and policy makers. 
Their concern over the success of firms on international markets can be explained from 
two perspectives. First, exporting is recognised as a straightforward way for firms to 
overcome size limitations of domestic markets and to secure their success and survival 
in a globalised world (Majocchi et al., 2005). Second, competitive profiles of exporters 
are often used as argument in explaining economic growth of nations (Lall, 2000). The 
literature postulates that technology intensive products offer better prospects for 
growth as they are not easily imitable and they may trigger the development of new 
skills and knowledge in downstream and upstream industries. In contrast, standardised 
products are said to be easily imitable, grow only slowly and are more sensitive to price 
movements. Having in mind that for a long time exporters from transition economies, 
and among them Croatian exporters, competed in second group of products (Sections 
1.5.3 and 3.3.4), it seems important to examine whether their competitive profiles 
have changed over time. To do this, we first discuss theoretical arguments explaining 
the ability of firms to compete on international markets and then critically review the 
relevant empirical findings before we develop a model for the empirical part of the 
chapter.  
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5.2.1. Theoretical basis 
 The starting point in the analysis of the competitiveness of exporters is the 
identification of factors that underlie variations in success of firms on international 
markets. The widely accepted view is that market imperfections play a significant role 
in explaining the ability of firms to compete abroad. In line with the discussion about 
the theoretical foundations of competitiveness (Section 1.3), the literature posits that 
under conditions of imperfect competition such as asymmetric distribution of 
information, the success of exporters will be determined by firm, industry and country 
specific advantages. One strand of the literature, with roots in evolutionary economics, 
links competitiveness of exporters with improvements in aspects of their behaviour 
such as cost efficiency and labour productivity (Iyer, 2010) or innovations, technology 
and human capital (Bleaney and Wakelin, 2002; Singh, 2009). Hence, this literature 
suggests that factors and forces which are used in the general analysis of 
competitiveness at firm level may also apply to firms’ performance on international 
markets. 
  In addition to firm behaviour, the literature pays special attention to 
characteristics of firms such as size, age and ownership (Bonaccorsi, 1992; Wagner, 
1995; Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Majocchi et al., 2005). The central argument behind 
this reasoning is that exporters need to possess certain skills, knowledge, experience 
and assets which are costly and difficult to obtain for small firms. Drawing their roots 
from a resource-based view, some studies consider the size of firms as an important 
factor for overcoming of these barriers. In this context size is taken as proxy for access 
to finance, possession of specific organisational and human resources and economies 
of scale. Another line of reasoning, based on the transaction costs approach, explains 
the link between size and exports with two arguments. First, the risk of failure makes 
small firms averse towards exporting; second, under conditions of imperfect 
competition fear of the hold-up problem prevents them from obtaining export-specific 
resources through market interactions.  
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 Barriers to exporting may be more easily overcome by firms with more 
experience (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Becchetti and Rossi, 2000; Dijk, 2001; Majocchi 
et al., 2005; Singh, 2009). In the spirit of the Austrian school, the values, routines and 
traditions accumulated by firms through their working lives are factors that can help 
them make optimal choices in the current period. Similarly, exporting experience, 
defined as the familiarity of firms with preferences of foreign consumers, distribution 
networks, the business culture and institutional framework may be a competitive 
advantage of established exporters over newcomers. Finally, in the context of 
developing and transition economies, foreign ownership has been recognised as an 
important factor in explaining competitiveness of exporters by providing them with 
new technology, knowledge and the ability to use networks established by their 
owners.   
 Among the channels that can lower barriers to exporting, the existing studies 
also emphasise the agglomeration externalities such as those described in Section 4.2.3 
(Bonaccorsi, 1992; Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Becchetti and Rossi, 2000; Malmberg et 
al., 2000; Stiebale, 2008; Iyer, 2010; Koenig et al., 2010). In this context, the 
geographical proximity of exporters to each other, their location near borders or in 
large urban areas and specific business zones are recognised as factors that can ease 
the access of firms to the pool of skills and expertise, facilitate their networking with 
laboratories and institutions and provide them with amenities such as lower 
administrative fees, tax and customs exemptions, cost-sharing activities and knowledge 
spillovers. However, the literature also postulates that the net benefits from 
agglomerations will be disproportionally accrued to firms in technology intensive and 
innovative industries which have a higher demand for highly skilled labour and 
knowledge base than in low technology intensive firms which base their production on 
standardised production processes. For this reason the former firms which need to 
constantly innovate are more likely to remain in urban areas while low-end firms are 
more likely to move to smaller urban centres with lower costs (Venables, 1996; Feser, 
2002). 
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 In terms of the firm’s environment, the literature distinguishes between three 
groups of factors. First, in line with predictions of international trade models, the 
competitiveness of exporters is explained by the comparative advantage or the level of 
development of their economies (Dijk, 2001; Wignaraja, 2008). Second, industry 
specific factors such as economies of scale, concentration or technological intensity of 
industries are considered as important for the ability of firms to compete abroad 
(Smith et al., 2002; Duenas-Caparas, 2006; Stiebale, 2008; Singh, 2009). Hence, for 
firms in low technology industries the ability to underprice their rivals is considered as 
their main source of competitive advantage while in the high technology intensive ones 
product differentiation and quality improvements will be more important (Lall, 2000). 
Third, based on the views current in institutional economics, different elements of the 
legal development and institutional infrastructure (Correa et al., 2007) and the access 
of firms to subsidies (Becchetti and Rossi, 2000; Bellone et al., 2010) have been 
included in some models.  
 Putting all these pieces together, it can be argued that the explanation for the 
competitiveness of exporters rests on same factors that were identified in the previous 
chapter. The success of firms on international markets may be linked to different 
elements of their behaviour and characteristics, and features of their environment. 
Furthermore, the emphasis of some studies on the past experience of firms appears to 
be similar to the reasoning used in justifying the dynamic approach to competitiveness. 
Hence, in building their ability to sell products on foreign markets exporting firms rely 
on the knowledge and resources which are the results of their past achievements. 
Finally, the literature maintains that the behaviour of exporters and their 
characteristics may vary depending on whether they compete on the basis of price or 
quality.   
5.2.2. Literature review 
 The views discussed in the previous sub-section have been empirically tested by 
a large number of authors. Their work has developed in three main directions. One set 
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of studies is focused on the decision of firms to export and tests the hypothesis about 
sunk costs of exporting (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Bleaney and Wakelin, 2002; Smith 
et al., 2002; Damijan et al., 2004; Anh et al., 2008; Wignaraja, 2008; Becker and Egger, 
2009; Bellone et al., 2010). For the second group of authors the main research 
questions are whether successful exporting firms self-select themselves into exporting 
and does participation in international markets improve their performance through the 
so-called learning-by-exporting effect (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Fernandes and Isgut, 
2005; Loecker, 2007; Andersson and Loof, 2009). Finally, the third group of studies 
looks directly into ability of firms to sell their products on international market using 
measures such as export revenues or export intensity, i.e. the export/sales turnover 
ratio (Becchetti and Rossi, 2000; Malmberg et al., 2000; Filatotchev et al., 2001; 
Verwaal and Donkers, 2002; Majocchi et al., 2005; Duenas-Caparas, 2006; Correa et al., 
2007; Dejo-Oricain and Ramirez-Aleson, 2009; Singh, 2009; Iyer, 2010; Koenig et al., 
2010)  
 The results of these investigations point to certain patterns in the behaviour of 
exporters. First, reductions in unit labour costs (Basile, 2001; Dijk, 2001; Smith et al., 
2002) and improvements in labour productivity (Damijan et al.,2004; Stiebale, 2008; 
Iyer, 2010) increase both the propensity of firms to export and their export intensity. 
Second, in most cases, the ability to compete abroad is greater in firms which have 
invested in human capital (irrespective of the measures used for this factor such as 
education of staff, skill intensity, managerial experience, training of employees and 
average wages) (Wagner, 1995; Dijk, 2001; Smith et al., 2002; Duenas-Caparas, 2006; 
Wignaraja, 2008) although in several studies the impact of human capital was negative 
(Anh et al., 2008; Stiebale, 2008).1 Third, innovations, measured by both R&D 
expenditure and indicators of innovation output, and technology measured either by 
investment in machinery and equipment or capital intensity of firms positively affect its 
export achievements (Wagner, 1995; Dijk, 2001; Smith et al., 2002; Correa et al., 2007; 
                                                            
1 These studies argue that for price competitive firms investment in human capital may act as 
competitive disadvantage as it increases their overall costs. 
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Anh et al., 2008; Wignaraja, 2008; Singh, 2009). Fourth, there are considerable 
differences in competitive profiles of exporters which may be related to characteristics 
of their industries. Bleaney and Wakelin (2002) show that cost reductions improve only 
the competitiveness of firms in low technology intensive industries while Dijk (2001) 
and Duenas-Caparas (2006) suggest that innovations and improvements in human 
capital have positive influence on the competitiveness of exporters from high 
technology intensive industries.  
 To capture the effect of international experience, several studies have included 
the lagged dependent variable for which they obtained positive and significant 
coefficient (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Filatotchev et al., 2001; Damijan et al., 2004; 
Stiebale, 2008; Bellone et al., 2010). However, the findings with respect to size and age 
have been rather ambiguous ranging from positive (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; Smith et 
al., 2002; Majocchi et al., 2005; Correa et al., 2007; Wignaraja, 2008; Stiebale, 2008; 
Bellone et al., 2010) to negative (Singh, 2009; Iyer, 2010) and to insignificant 
(Filatotchev et al., 2001; Correa et al., 2007), thus the absence of a consensus. Finally, 
several studies have reported the positive effect of foreign ownership on the decision 
of firms to export and their export intensity in developing and transition economies 
(Damijan et al., 2004; Correa et al., 2007; Wignaraja, 2008; Stiebale, 2008). These 
findings suggest that the ability of firms to utilise networks, knowledge and other 
resources of their foreign owners may help them to overcome the sunk costs of 
exporting.  
 A common approach to agglomeration externalities has been to include a 
measure for the geographical proximity of exporters (Koenig et al., 2010), also 
supplemented by a measure for proximity of firms from other industries (Malmberg et 
al., 2000) or measures of the location of firms in border regions (Stiebale, 2008), large 
urban areas (Roberts and Tybout, 1997) and industrial districts (Bechetti and Rossi, 
2000). Following the theoretical predictions, agglomerations have been found to exert 
a positive impact on both decision of firms to export and their export intensity. Besides, 
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most of studies have attempted to control for industry-specific heterogeneity by 
including controls for the sector to which a firm belongs (Roberts and Tybout, 1997; 
Malmberg et al., 2000; Dijk, 2001; Majocchi et al., 2005; Anh et al., 2008; Stiebale, 
2008; Singh, 2009) or for concentration, average export intensity and intra-industry 
trade (Bleaney and Wakelin, 2002; Iyer, 2010). Finally, the ability of firms to compete 
abroad has been positively correlated with their domestic market shares (Wagner, 
1995; Singh, 2009) and subsidies received from governments (Bechetti and Rossi, 2000) 
and negatively correlated with currency appreciation (Majocchi et al., 2005; Singh, 
2009). 
 Several studies have postulated that exporters and non-exporters may be 
different in systematic ways and that the failure to control for this difference could lead 
to selection bias and cause estimates to be inefficient and biased (Wagner, 1995; 
Bechetti and Rossi, 2000; Basile, 2001; Correa et al., 2007). For this reason, one set of 
studies relied on the Heckman's two step procedure where in the first step the 
probability of exporting was estimated by means of a probit model followed by a 
standard linear regression in the second step using observed outcomes and an estimate 
of a selection correction term from the first step (Basile, 2001; Correa et al., 2007). 
However, such approach has been criticised on the grounds that firms make their 
decisions to export and how much to export simultaneously (Wagner, 1995; Duenas-
Caparas, 2006). Furthermore, empirical findings have only partially confirmed the 
existence of the selection bias and, thus, there is no general agreement that this 
approach to estimation is appropriate (Basile, 2001; Correa et al., 2007). 
 Another approach to deal with the combination of the two decisions has been 
to use the Tobit technique which treats both propensity of firms to export and their 
export intensity as the outcomes of the same parameters and estimates them in a 
single equation (Wagner, 1995; Bechetti and Rossi, 2000). The critics of this approach 
argue that the assumption that the same factors affect the decision of firms to export 
and their export intensity is a major simplification (Correa et al., 2007). Also, in 
interpreting their estimates, the studies using this methodology do not explain whether 
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their findings are conditional on the decision of firms to export or on observed level of 
export intensity. However, in discussing the potential for selection bias, existing studies 
do not pay any attention to the specific question of research objectives. This question is 
particularly important when the argument about systematic differences between 
exporters and non-exporters may be of minor importance for studies whose research 
aim is to draw inferences about the former group.2 Although this issue has not been 
discussed in detail, several studies have stated that firms participating in international 
markets are their primary objective and in that context limited their investigation to 
samples of exporters without addressing the issue of selection bias (Malmberg et al., 
2000; Verwaal and Donkers, 2002; Dejo-Oricaini and Ramirez-Aleson, 2009; Koenig et 
al., 2010).  
 Some of existing studies suggest that the relationship between exporting 
success and various elements of firm behaviour may be simultaneous. It is indicated 
that the exporting has impact on investment and innovation decisions of firms by 
providing them with easier access to finance and helping them to spread costs over 
larger customer base (Smith et al., 2002; Manole and Spatareanu, 2010). Furthermore, 
experience gathered on markets of developed economies may help exporters from 
developing economies to improve their behaviour (Damijan et al., 2004; Kostevc, 2005; 
Van Biesebroeck, 2005). The empirical findings for firms with superior attributes self-
selecting themselves to export as well as the evidence of participation on international 
markets having positive impact on the investment in technology and human capital, 
innovations or labour productivity of firms underlie such reasoning (Damijan et al, 
2004; Van Biesebroeck, 2005; Manole and Spatareanu, 2010). However, it is not clear 
whether these results reflect simultaneity as the observed mechanism involves a time 
                                                            
2 Wooldridge (2002, p. 551) notes that any discussion about sample selection problem should establish 
as starting point the population of interest. Generally, it is suggested that in situations when object of 
interest is a subset of larger population “the proper approach is to specify a model for that part of the 
population, obtain a random sample from that part of the population and proceed with standard 
econometric methods”. 
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dimension. Instead, they may reflect dynamic and mutually reinforcing nature of 
relationship between competitiveness and restructuring outlined in Section 1.3.  
 Studies including lagged dependent variable in their models have recognised 
that this variable will be correlated with error term as the dependent variable (Roberts 
and Tybout, 1997; Filatotchev et al., 2001; Stiebale, 2008). Also, it has been suggested 
that decisions of firms on the allocation of their output between the domestic and 
foreign market as well as their choices about level of employment (size), investment or 
innovation may be affected by factors such as changes in market trends, ownership or 
characteristics of management (Koenig et al., 2010). Such reasoning appears to be in 
line with our discussions in Sections 1.4.3 and 2.4.2 which identified several firm 
characteristics and features of their environment such as ownership, hard budget 
constraint, managerial skills etc. as important factors in explaining restructuring and 
competitiveness of enterprises in transition. Thus, the failure to deal adequately with 
this source of endogeneity would lead to biased and inconsistent estimates.  
 In analysing behaviour of exporters, most studies have ignored previously 
mentioned problems (Wagner, 1995; Bechetti and Rossi, 2000; Malmberg et al., 2000; 
Verwaal and Donkers, 2002; Majocchi et al., 2005; Correa et al., 2007; Wignaraja, 
2008). In others, they have been dealt with in different ways. One set of literature 
included potentially endogenous variables such as productivity, employment, average 
wages or innovations in lagged form (Loecker, 2007; Becker and Egger, 2009; Iyer, 
2010; Koenig et al., 2010). Also, Anh et al. (2008) have regressed the potentially 
endogenous variable of innovation on a set of instruments which are considered as 
exogenous to exporting and then used the fitted values from this equation as proxy in 
the model for export. However, their study uses human capital and investment strategy 
of firm as determinants of innovation which are also recognised by other studies as 
important factors in explaining the success of exporters. Some studies using 
longitudinal datasets have utilised the GMM method of dynamic panel analysis which 
has enabled them not only to control for endogeneity, the correlation between the 
current exporting success and its past realisations but also to take into account the 
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unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity (Filatotchev et al., 2001; Damijan et al., 2004; 
Stiebale, 2008; Andersson and Loof, 2009; Bellone et al., 2010). Another group of 
studies have used a system of equations assuming that propensity and intensity of 
export are correlated with behaviour of firms or their domestic market share through 
the common error term (Smith et al., 2002; Singh, 2009). 
 All in all, the empirical studies have pointed to a large number of determinants 
of export success but also raised several methodological issues which need to be taken 
into account in our modelling strategy. However, it needs to be emphasised that this 
literature suffers from two major shortcomings which we also identified in previous 
chapter. First, many studies reviewed in this section have omitted the longitudinal 
dimension of their datasets and either pooled the data or estimated separate 
regressions for each year (Wagner, 1995; Bleaney and Wakelin, 2002; Smith et al., 
2002; Loecker, 2007; Singh, 2009; Koenig et al., 2010). Second, in terms of the 
geographical coverage, previous studies are disproportionately distributed between 
developed and developing countries in favour of the former. This problem is 
particularly emphasised for transition economies where, as we established in Section 
1.5.3, with exception of couple of studies (which, however, do not use dynamic panel 
analysis) all evidence are of qualitative nature.  
5.2.3. Model specification 
 Having identified the major theoretical explanations for the success of firms in 
international market and reviewed the relevant empirical findings, we can now outline 
the model for this part of our research. In line with the core theoretical framework of 
the thesis and predictions from the literature, the model can be written in its simplest 
form as:  
CIit=f(CIit-1,Ait, Cit, Eit)               (5.1) 
where CI stands for competitiveness index, measured by export intensity, i.e. 
export/sales turnover ratio, of a firm and A, C and E are the restructuring activities and 
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characteristics of the firm and features of the firm’s environment similar to the 
previous chapter.  
 The inclusion of lagged dependent variable in the model may be explained with 
similar arguments as those used in Section 4.2.3. Generally, we expect that 
accumulated knowledge, established networks of distributors, familiarity with business 
culture and customer network externalities provide firms with ability to compete on 
international market. On same basis, unit labour costs and unit material costs as well as 
labour productivity are included as proxies for improvements in the efficiency of firms 
and for these variables we expect the same signs as in the previous chapter. The model 
also includes three other variables which are intended to capture the ability of firms to 
compete through differentiation and improvements in quality of their products. 
Investment in machinery and equipment, defined as change in tangible fixed assets, is 
included as indicator of new technology introduced by the firm. The effect of 
innovation activities is captured by a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a firm 
reports positive level of intangible fixed assets in its balance sheet.3 This item of the 
balance sheet includes patents, licences and research projects in process, and is a 
widely used measure of innovation output. While not being a perfect measure of 
innovation activities (as innovation may be reflected in small improvements in products 
and processes which would not be treated as intangible fixed assets), it is the closest 
proxy available in the dataset. Finally, the impact of higher quality human capital is 
accounted for by a dummy variable which takes the value of unity if a firm pays an 
average annual wage higher than the average annual wage in its 3-digit industry.  This 
reflects the fact that the firm is willing to pay wages in excess of average industry wage 
in order to attract higher quality workers (Solow, 1979; Weiss, 1980; Katz, 1986). 
 Having in mind that our primary objective is to evaluate competitive profiles of 
exporters, we would expect that two groups of elements of firm behaviour have a 
different impact on price-competitive firms from those which compete through quality. 
                                                            
3 In this respect our study follows Stiebale (2008) who used same database as ours. 
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Accordingly, we expect the former to place more emphasis on cost reductions and 
improvements in labour productivity while latter would build their international 
position through investment in new machinery and equipment, innovations and human 
capital. Also, we expect that previously mentioned problems of endogeneity are likely 
to affect our estimates of the firm behaviour for two reasons. First, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the lagged dependent variable is by construction correlated with the 
time-invariant elements in the error term. Second, our discussion in Section 2.4.2 
highlighted several characteristics of firms and features of their environment such as 
quality of management, ownership, hard budget constraints, etc which can affect the 
behaviour of firms (restructuring) and also can be related to their competitiveness. As 
we are unable to control for some of these elements, it is likely that they will act as 
sources of endogeneity. For this reason we treat unit labour and unit material costs, 
labour productivity, investment in new machinery and equipment, innovations and 
human capital as endogenous.  
 Among the characteristics of firms, we include their size, measured by the 
number of employees, and age as proxy for general business experience. Having in 
mind the discussion of previous two sections, we expect that larger firms would be 
more easily able to overcome barriers to exporting and to outperform their rivals on 
international markets better than their smaller domestic rivals. However, we need to 
be aware of, and control for, the possible endogeneity problem between size and 
export behaviour. As noted by Koenig et al. (2010), the decisions of firms about the 
desired level of employment (size) and about the allocation of output between 
domestic and foreign markets (export intensity) will be determined with the 
characteristics of their managers and the type of ownership. This calls for treatment of 
size as an endogenous variable.  
 We also expect that older firms are likely to be more competitive on the 
international markets as they use their accumulated knowledge as well as the 
connections built over time to become more successful exporters. However, younger 
firms may also be successful exporters since they may rely on modern technology 
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which would make them more productive. We also take into consideration the 
arguments from life cycle theory of the firm which implies nonlinear relationship 
between age of firm and its market success. In this context, it is suggested that younger 
and older firms are more likely to compete with standardised products as the former 
will face obstacles with respect to access to finance while the organisational complexity 
of latter will reduce their incentives for innovation. Hence, if Croatian exporters 
compete in terms of prices we would expect to see a U-shaped relationship between 
their age and export intensity while an inverse U-shape relationship would be expected 
if they compete in terms of quality. To control for this possibility we also include age 
and its quadratic form, with age being measured as the number of years between year 
t and the year of firm's establishment. 
 In Section 4.2.3 we argued that, on the basis of new economic geography, firms 
benefit from being located close to other firms (Krugman, 1980; 1991; 1993; Venables, 
1996; Hafner, 2008). Here, we distinguish between different categories of 
agglomeration economies which could be of importance for exporters. The 
agglomeration literature distinguishes between centripetal forces attracting firms to 
dense urban areas and centrifugal forces driving firms away from large urban centres 
because of the negative externalities and adverse effects on the firm's exporting 
behaviour. The former include access to upstream firms, better pool of skills and 
expertise and also better flow of information between firms which facilitates their 
access to up-to-date techniques. The latter include higher costs of labour and other 
inputs arising from geographical proximity of firms in one location (Krugman, 1980; 
Venables, 1996; Feser, 2002; Brulhart and Mathys, 2008). Based on this, firms placing 
more emphasis on innovations in building their competitiveness are more likely to be 
located near the sources of innovation while those competing on prices are more likely 
to move to less costly areas. Hence, we would expect a positive sign on the variable 
controlling for the location of firms in large cities in the former case and negative sign 
in the latter case. 
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Besides location in large cities we introduce additional two measures of 
agglomeration economies indicating if a firm is located in two types of special 
economic zones which are widely used in Croatia: entrepreneurial zones and free trade 
zones. Entrepreneurial zones offer firms various infrastructural amenities and lower 
administrative fees. Free trade zones offer firms reductions in taxes and customs 
payments. Although they may be considered as indicators of the presence of both 
types of agglomeration economies, they may also reflect some factors from the firm's 
external environment such as government policies intended to boost competitiveness 
of exporters. In our model we introduce two dummy variables one for each type of 
zones which take the value of unity if the firm is located in one of these zones.   
We also include measures for urbanization and localization economies which we 
defined in the previous chapter in order to control for externalities in terms of mutual 
information exchange between the firms located in proximity of each other. Referring 
to the earlier discussion of sunk costs required by engagement in exports, it is likely 
that urbanisation and localisation economies help to reduce these barriers to 
exporting. We measure urbanisation economies by the ratio of the number of 
exporting firms from other industries (other than the firm's 4-digit industry) in the 
region in relation to total number of firms in that region; and localisation economies as 
the ratio of the number of other exporters from the firm's 4-digit industry in the region 
in relation to total number of exporters in that region.   
 Our final measure of agglomeration is a dummy variable for firms located in 
regions which have land-border with Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH). There are several 
reasons for inclusion of this variable. First, this country is one of Croatia's main trading 
partners (Section 3.3.4) and it is the only country to which Croatia exports more than it 
imports from. Second, firms in border regions find it less costly (because of 
transportation costs) to export to BiH than to sell their products on the domestic 
market. Finally, firms in border regions benefit from the knowledge spillovers arising 
from cooperation with firms on the other side of the border. In addition, the 
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geographic position of Croatia is such that eight of its 20 administrative regions4 have 
land-borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina, nine have land-borders with the EU (which is 
another main exporting market for Croatian firms), one has border with both and two 
do not have a border with any country. A positive sign would suggest that Croatian 
firms are more competitive on the market of Bosnia-Herzegovina if they have a border 
with this country while the opposite would suggest that other Croatian firms are more 
competitive. 
 Finally, in order to control for industry-specific factors affecting the success of 
firms on international markets we include three variables for the technological 
intensity of firm’s industry based on OECD (2007) taxonomy of industries introduced in 
Chapter Three. In general, we expect that firms from low technology intensive 
industries trade undifferentiated products using simple technologies and standardised 
processes basing their competitiveness on low labour costs while medium high-
technology intensive industries would encompass skill and scale intensive processes 
with moderately high levels of R&D, advanced skill and lengthy learning periods which 
include networking between firms. Finally, high-technology intensive industries are 
those with advanced and fast changing technologies with high R&D intensity, requiring 
sophisticated technology infrastructure, high levels of specialised skills, interactions 
between firms and between firms and research institutions. Table 5.1 gives the full 
definitions of the variables included in the empirical work.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 Although City of Zagreb, the capital of Croatia and Zagreb County are officially treated as two separate 
administrative units we treat them here as one. 
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Table 5.1: Description of variables 
Dependent variable  
Exint Export to sales ratio – Export intensity 
Independent variables  
Empl Number of employees -  size 
Capinv Investment in machinery and equipment  – the change in tangible fixed assets between 
the two periods (1000 EUR) 
Innov Dummy for innovative activity, 1 if firm reported intangible fixed assets in its balance 
sheet in a given year 
Ulc Unit labour costs – costs of employees divided by sales revenue  
Umc Unit material costs – costs of material divided by sales revenue 
Prod Labour productivity – turnover (1000 euro) per employee 
WPremium Wage Premium, 1 if firm pays average annual wage higher than that in its 3-digit NACE 
industry 
Lgcit Dummy for large cities, 1 if located in cities with more than 100 000 inhabitants 
Entzone Dummy for entrepreneurial zone, 1 if located in entrepreneurial zones 
Openzone Dummy for free trade zone, , 1 if located in free trade zones 
Urbef Number of other exporters in firm’s region in relation to total number of firms in that 
region – measure of urbanisation economies 
Locef Number of other exporters in firm’s 4-digit NACE industry in its region in relation to 
number of exporters from other industries in that region – measure of localisation 
economies 
Border Dummy for border with BiH, 1 if firm is located in regions with land-border with Bosnia 
and Hercegovina 
Age Years since the year of incorporation – experience 
Agesq Quadratic term of age 
Mlow Dummy for type of technology, 1 if firm operates in medium-low technology industries 
Mhigh  Dummy for type of technology, 1 if firm operates in medium-high technology industries 
High  Dummy for type of technology, 1 if firm operates in high technology industries 
5.3. Dataset 
 The investigation is conducted on the sample of exporting firms from Croatian 
manufacturing industries in the 1999-2007 period constructed from the Amadeus 
database which has already been described in Chapter Four. The analysis is limited to 
exporting firms from Croatia due to the lack of data on exports for other countries. 
There are about 11000 observations distributed unevenly across nine years, ranging 
from 929 in 1999 to 1687 in 2007. Descriptive statistics for quantitative variables are 
presented in Table 5.2.5 It is clear from the table that we are dealing with an 
unbalanced panel. Also, unlike previous chapter, the problem of missing variables is 
much less pronounced and for all variables the number of missing observations is 
below 5%.  
                                                            
5 Detailed annual descriptive statistics can be found in Tables A5.1-A5.5 in Appendix V. 
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics of 
quantitative variables 
Name Mean StDev. Missing 
Exint 0.30 0.30 0.0 
Empl 121 425 0.7 
Capinv 177 5414 1.1 
Ulc 0.22 0.58 0.5 
Umc 0.67 0.40 0.0 
Prod 87 160 0.7 
Urbef 0.48 0.07 0.0 
Locef 0.02 0.03 0.1 
Age 20.4 26.2 0.0 
Agesq 1105 4121 0.0 
Note: Values with decimal places have         
been rounded. 
The descriptive statistics indicate that Croatian exporters sell about one third of 
their output on international markets. On average, they are medium sized firms. 
Investment in machinery and equipment (Capinv) and labour productivity exhibit the 
largest variations in the sample. These variables are deflated by the producer price 
indices for the manufacturing industry in order to exclude the effect of inflation. Unit 
labour costs are somewhat lower than unit material ones. As the indicators of 
agglomeration effects show the geographical concentration of Croatian exporters is 
relatively low; they tend to be dispersed across the country. However, the proximity of 
other firms in administrative region of the exporter is somewhat higher about 50%. 
Finally, the variable age does not exhibit large variation indicating that, on average, 
firms in our sample in period of investigation were about 20 years old, i.e., a very large 
number were established in the period of transition.  
 Table 5.3 shows the descriptive statistics for our categorical variables. One 
important finding here is that there are no missing observations except the dummy 
variable for skill intensity (WPremium). However, even for this variable the rate of 
missingness is fairly low. In general, Table 5.3 also demonstrates that the majority of 
exporters were located outside of large cities; with about 23% of them in 
entrepreneurial zones and even less (14%) in free trade zones. Furthermore, about one 
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third of exporters have paid annual wages higher than the average wage in their 3-digit 
industry. We can also see that about 20% of firms in the sample are located in regions 
with land border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Over a third of firms have reported a 
positive value of intangible fixed assets in their balance sheet.  
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics 
for categorical variables 
Variables 1 Missing 
Lgcit 38% 0.0 
Entzone 23% 0.0 
Openzone 14% 0.0 
WPremium 32% 1.36 
Innov 36% 0.0 
Border 20% 0.0 
Mlow 30% 0.0 
Mhigh 19% 0.0 
High 8.5% 0.0 
As a final check of the dataset, pairwise correlations have been calculated for all 
variables used in the investigation. The results, presented in Table A5.5 in Appendix V, 
show that most of the correlation coefficients are fairly low suggesting that our 
variables measure statistically different concepts (Feser, 2002).  
5.4. Methodology 
 Our previous discussion suggests that there are several methodological issues 
which need to be taken into account in modelling the competitiveness of exporters. 
Primarily, this relates to problem of endogeneity due to correlation between lagged 
dependent variable and variables reflecting firm behaviour and size with error term. 
Another methodological issue that deserves to be discussed is the nature of our 
dependent variable which is by definition bounded between 0 and 1. In principle, there 
is no single method or a single estimator that can deal with both of these issues. Two 
types of methods have been commonly used in the context of longitudinal datasets for 
estimations of models with export intensity as the dependent variable. First, 
researchers placing emphasis on the truncated nature of export intensity have used a 
tobit methodology. Second, others, who consider the dynamic nature of export 
intensity and the theoretical basis of the relationship between export intensity and its 
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determinants as more important, have used a dynamic panel system GMM. Both 
approaches have their advantages and disadvantages and these must be weighed 
against each other. Having considered the relevant trade-offs, we have decided in 
favour of the dynamic panel system GMM methodology. The reasons for this decision 
are explained below.   
 The tobit method has been used to investigate behaviour of exporting firms by 
many authors (Wagner, 1995; Bechetti and Rossi, 2000; Dijk, 2001). This technique is 
designed to handle models in which the dependent variable has a positive probability 
mass at one or more points. It is part of family of limited dependent variable models 
which are based on maximum likelihood estimation. For panel data, the tobit random 
effects' model is available with command xttobit in the Stata 11 software. It controls 
for truncation and individual heterogeneity but it requires all regressors to be 
exogenous, thus not being able to handle the use of lagged dependent variable and 
other endogenous covariates. The endogenous regressors can be estimated in pooled 
tobit with option ivtobit in the Stata software. However, this comes at the cost of 
omitting the dynamic element and not controlling for individual heterogeneity.   
 Another used method is the dynamic panel GMM technique which as discussed 
in Section 4.4 is capable of handling a lagged dependent variable, endogeneity of other 
explanatory variables and unobserved heterogeneity (Filatotchev et al, 2001; Damijan 
et al., 2004; Stiebale, 2008; Bellone et al., 2010). However, this method is also not 
without flaws. The first shortcoming is that predictions may be outside of interval in 
which the dependent variable lies. The second problem is that the effect of explanatory 
variables on dependent variable does not have to be constant as it is assumed in linear 
methods of estimation such as dynamic panel GMM. Moreover, Wooldridge (2002, p. 
525) suggests that, even with corner solution variables, the inference from linear 
regression does not necessarily have to be uninformative and that linear regression 
might approximate the partial effects obtained with Tobit when the explanatory 
variables are near the population mean. To sum up, having considered the advantages 
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and disadvantages of various approaches, we have chosen to pursue the estimation 
with dynamic panel GMM method.  
5.5. Discussion of findings 
 In this section we investigate the hypotheses from Section 5.2 about the 
behaviour of exporters from Croatian manufacturing industries using the following 
baseline model specification:  ln(exint)it=c+β1ln(exint)it-1+β2ln(empl)it+β3capinvit+β4innovit+β5ln(ulc)it+β6ln(umc)it +β7lgcitit+β8entzoneit+β9openzoneit+β10urbefit+β11locefit+β12borderit+β13ageit+β14agesqit  (5.2) +β15mlowit+β16mhighit+β17highit+∑ yeart2007t=2000 +ui+vit                                 
 Export intensity, employment and costs variables are in natural logarithms while 
investment in machinery and equipment, urbanisation and localisation effects and age 
are in levels.6 Since unit labour costs and productivity are highly correlated we estimate 
two separate models, each including one of these variables. The model also includes 
time dummies as controls for cross-section dependence. Furthermore, using formulas 
presented in Section 4.4.2, we compute long-run effects of our variables. Finally, given 
that the data for the average wages, a proxy for skilled labour, is available only for the 
2001-2007 period we estimate the model including this variable separately as its 
inclusion implies dropping two years of observations. The results of estimation for both 
the short and long run are presented in Table 5.4. As in the previous chapter, the 
diagnostics of the models will be addressed before we engage in the discussion of 
empirical findings.   
5.5.1. Diagnostics 
 Main diagnostics relevant for our model are presented in Table 5.4. As it can be 
seen the usual diagnostics relevant to the dynamic panel GMM models are satisfactory. 
There is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying 
restrictions in the Hansen's test for the validity of instruments. Moreover, the 
                                                            
6 We decide to treat some variables in levels because some of the observations have negative or zero 
values and others are fairly small numbers.  
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computed p-value for this test is relatively high being very close to or above the most 
conservative threshold of 0.25 in all specifications (Roodman, 2009a). The difference-
in-Sargan tests for validity of subsets of instruments also support our choice of 
instruments (Tables A5.6-A5.9 in Appendix V). We are particularly interested in the 
difference-in-Sargan tests for subsets of instruments for the levels equation and for 
subsets of instruments for the lagged dependent variable. For both of these there is 
insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions 
which suggests that the system GMM is preferred to the difference GMM estimator 
and that the model satisfies the steady state assumption (Roodman, 2009a).  
Table 5.4: Model diagnostics 
 SPECIFICATIONS 
 1 2 3 4 
Number of observations 11096 11089 9261 9260 
Number of groups 2039 2037 1977 1976 
Wald test 872.95 837.26 725.39 722.82 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan/Hansen J Statistic 173.24 148.10 163.30 152.57 
Prob> chi2 0.224 0.574 0.233 0.360 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first 
differences -12.47 -12.21 -11.30 -11.05 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first 
differences 1.48 1.29 0.22 0.20 
Prob>chi2 0.139 0.195 0.827 0.843 
Instrument count 186 178 176 172 
 The validity of the instruments was also scrutinised with additional tests. For all 
models the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation was rejected, as expected, 
but there is insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation of 
second order. We have also compared the values of coefficient on lagged dependent 
variable with the same coefficient in OLS and FE estimations as the true estimator of 
this coefficient should be lower than the coefficient obtained by OLS but higher than 
the coefficient obtained with the FE technique (Roodman, 2009b). In all four cases the 
coefficient lies within the boundaries (Table A5.10 in Appendix V). Finally, the number 
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of instruments in all of our models is relatively low in comparison with the number of 
groups of observations. 
 Further aspects of the validity of the model refer to the explanatory power of 
the variables used and the examination of fitted values as there is the possibility that 
fitted values fall outside of the interval in which the dependent variable lies when 
linear methods are used. In relation to the former, the null hypothesis that the 
variables jointly have no explanatory power is rejected with very high probability in all 
specifications. The latter issue also does not seem to be a major problem in our case. 
Examination of fitted values suggests that for all models the number of fitted values 
outside the interval in which dependent variable lies is very low, ranging on average 
around 0.2% (see Table A5.11 in Appendix V).  
5.5.2. Interpretation of results 
 The first two specifications in Table 5.5 report the results with productivity and 
unit labour costs respectively for the period 1999-2007 while the latter two columns 
also include the proxy for skilled labour which restricts the sample to the 2001-2007 
period. The findings are consistent across all four specifications as all significant 
coefficients maintain their signs and in majority of cases also their significance. The 
significant and positive coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is consistent with 
a learning-by-exporting mechanism where firms use past accumulated experience to 
organise and to manage their present operations in a more efficient manner and sell 
more on the foreign market. The magnitude of coefficient is very similar in all four 
specifications about 0.47. Ceteris paribus, this means that a 1% increase in the rate of 
export intensity in previous year would lead to 0.44 percent increase in current year. 
From there, a long-run multiplier can be calculated which implies that the long-run 
coefficients of our explanatory variables are higher by about 1.92 times, as shown in 
the LR column under each specification. 
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Table 5.5: Dynamic panel system GMM estimation for Croatian exporters, 1999-
2007 (dependent variable: ln(Exint)) 
 SPECIFICATION 1 SPECIFICATION 2 SPECIFICATION 3 SPECIFICATION 4 
 SR LR SR LR SR LR SR LR 
Lagged dependent 
variable 
0.48*** 
(0.000) - 
0.47*** 
(0.000) - 
0.48*** 
(0.000) - 
0.47*** 
(0.000) - 
SIZE         
Employment: 
ln(Empl) 
0.09* 
(0.079) 
0.18* 
(0.079) 
0.08** 
(0.028) 
0.16** 
(0.028) 
0.08* 
(0.101) 
0.16* 
(0.101) 
0.06 
(0.131) 
0.12 
(0.131) 
RESTRUCTURING         
Investment in 
machinery and 
equipment (Capinv) 
3.29e-07 
(0.860) 
6.32e-07 
(0.860) 
2.74e-07 
(0.820) 
5.19e-07 
(0.820) 
4.76e-07 
(0.746) 
9.09e-07 
(0.746) 
4.01e-07 
(0.719) 
7.54e-07 
(0.719) 
Innovation (Innov) 0.06 (0.317) 
0.12 
(0.316) 
0.04* 
(0.525) 
0.08* 
(0.524) 
0.07 
(0.337) 
0.14 
(0.337) 
0.06 
(0.409) 
0.12 
(0.409) 
Unit labour costs: 
ln(Ulc) - - 
-0.42*** 
(0.000) 
-0.80*** 
(0.000) - - 
-0.42*** 
(0.000) 
-0.78*** 
(0.000) 
Unit material costs: 
ln(Umc) 
-0.39** 
(0.038) 
-0.75** 
(0.036) 
-0.56*** 
(0.004) 
-1.05*** 
(0.004) 
-0.60*** 
(0.003) 
-1.13*** 
(0.003) 
-0.66*** 
(0.002) 
-1.24*** 
(0.003) 
Labor productivity: 
ln(Prod) 
0.36*** 
(0.000) 
0.69*** 
(0.000) - - 
0.38*** 
(0.000) 
0.73*** 
(0.000) - - 
Wage Premium 
(WPremium) - - - - 
-0.28** 
(0.031) 
-0.54** 
(0.030) 
0.01 
(0.972) 
0.01 
(0.972) 
AGGLOMERATION ECONOMIES        
Located in large 
city(Lgcit) 
-0.31*** 
(0.000) 
-0.59*** 
(0.000) 
-0.26*** 
(0.000) 
-0.49*** 
(0.000) 
-0.30*** 
(0.000) 
-0.57*** 
(0.000) 
-0.28*** 
(0.000) 
-0.52*** 
(0.000) 
Located in 
entrepreneurial zone 
(Entzone) 
0.02 
(0.746) 
0.04 
(0.746) 
0.03 
(0.617) 
0.05 
(0.617) 
0.02 
(0.770) 
0.03 
(0.770) 
0.03 
(0.599) 
0.06 
(0.600) 
Located in free trade 
zone (Openzone) 
0.19*** 
(0.007) 
0.37*** 
(0.006) 
0.18*** 
(0.005) 
0.35*** 
(0.004) 
0.14** 
(0.051) 
0.27** 
(0.047) 
0.16** 
(0.021) 
0.30** 
(0.019) 
Located in region 
bordering B&H 
(Border) 
0.10* 
(0.074) 
0.19* 
(0.071) 
0.09* 
(0.094) 
0.17* 
(0.093) 
0.10* 
(0.082) 
0.20* 
(0.080)) 
0.10* 
(0.089) 
0.18* 
(0.089) 
Urbanisation effect 
(Urbef) 
1.02*** 
(0.001) 
1.95*** 
(0.000) 
0.81*** 
(0.004) 
1.54*** 
(0.003) 
0.97*** 
(0.001) 
1.85*** 
(0.001) 
0.81*** 
(0.005) 
1.52*** 
(0.004) 
Localisation effect  
(Locef) 
3.33*** 
(0.000) 
6.40*** 
(0.000) 
2.91*** 
(0.000) 
5.52*** 
(0.000) 
2.82*** 
(0.001) 
5.38*** 
(0.001) 
2.56*** 
(0.002) 
4.81*** 
(0.001) 
BUSINESS 
EXPERIENCE         
Age – number of 
years since 
foundation(Age) 
0.003 
(0.402) 
0.01 
(0.401) 
0.01* 
(0.092) 
0.01* 
(0.093) 
0.004 
(0.248) 
0.01 
(0.246) 
0.01* 
(0.075) 
0.01* 
(0.075) 
Quadratic term – 
number of years 
since foundation 
squared (Agesq) 
-2e-5 
(0.299) 
-3e-5 
(0.299) 
-2e-5 
(0.201) 
-4e-5 
(0.202) 
-2e-5 
(0.223) 
-3e-5 
(0.221) 
-2e-5 
(0.224) 
-3e-5 
(0.225) 
TECHNOLOGY INTENSITY        
Medium-low 
technology intensive 
industry (Mlow) 
-0.03 
(0.580) 
-0.06 
(0.580) 
0.01 
(0.887) 
0.01 
(0.887) 
-0.02 
(0.726) 
-0.04 
(0.726) 
0.01 
(0.813) 
0.02 
(0.813) 
Medium-high 
technology intensive 
industry (Mhigh) 
0.0002 
(0.998) 
0.0003 
(0.998) 
0.07 
(0.205) 
0.14 
(0.202) 
-0.04 
(0.536) 
-0.08 
(0.537) 
0.05 
(0.458) 
0.09 
(0.456) 
High-tech intensive 
industry (High) 
-0.32*** 
(0.004) 
-0.61*** 
(0.003) 
-0.25*** 
(0.009) 
-0.48*** 
(0.009) 
-0.40*** 
(0.000) 
-0.77*** 
(0.000) 
-0.30*** 
(0.002) 
-0.56*** 
(0.002) 
Constant term (Cons) -3.26*** (0.000) - 
-2.77*** 
(0.000) - 
-3.43*** 
(0.000) - 
-2.82*** 
(0.000) - 
Note: p-values in brackets where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
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p-values are obtained from two-step dynamic panel procedure with Windmeeijer's corrected robust standard errors. Year dummies 
included. 
 
 
 Coefficients for investment in machinery and equipment and innovation are 
statistically insignificant. However, these findings should be viewed cautiously as 
innovations and technological improvements for small firms may be embodied in 
incremental changes in the production process which would not be registered as 
changes in tangible or intangible fixed assets. Moreover, technology and innovation 
may influence export intensity indirectly by leading to improvements in the 
productivity of labour which we also control for in some specifications. Finally, we 
would expect that investment in technology and innovation are less important than 
cost reducing activities for firms which compete in prices (Lall, 2000).  
 The above conclusion is also supported by the findings for cost variables. Both 
unit labour and unit material costs have negative signs and are significant in line with 
our expectations. Reduction in the unit labour costs for 1% increases export intensity 
by about 0.4% (Specifications 2 and 4). Ceteris paribus, the same reduction in unit 
material costs would yield an increase in export intensity of about 0.6%. These findings 
can be taken as evidence that Croatian exporters compete on the basis of costs. Given 
that productivity and ulc are both proxies for labour efficiency (as we explained in 
previous chapter) the variable ulc is excluded from the model in Specifications 1 and 3 
which include labour productivity. The estimated coefficient on productivity is positive 
and statistically significant in both specifications. Ceteris paribus, if firms improve their 
productivity by 1%, export intensity will increase by about 0.4%. These findings remain 
robust with the inclusion of the variable WPremium in Specification 3. 
 The inclusion of our proxy for human capital, wage premium, reduces sample by 
two years to the period 2001-2007. The estimated coefficient of this variable has 
negative sign and it is significant only in the model with productivity in Specification 3.7 
Ceteris paribus, firms that pay wages above industrial average have a 24 percent lower 
                                                            
7 When dependent variable is defined as log(y), the percentage change in the predicted value when 
dummy variable takes value of 1 will be expressed as 100 ∗ [exp (?̂?) − 1]  ] ] (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 238). 
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export intensity in the short run and about 42 percent lower export intensity in the 
long run than their rivals which pay wages at or below industry average. The negative 
sign in front of this coefficient is another finding which we would expect from price-
competitive firms. Moreover, relatively high magnitude of coefficient may be 
interpreted as indicator that Croatian firms are particularly sensitive on changes in 
costs of their labour.  
 Given the insignificant coefficients for investment in technology and for 
innovation as well as the negative sign for wage premium, the proxy for skills, the 
pattern of restructuring observed in exporting firms is what we would expect from 
firms from low-technology and resource intensive industries which constitute the 
majority of firms in our sample. These firms participate in international markets with 
low quality products produced with standardized technologies, with costs, particularly 
costs of labour, being their main competitive advantage. Hence, they remain 
competitive only by constantly improving their cost efficiency (Lall, 2000). The 
important finding in this section is the positive relationship between export intensity 
and productivity, which with the significant lagged dependent variable is consistent 
with the hypothesis that competitiveness and restructuring are interrelated and 
mutually reinforcing over time.   
 The findings with respect to agglomeration economies are robust across 
different specifications as all variables retain their sign and, except in one case, their 
significance. Firms located in four largest metropolitan areas in Croatia are less export 
intensive than their rivals located in other areas. Export intensity of firms located in 
large cities is, ceteris paribus, lower about 27 percent (Specification 1). The negative 
effect of location in large cities may reflect the fact that firms located in these cities 
exploit benefit of location in the form of easy access to domestic buyers, paying less 
attention to international markets and export a smaller proportion of their output. 
However, it may also be the case that large cities which are costlier (especially in 
human resources)  are a disadvantage to cost conscious exporting firms that are from 
low-technology intensive industries and compete in prices. Furthermore, the 
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concentration of firms outside of dense urban areas may be related to the 
development of a better transport infrastructure (Lall, 2000), something Croatia 
invested much on in period of analysis.  
 There is further evidence suggesting that exporting firms tend to locate 
themselves in areas which make them more cost competitive. The location in free trade 
zones is positively associated with the export intensity of Croatian manufacturers. 
However, location in areas with entrepreneurial zones does not seem to be relevant for 
them. The free trade zones increase the export intensity of firms in our sample for 
about 21 percent. This finding is a further support to the notion that Croatian 
manufacturers compete in prices on the international markets as free trade zones offer 
multiple cost advantages such as customs-free and tax-free imports of machinery, 
equipment, materials and intermediate inputs, exemption from VAT and reduced profit 
tax, and therefore, particularly suit firms competing in prices.    
 Firms located in regions with a land-border with Bosnia-Herzegovina are, ceteris 
paribus, more export intensive than firms in other regions, although the coefficient is 
only significant at the 10% level. The magnitude of the effect is relatively stable across 
different specifications and is estimated at 11 percent. On the one hand, it is possible 
that firms in these border regions find it more profitable to export into the 
neighbouring country than to the domestic market due to transportation costs which 
may be lower in international trade than in domestic trade (given the geography of 
Croatia). On the other hand, it is also likely that factors such as a common language and 
culture which are commonly identified in gravity-type models of international trade are 
at work here.  In addition, many of these regions were hit severely by the war and 
many municipalities still receive subsidies and so do firms which establish their plants 
in these regions. Moreover, in terms of recent developments in infrastructure in 
Croatia these regions are well connected through the improved road network. 
Therefore, it is also likely that positive and significant coefficient on this variable is 
related to cost advantages received by firms in these regions.  
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 The last two proxies for agglomeration are the effects of urbanisation and 
localisation economies. The findings for these two effects are consistent with the 
theory, both coefficients being statistically significant and positive. Depending on the 
specification the coefficient on the urbanisation effect takes values between 0.8 and 1 
which means that an increase of 1 percentage point in number of exporters which do 
not operate in the firm's own industry in relation to number of all firms in the firm's 
region leads to increase in the rate of export intensity between 84 and 100% which is a 
very strong effect. It is therefore likely that the common infrastructure shared by 
exporters from various industries plays an important role for Croatian firms. The effect 
of localisation is even stronger as the coefficients for this variable range between 2.6 
and 3.3. Although these measures are extremely high we must bear in mind that our 
measure of localisation takes very low values, with the mean value of this variable 
being only 0.02 (meaning that on average only 2% of exporters in same region are from 
the same industry). In addition the maximum concentration of this variable is 0.16 
which suggests that the interpretation in terms of percentage points is not a marginal 
change. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to look at these results in terms of 
basis points. When observed this way the results suggest that increase in one basis 
point in the concentration of exporters from same industry in the region leads to an 
increase in the export intensity of firms by between 2.8% and 3.8% in the short run and 
4.8% and 6.4% in the long run. 
 In summary, locations which provide firms with cost advantages have a positive 
effect on their export intensity. The evidence on the effect of urbanisation may also be 
interpreted as a sharing of common resources and information about threats and 
opportunities of foreign market which may help firms, particularly small ones to reduce 
costs of their export performance and also to reduce the risks of failure. A similar 
finding may also apply to localisation economies although it is likely that in this case the 
variable reflects also the effect of cooperation with other firms from the region in 
terms of subcontracting or joint operations on international markets (Bonaccorsi, 
1992).  
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 In all four specifications size has a positive sign and the coefficient is statistically 
significant in Specifications 1-3. The magnitude of coefficients is also very similar in 
Specifications 1-3 although it is slightly higher in Specification 1. Looking at these 
specifications this means that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the number of employees 
by 1%, leads to growth of export intensity rate by about 0.08% in the short run. In the 
long run, the impact of size on export intensity is larger and, ceteris paribus, the same 
increase in size would lead to 0.18% higher rate of export intensity. This finding is 
consistent with argument that the small size of the domestic market is an important 
motivation for Croatian exporters to increase the share of output exported once the 
opportunities of the domestic market are exhausted. It is also likely that the positive 
relationship between size and export intensity is influenced by sunk costs of exporting. 
Although smaller firms can bear these costs by relying on the market instead of doing it 
within the firm, it is likely that market imperfections present in the turbulent 
environment of transition prevent smaller firms from exploiting the market 
mechanisms in acquiring skills and knowledge needed for successful performance on 
international markets. For the same reason it is argued that small firms are more risk 
averse as, under these imperfections, the flow of information needed for successful 
export performance is likely to be even more constrained (Bonaccorsi, 1992; Majocchi 
et al., 2005).  
 The findings for age and age squared, the proxy for general experience of the 
firm, are constant in terms of sign (positive on age and negative on the squared term) 
but the squared term is insignificant in all specifications while former one is significant 
only in some specifications at the 10% level.  This may be caused by the high pairwise 
correlation between the empl, the measure of size and age and agesq, a sign of 
potential multicollinearity. To control for this we have also estimated the model 
without the variable empl (Tables A5.12-A5.15 in Appendix V) and both variables for 
age are statistically significant.8 Hence, it is possible that there is problem of collinearity 
                                                            
8 The diagnostics of these models are satisfactory and neither of the coefficients changes its sign.  
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between the age of firm and its size.  Here we interpret findings from Specification 2 of 
our baseline model (Table 5.5). 
 When interpreting the coefficients of age we must also take into consideration 
the effect of quadratic term as it makes no sense holding one factor fixed while 
interpreting other.9 Using mean value for the age, which in the 2007 was 21.36 we can 
say that an additional year of experience for the average exporting firm increases its 
export intensity by 0.4 percent in the short run and by about 0.7 percent in the long 
run.10 The signs suggest a parabolic shape which means that until some point the age 
has a positive effect on the export intensity after which the effect becomes negative. 
The turning point after which the experience negatively influences export intensity in 
our sample is 118 years.11 Given that in our sample less than 1% firms are older than 
118 years the quadratic to the right of 118 can be ignored for all practical purposes 
(Wooldridge, 2006 p. 203). Hence, we can conclude that the experience which firms 
gather has positive, but diminishing, effect on export intensity. 
 In terms of the impact of technology intensity, based on the OECD (2007) 
classification discussed in Chapters Three and Four, as it can be seen from Table 5.5 
there appears to be no statistical difference in export intensity between firms from 
low, medium-low and medium-high technology intensive industries. What is evident, 
however, is that firms in high-technology intensive industries export a lower share of 
their output than firms in low technology intensive sectors. The size of coefficient 
varies between -0.25 in Specification 2 and -0.40 in Specification 3, meaning that firms 
from this group of industries have between 22% and 33% lower export intensity than 
their counterparts in low technology intensive industries. This finding is consistent with 
                                                            
9 In fact, it would make sense to interpret only the coefficient of age when it changes by one year. A 
common interpretation in such cases is done using formula ∆𝑦� =∝�1+ 2 ∝�2 𝑥 where the first factor on 
the right hand side refers to original variable and the second one to its quadratic term. 
10 The coefficients in Appendix V are slightly higher suggesting the effect of approximately 0.8%. 
11 Following the procedure described in Wooldridge (2006, p. 201) it is also possible to determine this 
turning point as the ratio of the coefficient of age over twice the absolute value of the coefficient of the 
quadratic term. 
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other findings observed throughout the investigation in this chapter that Croatian firms 
with highest export intensity come from low-technology intensive industries. 
5.6. Conclusion 
 The competitive profiles of exporters from transition economies, and among 
them Croatian firms, have for a long time been based on low technology intensive 
standardised products. However, international trade theories reviewed in Section 1.3 
postulate that such goods and services embody a lower potential for growth of firms 
and their economies than products rich in knowledge, technology and skills. The shift 
between two competitive profiles is often described as a lengthy process which 
requires learning, development of specific supporting infrastructure and specific 
government policies. Having in mind developments in the Croatian institutional 
framework in advanced stage of transition, identified in Section 3.3.2, the objective of 
this chapter has been to investigate whether favourable climate of that period affected 
the competitive profile of Croatian exporters.  
 The results of investigation are in line with theoretical predictions about 
behaviour of price competitive firms. First, in building their international position, 
Croatian exporters rely on cost reductions and improvements in labour productivity. 
Second, the sensitivity of these firms to wage increases suggests that labour costs still 
play a major role in their success on international markets. Third, in overcoming 
barriers to exporting these firms rely on own resources, previous experience and cost 
and knowledge sharing agglomeration externalities. Fourth, the positive and significant 
relationship between export intensity and the firms’ location in small urban areas or 
free trade zones suggest that some of policies undertaken by Croatian government in 
analysed period such as investment in infrastructure or development of export-
targeting policies may have produced beneficiary effects on the competitiveness of 
exporters. When taken together, these findings indicate that Croatian exporters still 
rely on the same competitive advantages as the ones used in early stages of transition. 
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 As cost advantages based on factor prices are not a long-run source of 
competitiveness, sooner or later a technological shift is needed for firms in order to 
survive and succeed. In this context, our findings raise concern over the prospects of 
Croatian exporters in the light of forthcoming accession to the European Union. 
Therefore, there is a need to investigate the role of mechanisms such as government 
policies, strategic alliances or intra-industry trade through which the technological 
structure of Croatian exports can be improved. With that in mind, the next objective of 
our investigation is to undertake in-depth analysis of competitiveness of Croatian 
exporters on the EU market paying special attention to their ability to compete on 
quality.  
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6.1. Introduction   
 In Sections 1.5 and 3.3 we pointed out that, following the demise of central 
planning, transition economies reoriented their international trade towards the 
economies of EU15 and established that they penetrated the EU15 markets as 
producers of price-competitive products, but that over time some of them, 
particularly those from advanced CEECs, shifted to quality-competitive segments of 
these markets. We also established that producers from advanced CEECs have, for a 
considerable period of time, been in more favourable position on the EU15 market 
than their counterparts from other transition economies, including Croatia. Bearing 
in mind these findings as well as the fact that Croatia is country with the highest 
prospect of becoming the next EU member, it is important to address the ability of 
its producers to compete on EU market. The present investigation aims to identify 
whether there has been a change in the structure of Croatian export to EU15 
market, if any change was of inter- or intra-industry type, and how the quality of 
Croatian exports to this market can be improved.  
 In order to address these issues we undertake an industry-level analysis, 
employing a panel of 89 3-digit manufacturing industries in the period between 
2001 and 2007. The use of industry level analysis instead of the firm level enquiry 
pursued in Chapters Four and Five is motivated by the lack of relevant data at the 
firm level but also by the desire to investigate what factors and forces determine 
competitiveness at the industry level.  The first part of the empirical investigation 
will use dynamic shift and share analysis to examine whether the change in the 
share of Croatian manufacturing industries on the EU15 market has been led by 
competitiveness, restructuring or changes in demand. We will then move to 
examine the within-industry changes in the structure of Croatian trade with EU15 
using 3-digit industries in our analysis. The last part of investigation will bring 
together several important aspects recognised in the trade and transition literature 
as we investigate which factors and forces can improve the relative quality of 
Croatian export on EU15 markets. These findings complement the findings based on 
firm level analysis and complete our search for the pattern of Croatian 
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competitiveness in the transition period helping us to formulate the conclusions of 
thesis in last chapter.  
 The chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 provides the conceptual 
framework of the analysis consisting of the theoretical basis, the review of main 
findings from the literature and ending with the formulation of the model for the 
analysis of quality improvements in Croatian exports to EU15. The main 
characteristics of the dataset will be discussed in Section 6.3 followed by the 
analysis of changes in the structure of exports to the EU15 market in Section 6.4. 
Section 6.5 will investigate the question of how the relative quality of Croatian 
exports can be improved. Finally, Section 6.6 will conclude. 
6.2. Conceptual framework 
 The common starting point in the analysis of the structure of a nation’s 
exports is the nexus of theories linking international trade with economic growth. 
As we pointed out in Section 1.3, one strand of economic literature postulates that 
the level of sophistication embodied in a country’s exports has an important role in 
explaining the growth potential of that country. Similar to firm-level studies, 
discussed in the previous chapter, this literature argues that quality based 
competitive profiles embody a higher growth potential than price based profiles. 
Therefore the key issue for the competitiveness of developing and transition 
economies is the identification of factors and forces which can lead to the quality 
upgrading of their exports. In a sizeable body of literature these factors and forces 
have been identified by the theories explaining the behaviour of firms and 
industries by the Austrian, evolutionary and institutional economics schools. This 
literature will be reviewed in this section in order to establish the theoretical basis 
of the research and develop the model that will be used in the empirical part of this 
chapter.  
6.2.1. Theoretical basis 
 Theories of trade and growth usually predict that through effects of 
specialisation, such as greater production efficiency or the exploitation of 
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economies of scale, international trade increases the ability of nations to grow and 
to provide their citizens with better standard of living (Ram, 1985). In addition, it 
has been postulated that exporting is related to economic growth indirectly through 
the impact of knowledge and technology spillovers on the productivity of physical 
and human capital (Hesse, 2009; Sohn and Lee, 2010).  However, a sizeable body of 
knowledge underlines that a far more important issue than ability of nations to 
export is the structure of their exported products (Cuaresma and Worz, 2005; 
Hausmann et al., 2007; Guerson et al., 2007). The origins of such thinking can be 
traced to work of different economic schools, discussed in Section 1.3, which 
consider that the impact of individual industries on growth will differ due to factors 
such as innovation capacity or the extent of economies of scale. This implies that 
the structure of exports may hold part of the answer to the question why some 
nations perform better than others in trade and growth. 
 The structure and quality of exports are usually explained using three 
strands of trade theories. The traditional trade models postulate that the structure 
and quality of exported products are determined by relative factor endowments. In 
this context, quality is usually associated with technological intensity of the 
industry; it is postulated that nations relatively endowed with factors conducive to 
specialisation in sophisticated and high-technology intensive, i.e. high quality goods 
are likely to achieve higher rates of growth than those specialised in low technology 
or standardised price-competitive products (Fontagne et al., 1998; Liu and Shu, 
2003; Cuaresma and Worz, 2005; Monfort et al., 2008; Sohn and Lee, 2010). From 
here it follows that quality upgrading of a nation’s exports takes place through shifts 
in specialisation from the low towards the high technology intensive industries. The 
new trade theories are more focused on trade taking place within industries. 
Models in this category consider economies of scale and demand for varieties as the 
main factors behind intra-industry trade (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003). The key to 
explaining the structure and quality of a nation’s exports becomes its general level 
of economic development. Hence economies at similar levels of development will 
be more inclined to trade similar products with developed economies exchanging 
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more sophisticated goods among themselves and with their less developed 
counterparts trading in similar goods of lower quality. 
 There is also a third way of explaining the structure and quality of a nation’s 
export which has its roots in the concept of vertical intra-industry trade (Greenaway 
et al., 1995; Fontagne et al., 1998; Fukao et al., 2003; Monfort et al., 2008; Sohn and 
Lee, 2010). It implies that, within industries, nations at different stages of 
development will exchange varieties of goods differentiated by their level of quality. 
This literature complements the standard arguments for intra-industry trade 
models mentioned above with assumption that the preferred level of quality will be 
determined by the relative factor endowments of an economy thus bringing 
together both traditional and new trade theories (Fontagne and Freudenberg, 1997; 
Hummels and Klenow, 2005). It is predicted that producers from developed 
economies are more likely to compete in high quality segments of their industries 
and thus achieve higher rates of growth while their counterparts from developing 
economies will, due to their lack of technology and skills, compete in less 
sophisticated varieties of the same goods (Greenaway et al., 1995; Imbriani et al., 
2008; Monfort et al., 2008). 
 The explanations for improvements in the relative sophistication of a 
country’s exports can be identified in the contributions of the Austrian, evolutionary 
and endogenous growth literature reviewed in Section 1.3. In this context, most of 
studies include physical and human capital and innovations, the factors identified in 
Section 2.4.1 as forms of strategic restructuring in the transition process (Fontagne 
et al., 1998; Kandogan, 2004; Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Verhoogen, 2007; 
Monfort et al., 2008; Schott, 2008). In some studies, the authors suggest that the 
quality of the country’s institutional environment, particularly the prevalence of 
corruption, enforcement of contracts and property rights may also have an impact 
on the structure of its exports (Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Hausmann et al., 2007; 
Bastos and Silva, 2010). In addition, Hausmann et al. (2007) link the incentives of 
producers to move towards the higher quality segments of their industries with the 
ability of the market to provide them with the needed information about returns on 
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such activities and postulate that in cases involving market failure government 
policies have a key role in shaping the country’s production and trade structures.    
 In the endogenous growth models, the existing literature has recognised 
that knowledge and technology spillovers have an important role for quality 
upgrading of exports from developing economies. One group of authors suggest 
that the quality of traded products is positively related to the import penetration in 
industries (Monfort et al., 2008; Fernandes and Paunov, 2009). On the one hand, 
import penetration in industries from developing economies acts as an incentive for 
high-cost firms in developed countries to move to the quality segments of their 
industries. A similar reasoning is employed by Lelarge and Nefussi (2007) who 
include in their model the intensity of domestic competition. On the other hand, 
import penetration acts as a channel for horizontal knowledge and technology 
spillovers in developing economies. In the context of transition economies, the 
imports of intermediate inputs and final goods as well as foreign direct investment, 
have been identified as the key channels for technology transfer (Hoekman and 
Djankov, 1997; Kandogan, 2004). In addition, spillovers may be realised through the 
‘learning-by-exporting’ process, i.e. a strong and continuous presence on foreign 
markets (Brooks, 2006).  
 In addition to above channels, the quality of exported products may be 
improved through intra-firm trade (Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; Kandogan, 2004; 
Marin, 2006). Such relationship may have beneficiary impact on affiliates through 
several channels such as the imposition of minimum quality requirements by the 
parent company or through access to the know-how and technology of its parent. 
Also, the intra-firm trade may affect the parent company through learning-by-
exporting. Besides intra-firm trade, Hausmann et al. (2007) suggest that financial 
constraints may be an important factor in explaining the quality of exported 
products. As we mentioned in Section 2.4.2, access to finance has been an 
important determinant of restructuring among enterprises in transition. Finally, the 
work of some authors suggests that quality upgrading takes place over time 
(Iacovone and Javorcik, 2008; Fernandes and Paunov, 2009). The explanation is that 
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the shift from one segment of the market to another requires learning and 
acquiring or developing specific assets and skills which may be a lengthy process. 
 Summarising this discussion we can see that economic theory provides the 
rationale for the link between the structure of a nation’s exports and its economic 
growth. In this context, it is postulated that improvements in quality may come 
through cross-industry structural changes and through changes in the level of 
sophistication of products traded within industries. Furthermore, the shift from one 
quality segment to another is considered as a dynamic process commonly related to 
investment in capital, innovations and skills as well as to knowledge and technology 
spillovers. Finally, institutional factors and financial constraints may have important 
roles in explaining the structure of a nation’s exports.   
6.2.2. Literature review 
 The structure and geographical direction of exports from transition 
economies have been investigated by a large number of studies some of which 
were reviewed in Sections 1.5.3 and 3.3.4. This body of knowledge has contributed 
to a better understanding of the structure of exports from transition economies and 
the role of the EU15 economies in their overall trade. As it was established there, 
after the demise of central planning, EU15 countries have been the most important 
trading partners of transition economies (Havlik, 2000; 2005). The trade between 
these two blocks, however, has for a long time been of vertical intra-industry type 
with transition economies exporting products of lower quality to the EU15 market 
and importing from there more sophisticated products (Aturupane et al., 1997; 
Rojec and Ferjancic, 2006). Finally, we established that, in later years of transition, 
exporters from several transition economies, particularly those in CEECs, have 
shifted from low to high technology intensive industries and to high quality 
segments of the market (Havlik, 2000; Benacek et al., 2006). 
 Despite this large body of knowledge on the trade of transition economies, 
relatively little quantitative empirical work on the factors affecting improvements in 
the quality of exports to EU15 has been undertaken (Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; 
Dulleck et al., 2005). This is particularly true for group of ‘laggard’ transition 
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economies which have not yet joined the EU and which includes Croatia. However, 
outside the transition context, several studies have investigated the determinants 
of quality upgrading of exported products. The quality of exports is usually 
measured with the unit export values, defined either in absolute (Lelarge and 
Nefussi, 2007; Fernandes and Paunov, 2009; Bastos and Silva, 2010) or relative 
(Dulleck et al., 2005; Monfort et al., 2008) terms which, as we established in Section 
1.4.3, are principal measures of export quality in the microeconomic approach to 
competitiveness. In other studies, the sophistication of country’s exports was 
measured with the indices of specialisation such as RCA (Hoekman and Djankov, 
1997) and by the productivity embodied in the production of exported products 
(Hausmann et al., 2007). A different approach to these has been adopted by 
Hummels and Klenow (2005) who suggest that competitiveness of country is 
quality-driven if it exports higher quantities of goods at higher prices than its rivals.  
 The evidence from the existing body of empirical literature follows the ideas 
mentioned in the previous section. Starting with the trade-growth relationship, the 
findings confirm the hypothesis that developed economies tend to export more 
sophisticated goods of higher quality and to charge for them higher prices 
(Hummels and Klenow, 2005; Hausmann et al., 2007). More importantly, this 
finding remains robust to particular measures of the level of development such as 
GDP or GDP per capita. In addition, the characteristics of the destination market 
seem to be important for exporters from developing economies. Bastos and Silva 
(2010) report that unit export values of exported products increase with the rise in 
GDP of importing countries while Dulleck et al. (2005) obtain a positive sign for the 
coefficient on market share of individual industries on the EU15 market. These 
findings are interpreted as the evidence of the learning-by-exporting effect. As we 
explained in previous chapter, in building their competitiveness, producers from 
developing economies can benefit from the knowledge and technology spillovers 
associated with participation in the markets of developed economies. 
 The pressure of foreign competitors on the domestic market is another 
important mechanism of quality upgrading of exported products. Lelarge and 
Nefussi (2008) find that competitive pressure of producers from low-wage countries 
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on the domestic market of developed economies facilitates their innovation activity 
which in turn has a positive effect on the quality of their exports. Similar findings 
have been reported by Fernandes and Paunov (2009) who use the transport costs of 
imported products as a proxy for import penetration and Monfort et al. (2008) who 
take the removal of trade barriers as a proxy for the stronger presence of low-cost 
producers on the EU15 market. In addition, Hoekman and Djankov (1997) report 
the positive impact of the imports of intermediate inputs on the structure of 
exports of transition economies. Their study also finds a positive relationship 
between outward intra-firm trade and the structure of exports. These findings imply 
that horizontal spillovers have an important role in quality upgrading of exports 
from transition economies. However, they do not find any relationship between the 
structure of exports and FDI. Finally, the quality of institutions does not seem to 
statistically affect the level of sophistication of a nation’s exports (Hausmann et al., 
2007).   
 Existing studies do not address directly the relationship between 
restructuring and the quality of nation’s exports. However, several factors and 
forces which we identified in Section 2.4.3 as forms of restructuring in transition are 
included in analyses. The evidence in this respect is rather ambiguous. It seems that 
in addition to previously mentioned innovation, human capital has important role in 
determining the sophistication of nation’s exports (Hausmann et al., 2007; Monfort 
et al., 2008) while the relationship between capital intensity of industry and 
measures of export quality is found to be statistically insignificant (Lelarge and 
Nefussi, 2008; Monfort et al., 2008). A distinctive approach to the matter of quality 
upgrading is taken by Dulleck et al. (2005) who control for the dependence of 
changes in relative unit export values on their initial level. They obtain a statistically 
significant and negative coefficient for the initial level of export quality.  
With the exception of a few studies using cross-section datasets (Hummels 
and Klenow, 2005; Bastos and Silva, 2010) most of the studies referred to above 
used panels of firms or industries which have been estimated using static panel 
methods or as pooled cross sections which is interpreted as evidence that quality 
upgrading takes place at slower pace within industries with higher initial quality 
Chapter Six: The Structure and Quality Upgrading of Croatian Exports to EU15 Market 
 
170 
 
than among those with lower levels (Hoekman and Djankov, 1997; Dulleck et al., 
2005; Hausmann et al., 2007; Lelarge and Nefussi, 2008; Monfort et al., 2008; 
Fernandes and Paunov, 2009). Although it has been acknowledged that models of 
quality upgrading may be subject to  endogeneity due to reverse causality between 
the relative unit export values and factors such as FDI or export market share as 
well as due to the correlation between factors such as innovation, skills and capital 
intensity on one hand, and the error term on the other (owing to the impact of 
omitted variables such as institutions, quality of management or ownership on the 
former) the empirical strategy in most studies has been to ignore these issues. 
Finally, a review of the empirical literature shows that existing studies have not paid 
attention to financial constraints which were identified in the previous section as a 
possible determinant of the quality of exported products.  
6.2.3. Model specification 
 Having established the theoretical basis for the research in this chapter and 
reviewed the relevant empirical findings we can develop an empirical model to 
analyse the quality upgrading of Croatian exports to EU15 markets. Taking the core 
theoretical framework of the thesis, the concept of imperfect competition, and the 
earlier discussion of international trade in this chapter, the basic model can be 
written as: 
Ruevit=f(Ruevit-1,Restit,Finit,Spillit)                               (6.1) 
 The dependent variable (Ruev) in equation 6.1 is the relative unit export 
value defined as ratio of the unit value of Croatian exports to EU15 to the unit value 
of EU15 imports from the rest of the world which, as we noted in Section 1.4.3, at 
higher levels of aggregation (2 or 3-digit) is much closer to the meaning of proxy for 
quality than for prices (Fischer, 2007). A similar measure for the relative quality of 
exports has been used by Dulleck et al. (2005) and Monfort et al. (2008). Our choice 
of denominator was based on the findings from Sections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 where it 
was established that producers from transition economies have been mainly 
competing on the EU15 market with exporters from other countries (Havlik et al., 
2001). 
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 On the right hand side of equation we include the dependent variable lagged 
one period to control for the dependence of the current quality of exports on its 
past values. As we mentioned in Section 6.2.1, the movement from price to quality 
segment of market requires learning and acquiring or developing specific assets and 
skills. This is consistent with propositions from the endogenous growth literature 
which imply that improvements in a country’s (industry’s, firm’s) competitiveness 
take place through gradual improvements in the quality of its products (Grossman 
and Helpman, 1994; Klette and Griliches, 2000).  
 In equation 6.1 the Rest refers to the process of restructuring. Following our 
theoretical framework in Section 1.3, particularly propositions of evolutionary, 
technology gap and endogenous growth theories as well as findings from the 
transition literature in Section 1.5.3 and discussion of the determinants of quality 
upgrading in Section 6.2.1 we model this process with three variables. Having in 
mind how the obsolescence of physical capital and a lack of innovativeness have 
been among the main deficiencies of firms in former centrally-planned economies, 
we include the capital-labour ratio (Kl) to control for the acquisition of new and the 
replacement of obsolete capital and a variable controlling for innovation intensity of 
the industry defined as the ratio of innovation output (including patents, licenses 
and project development) to the number of employees (Inne). We also consider 
that the shift towards higher quality segment of the market may be easier in 
industries with higher proportion of skilled labour. In line with Hausmann et al. 
(2007) we expect that the better quality of human capital would help producers to 
discover the potential returns of their actions and to reduce their aversion to 
investment necessary for the development of high quality products. For this reason 
the ratio of the average wage paid in industry to the average wage in manufacturing 
sector is included as a proxy for the quality of labour or the human capital 
(Wpremium). While not being perfect indicator of human capital as it may, like we 
established in Chapter Five, pick up effect of labour costs it is the closest measure 
available to us. For all three variables we expect to find positive signs.  
 In terms of factors deterring restructuring, we have already discussed access 
to finance as one of the important barriers to improvements in the behaviour of 
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firms (Section 2.4.2). In equation 6.1, Fin stands for set of variables which control 
for financial constraints. As the quality upgrading may be financed from internal 
funds only by the largest firms and in competitive industries with a large number of 
small producers external funds may be more important, we introduce a measure of 
leverage defined as the quotient between long-run debt to assets ratio and number 
of firms in the industry (Lev). We consider that firms rely on long-run loans for 
strategic operations such as quality upgrading while short-run borrowing is being 
used to finance current activities. However, we do not have a priori expectations 
about the sign of this variable. On the one hand, the higher borrowing can be 
positively related to improvements in the quality of exports. On the other hand, the 
excessive amount of debt can act as a burden for firm, thus constraining its strategic 
activities. In such cases, a negative sign can be expected. The model also includes 
the level of subsidies, measured by the total amount of revenues from subsidies 
divided by the number of firms in a given industry (Subs). Similar to the ‘leverage’ 
we do not have a priori expectations about the sign of this variable as a higher 
amount of subsidies may help firms to improve their competitiveness but also, as 
we established in Section 2.4.2, in the absence of hard budget constraints, it may 
weaken the incentive for restructuring. This variable, in addition to access to 
finance, reflects aspects of government policies towards the specific sector. 
 To capture the effects of knowledge and technology spillovers (Spill) on 
quality upgrading several variables are introduced. To control for the presence of 
horizontal and vertical spillovers to domestic market from imports we include 
relative import intensity (Imp) defined as the ratio of total imports in an industry 
and average imports in the manufacturing sector. The extent of competition in an 
industry is measured with a variable Comp defined as the number of firms in that 
industry divided by average number of firms in the manufacturing sector. In light of 
discussion in Section 6.2.1, we expect that horizontal and vertical spillovers in 
combination with threat of market seizure should act as incentive for firms to invest 
their efforts in quality upgrading.  
 We also control for the intensity of intra-firm trade (IFT) with a variable 
constructed as a ratio between revenues of Croatian firms from exports to affiliates, 
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parent companies or other enterprises belonging to same group which are located 
abroad and their total revenues from exports. We expect that quality upgrading can 
be easier for firms which can minimise transaction costs through sharing of 
technology, know-how and networks within organisation. Finally, the market share 
of each individual industry in the EU15 market (EUMshare) is included in order to 
control for the learning-by-exporting mechanism defined in the previous chapter. 
The complete list of variables is presented in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Description of variables 
Dependent variable  
Ruev Relative unit export value – Unit value of Croatian export to EU15/Unit value of 
export from other countries to the EU15  
Independent variables  
KL Capital labour ratio - tangible fixed assets/employee – EUR  per head 
Inne Patents, licences and development projects/employee – EUR per  head 
WPremium Wage premium – Wage per employee in industry i/average wage per employee 
in manufacturing sector – proxy for the quality of human capital  
Lev Leverage – (Long run debt/shareholders equity)/number of firms in industry i – 
proxy for external finance  
Subs Subsidies per company– Value of subsidies to industry i/Number of firms in that 
industry – EUR 
Imp Import intensity  – Total imports in industry i/Average imports in manufacturing 
sector  
Comp Competition – Number of firms in industry i/Average number of firms in 
manufacturing sector  
IFT Intra-Firm Trade – sales to enterprises abroad which belong to same group  
/total revenues from sales of goods and services abroad 
EUMshare EU15 Market share – export of industry i to EU15/EU15 apparent consumption 
in industry i (output minus exports plus imports) 
 Similar to previous chapters, we must take into account potential problems 
of endogeneity. Primarily this relates to the lagged dependent variable which, by 
definition, will be correlated with time-invariant elements of the error term. Our 
discussion in Section 2.4 also indicates that variables representing restructuring 
process are correlated with factors such as the quality of institutions or FDI which 
have been identified as important drivers of quality upgrading in Section 6.2.1. 
Similarly, the extent of intra-firm trade may be influenced with features of 
institutional environment such as legislation, tax benefits, absence of corruption 
etc. For this reason, we treat all three restructuring variables and variables 
measuring intra-firm trade in our model as potentially endogenous.  
 Additional problems of this type may arise from the fact that the choice of 
lenders about provision of loans and decisions of policy makers concerning 
allocation of subsidies to industry may be based on observed quality of its exports. 
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Also, the ability of Croatian producers to differentiate themselves and seize market 
share of their rivals on EU15 market may be determined with their previous and 
current relative quality of products. For this reason we treat financial variables and 
EU15 market share also as potentially correlated with the error term.  Having 
discussed all the relevant factors, it is now possible to develop a model to 
investigate how the quality of Croatian exports to EU15 market can be improved. 
This is done in Section 6.5. Before discussing the model, we will present the dataset 
used in this part of the research and examine major changes in the structure of 
Croatian exports to the EU15 market.  
6.3. The dataset 
 In this chapter we use the industry level data for Croatia’s 3-digit 
manufacturing industries by NACE classification covering the period between 2001 
and 2007, the most recent year for which data on most of our explanatory variables 
are available. The database is constructed from several sources. The unit export 
values and data on the Croatia-EU15 trade have been taken from the Eurostat’s 
Comext database at the most detailed 8-digit Combined Nomenclature level. They 
were then converted and aggregated into NACE 3-digit industry data. Furthermore, 
the Eurostat’s PRODCOM database had been used in the construction of EU15’s 
apparent consumption to calculate Croatia’s market share of the EU15 market. 
Finally, the industry specific variables were constructed using an industry-level 
dataset obtained from the Croatian Financial Agency (Financijska Agencija, or FINA). 
As all firms in Croatia are obliged to submit their annual financial statements to this 
Agency, the database is of all producers in each industry. Nevertheless, for some 
categories individual values are missing, although at very low rate, which means 
that we are dealing with an unbalanced panel. 
 As the Combined Nomenclature and NACE classification do not fully 
correspond with each other, some of the industries had to be excluded from the 
analysis while the data for two industries belonging to the same 2-digit NACE group 
had to be combined to correspond to one of the Combined Nomenclature group. 
Moreover, for some variables, the data in individual years were missing causing our 
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panel to be unbalanced. The data set used in econometric model, therefore, 
contains 89 out of 101 3-digit NACE manufacturing industries with a total of 529 
observations in the period between 2002 and 2007. As the data in FINA’s dataset 
are provided in Croatian national currency Kuna (HRK) they were converted to Euro 
using the average annual exchange rates obtained from the Croatian National Bank. 
Moreover, all nominal variables including capital, innovation intensity and subsidies 
have been deflated by the annual producer price indices for the manufacturing 
sector obtained from Croatian Statistical Office (DZS). The brief descriptive statistics 
of our dataset are presented in Table 6.2 which shows that we are dealing with a 
panel with a fairly low rate of missing observations. The detailed annual descriptive 
statistics of the dataset are presented in Tables A6.2-A6.4 in Appendix VI.  
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics 
Name Mean StDev. Missing(%) 
Ruev 1.20 1.17 0.6 
KL 286.92 298.81 0.3 
Inne 4.71 16.62 0.3 
WPremium 1.00 0.31 0.3 
Lev 0.67 8.79 0.2 
Subs 71.51 258.81 0.0 
Imp 1.00 3.09 0.0 
Comp 1.00 1.46 0.0 
IFT 0.15 0.20 2.4 
Eums 0.001 0.003 0.2 
 
 From descriptive statistics in Table 6.2 several interesting facts about the 
competitiveness of Croatian manufacturing industries on the EU15 market are 
revealed. These figures show that in the apparent consumption of EU15 the share 
of Croatian manufacturing industries was very low, about 0.1%. The average relative 
unit value of goods exported from Croatia to EU15 was above unity suggesting that 
in comparison with other exporters to the latter market, Croatian industries on 
average exported products of higher quality. However, we must be cautious in 
interpreting this finding as Hoekman and Djankov (1997) suggest that divergent 
conclusions can be drawn from observing trade between EU15 and transition 
economies at different levels of aggregation, an issue to which we will return in 
Section 6.4.  
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 Table 6.2 also reveals that several of our variables, including capital and 
innovation intensity as well as variables representing access to external finance 
have standard deviations which are several times higher than their means. As all of 
these variables take non-negative values, this finding implies that their distribution 
is positively (to the right) skewed. On one hand, such finding implies that most of 
Croatian industries are labour intensive with external borrowing and volume of 
subsidies being exceptionally high in only few of them. On the other hand, it also 
signals that our variables are not normally distributed and may give rise to 
heteroscedasticity. As these issues may have important implications in estimation of 
our model for quality upgrading we will return to them later in Section 6.5. In the 
meantime, Section 6.4 will examine major changes in the structure of Croatian 
exports to the EU15 market.  
6.4. Changes in the structure of Croatian exports to the EU15 market 
 In Section 3.3.4 we showed how, during transition, EU15 countries have 
been most important foreign markets for producers from Croatian manufacturing 
industries. In this section we continue the analysis at a more detailed level and 
examine the changes in the structure of Croatian exports. In this context, we first 
address changes that have taken place across industries and then consider whether 
there has been any shift in the ‘within-industry’ pattern of trade.  
6.4.1. Cross-industry changes in the structure of exports from Croatian 
manufacturing industries to EU15 market 
 We begin by comparing the demand of EU15 countries for total imports and 
their demand for imports from Croatia (defined as share of imports in apparent 
consumption) in 2001-2007 period. Indices in Figure 6.1 reveal that, with the 
exception of 2002, the demand of EU15 for imports had been rising and in 2007 its 
share in apparent consumption was 37% higher than in 2001. Croatian exports to 
the EU15 market over the analysed period also showed a generally upward though 
less consistent trend with its share in apparent consumption being 20% higher 
compared to 2001 level. We can conclude that EU15 demand for Croatian products 
increased at much slower rate than its overall demand for imports.  
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Figure 6.1: EU15 imports demand and Croatian exports to 
EU15 market (as share of apparent consumption), 2001-
2007 (2001=100) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on EUROSTAT 
Comext database 
 The division of Croatian industries by technological intensity on the basis of 
OECD (2007) classification reveals that over the analysed period the EU imports 
demand in all four groups increased by about 40% (Figure 6.2). But in terms of 
imports from Croatia, the share of low technology intensive industries was reduced 
and by 2007 it was at 89% of its 2001 level. Other three groups increased their 
market share with particularly strong increase taking place in high technology 
intensive industries. Between 2001 and 2007 the share of this group on the EU15 
market increased by about 191%.1 Hence, we can say that in analysed period there 
has been a clear cross-industry change in structure of Croatian exports (particularly 
their technological structure) to the EU15 market.  
 
 
 
                                                            
1 In terms of levels, Table A6.1 in Appendix VI shows that in 2001 low and medium low technology 
intensive industries from Croatia had almost two times a higher share of EU15 market than their 
medium-high and high technology intensive counterparts. However, while the former two groups of 
industries have not increased their market share between 2001 and 2007 the share of latter two 
groups increased, with high technology intensive industries having highest share among the four 
groups of Croatian industries by 2007. 
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Figure 6.2: EU15 imports demand and Croatian exports to EU15 market (as share of 
apparent consumption), 2001-2007 by technological intensity of industries (2001=100) 
Low technology intensive industries Medium-low technology intensive industries 
  
Medium-high technology intensive industries High technology intensive industries 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROSTAT’s Comext database 
 To further investigate the reasons behind changes in the structure of 
Croatian exports to EU15 market we undertake the so-called ‘shift and share 
analysis’. This technique enables us to decompose the change in the volume of 
imports from Croatia in the EU15 market and distinguish between changes induced 
by improved competitiveness, increased demand and restructuring. The starting 
point in the ‘shift and share analysis’ is the assumption that the overall demand of a 
country k (or s group of countries such as EU15) for industry i and its demand for 
imports of same industry from country j increase proportionally. The divergence 
between two ratios is commonly labelled as a “shift” (Selting and Loveridge, 1994). 
Using previous notation, the change in the volume of exports (x) of industry i from 
country j to country k between two periods can be decomposed in the following 
way:  
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∆xijt=xijt-n �∆Mkt Mkt-n⁄ �  +xijt-n ��∆Mikt Mikt-n⁄ � - �∆Mkt Mkt-n⁄ ��      +xijt-n[ (∆xijt xijt-n)� -�∆Mikt Mikt-n⁄ �],𝑛 ∈ (0,∞)       (6.2) 
 
 In equation (6.2), the exports of industry i from country j to country k is 
decomposed into three components: a general increase in demand in country k, an 
increase in the demand of country k for industry i in excess of the general increase 
in demand, and an improvement in the competitiveness of industry i from country j 
in comparison with other importers of the same industry in country k. Here, xij 
stands for the volume of exports from industry i in country j to country k while Mk 
and Mki refer to overall imports and the imports of industry i in country k.   
 The term xijt−n(∆Mkt Mkt−n⁄ ) is usually referred to as the general demand 
component. It shows how the demand for exports of industry i (group of industries, 
manufacturing sector) would develop if it was growing at the same rate as the 
overall demand for imports. The second term xijt-n��∆Mikt Mikt-n⁄ �-�∆Mkt Mkt-n⁄ �� is 
known as the structural effect component. It shows whether the demand for 
industry i in destination market has grown at above-average or below-average rate. 
Hence, a positive sign for this component indicates that the demand for a particular 
industry’s imports has grown at a higher rate than the overall demand for imports 
in the destination country. Finally, the third component xijt-n[ (∆xijt xijt-n)� -�∆Mikt Mikt-n⁄ �]  is the competition effect component. It indicates 
whether the rate of growth of a particular country’s exports of a given industry is 
higher than the rate of growth of exports from other producers to the same market. 
It is commonly interpreted as an indicator of given industry’s competitiveness on 
the destination country’s market. The first two components are considered 
exogenous while the last one is considered endogenous. 
 Each component of change in export is weighted by the factor xijt-n. 
Commonly this factor takes the value of the variable of interest (in this case exports 
from Croatia) in the base or in the terminal year in which case the technique is 
referred to as the static shift and share analysis. However, it has been suggested in 
the literature that the choice of the base or terminal year as the weight may lead to 
a bias as such practice rests on the assumption that the export structure remains 
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constant through the analysed period (Barff and Knight, 1988; Selting and 
Loveridge, 1994; Wilson et al., 2005). Another source of bias is the so-called 
compounding effect which is related to problems of assigning weights to particular 
components of change in the market share, primarily to the change in demand 
which is likely to be underestimated when the export of a particular industry grows 
faster than the overall export. To eliminate these biases, Barff and Knight (1988) 
have proposed the dynamic shift and share analysis which estimates the three 
components on an annual basis and then adds them together or interprets them 
separately.  
Table 6.3: Shift and share analysis of changes in Croatian 
exports to EU15, 2001-2007 (millions EUR) 
 
  Source: Own calculations using Eurostat Comext database 
 Table 6.3 shows that the volume of exports from the manufacturing sector in 
Croatia to EU15 increased (with exception of 2002 and 2005 years). However, a 
comparison between the realised volume of exports for whole period and the 
magnitude of demand effect reveals that the overall demand of EU15 for imports 
was growing at higher rate than its demand for Croatian products. A closer look at 
the structural effect suggests that Croatian industries have mainly exported 
products for which EU15 demand was growing at below average rate while the 
negative sign on the competition effect implies that they were losing 
competitiveness in comparison to other exporters to EU15. A brief examination of 
the annual changes suggests that from 2005 onwards (with exception of 2006) 
Croatian exports to EU15 recorded low rates of growth which were the result of the 
combination of structural problems and the loss of competitiveness. Table 6.4 
provides the analysis of changes in the volume of exports by Croatian industries to 
EU15 market according to their technological intensity. 
Period Δ(xijt) Demand effect Structural effect Competition effect 
2002 -42 -80 30 8 
2003 186 7 7 171 
2004 439 231 -25 233 
2005 -254 386 -142 -498 
2006 282 -2431 2744 -31 
2007 118 535160 -534727 -310 
Total 729 533270 -532113 -427 
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Table 6.4: Dynamic shift and share analysis of changes in the volume of exports of 
Croatian manufacturing Industries to EU15 by their technological intensity, 2001-2007 
(million EUR) 
Technological 
Intensity 
Δ(xijt) Demand  Effect Structural effect Competitive effect 
Low -93 519 -137 -474 
Medium Low 319 292 119 -92 
Medium High 304 182 23 97 
High 199 164 -11 46 
  Source: Own calculations from EUROSTAT Comext database 
 Analysis across industries by their technological intensity in Table 6.4 
enables us to understand our earlier findings in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.3. The table 
shows that the structural problems and declining competitiveness were behind the 
decline in the volume of exports from Croatian low technology intensive industries 
to the EU15 market while above average growth of EU15 demand for medium-low 
technology intensive industries triggered a rise in volume of exports from these 
Croatian industries. Finally, the rising market share of Croatian medium-high and 
high technology intensive industries on the EU15 market can be attributed to 
improvements in their competitiveness. These findings are further evidences of 
changes in the structure of Croatian export to EU15. 
6.4.2. Within-industry changes in the structure of Croatian exports to EU15 market 
 Our analysis in the previous section showed that the structure of Croatian 
export to the EU15 market shifted towards products of higher technological 
intensity. This finding may indicate that Croatian exporters have been increasingly 
competing with products of higher quality. In Section 6.2.1 we postulated that 
within industries producers can compete at different levels of quality, and in Section 
6.2.2 we showed that vertical intra-industry trade was the dominant mode of trade 
between transition economies and EU15 (Aturupane et al., 1997; Rojec and 
Ferjancic, 2006). We can now examine the pattern of trade between Croatia and 
EU15 to see whether this trade is of inter or intra-industry type and whether it is 
characterised by vertical differentiation or with horizontal exchange in similar 
products.  
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Figure 6.3: Indices of intra-industry trade, unit export values and relative unit 
export values of Croatian trade with EU15 2001-2007 (2001=100) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROSTAT’s Comext database 
The base category in construction of relative unit export values is 
EU15 imports from the rest of the world. 
 Figure 6.3 shows the Grubel Lloyd index of intra-industry trade (introduced 
in Section 1.4.2), unit export values and relative unit export values (imports from 
Croatia relative to EU15 imports from the rest of world) of Croatian export to EU15. 
From there we can see that over analysed period the share of intra-industry trade in 
overall exchange between the two entities declined and in 2007 it was at 80% of its 
2001 level. However, same Figure shows that the quality of Croatian exports to the 
EU15 market in this period increased in both absolute (15%) and relative (6%) 
terms.  
Table 6.5: Intra-industry trade (IIT), unit export values (EUV) and relative 
unit export values (RUEV) of Croatian trade with EU15, 2001-2007 
 IIT EUV 
(2001=100) 
RUEV 
(2001=100) 
Year/Industry type 2001 2007 2001 2007 2001 2007 
Low tech 1.0 0.8 100 69 100 64 
Medium low tech 0.5 0.5 100 183 100 142 
Medium high tech 0.4 0.3 100 104 100 117 
High tech 0.4 0.6 100 121 100 137 
Manufacturing 0.6 0.5 100 115 100 106 
Source: Own calculations based on EUROSTAT’s Comext database 
The base category in construction of relative unit export values 
is EU15 imports from the rest of the world. 
 Further look in these issues in Table 6.5 reveals that the intra-industry trade 
accounted for about half of the overall exchange between Croatian and EU15 
manufacturing sectors. The grouping of industries by their technology intensity 
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shows that the highest proportion of intra-industry trade between EU15 and Croatia 
in the analysed period took place in low technology intensive industries. In 2001, 
nearly all trade in this group of industries was of intra-industry type but by 2007 its 
share decreased by about one fifth. In medium-low and medium-high technology 
intensive industries, the proportion of intra-industry trade remained relatively 
stable and was of similar magnitude to the whole manufacturing sector. The share 
of intra-industry trade in group of high-technology intensive industries, however, 
increased from 0.4 to 0.6 over the analysed period. The absolute and relative export 
unit values show that, with the exception of low technology intensive industries, all 
groups experienced an increase in the value of their export to EU15. In relative 
terms, particularly strong increases can be observed in medium-low and high 
technology intensive industries.   
 To identify the type of trade conducted by individual Croatian industries, we 
follow the methodology originally developed by Abd-El-Rahman (1991) and later 
improved by Greenaway et al. (1995) and Fontagne and Freudenberg (1997). By 
comparing degrees of product similarity and of trade overlap this methodology 
enables us to distinguish sectors for which trade is of inter-industry type from those 
in which exchange is of vertically or horizontally differentiated nature (intra-
industry). Hence, we begin by disentangling the intra-industry trade of industry i in 
year t between Croatia and EU15 into two components, vertical and horizontal. 
IITit=HIITit+VIITit                                                                                                       (6.3) 
 In equation (6.3) IIT is the overall intra-industry trade in industry i while HIIT 
and VIIT are its horizontal and vertical components respectively. Greenaway et al. 
(1995) suggest that ratios between unit values of exports and imports of a particular 
industry may reveal whether the within industry trade is of vertical or horizontal 
type. Assuming that differences in unit values reflect variations in quality of traded 
products they argue that within industry trade is of horizontal type if unit values 
meet following condition: 
1-∝≤ EUVitIUVit ≤1+∝                                                                                              (6.4) 
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while trade will be of vertical intra-industry type if  
EUVitIUVit <1-∝ or EUVitIUVit >1+∝                                                                                       (6.5) 
where EUV and IUV are the unit export and unit import values of industry i in period 
t respectively and ∝ is the dispersion factor taking value of 0.15.2 However, 
Fontagne and Freudenberg (1997) suggest that such defined criterion does not take 
into account the distinction between one-way and two-way trade. Therefore, they 
propose an additional criterion to measure the degree of overlap in trade between 
two economic entities. A trade is considered to be of intra-industry type if the value 
of minority flow (exports or imports) represents at least 10% of the majority flow 
(imports or exports). This condition can be written as follows 
Min(Xit , Mit)Max (Mit,Xit) >10%                                                                                   (6.6) 
 When the two criteria are brought together they enable us to distinguish 
first between inter- and intra-industry trade and then within the intra-industry 
trade between horizontal and vertical differentiation. This typology is presented in 
Table 6.6.  
 
Table 6. 6: Criteria for identification of trade patterns 
 
   Source: Fountagne and Freudenberg (1997) 
                                                            
2 This dispersion factor refers to the minimum threshold that can be used to distinguish between 
similar and vertically differentiated products. It commonly takes values of 0.15 and 0.25 (Greenaway 
et al., 1995; Fontagne and Freudenberg, 1997). Our analysis adopts the former, more conservative 
criterion. 
Degree of overlap 
between export and 
import values: 
Does the minority 
flow represent at 
least 10% of the 
majority flow 
Similarity of unit export and 
import values: 
Do export and import unit values 
differ less than 15% 
Yes 
Horizontal 
differentiation 
No 
Vertical 
differentiation 
 
Yes 
Two-way trade 
in similar 
products 
Two-way trade 
in vertically 
differentiated 
products 
No Inter-industry trade 
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 Table 6.6 combines two previously mentioned criteria for distinction 
between different types of trade. The first column of this table enables us to 
distinguish between inter- and intra-industry trade. Hence, if the degree of overlap 
between unit export and import values is below 10% the trade is defined as 
exchange of intra-industry type. 3 However, if two flows diverge for more than 10% 
this implies that exchange is of inter-industry type (last row of table). If the first 
criteria for intra-industry trade is satisfied, next two columns of table can be used to 
distinguish between horizontal and vertical within industry exchange. Hence, if the 
minority flow represents at least 10% of majority flow and unit export and import 
values differ for less than 15% the products are considered to be horizontally 
differentiated. But if the degree of overlap is above 10% and the unit export and 
import values differ by more than 15% the products are considered to be vertically 
differentiated. 
 Using above presented methodology, Table 6.7 provides detailed overview 
of trade patterns between Croatia and EU15 at the level of 3-digit NACE industries 
in 2001 and 2007 (the beginning and the end of the period under consideration). 
From here we can observe a change in the pattern of trade between two economic 
entities over the analysed period. It is evident that the number of industries 
characterised by horizontal intra-industry trade has increased across all groups 
except the low technology intensive group. Also, several industries have shifted 
from the inter-industry to vertical intra-industry group. Particularly interesting is the 
pattern observed in the high technology intensive group where in 2001 there were 
no horizontally differentiated industries. By 2007, production of electronic valves 
and tubes (NACE 321) and manufacturing of sound and video receiving and 
recording goods (NACE 323) had been characterised with horizontal intra-industry 
trade. However, it is evident that in most Croatian industries, even in this advanced 
stage of transition, trade continues to be dominated by vertical differentiation. This 
is particularly true for industries of lower technological intensity.  
 
                                                            
3 Fontagne and Freudenberg (1997) suggest that such finding means that minority flow is not the 
structural component of trade and therefore can be labelled as insignificant. 
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Table 6.7: Trade pattern Croatia/EU15 at level of 3-digit industries, 2001-2007 
2001 
 Inter-industry Vertical intra-
industry  
Horizontal intra-
industry  
Low tech 154-157, 160, 172, 176, 363 
158,159, 
174,175,181, 182, 
183, 192, 193, 201, 
202, 204, 205, 21 
222, 361, 362, 364-
366 
151-153, 171, 
177, 203, 221 
Medium low tech 263-267, 271, 273 
232, 251, 252, 261, 
262, 268, 272, 274, 
281-286, 351 
287 
Medium high tech 
243, 245, 246, 
293, 296, 314, 
341 
247, 291, 292, 295, 
297, 311-313, 315, 
316, 342, 343, 352, 
354, 355 
294 
High tech 300, 322, 323, 331, 334 
321, 332, 333, 335, 
353 - 
2007 
Low tech 
156, 157, 160, 
172, 176, 363, 
364, 365 
151, 153-155, 158, 
159, 171, 174, 175, 
181-183, 193, 201-
205, 211, 212, 221, 
222, 361, 362, 366 
152, 177, 192 
Medium low tech 
232, 263, 264, 
273, 274, 283, 
286 
251, 252, 261, 262, 
266–268, 271, 272, 
282, 351 
265, 281, 284, 
285, 287 
Medium high tech 
243, 245, 246, 
296, 314, 315, 
341, 354 
244, 247, 291-295, 
297, 311, 316, 342, 
343, 352, 355 
312, 313 
High tech 331, 333, 335 300, 322, 332, 334, 353 321, 323 
                         Source: Own calculations based on EUROSTAT’s Comext database 
 The overall picture emerging from this analysis is that in the advanced stage 
of transition changes have occurred in the structure of Croatian exports to EU15 
both across and within industries. The composition of Croatian exports has shifted 
from low towards high technology intensive industries with the latter exhibiting the 
highest increase of EU15 market share. This was mainly caused by improvements in 
the competitiveness of these industries. Over analysed period unit export values of 
Croatian exports to EU15 have increased in both absolute and relative terms 
although we observed a lot of fluctuation in individual years in this respect. At first, 
this signals within-industry improvements in the quality of products. However, the 
analysis of similarity and overlapping in trade flows between Croatia and EU15 
reveals that the bulk of this trade still takes place through vertical differentiation. 
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Thus the results of our investigation are in line with studies mentioned earlier in this 
chapter which suggested that most of the trade between transition economies and 
EU15 countries is of intra-industry type with the former competing in low quality 
segments of the latter’s market and our findings in earlier chapters where we 
established that competitiveness of Croatian firms is mainly price-driven. The 
evidence of several industries switching from vertical to horizontal type of intra-
industry trade over the analysed period may be taken as an indicator of changing 
specialisation patterns towards the high quality segments of the market within 
Croatian manufacturing industries.  
6.5. Determinants of quality upgrading of Croatian exports to EU15 
market 
 The evidence from previous section suggests that quality upgrading has 
taken place both across and within Croatian manufacturing industries. Yet, they also 
point out that trade in many of Croatian industries is still characterised by vertical 
intra-industry trade. In this section we attempt to investigate which factors and 
forces can improve the relative quality of exports to EU15. To do this we estimate 
the model discussed in Section 6.2.3. Taking all elements identified there as 
relevant for the investigation the model to be estimated can be written as:  
ln(Ruev)it=αo+α1 ln(Ruev)it-1 +α2 ln(Kl)it +α3Inneit+α4 ln(WPremium)it +α5Impit +α6 ln(Comp)it +α7 ln(Eumshare)it +α8IFTit+α9Levit+α10Subsit+∑ yeart+2007t=2003 ui+vit (6.7) 
where variables include those in Table 6.1 and annual time dummies (year). In the 
estimation of equation (6.7) we use same methodology as in previous chapters, i.e. 
the twostep GMM system dynamic panel estimator with Windmeijer’s corrections 
for robust standard errors. The properties of this methodology have been discussed 
in detail in Section 4.4. There we identified ability to control for correlation between 
explanatory variables, including lagged dependent variable, on one hand and error 
term on the other as well as its power of distinguishing between short- and long-run 
effects of explanatory variables as key advantages of dynamic panel estimators and 
established that among different types of this estimator system one has several 
desirable features such as being more efficient in the presence of random walk or 
Chapter Six: The Structure and Quality Upgrading of Croatian Exports to EU15 Market 
 
188 
 
its ability to include categorical (dummy) variables. We also established that 
robustness to the patterns of heteroscedasticity makes two-step procedure with 
Windmeijer’s corrections for downward biased standard errors superior to one-step 
estimation.  
 The above mentioned properties of system dynamic panel GMM estimator 
make it suitable methodology for the analysis of determinants of quality upgrading 
in this chapter for several reasons. As we outlined in Section 6.3, there are reasons 
to expect a correlation between several of the variables and the error term. To 
control for this we treat the lagged dependent variable as predetermined and 
capital and innovation intensity, wage premium, EU15 market share and intra-firm 
trade as well as the two financial variables as endogenous. Our model also includes 
annual time dummies to control for potential sources of cross-sectional 
dependence. The examination of descriptive statistics in Section 6.3 implies that 
non-normality and heteroscedasticity may be present. While the normality is not 
among requirements of GMM dynamic panel estimators, the latter issue can be 
controlled for with use of two-step estimator. As in such case, standard errors tend 
to be downward biased we also apply previously mentioned Windmeijer’s 
correction.   
 Similar to earlier chapters, predetermined and endogenous variables have 
been instrumented with their own lags and lagged differences while exogenous 
variables entered instrumentation matrix as own instruments. As previously, our 
choice of instruments had to meet all relevant model diagnostics but between 
several alternative sets of instruments which satisfied above condition we decided 
for those outcomes which made more economic sense. However, in all considered 
specifications the major variables of interest retained their signs and significance 
suggesting the robustness of our model. Finally, the dependent variable and most of 
explanatory variables enter our model in logarithmed form. However, several right-
hand side variables also take value of zero and were thus used in non-logarithmic 
form. We now move to interpret our main findings. As previously, we begin with a 
discussion about model diagnostics.  
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Table 6.8: Dynamic panel system GMM estimations for quality upgrading 
of Croatian export to EU15 market, 2002-2007 (Dep. variable: ln (Ruev)) 
 SR LR 
Lagged dependent variable 0.63(0.000)*** - 
RESTRUCTURING   
Capital Intensity: ln( Kl) 0.26(0.018)** 0.71(0.027)** 
Innovation Intensity: (Inne)  0.01(0.031)** 0.02(0.021)** 
Wage Premium: ln (WPremium) -1.86(0.000)*** -5.03(0.001)*** 
SPILLOVERS   
Import Intensity: (Imp) 0.03(0.0022)** 0.09(0.019)** 
Number of Competitors: ln (Comp) 0.02(0.547) 0.05(0.566) 
EU15 Market Share: ln (Eums) -0.11(0.165) -0.29(0.267) 
Intra-Firm Trade: (IFT) -0.20(0.380) -0.54(0.412) 
ACCESS TO FINANCE   
Leverage: (Lev) -0.04 (0.030)** -0.11(0.006)*** 
Subsidies: (Subs) -0.0001(0.801) -0.0002(0.798) 
   
Constant term(cons) -2.44(0.000)*** - 
MODEL DIAGNOSTICS   
Number of observations 529 - 
Number of groups 91 - 
Wald test 422.53 - 
Prob>chi2 0.000 - 
Hansen J Statistic 33.54 - 
Prob> chi2 0.789 - 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences -3.19 - 
Prob>chi2 0.001 - 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences 0.51 - 
Prob>chi2 0.609 - 
Instrument count 57 - 
Note: p-values in brackets where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance of variables at 
1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. p-values are obtained from two-step 
dynamic panel procedure with Windmeeijer's corrected robust standard errors. Model 
includes year dummy variables. 
 
 The main results of estimation and model diagnostics are presented in Table 
6.8 while detailed printouts of estimation can be found in the Table A6.5 in 
Appendix VI. We can see that there is insufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions in the Hansen’s test for the validity 
of instruments. Similar to the estimations in previous chapters, the computed p-
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value is well above the most conservative threshold suggested in the literature 
(0.25). The difference-in-Sargan-tests for subsets of instruments for the levels 
equation and for the lagged dependent variable also do not provide sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions (Table 
A6.5 in Appendix VI). As we discussed in Section 4.5, former implies that the steady-
state assumption can be accepted and that the system GMM estimator should be 
preferred to the difference one while the latter diagnostic suggests that our model 
is not likely to suffer from cross-sectional dependence.  
 We also checked for the first and second order autocorrelation. As expected, 
the relevant diagnostics reject the null hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation 
but not the one of no second order autocorrelation. In addition, the comparison of 
magnitude of coefficient on the lagged dependent variable with magnitudes 
obtained in OLS and panel FE estimations shows that our coefficient lies between 
the former two (Table A6.6 in Appendix VI). Finally, the number of instruments 
relative to the number of groups of observations is somewhat higher than in 
previous estimations but still relatively low.  
 Having examined the diagnostics we can move to discuss main findings from 
Table 6.8. All the discussion of the effect of individual variables is ceteris paribus 
and we start with the short run estimates. The positive and highly significant 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable suggests that the relative quality of 
Croatian exports to EU15 market is positively related to its past realisations. The 
magnitude of coefficient implies that a one percent improvement in relative export 
unit value in the previous period leads to about 0.6% improvement in the current 
period.  Such a finding is consistent with the propositions of the endogenous growth 
literature which postulates that quality upgrading is a gradual process taking place 
over time.  
 All three restructuring variables are significant but only two of them have 
the expected sign. The coefficient on capital intensity indicates that one percent 
increase in capital/labour ratio leads to 0.29% improvement in the relative quality 
of Croatian exports to the EU15 market. Similarly, an additional euro of innovation 
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output per employee (innovation intensity) improves the relative quality of Croatian 
export to EU15 market by about 0.7%. These findings are in line with predictions 
from the transition literature that investment in new machinery and equipment and 
in development of new production processes and new products should improve the 
international competitiveness of producers from transition economies. More 
importantly, they support the Austrian, evolutionary and endogenous growth 
literature about the relation between innovation and technology on one hand, and 
the ability to compete through quality on the other. However, the coefficient on 
wage premium, our proxy for the quality of human capital is statistically significant 
with negative sign. As we mentioned in Section 6.2.3 this probably means that the 
variable captures the cost component of wages rather than human capital. Hence, 
the ability of industries to reduce costs of labour leaves producers with more funds 
which can be invested in upgrading of quality.  
 Among the four measures of spillovers we obtain a statistically significant 
and positive coefficient only on import intensity. It implies that if imports in an 
industry relative to average for the whole manufacturing increases by one 
hundredth of an unit, it would lead to improvement in the relative quality of export 
by about 0.03%.4 This finding may be interpreted as the evidence for several 
hypotheses mentioned in the transition and international trade literature. First, it 
may imply that imports of intermediate inputs and technology play important roles 
in shaping the competitiveness of transition economies as proposed in Hoekman 
and Djankov (1997). Second, it may also suggest that the stronger presence of 
importers on final goods market provides the entire industry with the knowledge 
and technology spillovers which have a beneficial impact on the relative quality of 
its exports, a process which is similar to the mechanism of learning discussed by 
Hausmann et al. (2007). Finally, it may mean that the pressure of foreign 
competitors forces domestic firms to look for new ways to differentiate themselves, 
leading them to the quality segments of the market with a consequent impact on 
the structure of their exports (Fernandes and Paunov, 2009).  
                                                            
4 Having in mind descriptive statistics of this variable we consider movement for 0.01 unit to 
represent sufficiently marginal change. 
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 Access to subsidies does not seem to have had a significant role in quality 
upgrading of Croatian exports. However, we do obtain negative and statistically 
significant coefficient on our measure of leverage. The coefficient is small 
suggesting that a decline in the debt to asset ratio per firm of one hundredth of unit 
leads to a 0.04 percent increase in the relative sophistication of Croatian exports to 
EU15 market.5 This finding may be taken as the evidence that borrowing acts as a 
constraint for strategic activities of firms such as improvements in the quality of 
their exports.  
Finally, the last column of Table 6.8 gives the long-run coefficients calculated 
from the results of the estimation. As it can be seen all the coefficients retain their 
significance and they are about 2.7 times higher than their short-run counterparts. 
As in previous chapters, we interpret this as the evidence that the outcomes of 
actions undertaken by firms in our sample are completely realised only in the long 
run.  
6.6. Conclusion  
 Several economic schools postulate that for the ability of country to grow 
and to provide its citizens with better standard of living, the structure of its exports 
is far more important than the ability to compete on international markets. 
Throughout the thesis it has been argued that the ability to compete in high quality 
segments of the market gives higher potential for growth of the economy than 
competitive profiles based on standardised price-competitive products. For this 
reason, a substantial body of literature has attempted to explain the channels 
through which less developed and transition economies can improve the level of 
sophistication of their exports. In the same spirit, and motivated by the findings of 
the previous two chapters on the competitive profile of Croatian firms in general 
and its exporters in particular, the objective of this chapter was to investigate 
changes in the structure of Croatian exports to the EU15 market in the advanced 
stage of transition. To tackle this issue we traced the evolution of changes in trade 
patterns both across and within the Croatian manufacturing industries. 
                                                            
5 Again we consider movement for 0.01 to represent sufficiently marginal change.  
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 The results of the investigation are mainly in line with findings of previous 
literature about competitive profiles of transition economies and potential channels 
for improvements in the relative sophistication of nation’s exports. Over the years, 
Croatian exporters to EU15 market have shifted from low technology intensive 
towards high technology intensive industries. It was established that the main 
reason for this was the loss of competitiveness in the former and competitiveness 
gains in the latter group of products.  However, our analysis of within-industry trade 
is in line with findings from previous chapters about price-driven competitiveness of 
Croatian firms.  Although the Croatian manufacturing is reorienting towards the 
more technologically intensive sectors (Sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2) our evidence 
suggests that, within these sectors, the Croatian trade with EU15 has all the 
characteristics of vertical intra-industry trade, a pattern typical for exchange 
between developed and developing economies. Finally, the last part of our 
investigation showed that technology and innovations play a key role in 
improvements in the relative quality of exports alongside with import-led spillovers, 
thus confirming the predictions from the trade and growth literature  
 When related to our findings from Chapters Four and Five the results of this 
analysis can be understood as further evidence of the adverse effect exercised by 
specific characteristics of Croatian transition (Chapter Three) on its 
competitiveness. To this end, observed structure of Croatian exports to EU15 
market may be explained with the delayed restructuring of its firms and industries 
while our findings about channels for quality upgrading may show the way for 
improvements in the overall competitiveness of the Croatian economy. For this 
reason, they will be used in next chapter to formulate conclusions of thesis.  
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7.1. Introduction 
 The recent surge of interest in competitiveness arises from the growing 
concerns over the future prospects of firms, industries and nations who need to 
compete in a globalised world. The prevalent approach in this field focuses on 
different aspects of socio-economic environment such as the quality of institutions, 
infrastructure or human capital (WEF, 2009; IMD, 2010). However, the economic 
literature suggests that in building national competitiveness these factors only have 
a supporting role while the key to the success of nations lies in the ability of their 
firms and industries to compete. Firms in transition countries had to introduce 
numerous changes in their behaviour in order to survive the shocks of transition 
and become competitive. The objective of this thesis, therefore, was to examine the 
relationship between competitiveness and restructuring of firms and industries 
paying special attention to the case of Croatia, an economy which has the best 
prospects of becoming the next EU member. 
 Our research focused on several questions which are crucial for the 
understanding of competitiveness in general and the competitiveness of transition 
economies in particular. What is competitiveness, how is it conceptualised and 
what is the proper way of measuring it in transition economies? What is the role of 
restructuring in shaping the ability of firms, industries and nations to compete? 
What are the distinguishing features of Croatia’s transition in comparison with 
advanced CEECs? Are the competitive profiles of Croatian firms and industries 
different from those of their counterparts in advanced CEECs? What determines the 
competitiveness of Croatian exports and how can the quality or sophistication of 
these products be improved? What can the government and firms do in order to 
improve the competitiveness of Croatian firms and their products?  
 In this chapter we will summarise the results of the investigation of the 
above questions and formulate a number of policy recommendations for improving 
the competitiveness of Croatian firms and industries. The chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 7.2 will summarise the main findings of the thesis. The 
contributions to knowledge of the thesis will be presented in Section 7.3. Policy 
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recommendations aimed at improving the competitiveness of firms and industries 
in Croatia will be developed in Section 7.4. Finally, Sections 7.5 and 7.6 will identify 
the limitations of this research and provide suggestions for further research.   
7.2. Main findings  
 Over the past few decades, concerns about competitiveness have arisen in 
both developed economies who wish to retain their traditional comparative 
advantages and the developing economies who have been struggling to compete in 
the global market place and secure higher rates of growth and better standard of 
living for their citizens (Lall, 2000; 2001). The widespread use of the concept has 
resulted in numerous definitions, theories and measures which are mainly grouped 
around the economic entities to which they apply. This fails to account for the 
complexity and multidimensional nature of competitiveness and provides room for 
the critiques of the concept. This study has developed a conceptual framework in 
which national competitiveness arises from interdependencies between the 
activities of firms, their characteristics and environment. We elaborated the 
complementarities between different measures of this concept and argued that the 
microeconomic approach best suits the needs of our research since its focus is on 
the ability of firms to compete which is explained with elements from micro, mezzo 
and macroeconomic level of economic activity. We also showed that, despite the 
views of some critiques, the concept of competitiveness is well established in both 
mainstream and alternative economic theories.  
 In the uncertain and unfamiliar conditions of early transition, the 
development of competitiveness was a multidimensional challenge that required 
the creation of institutions and policies to facilitate the adaptation of firms and 
industries to the new environment, the reorientation of their trade to new markets 
and most importantly the restructuring of enterprises that had to make numerous 
defensive and strategic changes in their behaviour in order to survive and become 
more competitive. Through a critical review of the literature we established that the 
pursuit of transitional reforms was faster in CEECs than in SEECs and CIS countries 
and created much stronger incentives for the restructuring of their firms. Evidence 
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was provided that in the first decade of transition, restructuring efforts of firms 
were mainly concentrated on improving labour productivity and unit labour costs 
typical for price-driven competitiveness. In the second decade, however, many 
firms, particularly those from advanced CEECs, embarked on strategic forms of 
restructuring such as innovations, technological upgrading or investment in human 
capital which facilitated the movement of these firms towards quality-driven 
competitiveness. 
 Compared to other transition economies, Croatia presents a unique and 
particularly interesting case to study. With a relatively liberal institutional 
framework and a semi-market economy, firms were familiar with the principles of 
behaviour in a market environment and enjoyed considerable freedom of decision-
making. The economic structure was closer to EU15 than that of any other centrally-
planned economy. In short, Croatia had all the prerequisites for a rapid and smooth 
transformation into a market economy. However, as our analysis has shown much 
of this initial advantage was lost because of the war, the unfavourable political 
climate in 1990s and late integration into regional, European and global economic 
institutions. The restructuring of the Croatian manufacturing sector was slower than 
in other CEECs and in the second decade of transition it was still dominated by low 
technology intensive industries. Moreover, while other transition economies were 
strengthening their position on EU15 markets, Croatia’s share of these markets was 
declining. These, together with some of the adverse effects of transition led us to 
conclude that the impediments to enterprise restructuring had eroded the 
competitiveness of Croatian firms.  
 The empirical part of thesis focused on three main areas of investigation: 
differences in the behaviour of firms in Croatia and several advanced CEECs 
(Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland and the Slovak Republic), the competitive 
profiles of Croatian exporters, and the structure and competitiveness of Croatian 
exports to EU15 market. The empirical work covers the period between 2000 and 
2007, the most recent year for which both firm and industry level data were 
available at the time of writing this thesis. The empirical evidence from Chapter 
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Four revealed many similarities between the behaviour of firms in Croatia and 
CEECs, particularly with Poland, suggesting that in the second decade of transition 
Croatian firms have been catching up with CEEC firms. We provided analysis that 
indicated that the market share of firms was influenced by both defensive (short-
run) and strategic (long-run) forms of restructuring such as investment in new 
machinery and equipment, improvements in the productivity of labour and 
reductions in unit labour and unit material costs. However, we did not find any 
evidence of a relationship between the market share of firms and agglomeration 
externalities such as knowledge and technology sharing and spillovers. Instead, our 
findings suggested that firms in transition, in general, have still not reached a stage 
where they could appreciate and seek the benefits of cooperation; they prefer to 
rely on their own strengths, abilities and accumulated knowledge. 
 The empirical analysis in Chapter Five focused on the behaviour of Croatian 
exporters, aiming to investigate whether, in the period under consideration, these 
firms moved from price competitiveness towards quality driven competitiveness. As 
argued throughout the thesis, the latter competitive profile bears higher value 
added and can lead to higher rates of growth – and therefore firms and nations 
should aim for it. The rich firm level dataset used allowed the introduction of 
several important new variables such as size, innovation activities and investment in 
human capital of firms, the proximity of international borders and the  role of 
specific government policies, such as the establishment of entrepreneurial and free 
trade zones, in the analysis. The results revealed that the international 
competitiveness of Croatian firms has been driven by cost reductions and 
improvements in labour productivity achieved through both short-run adjustments 
of firms within existing capacities and strategic restructuring whose outcomes are 
visible only in the long run, although we did also find weak evidence for the 
influence of the firms’ innovation activities. Taking variables reflecting the location 
of firms into account we found that export intensity of firms increases if they are 
located outside the main urban areas, in free trade zones and near the border with 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, all of which provide cost-based advantages. Contrary to 
the previous chapter, localisation and urbanisation economies (agglomeration 
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externalities) both have a positive influence on the export intensity of firms. This 
suggests that the sunk costs of exporting present a barrier for Croatian exporters 
which can be overcome through sharing the infrastructure and other relevant assets 
and benefiting from knowledge spillovers. 
 Having in mind the declining share of Croatian exports in the EU15 market 
and the prospects for an entry into the EU, the final empirical chapter examined the 
competitiveness of Croatian exports to the EU15 market. This analysis revealed that 
in the second decade of transition the market share of Croatian manufacturing 
sector in the EU15 market was gradually declining, mainly due to structural 
problems and declining competitiveness. However, it was shown that the structure 
of exported products underwent significant changes with respect to their 
technological intensity. While at one end the low technology intensive industries 
were losing competitiveness throughout the entire period, at the opposite end the 
competitiveness of the high technology intensive industries improved, resulting in 
increasing their market share. Yet, the examination of trade patterns between the 
two entities revealed that this exchange is mainly of inter-industry or vertical intra-
industry type. In other words, despite the shift towards industries of higher 
technological intensity Croatian producers continue to compete largely with simple 
standardised products using low prices as their main competitive advantage. As the 
last part of this investigation we examined how the quality of Croatian exports to 
EU15 market can be improved. It was shown that investment in new machinery and 
equipment, innovations, the pressure of imports on the domestic market and a 
stronger financial discipline have in both the short and long run positive effects on 
the relative sophistication of Croatian products.  
 Summarising these findings it is evident that the behaviour of firms in 
transition was marked by both defensive and strategic forms of restructuring. 
Although in the second decade of transition Croatia reached the standards of 
advanced CEECs in many respects, its firms have continued to compete in terms of 
prices which were identified as a pattern of firm behaviour with a low potential for 
growth. This highlights the need for policies which can assist these firms and 
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industries to improve the relative sophistication of their products and move 
towards the high quality segment of the market. However, before we discuss these 
recommendations, the next section will highlight main contributions to knowledge 
of this thesis.  
7.3. Main contributions to knowledge 
 This investigation has several contributions to the existing theoretical and 
empirical body of knowledge on competitiveness. Most of the scepticism towards 
and criticisms of, the use of the concept of competitiveness are rooted in the failure 
to recognise the complexity and the multidimensional nature of this concept. The 
contribution of the thesis in this field consists of analysing the major weaknesses of 
such treatment of competitiveness and of the development of a conceptual 
framework which takes into account interdependencies and complementarities 
between different dimensions of competitiveness. To this end, we have argued that 
the behaviour of firms affects their competitiveness and that of their industries 
which in turn determines the ability of their nations to grow and to provide own 
citizens with a better standard of living. At the same time, the economy-wide and 
industry level factors such as institutions, policies, external economies or inter-firm 
spillovers have important roles in shaping the ability of firms to compete. The 
relationships between these different dimensions of competitiveness are often not 
recognised or are not sufficiently emphasised and our work helps to fill this gap in 
the literature. 
 The discussion of the first two chapters highlighted the dynamic nature of 
competitiveness by demonstrating the relationship between the current 
competitiveness of firms and past levels, and identified several factors and forces 
such as ownership, the quality of management, industry-specific characteristics or 
institutions which may have an impact on both competitiveness and restructuring. 
While these issues of dynamics and endogeneity are well established and widely 
discussed in the theoretical literature from Austrian, evolutionary, endogenous 
growth and the resource-based schools, they have largely been neglected in the 
empirical work. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first study treating 
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competitiveness of firms or industries in transition in a dynamic framework while 
controlling for potential endogeneity of several forms of restructuring and firm-
specific heterogeneity at the same time, using the system GMM dynamic panel 
technique. In this respect, another contribution of this research, compared to the 
previously undertaken work, is that we bring together the operation of several 
different types of defensive and strategic restructuring (such as investment, 
innovations, human capital, labour productivity, unit labour and unit material costs) 
and observe their impact over the short and long (medium) run on the 
competitiveness of firms and industries.  
 A further contribution of this research to knowledge is its being one of initial 
attempts to examine the role of agglomeration externalities such as choice of 
location in large cities, proximity to the border, the proximity to other firms from 
the same and from other industries and the effects of specific government policies 
such as benefits offered to firms located in entrepreneurial and free trade zones. 
The importance of these factors and potential channels through which they affect 
competitiveness of firms have been widely discussed in non-transition countries 
(Fujita, 1988; Krugman, 1980; 1991; 1993; Venables, 1996; Hafner, 2008) but to the 
best of our knowledge, this was first attempt to address them in the context of 
transition. The inclusion of variables representing potential channels for knowledge 
and technology spillovers such as competition on the domestic and foreign markets, 
import penetration and intra-firm trade in the examination of the quality upgrading 
of exports has also not been previously analysed in context of the Croatian 
transition. 
 The final contribution of this thesis is its geographical and temporal 
coverage. Through a critical assessment of previous literature in first two chapters 
we came to the conclusion that the bulk of existing work, including even the most 
recent studies, address the behaviour of firms and industries in the first decade of 
transition. Our analysis goes beyond this literature by focusing on the second 
decade of transition when relatively normal conditions of a market economy 
prevails, covering the most recent period for which data was available. Furthermore 
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while the previous literature concentrated on advanced CEECs which joined the EU 
in 2004 and 2007 waves of accession, many aspects of competitiveness have 
remained uninvestigated for countries outside of this group. By focusing on Croatia 
our analysis has helped to fill at least part of this gap in the literature.   
7.4. Policy recommendations 
 Throughout the thesis the relationship between competitive profiles of firms 
and the ability of their nations to grow and to provide their citizens with better 
standard of living has been highlighted. It was stressed that quality-based 
competitiveness offers much better prospects for growth as sophisticated products 
can be more easily differentiated and bear higher value added. However, for most 
Croatian firms, the main source of competitiveness are the low costs and 
improvements in efficiency of labour which enable them to compete in terms of 
prices. The weakness of such behaviour, in addition to being associated with lower 
rates of growth, is that it can be pursued only for a limited period of time. With 
unchanged technology, prices cannot be reduced indefinitely and sooner or later 
technological shift must take place for firms to survive.  
 The above outline shows that one of most important issues for Croatian 
economy today is the identification of channels through which its firms can switch 
from price to quality-driven competitiveness. With this in mind our 
recommendations will primarily focus on measures which can facilitate such 
movement. Therefore attention should be paid to policies which can be designed by 
government as assistance in overcoming the potential barriers in this process and 
activities which need to be undertaken by firms as part of their strategic 
restructuring. In drawing these recommendations we will primarily rely on findings 
from previous chapters which will be related to the insights gained from the 
discussion of competitiveness of firms, industries and nations in a globalised world. 
These recommendations should be viewed as general guidelines for raising the 
prospects of Croatian economy in the light of its forthcoming membership in the 
European Union. 
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7.4.1. Recommendations for Croatian government 
 The empirical analysis demonstrated the discrepancy between the current 
behaviour of Croatian firms and measures which have to be undertaken in order to 
improve the relative sophistication, or quality, of their products. According to the 
results of Chapter Six, the key forms of restructuring underlying improvements in 
quality are innovations and investment in new technologies. This type of 
restructuring requires firms to acquire or develop specific knowledge and skills 
which often take the form of sunk costs and whose adoption depends on the 
absorptive capacity of firms and their access to finance. In this context, short and 
medium-run oriented government policies should be designed to stimulate 
innovative activity of firms by helping them to overcome previously mentioned 
barriers. In the long run, these measures should be complemented with policies 
aimed at improving the quality of institutions, infrastructure and the education 
system which should lay foundations for the development of knowledge-based 
economy. 
 In turbulent environment of transition firms may lack all information which 
are needed to make optimal choices. In such circumstances the experiences of 
other firms which have proven to be successful in similar circumstances may help to 
reduce the overall level of ignorance (Schumpeter, 1934; Schumpeter, 1942; Nelson 
and Winter, 1982; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Several 
studies mentioned in this thesis have made clear that the accession of CEECs to EU 
was accompanied with movement of their firms from price towards quality-driven 
competitiveness and have pointed to number of factors and forces which had 
impact on this change (Havlik, 2000; Kandogan, 2004; Benacek et al., 2006). The 
policies exercised by governments of other CEECs during their accession may help 
Croatian policy makers in their own efforts to create incentives for domestic 
producers to learn how to compete in quality. Furthermore, by pointing to 
experiences of firms in countries that already joined EU Croatian policy makers can 
help to reduce information asymmetries and raise awareness of domestic firms 
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about the need for movement from price towards quality-driven competitiveness 
and about the benefits that may arise from such change in competitive profile.  
 In order to overcome the above mentioned barriers, government policies 
should promote exchange of ideas and mutual sharing of infrastructure among 
firms which operate within the same industry or belong to same vertical chain. 
Chapter Five showed that in Croatia agglomeration externalities which include 
formal and informal inter-enterprise networks and cooperation with science and 
research community, positively affect the competitiveness of exporters. In this 
context, the creation of clusters which connect firms linked in horizontal and 
vertical chains to the science community under the government umbrella will be an 
important step stimulating innovation efforts through knowledge and cost sharing 
activities. Similar results can be achieved through free trade zones which create a 
pool of skill and expertise in one place, lower the administrative fees, tax and 
customs exemptions as well as facilitating cost-sharing and knowledge spillovers. 
However, we did not find any relationship between competitiveness of exporters 
and ‘entrepreneurial zones’, the second type of business zone in Croatia, which 
points to the need for the examination of the appropriateness of this type of policy.  
 The support for firms in moving from price to quality-driven competitiveness 
can come from science institutions such as universities or research laboratories. But 
the extent of such cooperation is currently fairly limited in Croatia where only about 
6% of the total R&D funding of higher education institutions comes from 
enterprises (DZS, 2010). These relationships can be strengthened through measures 
which must address both supply (science) and demand (firms) sides. On the supply 
side, it is important to increase the ability of scientific institutions to keep up to 
date with market requirements. Two main areas can be recommended for 
consideration in this respect: investment in improving the quality of human capital 
and increasing the government R&D expenditure which is currently below the EU27 
average in Croatia (Eurostat, 2009). However, these measures will not have effect 
unless firms are provided with the incentive to increase their R&D spending and to 
cooperate with science sector in Croatia. This stimulus can come from government 
Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
 
 205 
through the provision of financial amenities to firms linked to their innovation 
activities. Further incentives for collaboration between the science and business 
sectors can come in form of specialised agencies who would be responsible for 
investigating the needs of the business sector and putting firms in touch with 
research institutions that best suit their needs.  
 Some authors suggest that import penetration and foreign direct investment 
may facilitate quality upgrading of a nation’s products (Hoekman and Djankov, 
1997; Monfort et al., 2008; Amiti and Khandelwal, 2009). Given the openness of the 
Croatian economy, and the establishment of a positive relationship between foreign 
competitive pressure and quality upgrading of Croatian exporters in Chapter Six, the 
government should embark on measures directed at encouraging FDI. The 
development of a higher quality institutional framework, investment in 
infrastructure and the provision of financial amenities may raise attractiveness of 
Croatia to investors from developed economies and trigger horizontal and vertical 
spillovers for domestic producers. Also a stronger competitive pressure on price-
driven segments of the market from laggard transition economies and developing 
countries may act as incentive for Croatian firms to differentiate themselves and to 
move to the quality--driven segments of the market. In this context, policies aimed 
at strengthening trade relationships and attracting imports from above mentioned 
countries should be considered as a way of improving the quality-driven 
competitiveness. The evidence from developed market economies on producers 
moving to compete in terms of quality under the competitive pressure of low-cost 
imports speak in favour of such policy (Monfort et al., 2008).  
 The results from Chapters Four and Five suggest that most competitive 
Croatian firms are located outside large urban areas. The important precondition 
for stimulating innovation activities of these firms through knowledge sharing and 
spillovers is the development of infrastructure. During second decade of transition 
Croatian investment in infrastructure has mainly been concentrated in the 
development of transport infrastructure (mainly motorways) which provided firms 
with easier access to markets. However, taking into account Croatia’s determination 
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to become a knowledge-based economy, it is our belief that in future greater 
attention should be given to other types of infrastructure. To this end, the 
investment in telecommunications and information infrastructure should be 
pursued with stronger intensity than has been the case before.  
 In stimulating innovation activity and quality-driven competitiveness 
attention should also be given to the absorptive capacity of firms, i.e. their ability to 
acquire new knowledge and put it to best use. A potential channel for improving 
this capacity is investment in the quality of human capital. In Croatia, the general 
quality of human capital is less favourable than in other CEECs, manifested by the 
low proportion of highly educated persons, and the weak intensity of life-long 
learning (Sundac and Krmpotic, 2009). The starting point should therefore be the 
creation of measures that would raise the overall level of education in the country 
and promote life-long learning. Activities of the government should focus on 
increasing the rate of completion at higher education institutions and paying close 
attention to the future skill requirements. Also, as the changing environment 
requires individuals to continuously develop new skills in order to survive, future 
reforms of the education system should focus on developing the foundations for 
life-long learning. 
 Access to finance is also likely to be an important factor for the firms’ shift 
from one competitive profile to another. Our investigation in Chapter Six showed 
that, in the case of Croatia, the high level of debt of firms has an adverse effect on 
their quality upgrading. This suggests that the need to finance the firms’ current 
activities through external funds reduces amount of resources at their disposal for 
restructuring. The government assistance in this area can be provided through a 
system of subsidies. One channel could be the previously mentioned free-trade 
zones which, in addition to providing skills and knowledge, also offer to firms 
various types of financial amenities that would enable them to allocate additional 
funds to restructuring. Furthermore, subsidised loans, such are being provided by 
the Croatian government for some other activities, could be used to ease the 
financial pressure on restructuring firms. Finally, it is worth mentioning that at 
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present most of the direct and indirect subsidies in Croatia are directed to low 
technology intensive loss-making industries which compete in terms of prices. 
Taking into account the long history of subsidising these sectors and their failure to 
become viable, the existing criteria for the provision of subsidies should be 
reconsidered.  
7.4.2. Policies for improvements in firm behaviour 
 The success of the policies mentioned above depends on the ability of firms 
to acquire and implement new knowledge and put it to its best use. This implies 
that in order to succeed, technological innovations at firm level must be 
accompanied by organisational changes. For this reason, our policy 
recommendations for firms will mainly address their absorptive capacity. In addition 
to economy-wide measures presented above various strategies can be applied at 
the level of firms to improve this capacity. The central role in this process belongs to 
the quality of human capital. While government measures discussed in the previous 
section can help to improve its general level, firms must invest additional efforts in 
the development of specific skills and competencies. Some authors advocate the 
payment of above average wages (Solow, 1979; Weiss, 1980; Katz, 1986) or 
different forms of wage premiums which would be tied to employees’ efficiency 
and their ability of to meet the international standards of quality. However, our 
investigation in Chapters Five and Six has shown that in Croatia these measures 
negatively affect both the ability of firms to compete in prices and their quality 
upgrading. For this reason we recommend that improvements in the quality of 
human capital should take place through alternative mechanisms which are not 
related to payment scheme. In our view, attention should be given to investment in 
continuous education of employees and their on-the-job training.  
 Changes in organisational routines are strongly influenced by the quality of 
the firm’s management. As we demonstrated in Chapter Four, the effectiveness of 
decisions made by managers about costs, investment in new machinery and 
equipment or the productivity of labour positively affect the ability of their firms to 
compete. Equally important for the development of quality-driven competitiveness 
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is the ability of managers to create an environment within the organisation which 
would promote creativity and encourage the generation and diffusion of new ideas 
among employees (Tierney and Farmer, 2004). In addition to previously highlighted 
forms of restructuring such as continuous education and on-the-job training, this 
can be achieved through decentralisation of decision-making and the provision of 
greater autonomy to employees (Oldham and Cummings, 1996; Madjar et al., 2002; 
Nijhof et al., 2002; Dijk and Ende, 2002). We also think that firms can release 
additional human and technological capacities for innovations and quality 
upgrading by discontinuing their products with least market potential. Finally, the 
development of relations with external partners also depends on the quality of 
management. Bearing in mind how access to foreign technology was mentioned as 
important determinant of restructuring in our discussion in Chapter Two as well as 
in context of quality upgrading in Chapter Six, we recommend licensing of foreign 
technology as potential channel that can ease the movement of firms from one 
competitive profile to another. 
 In considering the mechanisms for improving the absorptive capacity of 
firms we should bear in mind two important issues. First, according to our analysis 
in Chapters Four and Five, competitiveness of firms in Croatia increases as they 
accumulate more experience which means that the development of skills and 
competencies and their implementation require time. Second, in pursuit of the 
above mentioned types of investment firms may be constrained by access to 
finance. From here it follows that young firms and start-ups as well as small and 
medium sized enterprises have a higher probability of facing obstacles in their 
movement towards quality-driven competitiveness. Therefore collaboration 
through networks of firms as well as cooperation between universities and research 
institutes on the one hand and business sectors on the other are strategies that 
should be implemented in order to overcome such barriers. We feel that the 
initiative for the creation of such networks should not come only from the 
government and supporting agencies but also from firms themselves which have a 
better knowledge of their own weaknesses and needs. The potential direction of 
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these initiatives could be towards the previously mentioned clusters as in Croatia 
these can also be founded on the basis of initiatives from business sector.  
 There is also a need to reconsider the financial behaviour of Croatian firms in 
the light of findings from Chapter Six about the negative relationship between 
borrowing and quality upgrading which imply that firms use funds which would 
otherwise be allocated to strategic restructuring to solve their liquidity problems. In 
their quality upgrading, Croatian firms should seek on non-conventional forms of 
financing such as changes in their governance structures through mergers with, or 
acquisitions by, foreign counterparts. These measures can help them to reduce the 
financial pressure they face and also may be valuable in overcoming many of the 
previously listed barriers to movement towards quality-driven competitiveness such 
as the acquisition of relevant knowledge, development of skills and competencies 
or access to new technology. Also, through intra-firm trade and the network of 
partners developed by the parent company, the creation of such structures can 
facilitate their positioning on international markets and lead to horizontal and 
vertical knowledge spillovers. Moreover, the prospects of forthcoming EU 
membership open up the possibility for firms to finance their quality upgrading 
through the EU structural funds on more favourable terms than conventional 
financial institutions.  
7.5. Limitations of research 
 Although our research offered several contributions to the existing body of 
knowledge on competitiveness, restructuring and firm behaviour in transition, we 
encountered several constraints throughout this research which can be considered 
as potential limitations of the investigation. These deficiencies have roots mainly in 
the lack of relevant data and the poor quality of available datasets. Here, we list the 
most important of these, explain their reasons and implications for the analyses in 
different chapters.  
 The quantitative analyses in our thesis have been undertaken using two 
main datasets: firm level data from Amadeus and industry-level database combined 
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from Eurostat and FINA. Our initial intention was to compare the behaviour of firms 
in Croatia with their counterparts from CEECs and SEECs which were once parts of 
the former Yugoslavia. However, in Chapter Four we had to limit ourselves only to 
the analysis of four CEECs. While for most of intended countries the data were not 
available or they could be obtained only for shorter time spans than the minimum 
requirement of dynamic panel methodology (4 years), in cases of Hungary and 
Slovenia we had to discard the datasets because of the high level of missing 
observations for several key variables of interest. In Chapters Five and Six we had to 
limit ourselves only to Croatian datasets. In Chapter Five this was caused by lack of 
data on exports for all other countries in the Amadeus database while in Chapter Six 
we could not obtain the industrial data needed to construct explanatory variables 
for other countries within the time frame and budget of this research. 
 The data on exports do not contain information about the destination of 
exported products which prevented us from constructing a measure of foreign 
market share in the firm level analyses. Additionally, we did not have data on 
imports or about the proportion of own value added to exported products. Our 
modelling approach to restructuring was based on quantitative indicators of firm 
behaviour. This was caused by the fact that longitudinal datasets containing 
qualitative indicators of this process do not exist. For this reason we could not 
include several important measures intended to reflect strategic restructuring such 
as provision of training, outsourcing of activities, licensing of technology, 
investment in quality certificates or the discontinuation of existing products which 
are otherwise available in cross-sectional datasets. In addition, we were constrained 
in modelling innovation activities of firms in two main areas. In Chapter Four we 
could not include any measure of innovation as for some CEECs these measures 
suffered from high rate of missing observations. In Chapter Five, we had to proxy 
innovations with intangible fixed assets which was the closest available measure. 
These problems were partially solved in Chapter Six where we had direct measure 
of innovation output in the form of patents, licences and development projects.  
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 Limitations were also present in modelling of firm and industry specific 
characteristics. This was particularly true for agglomeration externalities where we 
had to rely on a relatively broad measure constructed with the geographical 
proximity of firms within administrative regions instead of distinguishing between 
different types of these externalities such as inter-firm networks, access to 
infrastructure or collaboration between firms and the science sector. Similarly, the 
lack of data prevented us from controlling for several issues which have been 
identified in the transition literature as key factors underlying enterprise 
restructuring. Primarily this relates to different types of ownerships. Although the 
Amadeus database formally provides data on ownership we had to discard this 
variable as they were missing for more than two thirds of firms in all countries and 
contained no variation. Also, we could not obtain access to data on foreign direct 
investment at either firm or industry level. Nevertheless, in Chapter Six we included 
a measure intended to control for intra-firm trade although we were not able to 
distinguish between firms which are subsidiaries of foreign companies and firms 
which have their own subsidiaries abroad.  
To sum up, data limitations have constrained the scope of our analysis and 
resulted in a   reduction in the number of areas which we planned to cover in this 
investigation. 
7.6. Directions for further research  
 As one of the first quantitative investigations on the competitiveness of 
Croatian firms and industries with an emphasis on their restructuring, we have 
addressed several important issues which deserve to be explored in more detail.  
Here, some of the most important areas which, together with the gaps mentioned 
in the previous section, need to be considered by researchers in the forthcoming 
period. 
 Having in mind the central role of innovations in shaping quality-driven 
competitiveness, the determinants of the innovation process among Croatian firms 
is an interesting related area of study. Recent trends in the innovation literature 
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(Crepon et al., 1998; Loof and Heshmati, 2006; Hashi and Stojcic, 2010) highlight the 
need to emphasise different stages of this process starting from the decision of 
firms to innovate to factors and forces which affect the amount of innovation 
expenditure, the transformation of innovation input into innovation output, and the 
impact of innovations on the performance and competitiveness of firms. This type 
of research should compare the behaviour of Croatian firms with that of CEECs and 
West European market economies. The Community Innovation Survey datasets, 
which since recently also include Croatia, may be used as the basis for this type of 
investigation. 
 Another area needing further examination concerns the identification of 
agglomeration externalities. In deeper analysis of these issues we were constrained 
by the lack of relevant data. In this context, the creation of inter-enterprise 
networks and their implications for competitiveness of firms on both domestic and 
foreign markets are interesting areas of research. In addition, the role of investment 
in infrastructure and science, areas which have received much attention in Croatia 
recently, and their impact on competitiveness of exporters should be given 
attention. Finally, we consider that knowledge spillovers particularly those coming 
from import competition and foreign-owned companies deserve greater attention 
as the existing body of knowledge suggests that under different conditions the 
pressure of foreign competition may yield diverse effects on the competitiveness of 
domestic firms. In this context it seems interesting to observe whether outcomes 
from the interaction with foreign rivals differ in the short and long run. 
 The competitiveness of Croatian firms and industries could be placed in the 
context of the discussion of quality of the institutions. For the purpose of this 
investigation we have addressed several main areas of transitional reforms. 
Nevertheless, it might be worth examining the perception of firms about the 
importance of the quality of their socio-economic framework and investigate how 
common barriers which they encounter in everyday activities such as efficiency of 
the judicial system, the existing legislation, corruption as well as various fiscal and 
monetary policies affect their ability to compete. Finally, as the whole interest in 
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competitiveness rests on the relationship between competitive profiles of firms and 
economic growth of their nations, future researchers should pay attention to this 
relationship linking the performance of firms on domestic and foreign markets with 
their nation’s macroeconomic performance. It is our hope that the results of 
investigations in these directions will complement findings and recommendations of 
our thesis in providing a way of increasing the ability of Croatia to provide its 
citizens with better standard of living.  
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Appendix I: Supplement to Chapter One 
Table A1.1: The Global Competitiveness Index 2009/2010 rankings and 2009/2008 comparisons 
Country/  
Economy 
GCI 
2010
/ 
2009 
GCI 
2009/
2008 
Country/ 
Economy 
GCI 
2010
/ 
2009 
GCI 
2009
/200
8 
Country/ 
Economy 
GCI 
2010
/200
9 
GCI 
2009
/200
8 
Switzerland 1 2 Slovak Republic 47 46 Serbia 93 85 
United States 2 1 Italy 48 49 Syria 94 78 
Singapore 3 5 India 49 50 Dominican 
Republic 
95 98 
Sweden 4 4 Jordan 50 48 Albania 96 108 
Denmark 5 3 Azerbaijan 51 69 Armenia 97 97 
Finland 6 6 Malta 52 52 Kenya 98 93 
Germany 7 7 Lithuania 53 44 Nigeria 99 94 
Japan 8 9 Indonesia 54 55 Tanzania 100 113 
Canada 9 10 Costa Rica 55 59 Pakistan 101 101 
Netherlands 10 8 Brazil 56 64 Suriname 102 103 
Hong Kong SAR 11 11 Mauritius 57 57 Benin 103 106 
Taiwan, China 12 17 Hungary 58 62 Guyana 104 115 
United Kingdom 13 12 Panama 59 58 Ecuador 105 104 
Norway 14 15 Mexico 60 60 Bangladesh 106 111 
Australia 15 18 Turkey 61 63 Lesotho 107 123 
France 16 16 Montenegro 62 65 Uganda 108 128 
Austria 17 14 Russian 
Federation 
63 51 Bosnia/Herzegovi
na 
109 107 
Belgium 18 19 Romania 64 68 Cambodia 110 109 
Korea Rep. 19 13 Uruguay 65 75 Cameroon 111 114 
New Zealand 20 24 Botswana 66 56 Zambia 112 112 
Luxembourg 21 25 Kazakhstan 67 66 Venezuela 113 105 
Qatar 22 26 Latvia 68 54 Ghana 114 102 
UAE 23 31 Colombia 69 74 Nicaragua 115 120 
Malaysia 24 21 Egypt 70 81 Cote d’Ivoire 116 110 
Ireland 25 22 Greece 71 67 Mongolia 117 100 
Iceland 26 20 Croatia 72 61 Ethiopia 118 121 
Israel 27 23 Morocco 73 73 Malawi 119 119 
Saudi Arabia 28 27 Namibia 74 80 Bolivia 120 118 
China 29 30 Vietnam 75 70 Madagascar 121 125 
Chile 30 28 Bulgaria 76 76 Tajikistan 122 116 
Czech Republic 31 33 El Salvador 77 79 Kyrgyz Republic 123 122 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
32 39 Peru 78 83 Paraguay 124 124 
Spain 33 29 Sri Lanka 79 77 Nepal 125 126 
Cyprus 34 40 Guatemala 80 84 Timor-Leste 126 129 
Estonia 35 32 Gambia, The 81 87 Mauritania 127 131 
Thailand 36 34 Ukraine 82 72 Burkina Faso 128 127 
Slovenia 37 42 Algeria 83 99 Mozambique 129 130 
Bahrain 38 37 Macedonia, FYR 84 89 Mali 130 117 
Kuwait 39 35 Argentina 85 88 Chad 131 134 
Tunisia 40 36 Trin. and Tobago 86 92 Zimbabwe 132 133 
Oman 41 38 Philippines 87 71 Burundi 133 132 
Puerto Rico 42 41 Libya 88 91    
Portugal 43 43 Honduras 89 82    
Barbados 44 47 Georgia 90 90    
South Africa 45 45 Jamaica 91 86    
Poland 46 53 Senegal 92 96    
Source: WEF, 2009 
The 2009/2008 rank is out of 134 countries. One country covered in 2008 report, Moldova, had to be 
excluded in 2009 due to the lack of Survey data. 
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Appendix II: Supplement to Chapter Two 
Table A2.1: EBRD Transition indicators methodology 
Price liberalisation 
1 Most prices formally controlled by the government. 
2 Some lifting of price administration; state procurement at non-market prices for the majority of product categories. 
3 Significant progress on price liberalisation, but state procurement at non-market prices remains substantial. 
4 Comprehensive price liberalisation; state procurement at non-market prices largely phased out; only a small number of administered prices remain. 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: complete price liberalisation with no price control outside housing, transport and natural monopolies. 
External trade liberalisation 
1 Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate access to foreign exchange. 
2 Some liberalisation of import and/or export controls; almost full current account convertibility in 
principle, but with a foreign exchange regime that is not fully transparent (possibly with multiple 
exchange rates). 
3 Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions; almost full 
current account convertibility. 
4 Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions (apart from agriculture) 
and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct involvement in exports and imports by ministries 
and state-owned trading companies; no major non-uniformity of customs duties for non-agricultural 
goods and services; full and current account convertibility. 
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: removal of most tariff barriers; 
membership in WTO. 
Large-scale privatisation 
1 Little private ownership. 
2 Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed. 
3 
More than 25 per cent of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the process of being 
privatised (with the process having reached a stage at which the state has effectively ceded its 
ownership rights), but possibly with major unresolved issues regarding corporate governance. 
4 More than 50 per cent of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private ownership and significant progress with corporate governance of these enterprises 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: more than 75 per cent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate governance. 
Small-scale privatisation 
1 Little progress. 
2 Substantial share privatised. 
3 Comprehensive programme almost ready for implementation. 
4 Complete privatisation of small companies with tradable ownership rights. 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: no state ownership of small enterprises; effective tradability of land. 
Banking sector reform 
1 Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system. 
2 Significant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of directed credit or interest rate ceilings. 
3 
Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for prudential supervision 
and regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little preferential access to cheap refinancing; 
significant lending to private enterprises and significant presence of private banks. 
4 
Significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards; well-functioning banking 
competition and effective prudential supervision; significant term lending to private enterprises; 
substantial financial deepening. 
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set of competitive banking services. 
Non-banking financial sector reform 
1 Little progress. 
2 
Formation of securities exchanges, market-makers and brokers; some trading in government paper 
and/or securities; rudimentary legal and regulatory framework for the issuance and trading of 
securities. 
3 
Substantial issuance of securities by private enterprises; establishment of independent share registries, 
secure clearance and settlement procedures, and some protection of minority shareholders; 
emergence of non-bank financial institutions (for example, investment funds, private insurance and 
pension funds, leasing companies) and associated regulatory framework. 
4 Securities laws and regulations approaching IOSCO standards; substantial market liquidity and capitalisation; well-functioning non-bank financial institutions and effective regulation. 
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full convergence of securities laws and regulations with IOSCO standards; fully developed non-bank intermediation.  
Source: EBRD, 2010 
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Appendix III: Supplement to Chapter Three 
Table A3.1: Main trading partners of Croatia 1995-2007 
(in % according to 2007 rankings) 
Exports Imports 
Country 1995 2000 2007 Country 1995 2000 2007 
Italy 23,71 22.34 18.78 Italy 18.19 16.61 16.05 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 8.27 11.17 14.19 Germany 20.09 16.44 14.40 
Germany 21.52 14.26 9.84 Russian Federation 2.09 8.52 10.16 
Slovenia 13.12 10.83 8.13 Slovenia 10.72 7.94 5.94 
Austria 4.32 6.60 6.02 Austria 7.65 6.70 5.29 
Serbia n/a 2.42a 5.29 France 2.51 5.53 3.61 
France 2.42 2.84 2.19 Hungary 2.10 2.33 2.93 
Hungary 1.53 1.35 2.15 Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.12 1.03 2.84 
United Kingdom 1.24 1.72 1.91 Czech Republic 1.96 2.27 2.16 
Russian Federation 3.28 1.28 1.25 Poland 0.60 1.19 1.96 
Source: IMF DOTS Database 
aData for Serbia for 2000 refer to Serbia and Montenegro  
 
 
Table A3.2: Classification of manufacturing industries based on technology intensity 
 NACE rev.1.1 
High-technology intensive industries  
Aircraft and spacecraft 353 
Pharmaceuticals 2423 
Office, accounting and computing machinery 30 
Radio, TV and communications equipment 32 
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 
Medium-high technology intensive industries  
Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 31 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 
Chemicals, excluding pharmaceuticals 24 excl. 2423 
Railroad equipment and transport equipment, n.e.c. 352+354+355 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 29 
Medium-low technology intensive industries  
Building and repairing of ships and boats 351 
Rubber and plastics products 25 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23 
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 27-28 
Low-technology intensive industries  
Manufacturing, n.e.c.; Recycling  36-37 
Wood, pulp, paper, paper products, printing and 
publishing 
20-22 
Food products, beverages and tobacco 15-16 
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 17-19 
        Source: OECD, 2007 
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Appendix IV: Supplement to Chapter Four 
 Table A4.1: Number of observations for dataset in Chapter Four 
 Croatia Czech Republic Poland Slovak Republic Bulgaria 
2000 2258 296 992  966 
2001 2392 1116 1364 68 1057 
2002 2484 1970 1938 247 946 
2003 2652 2732 2257 447 979 
2004 2756 3855 2902 664 1050 
2005 2774 4041 3172 743 1108 
2006 2763 3863 4268 662 1099 
2007 2706 671   207 
 
 Table A4.2:Descriptive statistics for categorical variables used in models of Chapter Four 
 Croatia Czech Republic Poland Slovak Republic Bulgaria 
 0(%) 1(%) 0(%) 1(%) 0(%) 1(%) 0(%) 1(%) 0(%) 1(%) 
Lgcit      
2000 60.36 39.64 79.39 20.61 61.79 38.21   38.82 61.18 
2001 60.45 39.55 80.20 19.80 62.46 37.54 91.18 8.82 37.18 62.82 
2002 62.36 37.64 80.20 19.80 62.07 37.93 89.07 10.93 32.56 67.44 
2003 63.01 36.99 78.81 21.19 61.72 38.28 87.70 12.30 30.85 69.15 
2004 63.35 36.65 77.56 22.44 61.20 38.80 87.65 12.35 30.57 69.43 
2005 63.34 36.66 78.59 21.41 60.84 39.16 87.48 12.52 30.14 69.86 
2006 63.52 36.48 79.65 20.35 61.69 38.31 87.76 12.24 30.30 69.70 
2007 63.30 36.70 82.12 17.88     49.76 50.24 
Mlow      
2000 70.64 29.36 72.64 27.36 71.27 28.73   80.33 19.67 
2001 70.48 29.52 68.64 31.36 72.36 27.64 77.94 22.06 79.75 20.25 
2002 69.89 30.11 67.61 32.39 71.83 28.17 74.09 25.91 80.13 19.87 
2003 69.42 30.58 67.86 32.14 70.49 29.51 73.60 26.40 79.98 20.02 
2004 69.19 30.81 66.85 33.15 70.71 29.29 71.54 28.46 78.86 21.14 
2005 68.85 31.15 65.43 34.57 70.33 29.67 69.85 30.15 78.97 21.03 
2006 69.31 30.69 66.01 33.99 70.45 29.55 69.18 30.82 76.80 23.20 
2007 68.77 31.23 64.38 35.62     74.88 25.12 
Mhigh      
2000 83.53 16.47 75.34 24.66 76.31 23.69   77.54 22.46 
2001 84.11 15.89 74.64 25.36 78.08 21.92 77.94 22.06 78.24 21.76 
2002 84.26 15.74 73.40 26.60 78.64 21.36 75.30 24.70 77.59 22.41 
2003 84.39 15.61 72.84 27.16 78.25 21.75 75.39 24.61 77.63 22.37 
2004 84.43 15.57 74.06 25.94 78.39 21.61 75.30 24.70 78.19 21.81 
2005 84.25 15.75 74.73 25.27 78.91 21.09 74.29 25.71 78.34 21.66 
2006 83.86 16.14 73.54 26.46 79.01 20.99 74.62 25.38 78.62 21.38 
2007 83.56 16.44 72.13 27.87     81.16 18.84 
High      
2000 90.74 9.26 95.27 4.73 94.86 5.14   92.86 7.14 
2001 90.97 9.03 94.27 5.73 95.01 4.99 94.12 5.88 92.43 7.57 
2002 90.98 9.02 94.82 5.18 94.22 5.78 94.74 5.26 92.07 7.93 
2003 91.63 8.37 94.07 5.93 94.82 5.18 93.74 6.26 91.73 8.27 
2004 91.47 8.53 93.64 6.36 94.76 5.24 93.98 6.02 92.19 7.81 
2005 91.71 8.29 94.14 5.86 94.58 5.42 94.62 5.38 92.96 7.04 
2006 91.78 8.22 94.12 5.88 94.70 5.30 94.86 5.14 92.36 7.64 
2007 91.94 8.06 94.49 5.51     95.65 4.35 
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 Table A4.3:Descriptive statistics for continuous variables used in models of Chapter Four 
 Croatia Czech Republic Poland Slovak Republic Bulgaria Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Mshare           
2000 0.08 0.19 0.14 0.23 0.15 0.22   0.19 0.26 
2001 0.08 0.19 0.10 0.18 0.12 0.20 0.37 0.36 0.17 0.25 
2002 0.08 0.19 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.35 0.35 0.19 0.26 
2003 0.08 0.19 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.17 0.27 0.31 0.17 0.25 
2004 0.08 0.19 0.05 0.13 0.08 0.16 0.23 0.29 0.16 0.24 
2005 0.08 0.19 0.04 0.12 0.07 0.15 0.23 0.29 0.15 0.23 
2006 0.08 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.12 0.25 0.30 0.16 0.24 
2007 0.08 0.19 0.24 0.31     0.54 0.38 
Labprod           
2000 67 102 112 668 80 150   39 229 
2001 73 91 76 152 93 193 185 1067 38 115 
2002 72 100 88 417 85 212 156 969 39 91 
2003 72 88 107 427 75 149 208 1066 55 198 
2004 73 93 85 308 97 210 418 3648 70 439 
2005 81 140 86 183 109 393 98 247 67 328 
2006 90 158 94 198 121 243 135 461 58 127 
2007 94 166 108 189     104 366 
Invprod           
2000 -11 309 -2 371 39 622   8 393 
2001 -14 213 87 655 -36 948 17 277 -2 320 
2002 -15 227 -10 957 -23 551 39 681 4 259 
2003 -15 374 -30 450 -31 439 -16 397 -30 390 
2004 -16 308 12 647 -21 2871 61 740 3 620 
2005 4 401 -4 570 15 663 -9 379 3 561 
2006 -16 411 -12 1087 -26 1034 28 494 -31 452 
2007 3 519 46 1010     20 257 
Turn*           
2000 3692 42103 15919 30487 19153 69424   3191 7341 
2001 4151 41664 16230 50947 17787 54148 9848 19182 3335 7596 
2002 4281 37062 15876 112402 14026 44593 13024 29506 3592 7890 
2003 4355 37136 14421 98305 11370 41552 13126 31440 3822 8607 
2004 4639 41933 14060 99151 14037 60806 12846 32712 4174 9201 
2005 5863 55647 11329 50196 15131 61613 13263 32163 4774 10611 
2006 6043 58076 14167 58248 14566 69055 12814 23674 5863 13170 
2007 6553 62493 18266 49896     9966 16683 
Tfas**           
2000 2171 23326 6581 17308 5715 21373   1541 4654 
2001 2246 20473 5890 24309 5207 15902 2227 6039 1620 4899 
2002 2239 18693 6052 38396 4300 14442 4990 16242 1916 5682 
2003 2192 18330 5102 32049 3161 12121 4799 14920 2104 6440 
2004 2328 19897 4620 28903 3519 13917 5053 21051 2072 6321 
2005 2886 29220 3425 16962 4031 15619 5122 20218 2150 6515 
2006 2878 30981 4325 19226 3652 15107 4446 12589 2448 7169 
2007 3037 34416 6067 22964     4970 12364 
Ulc           
2000 0.20 0.48 0.21 0.15 0.18 0.12   0.20 0.19 
2001 0.20 0.56 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.14 0.25 0.16 0.18 0.18 
2002 0.22 0.81 0.27 1.62 0.18 0.16 0.23 0.15 0.18 0.18 
2003 0.22 0.57 0.24 0.36 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.19 0.60 
2004 0.23 0.52 1.56 82.78 0.16 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.17 
2005 0.26 1.24 0.23 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.17 
2006 0.26 1.13 0.23 0.34 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.20 
2007 0.23 0.59 0.22 0.16     0.13 0.12 
(continued on next page) 
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 Croatia Czech Republic Poland Slovak Republic Bulgaria Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Umc           
2000 0.68 0.39 0.48 0.19 0.52 0.29   0.43 0.27 
2001 0.69 0.68 0.50 0.67 0.51 0.23 0.48 0.24 0.43 0.33 
2002 0.68 0.64 0.65 8.57 0.56 0.77 0.48 0.24 0.42 0.26 
2003 0.67 0.37 0.45 0.28 0.55 0.26 0.48 0.22 0.43 0.70 
2004 0.71 0.97 3.39 183.32 0.56 0.21 0.47 0.22 0.41 0.27 
2005 0.69 0.60 0.44 0.28 0.56 0.21 0.47 0.22 0.42 0.28 
2006 0.72 1.73 0.44 0.28 0.56 0.21 0.48 0.23 0.42 0.29 
2007 0.69 0.70 0.46 0.20     0.50 0.24 
Urbef           
2000 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.05   0.30 0.30 
2001 0.22 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.03 0.30 0.30 
2002 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.39 0.35 
2003 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.41 0.34 
2004 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.39 0.34 
2005 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.13 0.03 0.39 0.33 
2006 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.40 0.35 
2007 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.08     0.15 0.06 
Locef           
2000 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02   0.02 0.03 
2001 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 
2002 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
2003 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
2004 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 
2005 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 
2006 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 
2007 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02     0.05 0.07 
Age           
2000 14 20 7 4 25 33   20 23 
2001 15 21 8 5 24 30 7 5 20 23 
2002 16 22 9 4 20 26 10 9 20 24 
2003 17 22 9 4 19 25 10 8 20 23 
2004 17 21 10 5 18 24 11 7 19 22 
2005 18 21 10 5 18 23 11 7 19 22 
2006 18 21 11 5 17 21 12 8 20 22 
2007 19 20 12 5     23 25 
 *Turn refers to turnover of firm used to construct its productivity of investment 
 **Tfas refers to tangible fixed assets of firm used to construct its productivity of investment 
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 Table A4.4:Correlation among variables used in models of Chapter Four 
Croatia 
 
Czech 
Republi
c 
 
          (continued on next page) 
 
 
         yr9    -0.1480  -0.1512  -0.1518  -0.1515   1.0000
         yr8    -0.1498  -0.1531  -0.1536   1.0000
         yr7    -0.1501  -0.1534   1.0000
         yr6    -0.1496   1.0000
         yr5     1.0000
                                                           
                    yr5      yr6      yr7      yr8      yr9
         yr9     0.0054  -0.0070  -0.0109  -0.0073   0.0327  -0.1395  -0.1425
         yr8     0.0021  -0.0049  -0.0128  -0.0130   0.0274  -0.1412  -0.1443
         yr7    -0.0020  -0.0038  -0.0131  -0.0079   0.0188  -0.1415  -0.1446
         yr6    -0.0040  -0.0005  -0.0104  -0.0077   0.0075  -0.1410  -0.1440
         yr5    -0.0035  -0.0027  -0.0024  -0.0030  -0.0022  -0.1380  -0.1409
         yr4    -0.0020   0.0060   0.0063   0.0075  -0.0121  -0.1329   1.0000
         yr3    -0.0006   0.0060   0.0189   0.0150  -0.0274   1.0000
         AGE     0.0064  -0.0468  -0.0297  -0.0496   1.0000
       LOCEF    -0.2089   0.0601  -0.2159   1.0000
       URBEF     0.0613   0.1247   1.0000
        high    -0.1333   1.0000
       mhigh     1.0000
                                                                             
                  mhigh     high    URBEF    LOCEF      AGE      yr3      yr4
         yr9     0.0043   0.0136   0.0493   0.0027  -0.0005  -0.0058   0.0063
         yr8    -0.0052  -0.0061   0.0355   0.0165   0.0130  -0.0078   0.0017
         yr7    -0.0045   0.0142   0.0100   0.0135  -0.0002  -0.0065   0.0057
         yr6    -0.0031  -0.0065  -0.0171   0.0000   0.0071  -0.0064   0.0027
         yr5     0.0003  -0.0056  -0.0204  -0.0038  -0.0100  -0.0037   0.0010
         yr4     0.0040  -0.0050  -0.0190  -0.0038  -0.0045   0.0012  -0.0027
         yr3     0.0034  -0.0043  -0.0149  -0.0146  -0.0011   0.0156  -0.0075
         AGE     0.2621   0.0054  -0.0634   0.0557   0.0290   0.0316  -0.0257
       LOCEF    -0.1991   0.0020  -0.0368   0.0194  -0.0139  -0.1115   0.0257
       URBEF    -0.0348  -0.0033   0.1083  -0.0368  -0.0027   0.5667  -0.0790
        high    -0.0599  -0.0108   0.0762  -0.0141  -0.0192   0.1607  -0.2026
       mhigh     0.0645  -0.0169   0.0433  -0.0124  -0.0120   0.0551  -0.2884
        mlow    -0.0314   0.0130  -0.0158  -0.0148   0.0025  -0.1387   1.0000
       lgcit    -0.0294  -0.0042   0.0849  -0.0093  -0.0102   1.0000
         UMC     0.0018   0.0020   0.0345   0.6323   1.0000
         ULC    -0.0219   0.0007  -0.0967   1.0000
     LABPROD     0.0861  -0.0146   1.0000
     INVPROD     0.0077   1.0000
      MSHARE     1.0000
                                                                             
                 MSHARE  INVPROD  LABPROD      ULC      UMC    lgcit     mlow
         yr9    -0.0805  -0.0993  -0.1023  -0.0994   1.0000
         yr8    -0.2132  -0.2628  -0.2708   1.0000
         yr7    -0.2194  -0.2704   1.0000
         yr6    -0.2129   1.0000
         yr5     1.0000
                                                           
                    yr5      yr6      yr7      yr8      yr9
                                                            
         yr9     0.0075  -0.0029   0.0210   0.0739   0.1018  -0.0490  -0.0668
         yr8     0.0034   0.0002   0.0023   0.0329   0.1058  -0.1298  -0.1768
         yr7    -0.0108  -0.0001   0.0027   0.0124   0.0315  -0.1336  -0.1820
         yr6    -0.0026   0.0106  -0.0010  -0.0162  -0.0154  -0.1296  -0.1766
         yr5     0.0094   0.0011  -0.0105  -0.0333  -0.0355  -0.1052  -0.1433
         yr4     0.0034  -0.0101  -0.0143  -0.0332  -0.0840  -0.0872   1.0000
         yr3    -0.0046  -0.0014   0.0098  -0.0148  -0.0913   1.0000
         AGE     0.0134   0.0232   0.0043  -0.0864   1.0000
       LOCEF    -0.0929  -0.0395  -0.1019   1.0000
       URBEF    -0.0083  -0.0280   1.0000
        high    -0.1486   1.0000
       mhigh     1.0000
                                                                             
                  mhigh     high    URBEF    LOCEF      AGE      yr3      yr4
                                                                              
         yr9     0.2139   0.0001   0.0114   0.0110  -0.0015  -0.0146   0.0096
         yr8    -0.0401  -0.0516  -0.0085   0.0044  -0.0039  -0.0077   0.0076
         yr7    -0.0760  -0.0658  -0.0032  -0.0100  -0.0040   0.0058   0.0143
         yr6    -0.0498  -0.0247   0.0079  -0.0113   0.0142   0.0186  -0.0015
         yr5    -0.0053   0.0286  -0.0165   0.0221  -0.0032   0.0024  -0.0102
         yr4     0.0291   0.0601  -0.0048  -0.0035  -0.0018  -0.0099  -0.0066
         yr3     0.0537   0.0803   0.0287  -0.0126  -0.0018  -0.0072  -0.0104
         AGE     0.0544   0.0312  -0.0018  -0.0681  -0.0126   0.0045  -0.0749
       LOCEF    -0.2011  -0.2128  -0.0064  -0.0094  -0.0045   0.0626   0.2074
       URBEF    -0.0225  -0.0295  -0.0010  -0.0334  -0.0029  -0.1689   0.0244
        high    -0.0175  -0.0164  -0.0063  -0.0126  -0.0021   0.0896  -0.1764
       mhigh    -0.0445  -0.0457   0.0157   0.0065   0.0122   0.0160  -0.4206
        mlow    -0.0271  -0.0271  -0.0006   0.0112  -0.0048  -0.0394   1.0000
       lgcit     0.0219   0.0288  -0.0128   0.0614  -0.0043   1.0000
         UMC    -0.0031  -0.0031   0.0000  -0.0023   1.0000
     LABPROD     0.0892   0.0713  -0.0018   1.0000
     INVPROD     0.0109   0.0086   1.0000
         L1.     0.8752   1.0000
         --.     1.0000
      MSHARE  
                                                                             
                 MSHARE   MSHARE  INVPROD  LABPROD      UMC    lgcit     mlow
                               L.                                             
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Poland 
 
Slovak 
Republi
c 
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         yr8    -0.2118  -0.2312  -0.2684  -0.2835   1.0000
         yr7    -0.1750  -0.1910  -0.2217   1.0000
         yr6    -0.1657  -0.1808   1.0000
         yr5    -0.1427   1.0000
         yr4     1.0000
                                                           
                    yr4      yr5      yr6      yr7      yr8
                                                            
         yr8     0.0045  -0.0069  -0.0004  -0.0489  -0.0287  -0.1252  -0.1678
         yr7     0.0052  -0.0047   0.0025  -0.0170   0.0570  -0.0497  -0.1386
         yr6     0.0010   0.0018  -0.0020  -0.0132  -0.0050   0.0046  -0.1312
         yr5     0.0030   0.0028  -0.0028  -0.0029  -0.0115   0.0221  -0.1130
         yr4    -0.0078  -0.0003   0.0062   0.0184   0.0045   0.0643  -0.1035
         yr3    -0.0078   0.0028  -0.0022   0.0503  -0.0124   0.0889   1.0000
       LOCEF     0.0520  -0.1145  -0.0917  -0.0336  -0.2279   1.0000
       URBEF    -0.0763   0.0271   0.0657  -0.0258   1.0000
         AGE    -0.0589   0.0311   0.0055   1.0000
        high    -0.1521  -0.1238   1.0000
       mhigh    -0.3358   1.0000
        mlow     1.0000
                                                                             
                   mlow    mhigh     high      AGE    URBEF    LOCEF      yr3
                                                                              
         yr8    -0.1046  -0.0917  -0.0046   0.0478  -0.0093   0.0061  -0.0014
         yr7    -0.0326  -0.0351   0.0105   0.0163  -0.0303   0.0109   0.0072
         yr6    -0.0086  -0.0227  -0.0022  -0.0044  -0.0200   0.0044   0.0031
         yr5     0.0220   0.0129  -0.0047  -0.0387   0.0068  -0.0112  -0.0014
         yr4     0.0369   0.0379  -0.0024  -0.0214   0.0323   0.0004  -0.0042
         yr3     0.0669   0.0742  -0.0036  -0.0056   0.0299  -0.0155  -0.0025
       LOCEF    -0.2255  -0.2287   0.0010  -0.0480  -0.0098   0.0299  -0.0410
       URBEF     0.0137   0.0132  -0.0104   0.0673  -0.0121  -0.0064   0.0275
         AGE     0.0894   0.0906   0.0014  -0.0426   0.1092  -0.0426   0.0012
        high    -0.0001  -0.0014   0.0051   0.0075   0.0668  -0.0628   0.1230
       mhigh     0.0066   0.0024  -0.0109  -0.0115   0.0627  -0.0335   0.0716
        mlow     0.0031   0.0029   0.0083  -0.0035  -0.0268  -0.0050  -0.0179
       lgcit     0.0265   0.0294  -0.0198   0.0435   0.0725  -0.1266   1.0000
         UMC     0.0144   0.0095  -0.0059   0.0952  -0.2671   1.0000
         ULC    -0.0961  -0.0789   0.0041  -0.1861   1.0000
     LABPROD     0.1004   0.0903  -0.0729   1.0000
     INVPROD     0.0044   0.0013   1.0000
         L1.     0.9360   1.0000
         --.     1.0000
      MSHARE  
                                                                             
                 MSHARE   MSHARE  INVPROD  LABPROD      ULC      UMC    lgcit
                               L.                                             
         yr7    -0.2584  -0.3304   1.0000
         yr6    -0.2398   1.0000
         yr5     1.0000
                                         
                    yr5      yr6      yr7
                                          
         yr7     0.0183   0.0090  -0.0052   0.0360  -0.0207  -0.0336  -0.1845
         yr6    -0.0037  -0.0045   0.0106  -0.0276  -0.0158  -0.0468  -0.1712
         yr5    -0.0226  -0.0044   0.0128  -0.0575   0.0032   0.0108  -0.1339
         yr4    -0.0195  -0.0025  -0.0043  -0.0581   0.0434   0.0986   1.0000
       LOCEF     0.1468  -0.0574  -0.0344   0.0588   0.0060   1.0000
       URBEF    -0.0010   0.0792  -0.0357  -0.0359   1.0000
         AGE     0.0064  -0.0386  -0.0195   1.0000
        high    -0.1545  -0.1406   1.0000
       mhigh    -0.3674   1.0000
        mlow     1.0000
                                                                             
                   mlow    mhigh     high      AGE    URBEF    LOCEF      yr4
                                                                              
         yr7    -0.0465  -0.0767  -0.0317  -0.0346  -0.0169  -0.0149   0.0066
         yr6    -0.0417  -0.0200   0.0420   0.0628   0.0065  -0.0059   0.0033
         yr5     0.0172   0.0837  -0.0285   0.0004   0.0172   0.0095   0.0020
         yr4     0.0962   0.1164   0.0112  -0.0083   0.0102   0.0106  -0.0116
       LOCEF    -0.3145  -0.3091  -0.0103  -0.0209   0.1342  -0.1147  -0.0202
       URBEF    -0.0633  -0.0517   0.0087  -0.0057   0.0439  -0.0446  -0.3421
         AGE     0.0291   0.0230  -0.0125  -0.0532   0.1743  -0.0092   0.0185
        high     0.0136   0.0264   0.0140  -0.0145   0.0605  -0.0717   0.1168
       mhigh    -0.0735  -0.0774  -0.0091   0.0341   0.0143  -0.0088  -0.0429
        mlow     0.0195   0.0239   0.0049  -0.0156  -0.0727   0.0020  -0.0309
       lgcit     0.0629   0.0649  -0.0029  -0.0095  -0.0116  -0.0926   1.0000
         UMC     0.1449   0.1495  -0.0065   0.0113  -0.2753   1.0000
         ULC    -0.1922  -0.1744  -0.0080  -0.0579   1.0000
     LABPROD     0.0239   0.0168  -0.0318   1.0000
     INVPROD     0.0221   0.0194   1.0000
         L1.     0.9200   1.0000
         --.     1.0000
      MSHARE  
                                                                             
                 MSHARE   MSHARE  INVPROD  LABPROD      ULC      UMC    lgcit
                               L.                                             
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Bulgaria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         yr9    -0.0646  -0.0661  -0.0688  -0.0709  -0.0705   1.0000
         yr8    -0.1594  -0.1631  -0.1697  -0.1750   1.0000
         yr7    -0.1602  -0.1640  -0.1706   1.0000
         yr6    -0.1554  -0.1591   1.0000
         yr5    -0.1494   1.0000
         yr4     1.0000
                                                                    
                    yr4      yr5      yr6      yr7      yr8      yr9
                                                                     
         yr9    -0.1108   0.1666  -0.0586   0.0186  -0.0118  -0.0200  -0.0689
         yr8     0.0475  -0.0156   0.0277   0.0231  -0.0040   0.0015  -0.1699
         yr7     0.0332  -0.0238   0.0287   0.0023  -0.0042  -0.0083  -0.1708
         yr6     0.0361  -0.0228   0.0238   0.0031  -0.0012   0.0037  -0.1657
         yr5     0.0581  -0.0168   0.0210  -0.0082   0.0046   0.0116  -0.1592
         yr4     0.0298   0.0096   0.0050  -0.0092   0.0062   0.0055  -0.1556
         yr3    -0.0759  -0.0081  -0.0350  -0.0088  -0.0007   0.0005   1.0000
        high     0.1449  -0.0224   0.1067  -0.1464  -0.1508   1.0000
       mhigh     0.0029  -0.0725  -0.0267  -0.2722   1.0000
        mlow    -0.0226  -0.0366   0.0127   1.0000
       lgcit     0.6051  -0.1665   1.0000
       LOCEF    -0.2275   1.0000
       URBEF     1.0000
                                                                             
                  URBEF    LOCEF    lgcit     mlow    mhigh     high      yr3
                                                                              
         yr9     0.2326   0.0356   0.0101   0.0343  -0.0279   0.0351   0.0265
         yr8    -0.0344  -0.0269  -0.0235   0.0075  -0.0449  -0.0085  -0.0054
         yr7    -0.0433  -0.0287   0.0087   0.0202  -0.0240  -0.0093  -0.0136
         yr6    -0.0271  -0.0042   0.0084   0.0254  -0.0153  -0.0139  -0.0122
         yr5    -0.0121   0.0102  -0.0216   0.0022   0.0278   0.0037  -0.0041
         yr4     0.0095  -0.0076   0.0085  -0.0237   0.0108  -0.0063   0.0140
         yr3    -0.0138   0.0129   0.0030  -0.0262   0.0181   0.0080   0.0028
        high    -0.0530  -0.0571  -0.0046   0.0224  -0.0158  -0.0878  -0.0587
       mhigh     0.0193   0.0196   0.0038  -0.0006  -0.0105   0.0006   0.0751
        mlow     0.0947   0.0975   0.0101  -0.0048  -0.0214   0.0732  -0.0447
       lgcit    -0.1443  -0.1401   0.0013   0.0650  -0.0961  -0.1096  -0.1288
       LOCEF    -0.0611  -0.0877   0.0068  -0.0117   0.0326   0.0048  -0.0288
       URBEF    -0.1781  -0.1603   0.0051   0.0327  -0.0742  -0.1286  -0.1888
         AGE     0.2337   0.2639  -0.0025  -0.0645   0.1383   0.0649   1.0000
         UMC     0.0665   0.0826  -0.0071  -0.0615   0.4424   1.0000
         ULC    -0.0414   0.0113  -0.0034  -0.0889   1.0000
     LABPROD     0.0575   0.0414  -0.0271   1.0000
     INVPROD    -0.0127  -0.0173   1.0000
         L1.     0.9039   1.0000
         --.     1.0000
      MSHARE  
                                                                             
                 MSHARE   MSHARE  INVPROD  LABPROD      ULC      UMC      AGE
                               L.                                             
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 Table A4.5: Printout of baseline dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the 
competitiveness of firms in Croatia, 2000-2007 (Dep. variable MShare) 
 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
 
> C, lag(2 3)) iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3-yr9) twostep robust
> CEF yr3-yr9, gmm(l.MSHARE, lag(1 1)) gmm(INVPROD LABPROD, lag(2 2) coll) gmm(UM
. xtabond2 MSHARE l.MSHARE INVPROD LABPROD UMC lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LO
                                                                              
       _cons     .0242485   .0092539     2.62   0.009     .0061112    .0423857
         yr9    -.0035513   .0035809    -0.99   0.321    -.0105696    .0034671
         yr8    -.0011546   .0031954    -0.36   0.718    -.0074175    .0051083
         yr7    -.0057546   .0033052    -1.74   0.082    -.0122328    .0007235
         yr6    -.0008151   .0024484    -0.33   0.739    -.0056138    .0039837
         yr5     .0005833   .0023647     0.25   0.805    -.0040515    .0052181
         yr4     .0017858   .0018878     0.95   0.344    -.0019143    .0054858
         yr3     .0008521   .0019013     0.45   0.654    -.0028743    .0045785
       LOCEF    -.3859633    .109613    -3.52   0.000    -.6008009   -.1711257
       URBEF    -.0174073   .0079565    -2.19   0.029    -.0330018   -.0018128
         AGE     .0005781   .0001858     3.11   0.002     .0002138    .0009423
        high    -.0051248   .0040963    -1.25   0.211    -.0131535    .0029039
       mhigh      .004655   .0032373     1.44   0.150    -.0016899        .011
        mlow    -.0060429   .0024699    -2.45   0.014    -.0108838    -.001202
       lgcit    -.0038601   .0023236    -1.66   0.097    -.0084143    .0006941
         UMC     -.003473   .0069209    -0.50   0.616    -.0170378    .0100918
     LABPROD     .0001126   .0000667     1.69   0.091    -.0000181    .0002434
     INVPROD     .0002375   .0000808     2.94   0.003     .0000791    .0003958
              
         L1.     .7246705    .072113    10.05   0.000     .5833316    .8660094
      MSHARE  
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8
Wald chi2(18) =   3017.55                                      avg =      6.16
Number of instruments = 53                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      3375
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =     20785
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  16.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.269
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  19.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.505
  iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(21)   =  20.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.496
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  15.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.269
  gmm(UMC, lag(2 3))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.275
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(31)   =  32.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.409
  gmm(INVPROD LABPROD, collapse lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  17.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.252
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  18.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.524
  gmm(L.MSHARE, lag(1 1))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(16)   =  21.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.178
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(18)   =  15.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.661
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(34)   =  36.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.374
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(34)   = 123.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.02  Pr > z =  0.987
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.14  Pr > z =  0.002
                                                                              
> : _b[mhigh]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
>  (lrAGE: _b[AGE]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmhigh
> ])) (lrURBEF: _b[URBEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrLOCEF: _b[LOCEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
> .MSHARE])) (lrUMC: _b[UMC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE
. nlcom (lrLABPROD: _b[LABPROD]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrINVPROD: _b[INVPROD]/(1-_b[l
                                                                              
      lrhigh    -.0186133   .0130948    -1.42   0.155    -.0442787    .0070521
     lrmhigh     .0169072   .0117445     1.44   0.150    -.0061116     .039926
      lrmlow    -.0219479   .0075627    -2.90   0.004    -.0367706   -.0071252
       lrAGE     .0020996   .0002669     7.87   0.000     .0015765    .0026228
     lrLOCEF    -1.401823   .1334392   -10.51   0.000    -1.663359   -1.140287
     lrURBEF    -.0632234   .0229941    -2.75   0.006    -.1082909   -.0181558
     lrlgcit      -.01402   .0077304    -1.81   0.070    -.0291714    .0011314
       lrUMC    -.0126139   .0252714    -0.50   0.618    -.0621449     .036917
   lrINVPROD     .0008625     .00033     2.61   0.009     .0002157    .0015092
   lrLABPROD     .0004091   .0002353     1.74   0.082    -.0000521    .0008703
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A4.6: Printout of alternative dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the 
competitiveness of firms in Croatia, 2000-2007 (Dep. variable MShare) 
 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
> robust
> ) gmm(UMC, lag(2 3)) iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3-yr9) twostep 
> yr3-yr9, gmm(l.MSHARE, lag(1 1)) gmm(INVPROD, lag(2 5) coll) gmm(ULC, lag( 2 .)
. xtabond2 MSHARE l.MSHARE INVPROD ULC UMC lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0120018   .0071642     1.68   0.094    -.0020398    .0260435
         yr9     .0023472    .002176     1.08   0.281    -.0019176    .0066121
         yr8     .0033759   .0022556     1.50   0.134    -.0010451    .0077968
         yr7    -.0001416   .0021716    -0.07   0.948    -.0043979    .0041147
         yr6     .0009896   .0019032     0.52   0.603    -.0027406    .0047198
         yr5     .0019189   .0018632     1.03   0.303    -.0017329    .0055708
         yr4     .0024746   .0014662     1.69   0.091    -.0003991    .0053483
         yr3     .0019606   .0015272     1.28   0.199    -.0010327    .0049539
       LOCEF    -.1726855   .0919024    -1.88   0.060    -.3528109      .00744
       URBEF    -.0058635   .0056742    -1.03   0.301    -.0169847    .0052576
         AGE     .0002073   .0001569     1.32   0.186    -.0001002    .0005148
        high    -.0004135   .0031963    -0.13   0.897    -.0066781    .0058512
       mhigh     .0045453   .0026643     1.71   0.088    -.0006766    .0097673
        mlow    -.0026977   .0018427    -1.46   0.143    -.0063093    .0009139
       lgcit    -.0019098   .0019302    -0.99   0.322    -.0056929    .0018733
         UMC     .0016906   .0012949     1.31   0.192    -.0008473    .0042286
         ULC    -.0049641   .0025948    -1.91   0.056    -.0100498    .0001216
     INVPROD     .0001325   .0000491     2.70   0.007     .0000362    .0002288
              
         L1.     .8585691    .062633    13.71   0.000     .7358106    .9813276
      MSHARE  
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8
Wald chi2(18) =   4157.19                                      avg =      6.19
Number of instruments = 89                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      3375
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =     20883
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  14.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.384
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(56)   =  52.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.598
  iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(21)   =  27.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.165
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(49)   =  40.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.801
  gmm(UMC, lag(2 3))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(36)   =  39.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.301
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(34)   =  27.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.765
  gmm(ULC, lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.21  Prob > chi2 =  0.266
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(66)   =  62.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.601
  gmm(INVPROD, collapse lag(2 5))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  17.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.183
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(57)   =  50.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.723
  gmm(L.MSHARE, lag(1 1))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(25)   =  27.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.330
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(45)   =  40.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.678
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(70)   =  67.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.557
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(70)   = 203.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.39  Pr > z =  0.695
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.32  Pr > z =  0.000
                                                                              
> gh]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
>  _b[AGE]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmhigh: _b[mhi
> RBEF: _b[URBEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrLOCEF: _b[LOCEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrAGE:
> )) (lrUMC: _b[UMC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrU
. nlcom (lrULC: _b[ULC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrINVPROD: _b[INVPROD]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]
                                                                              
      lrhigh    -.0029235   .0220323    -0.13   0.894    -.0461061     .040259
     lrmhigh     .0321382   .0199702     1.61   0.108    -.0070027    .0712791
      lrmlow    -.0190742   .0115042    -1.66   0.097     -.041622    .0034736
       lrAGE     .0014655   .0005534     2.65   0.008     .0003809    .0025502
     lrLOCEF    -1.220988   .2321086    -5.26   0.000    -1.675913   -.7660636
     lrURBEF    -.0414585   .0330127    -1.26   0.209    -.1061622    .0232451
     lrlgcit    -.0135034   .0124905    -1.08   0.280    -.0379843    .0109776
       lrUMC     .0119536   .0081538     1.47   0.143    -.0040275    .0279347
   lrINVPROD     .0009366   .0005132     1.82   0.068    -.0000693    .0019426
       lrULC     -.035099   .0165017    -2.13   0.033    -.0674417   -.0027562
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
247  
 Table A4.7: Printout of baseline dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the 
competitiveness of firms in Czech Republic, 2000-2007 (Dep. variable MShare) 
 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
> ostep robust
> OD UMC, lag(2 6) coll) iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high) iv(AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3-yr9) tw
> CEF yr3-yr9, gmm(l.MSHARE, lag(1 3) coll) gmm(INVPROD, lag(2 2) coll) gmm(LABPR
. xtabond2 MSHARE l.MSHARE INVPROD LABPROD UMC lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LO
                                                                              
       _cons     .1288181   .0187362     6.88   0.000     .0920958    .1655404
         yr9     .1280169   .0151839     8.43   0.000      .098257    .1577769
         yr8    -.0593157   .0117446    -5.05   0.000    -.0823347   -.0362968
         yr7     -.066547   .0120349    -5.53   0.000     -.090135    -.042959
         yr6     -.066865     .01268    -5.27   0.000    -.0917173   -.0420127
         yr5    -.0573736   .0105976    -5.41   0.000    -.0781445   -.0366027
         yr4    -.0444292   .0088358    -5.03   0.000    -.0617471   -.0271113
         yr3    -.0253369   .0071366    -3.55   0.000    -.0393244   -.0113495
       LOCEF    -1.736715   .2084701    -8.33   0.000    -2.145309   -1.328121
       URBEF    -.0593256   .0262107    -2.26   0.024    -.1106977   -.0079535
         AGE     .0013933   .0007808     1.78   0.074    -.0001371    .0029236
        high    -.0253406   .0084761    -2.99   0.003    -.0419534   -.0087278
       mhigh     -.030486     .00871    -3.50   0.000    -.0475573   -.0134147
        mlow    -.0049458   .0051948    -0.95   0.341    -.0151275    .0052359
       lgcit     .0133109   .0065545     2.03   0.042     .0004644    .0261575
         UMC     .0019515   .0028254     0.69   0.490    -.0035863    .0074892
     LABPROD     .0000257   .0000144     1.79   0.074    -2.48e-06    .0000539
     INVPROD    -.0000134   .0000153    -0.88   0.381    -.0000435    .0000166
              
         L1.     .1729925   .0833217     2.08   0.038      .009685       .3363
      MSHARE  
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8
Wald chi2(18) =    672.67                                      avg =      2.92
Number of instruments = 33                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      6344
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =     18544
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(10)   =  11.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.307
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   1.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.787
  iv(AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   4.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.346
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   8.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.539
  iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   9.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.693
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   4.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.118
  gmm(LABPROD UMC, collapse lag(2 6))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.693
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =  12.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.394
  gmm(INVPROD, collapse lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   7.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.094
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   5.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.858
  gmm(L.MSHARE, collapse lag(1 3))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.214
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   7.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.669
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(14)   =  13.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.495
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(14)   =  79.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.51  Pr > z =  0.131
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.85  Pr > z =  0.000
                                                                              
> : _b[mhigh]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
>  (lrAGE: _b[AGE]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmhigh
> ])) (lrURBEF: _b[URBEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrLOCEF: _b[LOCEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
> .MSHARE])) (lrUMC: _b[UMC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE
. nlcom (lrLABPROD: _b[LABPROD]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrINVPROD: _b[INVPROD]/(1-_b[l
                                                                              
      lrhigh    -.0306413   .0096614    -3.17   0.002    -.0495773   -.0117054
     lrmhigh     -.036863    .009501    -3.88   0.000    -.0554847   -.0182414
      lrmlow    -.0059803   .0062864    -0.95   0.341    -.0183014    .0063408
       lrAGE     .0016847   .0008986     1.87   0.061    -.0000766     .003446
     lrLOCEF    -2.099999   .1665819   -12.61   0.000    -2.426493   -1.773504
     lrURBEF    -.0717353   .0304648    -2.35   0.019    -.1314452   -.0120254
     lrlgcit     .0160953   .0076824     2.10   0.036     .0010382    .0311525
       lrUMC     .0023597   .0034441     0.69   0.493    -.0043907      .00911
   lrINVPROD    -.0000163   .0000183    -0.89   0.374    -.0000521    .0000196
   lrLABPROD     .0000311   .0000171     1.81   0.070    -2.54e-06    .0000647
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A4.8: Printout of alternative dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the 
competitiveness of firms in Czech Republic, 2000-2007 (Dep. variable MShare) 
 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
> lag(2 6) coll) iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high) iv(AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3-yr9) two robust
> yr3-yr9, gmm(l.MSHARE, lag(1 3) coll) gmm(INVPROD, lag(2 2) coll) gmm(ULC UMC, 
. xtabond2 MSHARE l.MSHARE INVPROD ULC UMC lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1213751   .0217417     5.58   0.000     .0787621     .163988
         yr9     .1305605   .0160421     8.14   0.000     .0991186    .1620025
         yr8    -.0568021   .0118703    -4.79   0.000    -.0800674   -.0335368
         yr7    -.0643253   .0121625    -5.29   0.000    -.0881634   -.0404872
         yr6    -.0656528   .0141003    -4.66   0.000    -.0932889   -.0380166
         yr5    -.0568143    .009744    -5.83   0.000    -.0759122   -.0377164
         yr4    -.0454973   .0100117    -4.54   0.000    -.0651198   -.0258747
         yr3    -.0251094     .00737    -3.41   0.001    -.0395542   -.0106645
       LOCEF    -1.625092   .2508719    -6.48   0.000    -2.116792   -1.133392
       URBEF    -.0435823   .0260555    -1.67   0.094    -.0946502    .0074855
         AGE     .0012306   .0016466     0.75   0.455    -.0019967    .0044579
        high    -.0292361   .0133825    -2.18   0.029    -.0554653   -.0030069
       mhigh    -.0313717   .0121757    -2.58   0.010    -.0552355   -.0075078
        mlow    -.0052216   .0054382    -0.96   0.337    -.0158802     .005437
       lgcit      .014281   .0087226     1.64   0.102     -.002815    .0313771
         UMC    -.0178536   .0536387    -0.33   0.739    -.1229835    .0872763
         ULC     .0449128   .1058603     0.42   0.671    -.1625695    .2523952
     INVPROD    -.0000198   .0000192    -1.03   0.302    -.0000575    .0000178
              
         L1.     .2439092   .0941547     2.59   0.010     .0593693    .4284491
      MSHARE  
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8
Wald chi2(18) =    727.79                                      avg =      2.95
Number of instruments = 33                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      6382
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =     18852
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(10)   =   8.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.628
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   2.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.636
  iv(AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   2.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.606
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   7.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.644
  iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   9.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.633
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.687
  gmm(ULC UMC, collapse lag(2 6))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.730
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =   9.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.622
  gmm(INVPROD, collapse lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   4.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.383
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   6.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.782
  gmm(L.MSHARE, collapse lag(1 3))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.460
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   6.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.731
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(14)   =  10.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.720
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(14)   =  52.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.46  Pr > z =  0.146
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.52  Pr > z =  0.000
                                                                              
> gh]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
>  _b[AGE]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmhigh: _b[mhi
> RBEF: _b[URBEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrLOCEF: _b[LOCEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrAGE:
> )) (lrUMC: _b[UMC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrU
. nlcom (lrULC: _b[ULC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrINVPROD: _b[INVPROD]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]
                                                                              
      lrhigh    -.0386675   .0187012    -2.07   0.039    -.0753211   -.0020138
     lrmhigh    -.0414919   .0139562    -2.97   0.003    -.0688456   -.0141382
      lrmlow     -.006906   .0069216    -1.00   0.318    -.0204722    .0066602
       lrAGE     .0016276   .0020831     0.78   0.435    -.0024553    .0057105
     lrLOCEF    -2.149335   .3493898    -6.15   0.000    -2.834126   -1.464544
     lrURBEF    -.0576417   .0329226    -1.75   0.080    -.1221687    .0068854
     lrlgcit      .018888   .0105647     1.79   0.074    -.0018185    .0395945
       lrUMC     -.023613   .0721647    -0.33   0.744    -.1650533    .1178272
   lrINVPROD    -.0000262    .000026    -1.01   0.314    -.0000772    .0000248
       lrULC     .0594014   .1427818     0.42   0.677    -.2204458    .3392485
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
249  
 Table A4.9: Printout of baseline dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the 
competitiveness of firms in Poland, 2000-2006 (Dep. variable MShare) 
 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
> v(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3-yr8) twostep robust
> l.MSHARE, lag(1 5) coll) gmm(LABPROD, lag(2 3)) gmm(INVPROD, lag(2 2)) gmm(UMC, lag(2 2) coll) i
. xtabond2 MSHARE l.MSHARE INVPROD LABPROD UMC lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3-yr8, gmm(
                                                                              
       _cons     .0347332   .0198412     1.75   0.080    -.0041547    .0736212
         yr8     -.022701   .0043298    -5.24   0.000    -.0311873   -.0142147
         yr7    -.0155997   .0039861    -3.91   0.000    -.0234123   -.0077871
         yr6    -.0098093   .0036724    -2.67   0.008     -.017007   -.0026116
         yr5    -.0076359   .0035108    -2.17   0.030    -.0145169   -.0007549
         yr4    -.0079254   .0029889    -2.65   0.008    -.0137835   -.0020673
         yr3    -.0067458   .0026614    -2.53   0.011    -.0119621   -.0015296
       LOCEF    -.5282439   .1068097    -4.95   0.000     -.737587   -.3189007
       URBEF    -.0394397   .0150979    -2.61   0.009     -.069031   -.0098485
         AGE     .0001087   .0000391     2.78   0.005     .0000322    .0001853
        high    -.0026696   .0041206    -0.65   0.517    -.0107458    .0054066
       mhigh    -.0006127   .0021972    -0.28   0.780    -.0049191    .0036937
        mlow     .0008421   .0018011     0.47   0.640    -.0026879    .0043721
       lgcit     .0006886   .0026068     0.26   0.792    -.0044206    .0057978
         UMC     .0025212   .0271512     0.09   0.926    -.0506941    .0557365
     LABPROD     .0000207   .0000123     1.68   0.092    -3.41e-06    .0000448
     INVPROD     3.90e-06   2.10e-06     1.86   0.063    -2.16e-07    8.01e-06
              
         L1.     .7243067   .0411621    17.60   0.000     .6436304     .804983
      MSHARE  
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7
Wald chi2(17) =   4907.79                                      avg =      3.43
Number of instruments = 49                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      4925
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =     16893
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  15.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.256
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(18)   =  19.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.350
  iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.425
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(29)   =  33.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.244
  gmm(UMC, collapse lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =   7.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.730
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  27.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.115
  gmm(INVPROD, lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  20.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.322
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =  15.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.284
  gmm(LABPROD, lag(2 3))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.207
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(27)   =  29.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.329
  gmm(L.MSHARE, collapse lag(1 5))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(15)   =  11.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.709
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(16)   =  23.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.090
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(31)   =  35.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.262
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(31)   = 140.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.45  Pr > z =  0.148
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -6.81  Pr > z =  0.000
                                                                              
> high: _b[mhigh]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
> ])) (lrAGE: _b[AGE]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrm
> RE])) (lrURBEF: _b[URBEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrLOCEF: _b[LOCEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE
> l.MSHARE])) (lrUMC: _b[UMC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.MSHA
. nlcom (lrLABPROD: _b[LABPROD]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrINVPROD: _b[INVPROD]/(1-_b[
                                                                              
      lrhigh    -.0096833   .0144585    -0.67   0.503    -.0380214    .0186548
     lrmhigh    -.0022223   .0078741    -0.28   0.778    -.0176552    .0132107
      lrmlow     .0030546   .0066048     0.46   0.644    -.0098905    .0159997
       lrAGE     .0003944   .0001259     3.13   0.002     .0001476    .0006412
     lrLOCEF    -1.916056   .1652276   -11.60   0.000    -2.239896   -1.592216
     lrURBEF    -.1430565   .0503744    -2.84   0.005    -.2417884   -.0443246
     lrlgcit     .0024978   .0094909     0.26   0.792    -.0161041    .0210997
       lrUMC      .009145   .0989042     0.09   0.926    -.1847038    .2029937
   lrINVPROD     .0000141   7.81e-06     1.81   0.070    -1.16e-06    .0000294
   lrLABPROD     .0000751   .0000437     1.72   0.086    -.0000105    .0001607
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A4.10: Printout of alternative dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the 
competitiveness of firms in Poland, 2000-2006 (Dep. variable MShare) 
 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
> wostep robust
> )) gmm(UMC, lag(2 2) coll) iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3-yr8) t
>  yr3-yr8, gmm(l.MSHARE, lag(1 .)) gmm(ULC, lag(2 2) coll) gmm(INVPROD, lag(2 2
. xtabond2 MSHARE l.MSHARE INVPROD ULC UMC lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF
                                                                              
       _cons     .0636768   .0337851     1.88   0.059    -.0025407    .1298943
         yr8    -.0260946   .0044326    -5.89   0.000    -.0347824   -.0174069
         yr7    -.0193375   .0039363    -4.91   0.000    -.0270526   -.0116224
         yr6    -.0138141   .0035863    -3.85   0.000     -.020843   -.0067851
         yr5    -.0119718   .0036485    -3.28   0.001    -.0191228   -.0048209
         yr4    -.0095198   .0027796    -3.42   0.001    -.0149678   -.0040719
         yr3    -.0065837   .0021717    -3.03   0.002    -.0108403   -.0023272
       LOCEF    -.6160214   .1107969    -5.56   0.000    -.8331795   -.3988634
       URBEF    -.0379531   .0156198    -2.43   0.015    -.0685673   -.0073388
         AGE     .0001025    .000045     2.28   0.023     .0000143    .0001908
        high    -.0017536   .0050998    -0.34   0.731    -.0117491    .0082419
       mhigh     .0002168   .0027912     0.08   0.938    -.0052538    .0056874
        mlow     .0014496   .0020922     0.69   0.488    -.0026511    .0055503
       lgcit     .0003094   .0040207     0.08   0.939     -.007571    .0081898
         UMC    -.0214324   .0474667    -0.45   0.652    -.1144653    .0716006
         ULC    -.0367568   .0204793    -1.79   0.073    -.0768956     .003382
     INVPROD     9.40e-07   3.33e-06     0.28   0.778    -5.58e-06    7.46e-06
              
         L1.     .6851648    .044194    15.50   0.000     .5985463    .7717834
      MSHARE  
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7
Wald chi2(17) =   4272.58                                      avg =      3.46
Number of instruments = 55                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      4941
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =     17088
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  11.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.598
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(24)   =  31.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.143
  iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.648
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(35)   =  41.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.203
  gmm(UMC, collapse lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =   7.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.762
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(26)   =  35.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.110
  gmm(INVPROD, lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   0.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.397
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(36)   =  41.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.233
  gmm(ULC, collapse lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(27)   =  34.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.145
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   7.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.652
  gmm(L.MSHARE, lag(1 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  11.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.564
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(24)   =  30.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.154
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(37)   =  42.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.245
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(37)   = 412.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.55  Pr > z =  0.580
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -6.65  Pr > z =  0.000
                                                                              
> [mhigh]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
> GE: _b[AGE]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmhigh: _b
> rURBEF: _b[URBEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrLOCEF: _b[LOCEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrA
> ])) (lrUMC: _b[UMC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (l
. nlcom (lrULC: _b[ULC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrINVPROD: _b[INVPROD]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE
                                                                              
      lrhigh      -.00557   .0159027    -0.35   0.726    -.0367386    .0255986
     lrmhigh     .0006885   .0088898     0.08   0.938    -.0167352    .0181123
      lrmlow     .0046044   .0067542     0.68   0.495    -.0086337    .0178425
       lrAGE     .0003256   .0001388     2.35   0.019     .0000536    .0005977
     lrLOCEF    -1.956647   .1577481   -12.40   0.000    -2.265828   -1.647467
     lrURBEF     -.120549   .0471551    -2.56   0.011    -.2129713   -.0281266
     lrlgcit     .0009827   .0128046     0.08   0.939    -.0241138    .0260792
       lrUMC    -.0680749   .1473435    -0.46   0.644    -.3568628    .2207131
   lrINVPROD     2.99e-06   .0000105     0.28   0.777    -.0000177    .0000236
       lrULC    -.1167493   .0660496    -1.77   0.077    -.2462041    .0127055
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A4.11: Printout of baseline dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the 
competitiveness of firms in Slovak Republic, 2001-2006 (Dep. variable MShare) 
 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
> gh) iv(AGE URBEF LOCEF yr4-yr7) twostep robust
> ) coll) gmm(LABPROD, lag(3 5)) gmm(UMC, lag(3 5) coll) iv(lgcit mlow mhigh hi
> LOCEF yr4-yr7 if Year>2000, gmm(l.MSHARE, lag(2 .) coll) gmm(INVPROD, lag(3 4
. xtabond2 MSHARE l.MSHARE INVPROD LABPROD UMC lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF 
                                                                              
       _cons     .1691677   .0804706     2.10   0.036     .0114483    .3268871
         yr7    -.0184895   .0041108    -4.50   0.000    -.0265464   -.0104325
         yr6    -.0404479   .0052654    -7.68   0.000    -.0507679   -.0301278
         yr5    -.0482469   .0097073    -4.97   0.000    -.0672729   -.0292209
         yr4    -.0051262   .0185773    -0.28   0.783    -.0415369    .0312846
       LOCEF    -1.921766   .5385604    -3.57   0.000    -2.977325   -.8662064
       URBEF    -.2002768   .1356762    -1.48   0.140    -.4661973    .0656438
         AGE     .0007949   .0007658     1.04   0.299    -.0007059    .0022958
        high    -.0066525   .0201424    -0.33   0.741     -.046131    .0328259
       mhigh    -.0136578   .0114676    -1.19   0.234    -.0361339    .0088184
        mlow     .0070967    .010976     0.65   0.518    -.0144159    .0286093
       lgcit     .0096742   .0180305     0.54   0.592    -.0256649    .0450134
         UMC    -.0150634    .132479    -0.11   0.909    -.2747175    .2445908
     LABPROD     5.52e-06   1.76e-06     3.13   0.002     2.06e-06    8.98e-06
     INVPROD     .0000126   .0000221     0.57   0.569    -.0000307    .0000558
              
         L1.     .6770615   .0976634     6.93   0.000     .4856448    .8684782
      MSHARE  
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6
Wald chi2(15) =   1087.93                                      avg =      3.43
Number of instruments = 42                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =       826
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =      2830
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =   4.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.700
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(19)   =  17.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.560
  iv(AGE URBEF LOCEF yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.529
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  18.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.649
  iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.767
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  20.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.565
  gmm(UMC, collapse lag(3 5))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =  16.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.633
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(7)    =   5.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.570
  gmm(LABPROD, lag(3 5))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.226
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(23)   =  17.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.770
  gmm(INVPROD, collapse lag(3 4))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.471
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  18.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.672
  gmm(L.MSHARE, collapse lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   5.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.813
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =  16.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.463
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(26)   =  22.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.683
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(26)   =  25.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.508
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.17  Pr > z =  0.240
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.60  Pr > z =  0.000
                                                                              
> (lrmhigh: _b[mhigh]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
> ARE])) (lrAGE: _b[AGE]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) 
> HARE])) (lrURBEF: _b[URBEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrLOCEF: _b[LOCEF]/(1-_b[l.MSH
> [l.MSHARE])) (lrUMC: _b[UMC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.MS
. nlcom (lrLABPROD: _b[LABPROD]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrINVPROD: _b[INVPROD]/(1-_b
                                                                              
      lrhigh       -.0206   .0636578    -0.32   0.746     -.145367    .1041671
     lrmhigh    -.0422922   .0337862    -1.25   0.211     -.108512    .0239277
      lrmlow     .0219753   .0331029     0.66   0.507    -.0429052    .0868558
       lrAGE     .0024616   .0023721     1.04   0.299    -.0021877    .0071109
     lrLOCEF    -5.950871    .861005    -6.91   0.000    -7.638409   -4.263332
     lrURBEF    -.6201699   .4351585    -1.43   0.154    -1.473065    .2327252
     lrlgcit     .0299569   .0539566     0.56   0.579    -.0757961      .13571
       lrUMC    -.0466448   .4133161    -0.11   0.910    -.8567294    .7634399
   lrINVPROD     .0000389   .0000648     0.60   0.548     -.000088    .0001659
   lrLABPROD     .0000171   6.85e-06     2.50   0.013     3.68e-06    .0000305
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A4.12: Printout of alternative dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the 
competitiveness of firms in Slovak Republic, 2001-2006 (Dep. variable MShare) 
 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
> r7) twostep robust
> ll) gmm(ULC UMC, lag(3 .)) iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high) iv(AGE URBEF LOCEF yr4-y
> F yr4-yr7 if Year>2000, gmm(l.MSHARE, lag(2 .) coll) gmm(INVPROD, lag(3 .) co
. xtabond2 MSHARE l.MSHARE INVPROD ULC UMC lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCE
                                                                              
       _cons     .1289694   .0804568     1.60   0.109    -.0287229    .2866618
         yr7    -.0108095   .0042428    -2.55   0.011    -.0191253   -.0024937
         yr6    -.0348962   .0050091    -6.97   0.000    -.0447138   -.0250786
         yr5    -.0334797   .0097795    -3.42   0.001    -.0526472   -.0143122
         yr4     .0104124   .0191037     0.55   0.586    -.0270302     .047855
       LOCEF     -1.89111   .5357687    -3.53   0.000    -2.941197   -.8410223
       URBEF    -.1512762   .1434303    -1.05   0.292    -.4323944    .1298419
         AGE     .0005551   .0008711     0.64   0.524    -.0011523    .0022625
        high    -.0012618   .0219199    -0.06   0.954    -.0442241    .0417004
       mhigh     -.017706   .0128349    -1.38   0.168    -.0428619    .0074498
        mlow     .0075657   .0116369     0.65   0.516    -.0152422    .0303736
       lgcit     .0212664   .0191239     1.11   0.266    -.0162157    .0587486
         UMC     .0996902   .1232833     0.81   0.419    -.1419407    .3413211
         ULC    -.0636916   .0738582    -0.86   0.388    -.2084509    .0810678
     INVPROD     .0001017   .0000328     3.10   0.002     .0000375    .0001659
              
         L1.     .6165979   .1092198     5.65   0.000      .402531    .8306648
      MSHARE  
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6
Wald chi2(15) =    836.88                                      avg =      3.47
Number of instruments = 63                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =       826
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =      2870
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =   6.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.527
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(40)   =  31.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.815
  iv(AGE URBEF LOCEF yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.802
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(43)   =  36.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.752
  iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(44)   =  36.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.776
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   1.35  Prob > chi2 =  0.717
  gmm(ULC UMC, lag(3 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   3.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.563
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(42)   =  34.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.802
  gmm(INVPROD, collapse lag(3 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.501
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(45)   =  36.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.808
  gmm(L.MSHARE, collapse lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(15)   =  13.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.566
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(32)   =  24.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.824
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(47)   =  38.02  Prob > chi2 =  0.822
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(47)   =  36.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.868
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.76  Pr > z =  0.445
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -4.72  Pr > z =  0.000
                                                                              
> : _b[mhigh]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
> lrAGE: _b[AGE]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmhigh
> (lrURBEF: _b[URBEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrLOCEF: _b[LOCEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (
> E])) (lrUMC: _b[UMC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) 
. nlcom (lrULC: _b[ULC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrINVPROD: _b[INVPROD]/(1-_b[l.MSHAR
                                                                              
      lrhigh    -.0032912   .0574247    -0.06   0.954    -.1158416    .1092592
     lrmhigh    -.0461814    .030159    -1.53   0.126     -.105292    .0129292
      lrmlow     .0197331   .0304247     0.65   0.517    -.0398981    .0793644
       lrAGE     .0014479   .0022112     0.65   0.513    -.0028859    .0057818
     lrLOCEF    -4.932445   .7651918    -6.45   0.000    -6.432193   -3.432696
     lrURBEF    -.3945629   .3724039    -1.06   0.289    -1.124461    .3353355
     lrlgcit     .0554677   .0503936     1.10   0.271     -.043302    .1542375
       lrUMC     .2600147   .3153964     0.82   0.410     -.358151    .8781804
   lrINVPROD     .0002653   .0001087     2.44   0.015     .0000523    .0004782
       lrULC    -.1661221    .180129    -0.92   0.356    -.5191684    .1869243
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A4.13: Printout of baseline dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the 
competitiveness of firms in Bulgaria, 2000-2007 (Dep. variable MShare) 
 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
> bust
> , lag(3 .) coll) iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3-yr9) twostep ro
> LOCEF yr3-yr9, gmm(l.MSHARE, lag(2 2)) gmm(INVPROD, lag(3 4)) gmm(LABPROD UMC
. xtabond2 MSHARE l.MSHARE INVPROD LABPROD UMC lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF 
                                                                              
       _cons     .0415343   .0302634     1.37   0.170    -.0177809    .1008494
         yr9     .3196355   .0247039    12.94   0.000     .2712167    .3680544
         yr8     .0021911   .0037078     0.59   0.555    -.0050761    .0094583
         yr7    -.0005574   .0039491    -0.14   0.888    -.0082975    .0071827
         yr6    -.0052852   .0035362    -1.49   0.135     -.012216    .0016456
         yr5    -.0007288   .0033571    -0.22   0.828    -.0073087     .005851
         yr4     .0146953   .0039287     3.74   0.000     .0069953    .0223954
         yr3    -.0055044   .0037004    -1.49   0.137    -.0127569    .0017482
       LOCEF    -.1968007   .1440859    -1.37   0.172    -.4792038    .0856024
       URBEF    -.0226787   .0087951    -2.58   0.010    -.0399169   -.0054406
         AGE    -.0001164   .0002253    -0.52   0.605    -.0005579    .0003251
        high    -.0001431   .0063897    -0.02   0.982    -.0126667    .0123805
       mhigh     .0025359   .0035469     0.71   0.475    -.0044159    .0094878
        mlow     .0032452   .0074305     0.44   0.662    -.0113183    .0178088
       lgcit    -.0007482   .0058737    -0.13   0.899    -.0122603     .010764
         UMC    -.0380371   .0521371    -0.73   0.466    -.1402239    .0641497
     LABPROD    -7.69e-06   .0000203    -0.38   0.705    -.0000475    .0000322
     INVPROD     .0000119   5.69e-06     2.10   0.036     8.01e-07    .0000231
              
         L1.      .914126    .074855    12.21   0.000     .7674129    1.060839
      MSHARE  
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8
Wald chi2(18) =   3793.32                                      avg =      4.71
Number of instruments = 55                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      1575
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =      7412
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  10.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.696
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  25.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.270
  iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  14.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.385
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  21.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.487
  gmm(LABPROD UMC, collapse lag(3 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(15)   =   9.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.874
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(21)   =  27.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.159
  gmm(INVPROD, lag(3 4))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =  11.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.380
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(25)   =  24.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.481
  gmm(L.MSHARE, lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  14.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.393
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  21.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.479
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(36)   =  36.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.448
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(36)   = 119.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.00  Pr > z =  0.317
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -6.38  Pr > z =  0.000
                                                                              
> (lrmhigh: _b[mhigh]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
> ARE])) (lrAGE: _b[AGE]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) 
> HARE])) (lrURBEF: _b[URBEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrLOCEF: _b[LOCEF]/(1-_b[l.MSH
> [l.MSHARE])) (lrUMC: _b[UMC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.MS
. nlcom (lrLABPROD: _b[LABPROD]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrINVPROD: _b[INVPROD]/(1-_b
                                                                              
      lrhigh    -.0016662   .0739762    -0.02   0.982    -.1466569    .1433246
     lrmhigh     .0295308   .0388873     0.76   0.448    -.0466869    .1057485
      lrmlow     .0377908   .0650185     0.58   0.561     -.089643    .1652247
       lrAGE    -.0013558   .0037548    -0.36   0.718     -.008715    .0060034
     lrLOCEF    -2.291738   2.166319    -1.06   0.290    -6.537644    1.954169
     lrURBEF    -.2640929   .1884235    -1.40   0.161    -.6333962    .1052104
     lrlgcit    -.0087125   .0642019    -0.14   0.892    -.1345459     .117121
       lrUMC    -.4429407   .6383935    -0.69   0.488    -1.694169    .8082876
   lrINVPROD     .0001391   .0001419     0.98   0.327    -.0001389    .0004172
   lrLABPROD    -.0000895   .0002833    -0.32   0.752    -.0006448    .0004657
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A4.14: Printout of alternative dynamic panel system GMM estimation for the 
competitiveness of firms in Bulgaria, 2000-2007 (Dep. variable MShare) 
 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
> .)) iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3-yr9) twostep robust
> F yr3-yr9, gmm(l.MSHARE, lag(2 2)) gmm(INVPROD, lag(3 5)) gmm(ULC UMC, lag(3 
. xtabond2 MSHARE l.MSHARE INVPROD ULC UMC lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCE
                                                                              
       _cons     .0388196   .0108427     3.58   0.000     .0175684    .0600708
         yr9     .3109724   .0255273    12.18   0.000     .2609398     .361005
         yr8    -.0017207   .0037042    -0.46   0.642    -.0089807    .0055393
         yr7    -.0040093   .0034781    -1.15   0.249    -.0108263    .0028076
         yr6    -.0071906   .0033263    -2.16   0.031      -.01371   -.0006712
         yr5    -.0049373   .0031445    -1.57   0.116    -.0111004    .0012257
         yr4     .0136603   .0038418     3.56   0.000     .0061304    .0211901
         yr3    -.0089166   .0032227    -2.77   0.006     -.015233   -.0026003
       LOCEF    -.1626792   .0982513    -1.66   0.098    -.3552483    .0298899
       URBEF    -.0225482   .0070335    -3.21   0.001    -.0363336   -.0087627
         AGE     .0000517   .0001718     0.30   0.764    -.0002851    .0003884
        high     .0040389   .0047148     0.86   0.392    -.0052019    .0132798
       mhigh     .0027378   .0036688     0.75   0.456     -.004453    .0099286
        mlow     .0044123   .0053332     0.83   0.408    -.0060406    .0148653
       lgcit    -.0002129   .0043507    -0.05   0.961    -.0087402    .0083144
         UMC    -.0117147   .0208882    -0.56   0.575    -.0526548    .0292253
         ULC     -.034097   .0319512    -1.07   0.286    -.0967202    .0285262
     INVPROD     .0000104   2.61e-06     3.97   0.000     5.24e-06    .0000155
              
         L1.     .8751862   .0579586    15.10   0.000     .7615894    .9887829
      MSHARE  
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         8
Wald chi2(18) =   3122.84                                      avg =      4.71
Number of instruments = 98                      Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      1574
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =      7411
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  10.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.720
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(65)   =  75.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.178
  iv(lgcit mlow mhigh high AGE URBEF LOCEF yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7 yr8 yr9)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(57)   =  63.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.265
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(22)   =  22.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.420
  gmm(ULC UMC, lag(3 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =  16.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.645
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(60)   =  69.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.182
  gmm(INVPROD, lag(3 5))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =   7.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.369
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(72)   =  78.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.285
  gmm(L.MSHARE, lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(25)   =  18.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.810
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(54)   =  67.22  Prob > chi2 =  0.107
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(79)   =  85.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.278
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(79)   = 261.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.49  Pr > z =  0.622
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -6.66  Pr > z =  0.000
                                                                              
> : _b[mhigh]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE]))
> lrAGE: _b[AGE]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrmhigh
> (lrURBEF: _b[URBEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrLOCEF: _b[LOCEF]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (
> E])) (lrUMC: _b[UMC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) 
. nlcom (lrULC: _b[ULC]/(1-_b[l.MSHARE])) (lrINVPROD: _b[INVPROD]/(1-_b[l.MSHAR
                                                                              
      lrhigh     .0323596   .0419134     0.77   0.440    -.0497891    .1145083
     lrmhigh     .0219351   .0279021     0.79   0.432    -.0327521    .0766222
      lrmlow     .0353513   .0351277     1.01   0.314    -.0334977    .1042004
       lrAGE     .0004142   .0012103     0.34   0.732    -.0019581    .0027864
     lrLOCEF    -1.303375   .7880155    -1.65   0.098    -2.847857    .2411071
     lrURBEF    -.1806543   .0730431    -2.47   0.013     -.323816   -.0374925
     lrlgcit    -.0017057   .0347268    -0.05   0.961     -.069769    .0663576
       lrUMC    -.0938577   .1787708    -0.53   0.600     -.444242    .2565267
   lrINVPROD     .0000831   .0000432     1.92   0.054    -1.53e-06    .0001677
       lrULC    -.2731831   .2850024    -0.96   0.338    -.8317774    .2854113
                                                                              
      MSHARE        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A4.15: Comparison of coefficients on lagged dependent variable obtained with OLS, 
dynamic panel system GMM and fixed effects estimation techniques for baseline specification 
 Coef. Std.Error z P>|z| 
Croatia  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.46 0.03 13.99 0.000 
System GMM 0.72 0.07 10.05 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.95 0.01 161.27 0.000 
Czech Republic  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.27 0.04 7.45 0.000 
System GMM 0.17 0.08 2.08 0.038 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.92 0.01 102.17 0.000 
Poland  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.41 0.03 14.61 0.000 
System GMM 0.72 0.04 17.60 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.85 0.01 91.65 0.000 
Slovak Republic  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.17 0.04 3.88 0.000 
System GMM 0.68 0.10 6.93 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.89 0.01 82.10 0.000 
Bulgaria  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.44 0.04 12.27 0.000 
System GMM 0.91 0.07 12.21 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.92 0.01 115.28 0.000 
 Table A4.16: Comparison of coefficients on lagged dependent variable obtained with OLS, 
dynamic panel system GMM and fixed effects estimation techniques for alternative specification 
 Coef. Std.Error z P>|z| 
Croatia  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.46 0.03 14.05 0.000 
System GMM 0.86 0.06 13.71 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.95 0.01 163.56 0.000 
Czech Republic  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.27 0.04 7.44 0.000 
System GMM 0.24 0.09 2.59 0.010 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.92 0.01 103.56 0.000 
Poland  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.40 0.03 14.57 0.000 
System GMM 0.69 0.04 15.50 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.85 0.01 90.40 0.000 
Slovak Republic  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.18 0.04 4.00 0.000 
System GMM 0.62 0.11 5.65 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.89 0.01 79.72 0.000 
Bulgaria  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.44 0.03 13.57 0.000 
System GMM 0.88 0.06 15.10 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.92 0.01 116.12 0.000 
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Appendix V: Supplement to Chapter Five 
Table A5.1: Number of observations for dataset in Chapter Five 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 
1999 835 833 - - 
2000 955 954 - - 
2001 1089 1089 1086 1086 
2002 1189 1189 1186 1186 
2003 1309 1309 1303 1303 
2004 1391 1391 1384 1384 
2005 1438 1437 1430 1430 
2006 1464 1463 1455 1455 
2007 1426 1424 1417 1416 
 
 Table A5.2:Descriptive statistics for continuous variables used in models of Chapter Five 
 Exint Empl Capinv Ulc Umc 
 Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
1999 0.31 0.30 148 577 -335 4978 0.22 0.46 0.65 0.24 
2000 0.30 0.31 146 555 -278 4332 0.22 0.54 0.65 0.23 
2001 0.31 0.31 149 538 204 1905 0.20 0.16 0.67 0.82 
2002 0.31 0.32 146 464 182 2235 0.24 1.02 0.65 0.34 
2003 0.31 0.32 135 427 -94 3360 0.22 0.37 0.65 0.22 
2004 0.31 0.32 128 400 178 4169 0.21 0.19 0.66 0.23 
2005 0.31 0.32 130 414 529 11578 0.22 0.19 0.67 0.24 
2006 0.31 0.33 122 369 315 4521 0.22 0.27 0.67 0.32 
2007 0.32 0.33 124 378 388 4671 0.23 0.58 0.66 0.25 
 Prod Urbef Locef Age Agesq 
 Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
1999 66 102 0.42 0.07 0.02 0.03 21 28 1225 4428 
2000 68 97 0.45 0.07 0.02 0.03 21 28 1221 4248 
2001 76 106 0.48 0.08 0.02 0.03 22 28 1288 4149 
2002 80 112 0.50 0.07 0.02 0.03 22 28 1306 4610 
2003 79 98 0.49 0.06 0.02 0.03 22 28 1281 4540 
2004 80 115 0.49 0.07 0.02 0.03 22 27 1194 4354 
2005 92 174 0.51 0.06 0.02 0.03 22 27 1191 4330 
2006 105 232 0.50 0.06 0.02 0.03 22 26 1177 4308 
2007 105 194 0.51 0.06 0.02 0.03 22 26 1149 4206 
Note: Numbers in table refer to the original values of variables which were used in 
equations in logarithmed form. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
257  
Table A5.3:Descriptive statistics for categorical variables used 
in models of Chapter Five 
 Innov WPremium Lgcit 
 0(%) 1(%) 0(%) 1(%) 0(%) 1(%) 
1999 65.63 34.37   62.51 37.49 
2000 66.60 33.40   60.10 39.90 
2001 64.19 35.81 62.34 37.66 59.69 40.31 
2002 62.83 37.17 67.96 32.04 62.91 37.09 
2003 62.41 37.59 68.07 31.93 62.95 37.05 
2004 61.25 38.75 68.71 31.29 63.41 36.59 
2005 60.92 39.08 66.57 33.43 63.77 36.23 
2006 59.63 40.37 66.60 33.40 63.93 36.07 
2007 56.45 43.55 66.06 33.94 63.60 36.40 
 Entzone Openzone Border 
 0(%) 1(%) 0(%) 1(%) 0(%) 1(%) 
1999 76.65 23.35 85.27 14.73 80.36 19.64 
2000 77.70 22.30 85.65 14.35 80.84 19.16 
2001 77.13 22.87 85.86 14.14 81.45 18.55 
2002 75.86 24.14 86.46 13.54 81.33 18.67 
2003 76.24 23.76 86.78 13.22 81.59 18.41 
2004 76.35 23.65 86.34 13.66 80.23 19.77 
2005 76.36 23.64 85.67 14.33 80.04 19.96 
2006 76.84 23.16 85.38 14.62 79.30 20.70 
2007 76.79 23.21 85.83 14.17 80.15 19.85 
 Mlow Mhigh High 
 0(%) 1(%) 0(%) 1(%) 0(%) 1(%) 
1999 70.54 29.46 79.4 20.60 91.02 8.98 
2000 69.95 30.05 79.90 20.10 91.41 8.59 
2001 69.61 30.39 80.44 19.56 91.37 8.63 
2002 69.05 30.95 80.74 19.26 91.67 8.33 
2003 70.13 29.87 80.44 19.56 92.44 7.56 
2004 70.81 29.19 80.37 19.63 91.59 8.41 
2005 70.45 29.55 80.39 19.61 91.45 8.55 
2006 70.42 29.58 80.33 19.67 91.80 8.20 
2007 69.57 30.43 80.29 19.71 92.36 7.64 
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Table A5.4:Correlation among variables used in Specifications 1 and 2 of Chapter Five 
 
 
        Yr10    -0.1330  -0.1404  -0.1454  -0.1481  -0.1496   1.0000
         Yr9    -0.1351  -0.1426  -0.1476  -0.1504   1.0000
         Yr8    -0.1337  -0.1412  -0.1461   1.0000
         Yr7    -0.1312  -0.1386   1.0000
         Yr6    -0.1268   1.0000
         Yr5     1.0000
                                                                    
                    Yr5      Yr6      Yr7      Yr8      Yr9     Yr10
                                                                     
        Yr10     0.0057  -0.0063   0.0041   0.0002  -0.0084  -0.1178  -0.1267
         Yr9     0.0030  -0.0039  -0.0033  -0.0003  -0.0008  -0.1196  -0.1287
         Yr8     0.0001  -0.0026  -0.0029  -0.0009   0.0042  -0.1184  -0.1273
         Yr7    -0.0046  -0.0024  -0.0061  -0.0008   0.0021  -0.1162  -0.1250
         Yr6     0.0036   0.0050  -0.0004  -0.0014  -0.0093  -0.1122  -0.1207
         Yr5     0.0041   0.0067   0.0078  -0.0039   0.0008  -0.1063  -0.1144
         Yr4     0.0042   0.0050   0.0034  -0.0013   0.0045  -0.1012   1.0000
         Yr3    -0.0076  -0.0004   0.0011   0.0032   0.0026   1.0000
        high    -0.0698  -0.0495  -0.1961  -0.1487   1.0000
       mhigh    -0.0186  -0.0385  -0.3238   1.0000
        mlow    -0.0200  -0.0226   1.0000
       Agesq     0.8547   1.0000
         Age     1.0000
                                                                             
                    Age    Agesq     mlow    mhigh     high      Yr3      Yr4
                                                                              
        Yr10     0.0083  -0.0065  -0.0013   0.0015   0.0034   0.1341  -0.0159
         Yr9     0.0165  -0.0094  -0.0020   0.0065   0.0117   0.0932  -0.0119
         Yr8     0.0163  -0.0086   0.0024   0.0024   0.0044   0.1019  -0.0084
         Yr7     0.0025  -0.0052   0.0023  -0.0043   0.0030   0.0313   0.0000
         Yr6    -0.0100  -0.0016   0.0032  -0.0088  -0.0096   0.0231   0.0011
         Yr5    -0.0160  -0.0012   0.0061  -0.0051  -0.0068   0.0449   0.0054
         Yr4    -0.0094   0.0208  -0.0041   0.0009  -0.0075  -0.0965   0.0170
         Yr3    -0.0149   0.0163  -0.0077   0.0027  -0.0021  -0.1591   0.0074
        high    -0.0497   0.2478  -0.1039   0.0342  -0.0771  -0.1091   0.1665
       mhigh     0.0343   0.0710  -0.0489   0.0090  -0.0184   0.0095  -0.1735
        mlow     0.0197  -0.1932   0.0744   0.0016   0.1023   0.0207   0.0117
       Agesq    -0.0027   0.0183   0.0037   0.0542   0.0040   0.0292  -0.0664
         Age    -0.0160   0.0272   0.0221   0.0522  -0.0028   0.0412  -0.0890
       Locef    -0.1146  -0.0077  -0.0033  -0.0062   0.0388  -0.1268   1.0000
       Urbef    -0.0414  -0.2288   0.2430  -0.0542  -0.0651   1.0000
      Border     0.0454  -0.2647   0.1299   0.1055   1.0000
    OPENZONE    -0.1049   0.1312  -0.1848   1.0000
     ENTZONE     0.0060  -0.4259   1.0000
       lgcit     0.0192   1.0000
         umc     1.0000
                                                                             
                    umc    lgcit  ENTZONE OPENZONE   Border    Urbef    Locef
                                                                              
        Yr10     0.0020  -0.0117   0.0116   0.0165   0.0424   0.0813   0.0064
         Yr9    -0.0199  -0.0092   0.0083   0.0115   0.0173   0.0610   0.0051
         Yr8    -0.0117  -0.0160   0.0061   0.0264   0.0064   0.0234   0.0181
         Yr7    -0.0005  -0.0019  -0.0061   0.0017   0.0040  -0.0060   0.0181
         Yr6    -0.0012   0.0122  -0.0015  -0.0164  -0.0049  -0.0144   0.0019
         Yr5     0.0079   0.0144   0.0069   0.0018  -0.0076  -0.0188   0.0001
         Yr4     0.0030   0.0018  -0.0033   0.0031  -0.0165  -0.0261  -0.0179
         Yr3     0.0082   0.0092  -0.0173  -0.0261  -0.0310  -0.0650  -0.0216
        high    -0.1043  -0.1023  -0.1739  -0.0049  -0.0029   0.1375  -0.0659
       mhigh     0.0331   0.0355  -0.0221  -0.0183   0.0537   0.0950  -0.0251
        mlow     0.0484   0.0421  -0.0058   0.0222  -0.0388  -0.0051  -0.0068
       Agesq     0.0343   0.0348   0.3153   0.0101   0.0954  -0.0624   0.1067
         Age     0.0703   0.0709   0.4938   0.0118   0.1524  -0.1312   0.2013
       Locef     0.0609   0.0657  -0.0183  -0.0119  -0.0537  -0.0882   0.0682
       Urbef     0.0807   0.0791   0.0811   0.0117  -0.0229  -0.0552   0.0623
      Border     0.0722   0.0778   0.0577  -0.0038  -0.0102  -0.0818   0.0505
    OPENZONE     0.0397   0.0430   0.0417  -0.0000   0.0140  -0.0925   0.0906
     ENTZONE     0.0855   0.0897   0.1450  -0.0099  -0.0350  -0.1237   0.0773
       lgcit    -0.1827  -0.1849  -0.1818   0.0084   0.0572   0.1965  -0.0977
         umc    -0.1446  -0.1490  -0.0803   0.0153   0.0529   0.3817  -0.4245
         ulc     0.2140   0.2192   0.3997  -0.0169   0.0382  -0.8513   1.0000
        prod    -0.2461  -0.2539  -0.3384   0.0316   0.0726   1.0000
       Innov     0.0169   0.0115   0.3124   0.0219   1.0000
      Capinv     0.0035   0.0009   0.0442   1.0000
        empl     0.1903   0.1793   1.0000
         L1.     0.8490   1.0000
         --.     1.0000
       exint  
                                                                             
                  exint    exint     empl   Capinv    Innov     prod      ulc
                               L.                                             
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Table A5.5:Correlation among variables used in Specifications 3 and 4 of Chapter Five 
 
 
 
 
 
        Yr10    -0.1719  -0.1781  -0.1816  -0.1834   1.0000
         Yr9    -0.1747  -0.1810  -0.1845   1.0000
         Yr8    -0.1729  -0.1791   1.0000
         Yr7    -0.1696   1.0000
         Yr6     1.0000
                                                           
                    Yr6      Yr7      Yr8      Yr9     Yr10
                                                            
        Yr10    -0.0150   0.0039  -0.0069   0.0040   0.0013  -0.0081  -0.1628
         Yr9    -0.0105   0.0008  -0.0043  -0.0036   0.0008   0.0005  -0.1655
         Yr8    -0.0069  -0.0024  -0.0029  -0.0033   0.0007   0.0060  -0.1638
         Yr7     0.0027  -0.0075  -0.0027  -0.0068   0.0007   0.0036  -0.1607
         Yr6     0.0038   0.0016   0.0055  -0.0006  -0.0001  -0.0091  -0.1551
         Yr5     0.0080   0.0018   0.0072   0.0080  -0.0033   0.0018   1.0000
        high     0.1778  -0.0637  -0.0475  -0.1962  -0.1480   1.0000
       mhigh    -0.1773  -0.0248  -0.0409  -0.3244   1.0000
        mlow     0.0160  -0.0153  -0.0191   1.0000
       Agesq    -0.0652   0.8566   1.0000
         Age    -0.0830   1.0000
       Locef     1.0000
                                                                             
                  Locef      Age    Agesq     mlow    mhigh     high      Yr5
                                                                              
        Yr10     0.0061   0.0075  -0.0050  -0.0014   0.0020   0.0040   0.0968
         Yr9     0.0010   0.0166  -0.0083  -0.0028   0.0084   0.0125   0.0485
         Yr8     0.0012   0.0153  -0.0070   0.0013   0.0037   0.0049   0.0589
         Yr7    -0.0179   0.0006  -0.0033   0.0011  -0.0037   0.0034  -0.0233
         Yr6    -0.0117  -0.0126   0.0005   0.0026  -0.0089  -0.0109  -0.0311
         Yr5    -0.0102  -0.0190   0.0008   0.0052  -0.0043  -0.0075  -0.0027
        high    -0.0103  -0.0478   0.2473  -0.1030   0.0303  -0.0782  -0.1068
       mhigh    -0.0167   0.0467   0.0653  -0.0419   0.0093  -0.0187   0.0168
        mlow     0.0189   0.0169  -0.2003   0.0774   0.0008   0.1099   0.0122
       Agesq     0.0032  -0.0021   0.0160   0.0040   0.0464  -0.0002   0.0276
         Age     0.0142  -0.0099   0.0284   0.0214   0.0454  -0.0071   0.0331
       Locef    -0.0121  -0.1152  -0.0017  -0.0077  -0.0028   0.0423  -0.1486
       Urbef    -0.0710  -0.0415  -0.2288   0.2587  -0.0712  -0.0555   1.0000
      Border    -0.0494   0.0423  -0.2654   0.1278   0.1088   1.0000
    OPENZONE    -0.0241  -0.1057   0.1293  -0.1820   1.0000
     ENTZONE    -0.0609   0.0017  -0.4240   1.0000
       lgcit     0.0900   0.0171   1.0000
         umc     0.0230   1.0000
    WPremium     1.0000
                                                                             
               WPremium      umc    lgcit  ENTZONE OPENZONE   Border    Urbef
                                                                              
        Yr10     0.0063  -0.0104   0.0097   0.0102   0.0399   0.0725   0.0014
         Yr9    -0.0174  -0.0067   0.0056   0.0047   0.0119   0.0498  -0.0003
         Yr8    -0.0089  -0.0156   0.0030   0.0210  -0.0010   0.0085   0.0141
         Yr7     0.0028  -0.0003  -0.0107  -0.0056  -0.0035  -0.0243   0.0142
         Yr6     0.0020   0.0152  -0.0056  -0.0246  -0.0128  -0.0332  -0.0031
         Yr5     0.0114   0.0170   0.0042  -0.0045  -0.0142  -0.0375  -0.0048
        high    -0.1073  -0.1025  -0.1667  -0.0084  -0.0095   0.1357  -0.0585
       mhigh     0.0266   0.0327  -0.0310  -0.0168   0.0642   0.1063  -0.0360
        mlow     0.0598   0.0528  -0.0011   0.0278  -0.0440  -0.0076  -0.0071
       Agesq     0.0341   0.0340   0.3107   0.0188   0.1021  -0.0508   0.0951
         Age     0.0672   0.0676   0.4788   0.0247   0.1588  -0.1119   0.1792
       Locef     0.0507   0.0592  -0.0086  -0.0205  -0.0568  -0.0988   0.0805
       Urbef     0.0875   0.0801   0.0742  -0.0020  -0.0325  -0.0803   0.0505
      Border     0.0718   0.0792   0.0591  -0.0007  -0.0161  -0.0867   0.0531
    OPENZONE     0.0349   0.0418   0.0356  -0.0038   0.0158  -0.0862   0.0831
     ENTZONE     0.0856   0.0873   0.1477  -0.0077  -0.0355  -0.1264   0.0760
       lgcit    -0.1812  -0.1774  -0.1883   0.0124   0.0563   0.2045  -0.0977
         umc    -0.1380  -0.1426  -0.0694   0.0214   0.0635   0.3848  -0.4238
    WPremium    -0.0266  -0.0291  -0.0012   0.0074   0.1056   0.3317  -0.0302
         ulc     0.2107   0.2149   0.3723  -0.0186   0.0383  -0.8557   1.0000
        prod    -0.2428  -0.2514  -0.3178   0.0345   0.0712   1.0000
       Innov     0.0290   0.0231   0.3307   0.0347   1.0000
      Capinv     0.0090   0.0053   0.0795   1.0000
        empl     0.1959   0.1857   1.0000
         L1.     0.8522   1.0000
         --.     1.0000
       exint  
                                                                             
                  exint    exint     empl   Capinv    Innov     prod      ulc
                               L.                                             
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 Table A5.6: Printout of dynamic panel system GMM estimation specification 1 for the 
competitiveness of Croatian exporters, 1999-2007 (Dep. variable ln(Exint)) 
 
 
 
          (continued on next page) 
 
 
>  high Yr3-Yr10) twostep robust orthogonal
> , lag(2 2)) iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh
> (empl Innov, lag(2 .)) gmm(Capinv, lag(2 .) coll) gmm(prod, lag(2 6)) gmm(umc
> er Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr3-Yr10, gmm(l.exint, lag(1 1)) gmm
. xtabond2 exint l.exint empl Capinv Innov prod umc lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Bord
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.258558   .4507233    -7.23   0.000     -4.14196   -2.375157
        Yr10    -.3258388   .0643258    -5.07   0.000    -.4519151   -.1997624
         Yr9    -.3396271   .0572633    -5.93   0.000    -.4518611   -.2273931
         Yr8    -.2746216   .0514764    -5.33   0.000    -.3755135   -.1737297
         Yr7    -.2389583    .044984    -5.31   0.000    -.3271254   -.1507912
         Yr6    -.2529467   .0422052    -5.99   0.000    -.3356673   -.1702261
         Yr5    -.2424629   .0421026    -5.76   0.000    -.3249826   -.1599433
         Yr4    -.1421626   .0350186    -4.06   0.000    -.2107978   -.0735275
         Yr3    -.1036275   .0320885    -3.23   0.001    -.1665197   -.0407352
        high    -.3169607   .1102271    -2.88   0.004    -.5330018   -.1009196
       mhigh     .0001521   .0644287     0.00   0.998    -.1261257      .12643
        mlow    -.0306092   .0553645    -0.55   0.580    -.1391216    .0779032
       Agesq    -.0000165   .0000159    -1.04   0.299    -.0000476    .0000146
         Age     .0029356   .0035056     0.84   0.402    -.0039353    .0098065
       Locef     3.328852   .7835191     4.25   0.000     1.793183    4.864522
       Urbef     1.016821   .2960949     3.43   0.001     .4364861    1.597157
      Border      .100617   .0562256     1.79   0.074    -.0095832    .2108173
    OPENZONE     .1913766   .0705762     2.71   0.007     .0530498    .3297034
     ENTZONE     .0189649    .058619     0.32   0.746    -.0959261     .133856
       lgcit    -.3074928   .0709755    -4.33   0.000    -.4466022   -.1683834
         umc    -.3894377   .1874291    -2.08   0.038    -.7567921   -.0220834
        prod     .3575048   .0873075     4.09   0.000     .1863854    .5286243
       Innov     .0644748   .0644193     1.00   0.317    -.0617847    .1907344
      Capinv     3.29e-07   1.86e-06     0.18   0.860    -3.31e-06    3.97e-06
        empl     .0944528   .0537212     1.76   0.079    -.0108387    .1997443
              
         L1.     .4795781    .030356    15.80   0.000     .4200815    .5390748
       exint  
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         9
Wald chi2(25) =    872.95                                      avg =      5.44
Number of instruments = 186                     Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      2039
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =     11096
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =  23.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.225
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(141)  = 149.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.287
> 4 Yr5 Yr6 Yr7 Yr8 Yr9 Yr10)
  iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr3 Yr
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =  21.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.222
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(143)  = 152.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.285
  gmm(umc, lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(39)   =  39.66  Prob > chi2 =  0.440
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(121)  = 133.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.205
  gmm(prod, lag(2 6))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   8.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.428
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(152)  = 165.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.220
  gmm(Capinv, collapse lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(89)   =  88.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.497
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(71)   =  84.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.126
  gmm(empl Innov, lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  12.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.455
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(147)  = 160.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.214
  gmm(L.exint, lag(1 1))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(45)   =  40.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.653
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(115)  = 132.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.126
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(160)  = 173.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.224
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(160)  = 306.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.48  Pr > z =  0.139
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -12.47  Pr > z =  0.000
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Long-run coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 1000)
> high: _b[mhigh]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.exint])), iterate(
>  (lrAgesq: _b[Agesq]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrm
> nt]))  (lrLocef: _b[Locef]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrAge: _b[Age]/(1-_b[l.exint]))
> t]))  (lrBorder: _b[Border]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrUrbef: _b[Urbef]/(1-_b[l.exi
> ENTZONE: _b[ENTZONE]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrOPENZONE: _b[OPENZONE]/(1-_b[l.exin
>   (lrumc: _b[umc]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lr
> ]))  (lrInnov: _b[Innov]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrprod: _b[prod]/(1-_b[l.exint]))
. nlcom (lrempl: _b[empl]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrCapinv: _b[Capinv]/(1-_b[l.exint
                                                                              
      lrhigh    -.6090457   .2083782    -2.92   0.003    -1.017459    -.200632
     lrmhigh     .0002923   .1238003     0.00   0.998    -.2423518    .2429363
      lrmlow    -.0588161   .1062047    -0.55   0.580    -.2669735    .1493414
     lrAgesq    -.0000317   .0000305    -1.04   0.299    -.0000915    .0000281
       lrAge     .0056408   .0067221     0.84   0.401    -.0075343    .0188159
     lrLocef      6.39645   1.453157     4.40   0.000     3.548315    9.244585
     lrUrbef     1.953841   .5582626     3.50   0.000     .8596662    3.048015
    lrBorder     .1933374   .1070089     1.81   0.071    -.0163961    .4030709
  lrOPENZONE     .3677336   .1340055     2.74   0.006     .1050877    .6303796
   lrENTZONE     .0364414   .1125789     0.32   0.746    -.1842092     .257092
     lrlgcit     -.590853   .1290605    -4.58   0.000    -.8438068   -.3378991
       lrumc    -.7483116   .3562384    -2.10   0.036    -1.446526   -.0500972
      lrprod      .686952   .1633898     4.20   0.000      .366714     1.00719
     lrInnov     .1238896   .1235564     1.00   0.316    -.1182764    .3660556
    lrCapinv     6.32e-07   3.57e-06     0.18   0.860    -6.37e-06    7.63e-06
      lrempl     .1814927   .1033487     1.76   0.079     -.021067    .3840525
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A5.7: Printout of dynamic panel system GMM estimation specification 2 for the 
competitiveness of Croatian exporters, 1999-2007 (Dep. variable ln(Exint)) 
 
 
 
          (continued on next page) 
 
 
 
> 10) twostep robust orthogonal
> iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr3-Yr
> empl Innov ulc, lag(2 .)) gmm(Capinv, lag(2 .) coll) gmm(umc, lag(2 2) coll) 
> r Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr3-Yr10, gmm(l.exint, lag(1 1)) gmm(
. xtabond2 exint l.exint empl Capinv Innov ulc umc lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Borde
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.768924     .31733    -8.73   0.000     -3.39088   -2.146969
        Yr10    -.1365402   .0411306    -3.32   0.001    -.2171548   -.0559256
         Yr9     -.168446   .0389425    -4.33   0.000    -.2447718   -.0921202
         Yr8    -.1212394   .0384296    -3.15   0.002      -.19656   -.0459188
         Yr7    -.1154759   .0358237    -3.22   0.001    -.1856891   -.0452628
         Yr6    -.1519749   .0344146    -4.42   0.000    -.2194262   -.0845236
         Yr5    -.1465482   .0351354    -4.17   0.000    -.2154123    -.077684
         Yr4    -.0845161    .030165    -2.80   0.005    -.1436385   -.0253937
         Yr3    -.0939864   .0317054    -2.96   0.003    -.1561279   -.0318449
        high    -.2513932   .0968263    -2.60   0.009    -.4411693   -.0616172
       mhigh     .0743354   .0586387     1.27   0.205    -.0405942    .1892651
        mlow      .007186   .0506221     0.14   0.887    -.0920315    .1064035
       Agesq    -.0000208   .0000163    -1.28   0.201    -.0000527    .0000111
         Age     .0048881   .0029027     1.68   0.092     -.000801    .0105772
       Locef     2.913123   .7524045     3.87   0.000     1.438437    4.387808
       Urbef     .8125572   .2795839     2.91   0.004     .2645829    1.360531
      Border     .0911365   .0544988     1.67   0.094    -.0156792    .1979523
    OPENZONE     .1849317   .0657592     2.81   0.005      .056046    .3138175
     ENTZONE     .0278388   .0557311     0.50   0.617    -.0813923    .1370698
       lgcit    -.2566595   .0587194    -4.37   0.000    -.3717473   -.1415716
         umc    -.5566952   .1923172    -2.89   0.004      -.93363   -.1797604
         ulc    -.4233167   .0881425    -4.80   0.000    -.5960728   -.2505606
       Innov     .0408052   .0641401     0.64   0.525    -.0849071    .1665175
      Capinv     2.74e-07   1.21e-06     0.23   0.820    -2.09e-06    2.64e-06
        empl       .08382   .0382476     2.19   0.028      .008856     .158784
              
         L1.     .4722059   .0313054    15.08   0.000     .4108484    .5335634
       exint  
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         9
Wald chi2(25) =    837.26                                      avg =      5.44
Number of instruments = 178                     Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      2037
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =     11089
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =  22.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.248
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(133)  = 125.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.669
> 4 Yr5 Yr6 Yr7 Yr8 Yr9 Yr10)
  iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr3 Yr
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.04  Prob > chi2 =  0.980
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(150)  = 148.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.529
  gmm(umc, collapse lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   4.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.832
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(144)  = 143.83  Prob > chi2 =  0.488
  gmm(Capinv, collapse lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(134)  = 125.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.681
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(18)   =  22.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.219
  gmm(empl Innov ulc, lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  16.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.295
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(138)  = 131.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.633
  gmm(L.exint, lag(1 1))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(35)   =  36.42  Prob > chi2 =  0.403
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(117)  = 111.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.621
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(152)  = 148.10  Prob > chi2 =  0.574
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(152)  = 259.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.29  Pr > z =  0.195
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -12.21  Pr > z =  0.000
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Long-run coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> 00)
> gh: _b[mhigh]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.exint])), iterate(10
> lrAgesq: _b[Agesq]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrmhi
> ]))  (lrLocef: _b[Locef]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrAge: _b[Age]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (
> ))  (lrBorder: _b[Border]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrUrbef: _b[Urbef]/(1-_b[l.exint
> TZONE: _b[ENTZONE]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrOPENZONE: _b[OPENZONE]/(1-_b[l.exint]
> (lrumc: _b[umc]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrEN
> ]))  (lrInnov: _b[Innov]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrulc: _b[ulc]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  
. nlcom (lrempl: _b[empl]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrCapinv: _b[Capinv]/(1-_b[l.exint
                                                                              
      lrhigh    -.4763092   .1815213    -2.62   0.009    -.8320845    -.120534
     lrmhigh     .1408417   .1102905     1.28   0.202    -.0753238    .3570072
      lrmlow     .0136152   .0959092     0.14   0.887    -.1743633    .2015937
     lrAgesq    -.0000395   .0000309    -1.28   0.202    -.0001001    .0000211
       lrAge     .0092614   .0055128     1.68   0.093    -.0015435    .0200663
     lrLocef      5.51943   1.386864     3.98   0.000     2.801226    8.237634
     lrUrbef     1.539534   .5231446     2.94   0.003     .5141897    2.564879
    lrBorder     .1726744   .1028654     1.68   0.093    -.0289381     .374287
  lrOPENZONE     .3503861   .1231414     2.85   0.004     .1090335    .5917388
   lrENTZONE     .0527455   .1055435     0.50   0.617     -.154116     .259607
     lrlgcit    -.4862871    .105468    -4.61   0.000    -.6930006   -.2795736
       lrumc    -1.054758   .3651886    -2.89   0.004    -1.770515   -.3390016
       lrulc    -.8020489   .1686795    -4.75   0.000    -1.132655   -.4714431
     lrInnov     .0773127   .1214027     0.64   0.524    -.1606321    .3152576
    lrCapinv     5.19e-07   2.29e-06     0.23   0.820    -3.96e-06    5.00e-06
      lrempl      .158812   .0722068     2.20   0.028     .0172892    .3003347
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A5.8: Printout of dynamic panel system GMM estimation specification 3 for the 
competitiveness of Croatian exporters, 1999-2007 (Dep. variable ln(Exint)) 
 
 
 
          (continued on next page) 
 
> e Agesq mlow mhigh high) iv(Yr5-Yr10) twostep robust orthogonal
> ) gmm(umc WPremium, lag(2 2)) iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Ag
> 1 1)) gmm(empl Innov, lag(2 .)) gmm(Capinv, lag(2 .) coll) gmm(prod, lag(2 6)
> ZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr5-Yr10, gmm(l.exint, lag(
. xtabond2 exint l.exint empl Capinv Innov prod WPremium umc lgcit ENTZONE OPEN
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.431768   .5250866    -6.54   0.000    -4.460919   -2.402617
        Yr10    -.1984154   .0460895    -4.31   0.000    -.2887492   -.1080816
         Yr9    -.2106824   .0392538    -5.37   0.000    -.2876184   -.1337464
         Yr8    -.1436244   .0347826    -4.13   0.000     -.211797   -.0754517
         Yr7    -.1099274   .0299832    -3.67   0.000    -.1686934   -.0511613
         Yr6    -.1225982   .0264984    -4.63   0.000    -.1745341   -.0706623
         Yr5    -.1174292    .027124    -4.33   0.000    -.1705912   -.0642672
        high    -.4036111   .1120317    -3.60   0.000    -.6231893    -.184033
       mhigh    -.0421872   .0682195    -0.62   0.536     -.175895    .0915207
        mlow    -.0199505   .0570029    -0.35   0.726     -.131674    .0917731
       Agesq     -.000019   .0000156    -1.22   0.223    -.0000496    .0000115
         Age     .0036273   .0031411     1.15   0.248    -.0025291    .0097837
       Locef     2.818698   .8877403     3.18   0.001     1.078759    4.558637
       Urbef     .9691772   .3050865     3.18   0.001     .3712187    1.567136
      Border     .1044492   .0601315     1.74   0.082    -.0134065    .2223049
    OPENZONE     .1429948   .0732137     1.95   0.051    -.0005014    .2864909
     ENTZONE     .0178008   .0609859     0.29   0.770    -.1017294     .137331
       lgcit    -.3011684   .0717236    -4.20   0.000    -.4417442   -.1605927
         umc    -.5961666   .2033701    -2.93   0.003    -.9947648   -.1975685
    WPremium    -.2809129   .1300495    -2.16   0.031    -.5358053   -.0260206
        prod      .382181   .0945441     4.04   0.000     .1968779    .5674841
       Innov     .0743013   .0773255     0.96   0.337    -.0772539    .2258564
      Capinv     4.76e-07   1.47e-06     0.32   0.746    -2.40e-06    3.36e-06
        empl     .0845928   .0516448     1.64   0.101    -.0166291    .1858147
              
         L1.     .4758387   .0352171    13.51   0.000     .4068144     .544863
       exint  
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7
Wald chi2(24) =    725.39                                      avg =      4.68
Number of instruments = 176                     Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      1977
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =      9261
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   7.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.318
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(145)  = 156.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.247
  iv(Yr5 Yr6 Yr7 Yr8 Yr9 Yr10)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =  11.27  Prob > chi2 =  0.421
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(140)  = 152.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.230
  iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  22.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.517
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(128)  = 141.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.200
  gmm(umc WPremium, lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(37)   =  40.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.302
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(114)  = 122.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.279
  gmm(prod, lag(2 6))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   6.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.270
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(146)  = 156.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.254
  gmm(Capinv, collapse lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(82)   =  91.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.215
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(69)   =  71.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.395
  gmm(empl Innov, lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =   7.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.784
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(140)  = 156.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.166
  gmm(L.exint, lag(1 1))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(43)   =  47.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.282
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(108)  = 115.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.294
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(151)  = 163.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.233
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(151)  = 279.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.22  Pr > z =  0.827
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -11.30  Pr > z =  0.000
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Long-run coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> rhigh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.exint])), iterate(1000)
> )) (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrmhigh: _b[mhigh]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (l
> exint]))  (lrAge: _b[Age]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrAgesq: _b[Agesq]/(1-_b[l.exint]
> .exint]))  (lrUrbef: _b[Urbef]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrLocef: _b[Locef]/(1-_b[l.
> ))  (lrOPENZONE: _b[OPENZONE]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrBorder: _b[Border]/(1-_b[l
>  (lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrENTZONE: _b[ENTZONE]/(1-_b[l.exint]
>  (lrWPremium: _b[WPremium]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrumc: _b[umc]/(1-_b[l.exint])) 
> ]))  (lrInnov: _b[Innov]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrprod: _b[prod]/(1-_b[l.exint]))
. nlcom (lrempl: _b[empl]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrCapinv: _b[Capinv]/(1-_b[l.exint
                                                                              
      lrhigh    -.7700132   .2086026    -3.69   0.000    -1.178867   -.3611598
     lrmhigh    -.0804851   .1304134    -0.62   0.537    -.3360906    .1751203
      lrmlow    -.0380617   .1086458    -0.35   0.726    -.2510036    .1748802
     lrAgesq    -.0000363   .0000297    -1.22   0.221    -.0000944    .0000218
       lrAge     .0069201   .0059655     1.16   0.246    -.0047719    .0186122
     lrLocef      5.37754   1.618292     3.32   0.001     2.205745    8.549334
     lrUrbef     1.849006   .5697126     3.25   0.001     .7323894    2.965622
    lrBorder     .1992692   .1136588     1.75   0.080    -.0234979    .4220363
  lrOPENZONE     .2728068   .1375549     1.98   0.047     .0032041    .5424095
   lrENTZONE     .0339606   .1163591     0.29   0.770    -.1940991    .2620202
     lrlgcit    -.5745721   .1279866    -4.49   0.000    -.8254212   -.3237229
       lrumc    -1.137372   .3877329    -2.93   0.003    -1.897315   -.3774299
  lrWPremium    -.5359284   .2472656    -2.17   0.030     -1.02056   -.0512968
      lrprod     .7291286   .1740599     4.19   0.000     .3879774     1.07028
     lrInnov     .1417527     .14771     0.96   0.337    -.1477536     .431259
    lrCapinv     9.09e-07   2.80e-06     0.32   0.746    -4.58e-06    6.40e-06
      lrempl      .161387   .0982761     1.64   0.101    -.0312306    .3540045
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A5.9: Printout of dynamic panel system GMM estimation specification 4 for the 
competitiveness of Croatian exporters, 1999-2007 (Dep. variable ln(Exint)) 
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>  Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr5-Yr10) twostep robust orthogonal
> ag(2 2)) gmm(umc, lag(2 3) coll) iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef
>  1)) gmm(empl ulc Innov, lag(2 .)) gmm(Capinv, lag(2 .) coll) gmm(WPremium, l
> ONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr5-Yr10, gmm(l.exint, lag(1
. xtabond2 exint l.exint empl Capinv Innov ulc WPremium umc lgcit ENTZONE OPENZ
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.818574   .3618215    -7.79   0.000    -3.527731   -2.109416
        Yr10    -.0496176   .0342592    -1.45   0.148    -.1167644    .0175293
         Yr9    -.0808969   .0315309    -2.57   0.010    -.1426962   -.0190975
         Yr8    -.0343102   .0317216    -1.08   0.279    -.0964835    .0278631
         Yr7    -.0321202   .0291486    -1.10   0.270    -.0892504      .02501
         Yr6    -.0649986    .026336    -2.47   0.014    -.1166163   -.0133809
         Yr5    -.0615382   .0264022    -2.33   0.020    -.1132854   -.0097909
        high    -.2994946   .0968815    -3.09   0.002    -.4893789   -.1096103
       mhigh     .0454825   .0612841     0.74   0.458    -.0746322    .1655972
        mlow     .0124304   .0524217     0.24   0.813    -.0903144    .1151751
       Agesq    -.0000212   .0000175    -1.22   0.224    -.0000554     .000013
         Age     .0053013   .0029734     1.78   0.075    -.0005264    .0111291
       Locef     2.560809   .8303278     3.08   0.002     .9333963    4.188222
       Urbef     .8076623   .2869685     2.81   0.005     .2452144     1.37011
      Border     .0967008    .056867     1.70   0.089    -.0147565    .2081581
    OPENZONE     .1578399   .0683813     2.31   0.021      .023815    .2918647
     ENTZONE     .0303466   .0577488     0.53   0.599     -.082839    .1435321
       lgcit    -.2750003   .0634986    -4.33   0.000    -.3994553   -.1505453
         umc    -.6583794   .2140073    -3.08   0.002    -1.077826   -.2389329
    WPremium     .0046525    .131516     0.04   0.972    -.2531142    .2624192
         ulc    -.4157243   .0962202    -4.32   0.000    -.6043125   -.2271362
       Innov     .0631387   .0764418     0.83   0.409    -.0866845    .2129619
      Capinv     4.01e-07   1.12e-06     0.36   0.719    -1.79e-06    2.59e-06
        empl     .0629994   .0417618     1.51   0.131    -.0188524    .1448511
              
         L1.     .4680298   .0359046    13.04   0.000     .3976581    .5384015
       exint  
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7
Wald chi2(24) =    722.82                                      avg =      4.69
Number of instruments = 172                     Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      1976
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =      9260
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =  21.50  Prob > chi2 =  0.205
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(130)  = 131.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.457
> 6 Yr7 Yr8 Yr9 Yr10)
  iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr5 Yr
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.684
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(144)  = 151.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.327
  gmm(umc, collapse lag(2 3))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =  10.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.461
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(136)  = 141.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.350
  gmm(WPremium, lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =   3.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.783
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(140)  = 148.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.294
  gmm(Capinv, collapse lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(121)  = 118.71  Prob > chi2 =  0.542
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(26)   =  33.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.139
  gmm(empl ulc Innov, lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  15.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.192
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(135)  = 136.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.446
  gmm(L.exint, lag(1 1))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(35)   =  41.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.195
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(112)  = 110.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.519
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(147)  = 152.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.360
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(147)  = 268.06  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.20  Pr > z =  0.843
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -11.05  Pr > z =  0.000
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(continued from previous page) 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
 
 Table A5.10: Comparison of coefficients on lagged dependent variable obtained with 
OLS, dynamic panel system GMM and fixed effects estimation techniques 
 Coef. Std.Error z P>|z| 
Specification 1  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.27 0.02 14.85 0.000 
System GMM 0.48 0.03 15.80 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.84 0.01 108.78 0.000 
Specification 2  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.27 0.02 14.83 0.000 
System GMM 0.47 0.03 15.08 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.84 0.01 108.84 0.000 
Specification 3  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.19 0.02 10.02 0.000 
System GMM 0.48 0.03 13.51 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.84 0.01 100.58 0.000 
Specification 4  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.19 0.02 10.01 0.000 
System GMM 0.47 0.04 13.04 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.84 0.01 100.78 0.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> igh: _b[high]/(1-_b[l.exint])), iterate(1000)
>  (lrmlow: _b[mlow]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrmhigh: _b[mhigh]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrh
> int]))  (lrAge: _b[Age]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrAgesq: _b[Agesq]/(1-_b[l.exint]))
> xint]))  (lrUrbef: _b[Urbef]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrLocef: _b[Locef]/(1-_b[l.ex
>   (lrOPENZONE: _b[OPENZONE]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrBorder: _b[Border]/(1-_b[l.e
> lrlgcit: _b[lgcit]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrENTZONE: _b[ENTZONE]/(1-_b[l.exint]))
> lrWPremium: _b[WPremium]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (lrumc: _b[umc]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (
> ]))  (lrInnov: _b[Innov]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrulc: _b[ulc]/(1-_b[l.exint])) (
. nlcom (lrempl: _b[empl]/(1-_b[l.exint]))  (lrCapinv: _b[Capinv]/(1-_b[l.exint
                                                                              
      lrhigh    -.5629914   .1796394    -3.13   0.002    -.9150781   -.2109046
     lrmhigh     .0854982   .1146064     0.75   0.456    -.1391263    .3101226
      lrmlow     .0233666   .0985293     0.24   0.813    -.1697473    .2164806
     lrAgesq    -.0000399   .0000329    -1.21   0.225    -.0001043    .0000246
       lrAge     .0099655   .0055913     1.78   0.075    -.0009932    .0209242
     lrLocef      4.81382   1.501562     3.21   0.001     1.870813    7.756828
     lrUrbef     1.518247   .5307136     2.86   0.004     .4780677    2.558427
    lrBorder     .1817786   .1067403     1.70   0.089    -.0274285    .3909857
  lrOPENZONE     .2967081   .1260961     2.35   0.019     .0495642     .543852
   lrENTZONE     .0570456   .1086664     0.52   0.600    -.1559365    .2700278
     lrlgcit    -.5169469   .1117155    -4.63   0.000    -.7359053   -.2979885
       lrumc    -1.237625   .4112295    -3.01   0.003     -2.04362   -.4316295
  lrWPremium     .0087458   .2472449     0.04   0.972    -.4758453    .4933369
       lrulc    -.7814805   .1830103    -4.27   0.000    -1.140174    -.422787
     lrInnov     .1186885   .1438976     0.82   0.409    -.1633457    .4007227
    lrCapinv     7.54e-07   2.10e-06     0.36   0.719    -3.36e-06    4.86e-06
      lrempl     .1184265   .0783283     1.51   0.131    -.0350943    .2719472
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A5.11: Examination of fitted values for falling outside of interval of dependent 
variable 
 Obs Mean Std.Dev Min. Max. 
Fitted values outside the 
interval of dep.variable 
No. % 
Specification 1        
Dependent variable 11096 -2.06 1.70 -10.13 0 9 0.08 Fitted values 11096 -2.02 0.91 -6.07 0.21 
Specification 2        
Dependent variable 11089 -2.06 1.70 -10.12 0 23 0.20 Fitted values 11089 -2.02 0.91 -5.77 0.71 
Specification 3        
Dependent variable 9261 -2.07 1.72 -10.13 0 20 0.22 Fitted values 9261 -2.03 0.92 -5.57 0.75 
Specification 4        
Dependent variable 9260 -2.07 1.72 -10.13 0 24 0.26 Fitted values 9260 -2.03 0.92 -5.89 0.95 
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 Table A5.12: Results from specification 1 without variable empl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> Yr10) twostep robust orthogonal
> ) iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr3-
> v, lag(2 .)) gmm(Capinv, lag(2 .) coll) gmm(prod, lag(2 6)) gmm(umc, lag(2 2)
> bef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr3-Yr10, gmm(l.exint, lag(1 1)) gmm(Inno
. xtabond2 exint l.exint Capinv Innov prod umc lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Ur
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.091443   .5322201    -5.81   0.000    -4.134575   -2.048311
        Yr10    -.3616843   .0693284    -5.22   0.000    -.4975656   -.2258031
         Yr9    -.3735087   .0627943    -5.95   0.000    -.4965833   -.2504341
         Yr8    -.3017351   .0568736    -5.31   0.000    -.4132053   -.1902649
         Yr7    -.2594645   .0494577    -5.25   0.000    -.3563999   -.1625291
         Yr6     -.261802   .0463145    -5.65   0.000    -.3525767   -.1710272
         Yr5    -.2554253   .0459716    -5.56   0.000    -.3455278   -.1653227
         Yr4    -.1666053   .0392221    -4.25   0.000    -.2434793   -.0897313
         Yr3    -.1087066   .0356575    -3.05   0.002     -.178594   -.0388193
        high    -.4147032   .1133381    -3.66   0.000    -.6368417   -.1925646
       mhigh    -.0158047    .068939    -0.23   0.819    -.1509228    .1193133
        mlow    -.0577259    .057678    -1.00   0.317    -.1707727    .0553209
       Agesq    -.0000353   .0000117    -3.01   0.003    -.0000582   -.0000123
         Age     .0085868   .0019477     4.41   0.000     .0047693    .0124043
       Locef     3.766889   .8756244     4.30   0.000     2.050696    5.483081
       Urbef      .961793    .321386     2.99   0.003     .3318879    1.591698
      Border     .0831789   .0616774     1.35   0.177    -.0377065    .2040643
    OPENZONE     .2272959   .0754981     3.01   0.003     .0793224    .3752693
     ENTZONE     .0575916   .0630164     0.91   0.361    -.0659183    .1811014
       lgcit    -.3809585   .0680976    -5.59   0.000    -.5144274   -.2474896
         umc    -.3593551   .1908016    -1.88   0.060    -.7333194    .0146092
        prod     .3862001   .1062834     3.63   0.000     .1778884    .5945118
       Innov     .0720098   .0704436     1.02   0.307    -.0660572    .2100768
      Capinv     5.33e-07   1.83e-06     0.29   0.771    -3.06e-06    4.12e-06
              
         L1.     .4635226   .0314646    14.73   0.000     .4018531    .5251921
       exint  
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         9
Wald chi2(24) =    724.78                                      avg =      5.44
Number of instruments = 142                     Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      2039
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =     11096
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =  16.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.638
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(98)   = 110.11  Prob > chi2 =  0.190
> 4 Yr5 Yr6 Yr7 Yr8 Yr9 Yr10)
  iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr3 Yr
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =  17.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.411
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(100)  = 108.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.258
  gmm(umc, lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(39)   =  38.53  Prob > chi2 =  0.491
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(78)   =  87.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.208
  gmm(prod, lag(2 6))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   9.57  Prob > chi2 =  0.296
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(109)  = 116.82  Prob > chi2 =  0.287
  gmm(Capinv, collapse lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(44)   =  38.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.709
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(73)   =  87.97  Prob > chi2 =  0.112
  gmm(Innov, lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =  16.37  Prob > chi2 =  0.291
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(103)  = 110.03  Prob > chi2 =  0.300
  gmm(L.exint, lag(1 1))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(36)   =  32.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.625
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(81)   =  93.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.159
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(117)  = 126.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.260
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(117)  = 236.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.45  Pr > z =  0.148
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -12.57  Pr > z =  0.000
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 Table A5.13: Results from specification 2 without variable empl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
> p robust orthogonal
> NTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr3-Yr10) twoste
>  ulc, lag(2 .)) gmm(Capinv, lag(2 .) coll) gmm(umc, lag(2 2) coll) iv(lgcit E
> ef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr3-Yr10, gmm(l.exint, lag(1 1)) gmm(Innov
. xtabond2 exint l.exint Capinv Innov ulc umc lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urb
                                                                              
       _cons     -2.51378   .3541393    -7.10   0.000    -3.207881    -1.81968
        Yr10    -.1521421   .0460532    -3.30   0.001    -.2424046   -.0618795
         Yr9    -.1939065   .0439443    -4.41   0.000    -.2800358   -.1077772
         Yr8    -.1299817   .0440858    -2.95   0.003    -.2163883   -.0435751
         Yr7    -.1234584   .0413097    -2.99   0.003    -.2044238   -.0424929
         Yr6    -.1538913   .0391003    -3.94   0.000    -.2305265   -.0772561
         Yr5    -.1647254   .0402729    -4.09   0.000    -.2436588    -.085792
         Yr4    -.1043078   .0352752    -2.96   0.003    -.1734459   -.0351697
         Yr3    -.1085207   .0364167    -2.98   0.003    -.1798962   -.0371452
        high    -.3024783   .1018521    -2.97   0.003    -.5021048   -.1028519
       mhigh     .0632362    .062319     1.01   0.310    -.0589069    .1853792
        mlow    -.0131259   .0535903    -0.24   0.807     -.118161    .0919091
       Agesq    -.0000358   .0000142    -2.52   0.012    -.0000636   -7.96e-06
         Age      .009656   .0021482     4.49   0.000     .0054455    .0138664
       Locef     3.396816   .8168055     4.16   0.000     1.795907    4.997726
       Urbef     .7521504   .2988626     2.52   0.012     .1663905     1.33791
      Border     .0778693   .0591757     1.32   0.188     -.038113    .1938515
    OPENZONE     .2124654   .0696395     3.05   0.002     .0759745    .3489564
     ENTZONE     .0654753   .0602642     1.09   0.277    -.0526404    .1835909
       lgcit    -.3199391   .0597854    -5.35   0.000    -.4371163    -.202762
         umc    -.4682517   .2053568    -2.28   0.023    -.8707437   -.0657598
         ulc    -.4414516   .1080833    -4.08   0.000    -.6532909   -.2296122
       Innov     .0705248    .070825     1.00   0.319    -.0682898    .2093393
      Capinv     4.34e-07   1.00e-06     0.43   0.665    -1.53e-06    2.40e-06
              
         L1.     .4706695   .0309773    15.19   0.000     .4099552    .5313838
       exint  
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         9
Wald chi2(24) =    737.61                                      avg =      5.46
Number of instruments = 134                     Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      2038
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =     11132
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(19)   =  16.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.649
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(90)   =  91.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.425
> 4 Yr5 Yr6 Yr7 Yr8 Yr9 Yr10)
  iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr3 Yr
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.739
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(107)  = 107.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.471
  gmm(umc, collapse lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(8)    =   5.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.690
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(101)  = 102.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.443
  gmm(Capinv, collapse lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(89)   =  85.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.585
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(20)   =  22.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.314
  gmm(Innov ulc, lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(15)   =  20.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.150
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(94)   =  87.39  Prob > chi2 =  0.672
  gmm(L.exint, lag(1 1))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(27)   =  26.52  Prob > chi2 =  0.490
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(82)   =  81.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.496
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(109)  = 108.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.509
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(109)  = 186.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.27  Pr > z =  0.204
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -12.68  Pr > z =  0.000
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 Table A5.14: Results from specification 3 without variable empl 
 
 
 
 
 
> ow mhigh high) iv(Yr5-Yr10) twostep robust orthogonal
> WPremium, lag(2 2)) iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq ml
>  gmm(Innov, lag(2 .)) gmm(Capinv, lag(2 .) coll) gmm(prod, lag(2 6)) gmm(umc 
> Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr5-Yr10, gmm(l.exint, lag(1 1))
. xtabond2 exint l.exint Capinv Innov prod WPremium umc lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE 
                                                                              
       _cons    -3.470323    .597055    -5.81   0.000    -4.640529   -2.300116
        Yr10    -.2342185    .052193    -4.49   0.000    -.3365149   -.1319222
         Yr9    -.2396115    .045578    -5.26   0.000    -.3289427   -.1502802
         Yr8    -.1611191    .040094    -4.02   0.000    -.2397019   -.0825363
         Yr7    -.1170879   .0346357    -3.38   0.001    -.1849727   -.0492032
         Yr6     -.117882   .0312288    -3.77   0.000    -.1790894   -.0566746
         Yr5     -.112757   .0319334    -3.53   0.000    -.1753453   -.0501687
        high    -.5269322   .1247942    -4.22   0.000    -.7715244     -.28234
       mhigh    -.0689507   .0747892    -0.92   0.357    -.2155349    .0776335
        mlow    -.0490678   .0607986    -0.81   0.420    -.1682308    .0700952
       Agesq    -.0000356   .0000133    -2.68   0.007    -.0000616   -9.56e-06
         Age     .0087222   .0021011     4.15   0.000     .0046041    .0128403
       Locef     3.721953   1.000425     3.72   0.000     1.761156     5.68275
       Urbef     .9436545   .3359636     2.81   0.005      .285178    1.602131
      Border     .0873456   .0671315     1.30   0.193    -.0442298     .218921
    OPENZONE      .191918   .0791617     2.42   0.015     .0367639    .3470722
     ENTZONE     .0549301   .0655935     0.84   0.402    -.0736307     .183491
       lgcit    -.3875749   .0727319    -5.33   0.000    -.5301267   -.2450231
         umc    -.5338784   .2259775    -2.36   0.018    -.9767861   -.0909706
    WPremium    -.3817829   .1512529    -2.52   0.012    -.6782331   -.0853326
        prod     .4549955   .1175684     3.87   0.000     .2245656    .6854253
       Innov      .109065   .0843513     1.29   0.196    -.0562605    .2743904
      Capinv     1.70e-06   1.60e-06     1.06   0.288    -1.43e-06    4.84e-06
              
         L1.      .451291   .0355632    12.69   0.000     .3815884    .5209936
       exint  
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7
Wald chi2(23) =    611.26                                      avg =      4.68
Number of instruments = 136                     Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      1977
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =      9261
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   4.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.591
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(106)  = 112.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.312
  iv(Yr5 Yr6 Yr7 Yr8 Yr9 Yr10)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =   7.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.761
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(101)  = 109.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.259
  iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(23)   =  18.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.705
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(89)   =  98.31  Prob > chi2 =  0.234
  gmm(umc WPremium, lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(37)   =  34.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.587
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(75)   =  82.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.253
  gmm(prod, lag(2 6))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   4.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.570
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(106)  = 112.44  Prob > chi2 =  0.316
  gmm(Capinv, collapse lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(40)   =  39.23  Prob > chi2 =  0.505
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(72)   =  78.01  Prob > chi2 =  0.294
  gmm(Innov, lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =  13.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.351
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(100)  = 103.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.373
  gmm(L.exint, lag(1 1))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(36)   =  31.75  Prob > chi2 =  0.671
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(76)   =  85.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.214
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(112)  = 117.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.349
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(112)  = 206.61  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.09  Pr > z =  0.927
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -11.36  Pr > z =  0.000
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 Table A5.15: Results from specification 4 without variable empl 
 
 
 
 
 
 
>  mlow mhigh high Yr5-Yr10) twostep robust orthogonal
> mm(umc, lag(2 3) coll) iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq
> gmm(ulc Innov, lag(2 .)) gmm(Capinv, lag(2 .) coll) gmm(WPremium, lag(2 2)) g
> order Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr5-Yr10, gmm(l.exint, lag(1 1)) 
. xtabond2 exint l.exint Capinv Innov ulc WPremium umc lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE B
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.645232   .3980609    -6.65   0.000    -3.425417   -1.865047
        Yr10    -.0504834   .0375841    -1.34   0.179    -.1241468      .02318
         Yr9    -.0836055   .0353997    -2.36   0.018    -.1529876   -.0142234
         Yr8    -.0255946   .0357891    -0.72   0.475      -.09574    .0445508
         Yr7    -.0160235   .0330598    -0.48   0.628    -.0808196    .0487726
         Yr6    -.0483748   .0300889    -1.61   0.108     -.107348    .0105984
         Yr5    -.0516149   .0308975    -1.67   0.095    -.1121729     .008943
        high    -.3502136   .1023701    -3.42   0.001    -.5508554   -.1495718
       mhigh     .0339519   .0646266     0.53   0.599    -.0927139    .1606178
        mlow    -.0016608   .0546714    -0.03   0.976    -.1088148    .1054932
       Agesq    -.0000318    .000015    -2.12   0.034    -.0000613   -2.35e-06
         Age     .0087969   .0022023     3.99   0.000     .0044805    .0131134
       Locef     3.163432   .8962909     3.53   0.000     1.406734     4.92013
       Urbef     .7716353   .3056735     2.52   0.012     .1725262    1.370744
      Border     .0810131   .0615205     1.32   0.188    -.0395649    .2015911
    OPENZONE     .1858727   .0719327     2.58   0.010     .0448872    .3268581
     ENTZONE     .0590186   .0610414     0.97   0.334    -.0606203    .1786575
       lgcit    -.3278597   .0634753    -5.17   0.000     -.452269   -.2034505
         umc    -.5330447   .2319108    -2.30   0.022    -.9875816   -.0785078
    WPremium    -.0581848   .1429306    -0.41   0.684    -.3383236    .2219541
         ulc    -.4448765   .1160856    -3.83   0.000       -.6724    -.217353
       Innov     .1032956   .0828389     1.25   0.212    -.0590656    .2656569
      Capinv     1.47e-06   1.75e-06     0.84   0.402    -1.97e-06    4.91e-06
              
         L1.     .4619197   .0356175    12.97   0.000     .3921107    .5317288
       exint  
                                                                              
       exint        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         7
Wald chi2(23) =    645.52                                      avg =      4.69
Number of instruments = 132                     Obs per group: min =         1
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =      1976
Group variable: ID2                             Number of obs      =      9260
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(17)   =  16.48  Prob > chi2 =  0.490
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(91)   = 103.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.180
> 6 Yr7 Yr8 Yr9 Yr10)
  iv(lgcit ENTZONE OPENZONE Border Urbef Locef Age Agesq mlow mhigh high Yr5 Yr
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   2.81  Prob > chi2 =  0.421
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(105)  = 116.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.202
  gmm(umc, collapse lag(2 3))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =  13.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.280
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(97)   = 106.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.240
  gmm(WPremium, lag(2 2))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =   6.12  Prob > chi2 =  0.525
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(101)  = 113.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.185
  gmm(Capinv, collapse lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(80)   =  83.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.359
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(28)   =  35.69  Prob > chi2 =  0.151
  gmm(ulc Innov, lag(2 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(13)   =  17.79  Prob > chi2 =  0.166
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(95)   = 101.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.296
  gmm(L.exint, lag(1 1))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(28)   =  38.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.094
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(80)   =  81.43  Prob > chi2 =  0.435
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(108)  = 119.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.208
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(108)  = 203.80  Prob > chi2 =  0.000
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.17  Pr > z =  0.863
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z = -11.24  Pr > z =  0.000
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Appendix VI: Supplement to Chapter Six 
 Table A6.1:EU15 market share of Croatian manufacturing industries divided by their 
technological intensity 2001-2007 (in %) 
 2001 2007 
Low-technology intensive industries 0.10 0.09 
Medium low-technology intensive industries 0.06 0.08 
Medium high-technology intensive industries 0.04 0.07 
High-technology intensive industries 0.04 0.10 
Source: Eurostat Comext Database 
Table A6.2: Number of 
observations for dataset in 
Chapter Six 
Year Observations 
2002 86 
2003 89 
2004 89 
2005 88 
2006 89 
2007 88 
 
Table A6.3: Descriptive statistics for dynamic panel system GMM estimation for quality upgrading of 
Croatian export to EU15 market, 2002-2007 (Dep. Variable: ln(Ruev)) 
 Ruev Kl Inne WPremium Lev 
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
2002 1.15 1.21 240 190 4.54 17.26 0.98 0.31 0.04 0.17 
2003 1.14 0.88 261 238 4.27 15.83 0.99 0.29 0.07 0.31 
2004 1.40 1.50 261 200 4.20 15.42 0.99 0.29 0.15 0.94 
2005 1.39 1.68 279 228 4.6 16.40 0.99 0.29 0.06 0.26 
2006 1.10 0.84 307 271 5.32 18.04 1.01 0.31 0.34 2.67 
2007 1.09 0.83 336 378 5.79 18.70 1.00 0.29 0.09 0.52 
 Subs Imp Comp IFT EUMshare 
 Mean Std.Dev Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
2002 70 329 1.04 2.96 1.06 1.48 0.14 0.18 0.001 0.002 
2003 68 302 1.01 2.95 1.02 1.48 0.16 0.19 0.001 0.002 
2004 70 244 1.01 2.76 1.02 1.47 0.16 0.20 0.001 0.003 
2005 68 214 1.02 3.30 1.03 1.48 0.15 0.20 0.001 0.002 
2006 81 213 1.02 3.32 1.02 1.49 0.16 0.21 0.001 0.002 
2007 77 234 0.71 0.91 1.03 1.50 0.17 0.22 0.001 0.002 
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Table A6.4: Correlation among variables used in dynamic panel system GMM estimation for quality 
upgrading of Croatian export to EU15 market 2002-2007 (Dep.variable: ln(Ruev)) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         yr7    -0.2009   1.0000
         yr6     1.0000
                                
                    yr6      yr7
                                 
         yr7     0.0265   0.0189  -0.0122   0.0088  -0.2009  -0.2009  -0.1995
         yr6    -0.0106   0.0094   0.0814   0.0146  -0.2023  -0.2023  -0.2009
         yr5    -0.0202  -0.0108  -0.0246  -0.0076  -0.2009  -0.2009   1.0000
         yr4     0.0371   0.0082   0.0089  -0.0045  -0.2023   1.0000
         yr3    -0.0065   0.0097  -0.0206  -0.0077   1.0000
        Subs     0.2065  -0.0560  -0.0162   1.0000
         Lev    -0.0181  -0.0759   1.0000
         IFT    -0.0425   1.0000
        EUMS     1.0000
                                                                             
                   EUMS      IFT      Lev     Subs      yr3      yr4      yr5
                                                                              
         yr7    -0.0184  -0.0151   0.0914   0.0266   0.0088  -0.0416   0.0005
         yr6    -0.0304   0.0441   0.0649   0.0141   0.0228   0.0087  -0.0027
         yr5     0.0571   0.0877   0.0048  -0.0049  -0.0014   0.0081   0.0006
         yr4     0.0497  -0.0176  -0.0375  -0.0156  -0.0026   0.0064  -0.0028
         yr3    -0.0123  -0.0223  -0.0489  -0.0137  -0.0131   0.0067  -0.0028
        Subs    -0.0741  -0.0760   0.0804   0.0161   0.1016   0.1294   0.0318
         Lev    -0.2020  -0.1951   0.0919  -0.0147  -0.0309  -0.0338  -0.0691
         IFT    -0.0813  -0.0840   0.1237   0.1885   0.2384   0.2199   0.0020
        EUMS     0.2671   0.2489  -0.2779   0.0030  -0.2081  -0.0165  -0.0044
        Comp    -0.0290  -0.0077  -0.0688  -0.0408  -0.0121   0.0752   1.0000
         Imp     0.0855   0.1047   0.2355   0.0584   0.3543   1.0000
    WPremium    -0.1676  -0.1229   0.3670   0.3986   1.0000
        Inne     0.0392   0.0512   0.2797   1.0000
          kl    -0.1813  -0.1438   1.0000
         L1.     0.8112   1.0000
         --.     1.0000
        ruev  
                                                                             
                   ruev     ruev       kl     Inne WPremium      Imp     Comp
                               L.                                             
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Table A6.5: Printout of dynamic panel system GMM estimation for quality upgrading of 
Croatian export to EU15 market 2002-2007 (Dep.variable ln(Ruev)) 
 
 
 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
 
 
> oll) gmm(Inne, lag(2 5)) iv(Imp comp yr3-yr7) twostep robust
>  gmm(l.ruev, lag(1 .) coll) gmm(kl wpremium eumshare IFT Subs Lev, lag(2 4) c
. xtabond2 ruev l.ruev kl Inne wpremium Imp comp eumshare IFT Lev Subs yr3-yr7,
                                                                              
       _cons    -2.435804   .6715224    -3.63   0.000    -3.751964   -1.119644
         yr7     .1009653   .0666955     1.51   0.130    -.0297554     .231686
         yr6     -.030063   .0611177    -0.49   0.623    -.1498515    .0897255
         yr5     .0139618   .0504663     0.28   0.782    -.0849504     .112874
         yr4     .1458695   .0601595     2.42   0.015      .027959    .2637801
         yr3     .0714369   .0589374     1.21   0.225    -.0440783    .1869521
        Subs    -.0000748    .000296    -0.25   0.801    -.0006549    .0005053
         Lev    -.0412872   .0190325    -2.17   0.030    -.0785902   -.0039842
         IFT    -.1990455   .2268125    -0.88   0.380    -.6435898    .2454988
    eumshare    -.1057862   .0761993    -1.39   0.165    -.2551341    .0435617
        comp      .020207   .0335772     0.60   0.547    -.0456031    .0860172
         Imp      .032085   .0140502     2.28   0.022     .0045471    .0596229
    wpremium    -1.862003   .3825103    -4.87   0.000    -2.611709   -1.112297
        Inne     .0074026   .0034279     2.16   0.031     .0006839    .0141212
          kl     .2641292   .1116442     2.37   0.018     .0453105    .4829479
              
         L1.     .6295546   .1090828     5.77   0.000     .4157561     .843353
        ruev  
                                                                              
        ruev        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Corrected
                                                                              
Prob > chi2   =     0.000                                      max =         6
Wald chi2(15) =    422.53                                      avg =      5.81
Number of instruments = 57                      Obs per group: min =         2
Time variable : Year                            Number of groups   =        91
Group variable: NACE                            Number of obs      =       529
                                                                              
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(7)    =   2.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.914
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(34)   =  30.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.622
  iv(Imp comp yr3 yr4 yr5 yr6 yr7)
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(20)   =  13.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.853
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(21)   =  19.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.522
  gmm(Inne, lag(2 5))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(24)   =  17.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.838
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =  16.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.503
  gmm(kl wpremium eumshare IFT Subs Lev, collapse lag(2 4))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   2.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.703
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(36)   =  30.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.725
  gmm(L.ruev, collapse lag(1 .))
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(12)   =   6.20  Prob > chi2 =  0.906
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(29)   =  27.34  Prob > chi2 =  0.553
  GMM instruments for levels
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.)
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(41)   =  33.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.789
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.)
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(41)   =  44.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.310
                                                                              
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.51  Pr > z =  0.609
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -3.19  Pr > z =  0.001
                                                                              
> l.ruev]))
> IFT]/(1-_b[l.ruev])) (lrLev: _b[Lev]/(1-_b[l.ruev])) (lrSubs: _b[Subs]/(1-_b[
> b[comp]/(1-_b[l.ruev])) (lreumshare: _b[eumshare]/(1-_b[l.ruev])) (lrIFT: _b[
> mium: _b[wpremium]/(1-_b[l.ruev])) (lrImp: _b[Imp]/(1-_b[l.ruev])) (lrcomp: _
. nlcom (lrkl: _b[kl]/(1-_b[l.ruev])) (lrInne: _b[Inne]/(1-_b[l.ruev])) (lrwpre
                                                                              
      lrSubs    -.0002019     .00079    -0.26   0.798    -.0017503    .0013465
       lrLev    -.1114528   .0405334    -2.75   0.006    -.1908969   -.0320087
       lrIFT    -.5373139    .655618    -0.82   0.412    -1.822302    .7476738
  lreumshare     -.285565   .2574233    -1.11   0.267    -.7901055    .2189755
      lrcomp     .0545479   .0950547     0.57   0.566    -.1317559    .2408517
       lrImp     .0866119   .0367806     2.35   0.019     .0145233    .1587006
  lrwpremium    -5.026389   1.482952    -3.39   0.001    -7.932922   -2.119857
      lrInne     .0199829   .0086407     2.31   0.021     .0030474    .0369183
        lrkl     .7130043   .3231574     2.21   0.027     .0796275    1.346381
                                                                              
        ruev        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
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 Table A6.6: Comparison of coefficients on lagged dependent variable obtained with 
OLS, dynamic panel system GMM and fixed effects estimation techniques 
 Coef. Std.Error z P>|z| 
Specification 1  
Fixed Effects (FE) 0.18 0.07 2.69 0.008 
System GMM 0.63 0.11 5.77 0.000 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 0.74 0.04 18.72 0.000 
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